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GEOGRAPHICAL-POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE TRANSBORDER CONSERVATION OF NATURAL AND CULTURAL HERITAGE

Borderlands and contemporary changes
of the politics in border regions

REGION AND REGIONALISM
No. 12 vol. 1

edited by Marek Sobczyński and Andrzej Rykała

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PAŃSTWOWY INSTYTUT NAUKOWY – INSTYTUT ŚLĄSKI W OPOLU

In memory of prof. Mariusz Kulesza,
Head of the Department of Political Geography
and Regional Studies, University of Lodz,
who died prematurely on August 6, 2014
– a wonderful, unforgettable colleague
and author of numerous articles published
in various volumes of Region and Regionalism

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FOREWORD

Poland's accession to the Schengen Agreement, along with eight other countries, mainly from Central Europe, resulted in the abolition of controls at national borders on December 21, 2007 and gave a new impulse to widespread transborder cooperation, both on state and region level. New possibilities for transborder protection of natural and cultural heritage also emerged.

Up until now, international environmental and cultural protection has been tackled in literature mostly on state and institutional level. The activities of international institutions specialising in protecting the natural and cultural heritage have been analysed especially closely. The topic has been much less frequently discussed in the context of bilateral activities between specific neighbouring countries and only sporadically as part of joint research and discussions by scientists from such countries. This volume aims to fill these gaps.

Particular emphasis has been placed on the issues of protection of cultural heritage in the context of cross-border cooperation, which is reflected in the collective title of the two volumes of Region and Regionalism No. 12 – *Geographical-political aspects of the transborder conservation of natural and cultural heritage.* The issue of conservation of cultural heritage was the object of research interests of prof. Mariusz Kulesza, who died prematurely on August 6, 2014, Head of the Department of Political Geography and Regional Studies, University of Lodz, the author of numerous articles published in various volumes of Region and Regionalism, whose memory this volume is dedicated to. To commemorate him and his research achievements, this volume opens with a short scientific biography of prof. Mariusz Kulesza, penned by Marek Sobczyński.

Volume 1 of Region and Regionalism No. 12, edited by Marek Sobczyński and Andrzej Rykała, is devoted to *Borderlands and contemporary changes of the politics in border regions.* The papers collected in this volume have been grouped into three thematic chapters.

The first chapter of this volume discusses the problem of *Integration vs peripherality – changes in border regions*. It opens with a paper by Andrea Uszkai from the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in Pécs (Hungary) entitled *Social and economic relationships in the history of the Central-European region.* The author focuses on the area of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, once referred to as Centrope, which was characterised by highly dynamic economy linked to the central hub of Vienna. Today, this space is a cross-border urban area, and its role in the global and regional economic dimension is steadily growing.

In the next article, entitled *Western Balkans and the European Union enlargement process*, Boštjan Rogelj from the University of Ljubljana (Slovenia) discusses the European Union's policy with regard to enlargement of this organisation in the Western Balkans in the context of global aspirations of the Union. The author argues that integration policy is linked to a broader context of global trends and in that it should be considered as such. The very timely question of European security is also not insignificant.

Next article by Tomasz Wiskulski from the University of Gdańsk (Poland) entitled *Integration of the Southern Dalmatia. The case study of the Herzegovina-Neretva canton* also refers to the Balkans and discusses the historical integration of the contiguous Dalmatian area inhabited by Croats on both sides of the Croatian-Bosnian border. The situation in this region has changed after the accession of Croatia to the EU, while Bosnia and Herzegovina remains outside this organisation.

The second chapter of this volume is entitled *Contemporary changes in border regions – new challenges for political geography.* It begins with an article by Roman Szul from the University of Warsaw (Poland) discussing *Border language politics and international politics*. Border language politics is construed as the situation and politics of language in borderland areas. The author discusses the subjective and objective factors such as: the issue of the spread of languages in the borderlands, self-definition of ethno-linguistic groups and their identification, ethnic and linguistic policies of state and regional authorities in relation to the population of borderlands, as well as cross-border relations between countries in the same aspect.

The paper by Ryszard Żelichowski from the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw (Poland) entitled *Language borders in the heart of the European Union: the case of Belgium* discusses the complex issue of language policy of the government of Belgium and its regions, including its capital, in historical perspective, showing the complexity of the issues and historical entanglement, which strongly affect the current political situation of Belgian federal monarchy and its language policy.

Alessandro Vitale from the University of Milan (Italy) devotes his paper, *Borders, ethno-national tensions, and minorities. The case of the border between the Baltic states and Russia* to the specific situation in the Baltic Sea region, where political borders established unilaterally by the Soviet authorities differently than during the first independence of the Baltic states, as well as a targeted policy of Russification by mass migration of Russian-speaking population have created a situation where political boundaries do not coincide with ethno-linguistic ones. The Russian minority in these Baltic states pose great social and political problems, and has become a threat to their existence in the current political situation in Eastern Europe. A. Vitale suggests that the creation of Euroregions in this space could alleviate existing tensions.

The next paper in this part was written by a Hungarian team of Tamás Hardi from Széchenyi István University of Győr, and Andrea Miklósné Zakar from Tomori Pal College in Kalocsa and discusses *Changes in regional approach in Romania – some results of a mental map research.* Studies using mental maps in Europe are used quite often. After joining the EU, Romania faced challenges in terms of its regional policy and regionalisation of the country. The study is the result of extensive research carried out under the project *The analysis of politico--geographic space structures in the Carpathian Basin – system changes, possible co-operations, incongruities at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries*. The paper presents the consequences for Romania of geopolitical changes that have occurred in the region through their perceptions by the respondents illustrated by an analysis of mental maps.

The paper by Romanian author Delia Bar-Kołelis and Łukasz Dopierała from the University of Gdańsk (Poland) entitled *The impact of political relations on cross-borders shopping tourism. A case study from Poland* discusses, based on authors' own research, the phenomenon of commercial tourism across the Polish border with Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, while analysing its impact on the development of borderlands and the directions of such trips.

The second part of the first volume of the publication closes with a paper from Slovenian geographer Jernej Zupančič from the University of Ljubljana – *Disputed and transformed: recent changes in the Slovenian-Croatian border landscape*, in which the author returns to the subject of unresolved border issues between the two countries, which have recently become an obstacle for Croatia's membership in the EU, and examines already implemented and planned ways to solve these problems.

The third part of volume 1 of Region and Regionalism No. 12 is entitled *Heritage of borders and borderlands in globalised world.*

In his article *On the nature of borders in the context of Józef Tischner's philosophy*, Jan Kłos from the Catholic University in Lublin (Poland) refers to the limits of human awareness of the identity, referring to the locality of the village Łopuszna, where Father Tischner was born and where he lived at the end of his life. He also writes about the limits of the values and ethos of community and tolerance as understood by Tischner, as well as the landscape and its personalisation. Despite the philosophical nature of this work, it fits well with the theme of heritage in the borderlands by showing the heritage of thought shaped in the borderlands, as well as the borderland and borders of humanity.

The third chapter of volume 1 ends with four papers by authors from the University of Lodz (Poland). In their paper, *Polish heritage in the multicultural borderland – the case of Vilnius Region* Katarzyna Leśniewska and Marek Barwiński use their own research to discuss the complex ethnic, social and political situation of the Vilnius region in the context of Polish and Lithuanian politics and their membership in the EU. In his paper, *The formation of political boundary in Karkonosze Mountains*, Marek Sobczyński discusses the historical process of formation of political boundaries on the Karkonosze mountains section of Sudetes border, currently serving as a Polish-Czech border sharply separating the two ethnic groups, at the same losing its barrier function due to both countries' membership in the EU and the Schengen Agreement. Tomasz Figlus' article *The cultural heritage of rural settlement of Polish Orava* analyses another multicultural borderland in Poland, this time at the verge of Slovak ethnos, and the specific morphological forms of villages in the Polish part of the region.

The volume closes with Łukasz Musiaka's paper entitled *Medieval heritage of small towns in the State of the Teutonic Order in the register of monuments*. The author discusses another historical borderland, originally inhabited by Balts, then under the influence of Germanic civilisation, which became Polish dominion, only to again become Polish borderland in the Second Polish Republic.

The papers from Hungarian, Polish, Romanian, Slovenian and Italian authors collected in volume 1 of Region and Regionalism No. 12 show a wide spectrum of European research in cross-border cooperation in its various aspects, including the timely issue of environmental protection and the equally important by overshadowed issue of the protection of cultural heritage, which was one of the central interests of the late prof. Mariusz Kulesza.

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PRO MEMORIA

Mariusz Kulesza
(1950–2014)

On August 6, 2014 the geographic community in Łódź suffered a great loss. At the age of just 64 years, prof. dr hab. Mariusz Eugeniusz Kulesza died a sudden and premature death. He was the head of the Department of Political Geography and Regional Studies at the Faculty of Geographic Sciences of the University of Łódź, as well as the founder and long-time head of the Sub--Department of Historical Geography and Cultural Heritage at the Department.

Mariusz Kulesza was born in Łódź on September 16, 1950 as a twin (along with brother Andrzej) to parents Wacław Kulesza and Genowefa Brzozowska. His education took place in his home town, from primary school through the Adam Mickiewicz Nineteenth High School, where he earned his high school

diploma, to his studies at the Faculty of History at the University of Łódź – the school he was destined to spend his life at. During his studies he was active in the student scientific movement, where his future interests in historical geography of urban settlement, history of settlement and spatial transformations in late medieval and modern times in Poland became apparent. These interests, however, could only be realised within the framework of the Scientific Society of Historians of the University Lodz, due to the profile of historical studies in Łódź at the time. In 1976, Mariusz Kulesza gained his master's degree in history based on his thesis entitles *Hotel and gastronomic venues in the eighteenth-century Polish cities*, supervised by prof. dr hab. Bohdan Baranowski, and reviewed by prof. dr hab. Zbigniew Kuchowicz.

Since 1976, Mariusz Kulesza worked at the City Museum in Łódź (in the famous Izrael Poznański Palace), starting as an assistant, through head of a department, to become the deputy director of the museum in 1980, serving until 1989.

During his tenure at the museum, Mariusz Kulesza was finally able to develop his interest in historical geography, as well as publish in the museum's publications and perform research in towns all over the region. At the same time, he undertook doctoral studies in history, which resulted in a dissertation entitled *The history of Zgierz before 1864*, written under the supervision of prof. dr hab. Bohdan Baranowski. It was reviewed by prof. dr hab. Stanisław Marian Zajączkowski (UŁ), prof. dr hab. Wiesław Puś (UŁ) and prof. dr hab. Jan Fijałek (Medical University of Łódź). Based of this work, he received a PhD in history from the University of Łódź.

His research achievements in historical geography made prof. dr hab. Marek Koter, the head of the Department of Political and Regional Economic Geography at the time, propose that dr Mariusz Kulesza become a lecturer at his department.

It was here that Mariusz Kulesza could fully develop his interest in urban historical geography, especially in morphology and morphogenesis of cities. In 2001, he published a book entitled *Morphogenesis of cities in Central Poland before the partitions. The former Łęczyca and Sieradz provinces*, which was the basis for his postdoctoral defence conducted on September 28, 2001 before the Council of the Faculty of Biology and Earth Sciences, University of Łódź, and earned a postdoctoral degree in geography, specialised in historical geography. Examiners included: prof. dr hab. Jan Rajman of the Pedagogical University of Cracow, prof. dr hab. Stanisław Liszewski of the University of Łódź and dr hab. Barbara Miszewska, prof. of the University of Wrocław. The Central Committee for Academic Titles and Degrees approved the Faculty's decision on February 25, 2002.

After completing his scientific advancements, the time was right to make his interest in historical geography institutional. Owing to the stellar development of academic staff under the guidance of prof. dr hab. Marek Koter, the personnel of the Department of Political Geography and Regional Studies, University of Łódź allowed for its internal division, resulting in the appointment of dr hab. Mariusz Kulesza in December 2002 as the head of the Sub-Department of Historical Geography and Cultural Heritage at the Department. In May 2004, he was appointed associate professor, University of Łódź. Between 2003 and 2010, Mariusz Kulesza also worked as a professor at the Higher School of Business in Piotrków Trybunalski.

The last step in the professional career of Mariusz Kulesza was the professor's degree in Earth sciences awarded by President Bronisław Komorowski on October 30, 2012 based on his achievements and a monograph published in 2011 and entitled *Morphogenesis and layout of medieval towns in Poland*.

From October 1, 2012, prof. dr hab. Mariusz Kulesza took the chair of the Department of Political Geography and Regional Studies at the Faculty of Geographical Sciences, University of Łódź, which he held until the end of his life, along with the chair of the Sub-Department he founded.

In the course of nearly four decades of scientific development, prof. Mariusz Kulesza went the way from Polish history in the 18th century to historical geography. His first scientific studies published while working at the museum, discussed the history of cities in Łódź region: Pabianice, Zgierz, Głowno and, most of all, his hometown of Łódź. He mainly tackled the spatial development of cities, their history and the influence of social, political, economic, cultural processes on their development. His doctoral thesis *The history of Zgierz before 1864* was interdisciplinary, between political and economic history, and historical geography. Large parts of it were published in the mid-1990s in a monograph about Zgierz (edited by R. Rosin). The lasting scientific legacy of the doctoral dissertation lies in the analysis of spatial development of Zgierz from pre-incorporation times to the 1860s. In it, Mariusz Kulesza proved that the old spatial structures, visible in the 1980s maps of Zgierz, are very persistent. The variations in the physiognomy of preserved buildings and the morphology of settlement plots and land usage in the city also proved significant. The turbulent history and functioning of Zgierz under different political and socio-economic systems left traces in the cultural landscape of the city.

In Mariusz Kulesza's later scientific career, concentrated interest in morphology and morphogenesis of medieval cities in the former Łęczyca and Sieradz provinces appeared, resulting in his postdoctoral thesis. It proved that these cities have developed from early medieval pre-incorporation spatial structures or as a result of the transformations of villages, and the remains of the original system

were still visible in small and medium-sized centres, which had not undergone massive transformations during the 19th and 20th centuries. Kulesza also determined Silesia's influence on the initial planning of cities in the region, which he explained by the probable use of the 13th and 14th-century Silesian measuring pattern.

Subsequent research by Mariusz Kulesza extended his area of interest into Pomerania and Silesia, which resulted in his professorial monograph, the first and still one of few historical analyses of morphology and planning of medieval cities in modern Poland. He made a significant contribution to the recognition of the genesis and development of small cities in historical, social, economic and, above all, spatial contexts not only in Central Poland, but in the whole country.

The third important trend prof. Kulesza's scientific development is the cultural heritage, mostly in Łódź and the region. In several important publications devoted to this issue, he raises the issue of the role of national and religious minorities in shaping the contemporary cultural landscape of Łódź and other cities in Central Poland. Some of these works, completed under grants from the Mayor of Łódź, were the first publications more widely analysing Łódź as a multicultural urban society, with special attention paid to the material traces of their heritage.

Prof. Kulesza's interest in the spatial development changes and the changing function of Polish cities following the 1989 transformation, especially districts of Łódź such as Bałuty, Ruda Pabianicka, former Litzmannstadt Ghetto and the postindustrial areas, is slightly less prominent in his research. He also marginally worked on the issues of territorial division of Poland in historical geography and the national and religious minorities in Poland.

Prof. Mariusz Kulesza's sudden death interrupted the works on publications much needed by Polish historical geography, such as a dictionary and monograph of Polish historical geography, a handbook on historical geography of Łódź, as well as the conceptualisation of terminology, including the notion of historical region.

The total scientific output of prof. Mariusz Kulesza is over 140 publications (including some in English, Hungarian and German), including 11 books authored and edited by him.

Mariusz Kulesza took several scientific scholarships, including from the Portuguese government in Lisbon (1981, 1984) in cultural heritage and conservation, as well as at the French Institute of Urban Planning at the University of Paris 8 in Champs sur Marne near Paris (1994–1995). He participated in approx. 50 conferences, mostly as a speaker, including 28 international ones in Bari, Cincinnati, Florence, Glasgow, Ljubljana, Ouro Preto, Prague, Prešov, Stockholm and Vilnius. He also was the organiser of several of them. His

inspiration lead to the rebirth of historical geography conferences in Poland, held since the 1960s.

Over 23 years of academic work at the University of Łódź, prof. Mariusz Kulesza taught 37 courses, classes and, above all, field classes, graduate and postgraduate seminars. He lectured not only at the faculty of geography, but also land management, regional studies, tourism and recreation. He supervised more than a hundred masters in geography, and five postgraduates. He was an examiner in postdoctoral and postgraduate procedures. He created the concept for the postgraduate specialisation programme in historical geography, and co-created the curriculum in regional studies. He also worked on curricula for the college of European and regional studies, which he chaired, as well as the curriculum in the cultural heritage of Łódź and the region for school and preschool teachers.

Professor Mariusz Kulesza had a unique ability to convey his vast knowledge to students and school pupils, which won their appreciation and affinity, and made his lectures their first choice. His teaching skills meant that he was repeatedly chosen by the students as one of the best lecturers. As a tutor for his younger colleagues and students, he was always valued and liked for is kindness, understanding and warmth.

In the course of his work, Mariusz Kulesza held many responsible and important positions, such as the already mentioned deputy director of the City History Museum in Łódź. After coming to the University of Łódź, he served four terms, until his death, as the chairman of the Faculty Election Committee. He participated in the faculty enrolment committee several times, including as its deputy chairman. He was also a member of the admissions committee for doctoral studies.

He has served in several editorial boards. He was a member of the editorial board, deputy editor and most recently the editor of *Folia Geographica Socio-Oeconomica*. As the historical geography editor, he was part of the editorial staff of *Studia z Geografii Politycznej i Historycznej* published since 2012. Since 2013, He was a member of the Scientific Council of *Rocznik Historyczno-Geograficzny. Studia GeoHistorica*.

As part of his work outside of the university, between 2007 and 2010 he was a member of the Task Force for Development Urban and Metropolitan Areas at the Committee for Spatial Economy and Regional Planning of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Since 2001, he participated in the Committee on Historical Sciences of the Academy. He was also the founding member of the Committee of Political and Historical Geography at the Polish Geographical Society and was scheduled to work on its founding during a conference in Łopuszna (which took place a week after his death). Internationally, he was

active mostly in ISUF (International Seminar on Urban Form), he participated in several conferences of the organisation and published in its journal *Urban Morphology*.

Prof. Mariusz Kulesza received multiple individual and collective awards of all levels for his scientific and teaching achievements by the Rector of the University of Łódź, the Dean of the Faculty of Geographic Sciences.

Professor Mariusz Kulesza left behind two sons. Both combine scientific passion with practice, older Adam in law, while younger Piotr – in history. His most beloved pastimes included tourism and music, especially the works of his favourite Rolling Stones, of which he was not only a fan, but an expert.

Prof. dr hab. Mariusz Kulesza was a renowned scientist with vast and universally valued body of work, a great teacher and tutor, efficient organiser of science, as well as its promoter. His sudden death is a painful loss for the geographic community in Łódź, but also for the whole city, which he devoted much of his work to. Polish historical geography has lost one of its key personalities, a scholar who reinvigorated it after dozens of years of stagnation to rise again among geographic sciences in Poland.

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Section I

INTEGRATION VS PERIPHERALITY – CHANGES IN BORDER REGIONS

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REGION and REGIONALISM
No. 12

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS IN THE HISTORY OF THE CENTRAL--EUROPEAN REGION*

1. INTRODUCTION

The main objective of this paper is to overview the history of more borderlands in the core region of Central Europe. This topic is obviously a very wide one, therefore some restrictions need to be applied. The focus is on those 20th century historical events, which could determine the current situation in social and economic relationships between the several border regions in Central Europe.

The paper highlights the most typical features of the given border regions in the past and today. It is not an attempt at deep analysis, as its aim is to overview the 20th-century history of the borders in question and investigate the social and economic processes, including those factors which describe the cross-border interactions and relationships.

The first part highlights the difficulty in delineation of 'Central Europe' and discusses two different approaches to doing this. The first one is based on an empirical research; the second one comes from a concept of a European cross-border project. The second part summarises the main characteristics of several historical and present-day relationships at the borders of the Centrope region, with a special regard to the everyday movements, such as cross-border commuting and other labour market processes.

* Research was supported by OTKA (National Scientific Research Found), (ID: K 104801, project leader: Tamás Hardi).

2. THE MEANINGS OF 'CENTRAL EUROPE'

The Central and Eastern European countries have had a long common history. At the dawn of the First World War, the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy occupied contemporary Austria, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as present-day Czech and Slovak Republic, Vojvodina, Transylvania, Trentino--Alto Adige, and parts of contemporary Southern Poland and Western Ukraine. In contrast to the Western European countries, it was a multi-ethnic state formation, in which people of different ethnic descent (Germans, Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Croats, Serbs, Bosnians, Romanians, Poles, Ruthenians, Slovenes and Italians) lived together (Jennissen 2011). However, after this empire split into a number of different countries in 1918, this coexistence determined the historical and economic development processes in these states for a long time.

As we know, there are numerous approaches to the interpretation of the term 'Central Europe'. A detailed description of the several Central European definitions is not the objective of this study. Nevertheless, I would like to mention one of our research projects, in which – among others – we are looking for an answer to how the university students define several geographical categories in the Carpathian Basin. One of our important results is the interpretation and division of 'Central Europe'. Based on our questionnaire surveys[1], two main directions can be identified. The first one is a Central Europe with centres on Austria and Germany. Such view is characteristic mainly among Austrian responders. The other approach imagines Slovakia, Czech Republic and Poland as 'Central Europe'. This latter notion is specific to Slovakian responders. For the sake of the paper, these Austrian and Slovakian answers are the most rel-evant. The Austrian responders[2] come from the universities of Eisenstadt and Linz and the Slovakian[3] one from Košice, Trenčin and Bratislava. More than 90% of Austrian responders perceive their own country and Germany as belong-ing to Central Europe. The other countries are less noted. In contrast, more than 90% of Slovakian responders think that Czech Republic and Slovakia for Central Europe, but Poland, Austria and Hungary also were noted in high rates. Figure 1 represents the responses of these two nations.

Moreover, Central Europe can be interpreted and delineated from other point of view as well. Another concept of Central Europe is the so called 'Centrope',

[1] Total sample size: 826 university students from the following countries: Austria, Slovakia, Romania, Serbia, Croatia.

[2] Total 112 responders.

[3] Total 194 responders.

which has been created 10 years ago, and is one of the most important formal frameworks for the cooperation in the Central-European region. It is currently functioning in several regions, including Vienna and other Austrian provinces such as Lower Austria and Burgenland, the region of South-Moravia in the Czech Republic, the region of Bratislava and Trnava in Slovakia, Győr-Moson--Sopron and Vas counties in Hungary, and the cities of Eisenstadt, St. Pölten, Brno, Bratislava and Trnava (Fig. 2).



Fig. 1. Which countries belong to Central Europe?
Source: OTKA research program, 2014

Fig. 2. Centrope partner regions and cities
Source: Regional Development Report 2010 Returning to Growth

The Centrope concept is especially important, as this paper focuses on this region, which can be defined as a cross-border functional urban area with the centre in the Austrian capital, Vienna. The Centrope region was established and defined through the Declaration of Kittsee in September 2003. This declaration was signed by governors and committee presidents of the above mentioned countries, provinces, regions and cities. (Schwiezer-Koch 2013) Today, it may be called one of Europe's most dynamic and interesting economic areas: almost all partner regions are among the economic driving forces of their respective countries and boast above-average performance indicators. Roughly six and a half million people live in the eight federal provinces, regions and countries that make up the Central-European region. Two capitals, Bratislava and Vienna, are situated at a distance of around 60 kilometres from each other, while Brno and Győr are additional cities of supra-regional importance. It also includes numerous other towns that are the driving forces of an economically and culturally expanding European region (centrope.com 2014).

3. RELATIONSHIPS AT THE BORDERS OF THE CENTROPE COUNTRIES

The Centrope region, where four countries and four languages meet, has 5 borderlines, namely Austrian-Hungarian, Austrian-Slovak, Austrian-Czech, Hungarian-Slovak and Czech-Slovak. This fact makes the analysis more exciting. The aim of this section is to explore the historical and political events that formed the present economic and social relations among the partner regions and countries of Centrope. The paper tries to summarise the most relevant historical events and omits the ones which are not important for these relations.

3.1. Austrian-Hungarian border region

The border between Austria and Hungary is 366 km long and begins on the river Danube. The border has a mostly north-south orientation, but includes a significant westward deviation around the village of Tárnokréti (Hungary), creating a portion of Hungarian territory protruding into Austrian land. The border comes to an end near the village of Felsőszölnök at the Austria-Hungary--Slovenia tripoint (Mission Opérationnelle Transfrontalière, 2014c) (Fig. 3.)

Firstly, let us present the main historical events that determined the Austrian--Hungarian cross-border relationships. It is worth mentioning the so called ‘gate

function' of this border region, as different borderlines (countries and empires) ran at this territory from ancient times, such as the border of the Roman Empire, Eastern border of Charles the Great's Empire, Western border of the Hungarian Kingdom, and others (Rechnitzer 1999).

Fig. 3. Austrian-Hungarian borderline
Source: edited by the author

There were no significant border debates between the Hungarian Kingdom and the neighbouring Austria until the end of the First World War. The border ran along natural lines, the Leitha river in the north, the Rosalie Mountain in the middle and along the Lappincs river in the south (Molnár 2010). At that time, the Hungarian border was the Western border of the current Burgenland. Its importance decreased significantly during the dualistic Austria-Hungary (Hardi 1999). The creation of the current border is due to the Trianon Treaty, signed on June 4, 1920[4].

Between the First and the Second World Wars, the borders were easily crossed, but direct trade and currency exchange were limited, while employment was subject to authorisation, therefore the attractiveness of Vienna in the

[4] The detailed overview of the circumstances of the Trianon Treaty is not subject of this paper.

Hungarian area has waned, but the knowledge about the parts of neighbouring country remained, owing to familiar relations and friendships (Rechnitzer 1999). Between 1945 and 1948, the population of the border zone could cross the border relatively easy from both sides (Molnár 2010). This situation has changed in 1949, when the so called 'Iron Curtain' emerged along the Eastern borders of Austria. The crossing points were eliminated and the border was transformed into a 'dead frontier'. Basically, all contacts between the populations on both sides of the border ceased (Rechnitzer 1999). However, the possibility of travel to Western countries was became gradually easier starting in the early 1960s, while the frontier zone remained tightly guarded until 1989 (Molnár 2010). After 1989, the situation of the region changed again due to the political transformations in Hungary. The borders were opened and the crossings were more and more significant, with shopping tourism flourishing to an especially high extent. The cross-border relationships have become stronger and diverse (employment, ownership, tourism, use of services etc.). After the EU accession of Austria (1995), the country turned westward and paid more attention to the Western integration, so the economic and political importance of the Austrian-Hungarian border region temporarily decreased (Rechnitzer 1999). Despite this political phenomenon, the connections have become more intense, with estimated 10–15 thousands commuters from Hungary coming to Austria at the end of the 1990s (Hardi 2005.)

Based on the HV/WIFO-INDIV data, the first cross-border commuters got around €1000 basic wage (without supplementary allowances and gratuities), which increased to €1200–1500 to the year of 2008. This amount has likely continued to rise since then.

In the last decade, the population growth of Vienna became more dynamic – especially owing for the foreign immigrants. The proportion of foreign babies steadily increases, which has an impact on the labour market as well: 30 out of 100 new-borns were not Austrian in 2012. This proportion in Burgenland is 9, in Lower-Austria 11 and in Styria 12. Foreigners comprise 11% of the total population of Austria. The number of foreigners is growing in Burgenland as well, though it still has the lowest rate compared to the national average. Since 2001, the population of the province has expanded by five thousands of non-Austrian citizens. Hungarians, Germans, Romanians, and Slovaks are the most prominent among foreigners.

Hungarians in Burgenland mostly work in agriculture and forestry (63% in 2011). It is not surprising, since this sector is dominant in this province. Therefore, the rate of unemployment shows higher seasonality than the national average. One third (30.4%) of the workers in catering and gastronomy are

Hungarians. As for geographical location of foreigner employees, Neusiedl am See district has emerged from the other districts of Burgenland in the last 20 years. Here, the rate of foreign employees exceeds 30%. Burgenland province as a whole can be observed as a north-south slope: the more developed northern part of Burgenland where the service sector dominates provides more job opportunities for foreigners. Hungarian employees also find the northern Burgenland region (Eisenstadt, Mattersburg, Neusiedler am See) to be the most attractive (Pogátsa 2014).

According to an estimate of the qualification of commuters between 1998 and 2008, the employees commuting to Burgenland mostly have basic qualifications, while the commuters with secondary and higher education degrees are underrepresented. In commuting, transport connections plays a significant role. Connections are excellent in the northern part of region, but it is still difficult to get from Vas country to northern Burgenland in a reasonable time (Pogátsa 2014).

As part of a cross-border cooperation project named EMAH[5], travel surveys were carried out to capture the actual traffic and the information about the travellers crossing the border occasionally or regularly. Several surveys on railway and road traffic over the regional border crossing points were carried out; the outcomes present a detailed picture of commuting and travel behaviours in the border region. The main findings are summarised below.

As for *railway* passenger traffic on the, surveys were carried out twice in the border-crossing trains; one was in the spring and the other was in the summer of 2013. In total, more than 30,000 passengers on the five cross-border railway lines[6] were sampled to analyse the passenger traffic. The results of the survey show that the train lines play an important role in the regional transport in both countries: approximately 35 to 40% of the passengers crossing the Austrian-Hungarian border travel by train. The main destinations are Sopron, Győr and Mosonmagyaróvár in Hungary, and Vienna, Wiener Neustadt, Neusiedl am See and Graz in Austria. Other important destinations include Parndorf and Mattersburg in Austria. The passenger traffic flows are relatively large during the

[5] The project 'Eco-mobility in the Austro-Hungarian border region' (EMAH) is funded as part of the cross-border cooperation programme Austria-Hungary 2007–2013 by the European Regional Development Fund, by the Austrian Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management, by Burgenland, and by Hungary.

[6] Railway Line 524: Deutschkreutz – Sopron – Wiener Neustadt – Vienna, Railway line 512: Deutschkreutz – Sopron – Ebenfurth, Railway line 700: Győr – Hegyeshalom – Bruck an der Leitha – Vienna, Railway line 530: Szentgotthárd – Fehring – Feldbach – Graz, Railway line 731: Fertőszentmiklós – Pamhagen – Neusiedl am See.

morning and evening hours, especially the passenger traffic from Hungary to Austria in the morning and from Austria to Hungary in the evening. This implies a large number of commuters from Hungary to Austria. In total, 3,000 passengers were asked about their destinations and purpose. This corresponds to about 10% of the total passengers or, if we only consider the passengers crossing the border, to about 20%. The analysis shows various aspects and differences of the commuting behaviour: travelling to the educational facilities drastically decreases in the summer (by 19%), while tourism increases strongly (by 15%) compared to the spring questionnaire. As for the reason for choosing the train, majority of the respondents quoted favourable travel cost as the main reason, while a portion of the respondents who changed from cars to the train for environmental reasons is marginal.

During the three-day *road traffic* survey in October 2013, 79,554 vehicles crossing the seven border points between Austria and Hungary were counted. Among them, 59.5% had Hungarian number plates while 32.1% were Austrian. Most of them were passenger vehicles (88%), followed by small trucks (5.5%). 2,625 people or 13% of the vehicles counted during the survey were surveyed in detail with questionnaires. 60% of the surveyed drivers travelled alone. 75% of vehicles with more than one person were travelling to a destination common for all passengers. Most of the cross-border travellers make the trips both ways on the same day. On weekdays, the percentage of the commuters is 80%, and this group crosses the border many times in a week. Majority of the commuters crossing the border typically work for the manufacturing or service sector (Eco--mobility in the Austro-Hungarian... 2014).

A relatively new migration trend within Hungary has also been observed, namely people moving from the less developed eastern regions of Hungary to the border area in search of better employment. A significant proportion of the jobs are temporary or seasonal. The increased Austrian employment opportunities and the considerable differences in the wage level brought about a shortage of well-trained labour in certain sectors within Hungary (e.g. in tourism-related services, construction or engineering) and put a constant upward pressure on the wage level in Hungary. Employment of Austrians in the Hungarian counties is practically negligible (Cross-border Cooperation Austria-Hungary 2014–2020 Regional Analysis and SWOT 2013).

3.2. Hungarian-Slovak border region

The length of the Slovakian-Hungarian border, which bisects a varied natural and social environment, is 679 km (Hardi 2009a) (Fig. 4). First of all, we have to mention that the Slovak-Hungarian border region is situated in an area which belonged to single state formations until the end of the First World War: the Kingdom of Hungary and the Austro–Hungarian Monarchy (Hardi, Csizmadia, Lampl et al. 2008).

Fig. 4. Hungarian-Slovak borderline
Source: edited by author

After the First World War, with the separation from the Kingdom of Hungary, a virtual, symbolic region was set up in Southern Slovakia (Mannová, 2009). This state border was created by the peace treaty at the end of the First World War and did not follow the ethnic border. In 1920, the border between Czechoslovakia and Hungary was designated mainly on the basis of military--strategic, transport, and economic conditions. It ran through seven former Hungarian counties, often severing family ties. In 1938, the border was pushed northwards by the Munich Treaty, and this situation remained until the end of the Second World War, when the ceasefire restored the situation existing before 1938 (Hardi, Csizmadia and Lampl et al. 2008).

As far as the ethnic composition of population are concerned, Hungarians became the largest minority ethnic group in the 1980s. In 1984, approximately 590,000 Hungarians (concentrated in southern Slovakia) made up 11 percent of Slovakia's population[7]. In the 2001 census, more than 520,000 citizens declared themselves 'Magyars' (9.7% of all the inhabitants of Slovakia). They live in relative concentration in Southern Slovakia (Mannová 2009) (Fig. 5).



Fig. 5. Location of the Hungarians in Slovakia
a) Slovakia and its administrative units showing the areas inhabited by Magyars; Deeper grey represents settlements with more than 9.7 % of Magyars (9.7% was a statewide average in 2001); b) declared ethnicity in settlements of Southern Slovakia (1930); c) declared ethnicity in settlements of Southern Slovakia (2001)
Source: E. Mannová (2009)

[7] Data as of August 1987, http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-3686.html.

If explore the ethnic processes of the last 10 years, we can see that the proportion of the Hungarian population have decreased in the Southern Slovakian regions. Based on data from the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic for 2001, 4.56% of the total population of the Bratislava region, 23.74% of the Trnava region and 27.52% of the Nitra region were Hungarian. By 2011, these proportions became 3.97%, 21.73% and 24.54%, respectively. Moreover, it is worth noting that the Slovak population in the South-western Slovak regions also decreased in this period, while other nationalities grew.

In this region, the cross-border employment and shopping were already usual activities during the socialism (Jagodič 2010). The two states, Czechoslovakia and Hungary have signed an international convention of bilateral employment in 1985. In this era, the commuting was dominant in both directions.

Opposite Mosonmagyaróvár there is Bratislava, which went through significant economic-and industrial development in the 1980s. Thus, many employees went across the border to work in plants in Bratislava from Mosonmagyaróvár and its surroundings. Employees from the other side of the border mostly worked in the textile industry in Győr or in the alumina plant in Almásfüzitő in 1980s, but other factories also gave jobs for domestic and foreign employees. Because of the economic recession of the transition period, the cross-border employment temporarily discontinued. After the stagnation, the number of commuters from Slovakia to Hungary started rapidly increasing since 1999. In the western part of the Slovakian part of the border region, the unemployment rate is higher than on the Hungarian side, as large industrial centres can be found near the border (Győr-Komárom-Almásfüzitő, Esztergom-Dorog-axis, Tatabánya, etc.), which have exhausted the local workforce capacity. Since 1999, the development of commuting was supported by a Framework Agreement between the two countries, with conditions becoming so lenient that any barriers practically ceased to exist. Therefore, May 2004 has not changed the labour market significantly. In 2005, the number of the Slovak citizens working in Hungary has been estimated at around 30 thousand. Since the EU accession, very strong economic development can be observed in Slovakia, with obvious effects on its labour market. The number of commuters is probably decreasing in the western border section as well, but it should stabilise at a healthy level. However, a process in the opposite direction has also started. The Slovak companies attract domestic workers across the border, especially looking for skilled workers. A new tendency can also be observed. At the less-developed eastern part of the border region, Slovak entrepreneurs are looking for employees from Hungary. Demand for skilled labour is also dominant in this case. All in all, the economic development creates interesting movements (Hardi and Lampl 2008.)

Besides cross-border employment, last years have also seen a tendency of a significant number of Slovak citizens settling down in Hungarian settlements near Bratislava. Their lifestyle is primarily connected to Slovakia, so cross--border travelling is a daily occurence (Prileszky 2010). Based on the data (March, 2010) of the Land Office of Győr-Moson-Sopron country, 1,269 people living in Győr-Moson-Sopron have registered address in Slovak, and 1256 of them purchased real estate since May 1, 2004 in this country. The purchases were made mostly in 2008 and 2009, but the wave of real estate purchases started in 2004. The resolution of the country office confirms that Rajka, Dunakiliti, Dunasziget, Feketeerdő settlements are the most attractive due to the proximity of the Slovak border and the expanding suburbanisation of Bratislava (Baj 2010).

3.3. Czech-Slovak coexistence, relationships and main features of the border

With a length of 251.8 km, the border between the Czech Republic and Slovakia is one of the newest borders in Europe. It begins in the north at the tripoint formed by the Polish, Czech and Slovak borders. The border is fairly straight and takes a south-westerly direction up to the crossing of the borders of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Austria (Mission Opérationnelle Transfrontalière 2014d) (Fig. 6).

Regarding to Czech-Slovak relationships, we have to mention that the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy of 1867 established the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. After the collapse of this Monarchy at the end of the First World War (1918), the First Czechoslovak Republic (1918–1938), and then the Second Czechoslovak Republic (1938–1939) were established. During the Second World War (1939–1945), the Slovak State was established. This one-party Slovak State ended in 1944, when democratic and communist forces organised a revolt. In 1948 dramatic changes took place, and the communist period lasted from 1948 to 1989 in different political-administrative forms as the Czechoslovak Republic (1945–1960), the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (1960–1990), the Czechoslovak Federative Republic (1990) and the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic (1990–1992). In 1993, the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic split into two independent states, the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic (Kanianska et al. 2014).

Besides this fact, it is worth mentioning that the Slovak part of Czechoslovakia remained poorer during the whole period of the existence of the common country and, until 1970s, relatively less developed. While the Czech part hosted

a mixture of industries, heavy industries of steel and armaments were operating in the Slovak part. It explains high unemployment that Slovakia has been struggling with throughout the whole transition period: unemployment jumped high due to the abundance of heavy industries, especially armaments and steel, which went bankrupt due to the loss of export markets and old-fashioned ways of production which were not able to survive the competition with Western markets. The level of development of the two countries measured by GDP per capita differed by over 20% in 1990 and it has not changed much since. A return to 1989 wage levels was much faster and more successful in the Czech Republic, which surpassed its wage level from before the transition towards the end of 1990s (Kurekova 2009).

Fig. 6. Czech-Slovak borderline
Source: edited by author

Questions about the meaning of the border in this new situation arise. To answer, we can overview the tendencies of labour mobility before and after the dissolution. The intensity of cross-border population mobility expressed by the frequency of crossings (i.e. the intensity of movement through the official border crossings) is also included in the evaluation of migration-commuting relations. A radical increase of this indicator was registered at the Slovak-Czech border during 1994–1996, when the number of crossings (railway and road crossings in total) increased 2.4 times. In this period, the number of Slovaks employed in the

Czech Republic increased from 25,000 to 70,000. This intensity has not been increasing further since, with a slight decrease between 1996 and 2002 (Halás 2006).



Fig. 7. Regionalisation of the Slovak part of the Slovak-Czech borderland on the basis of the intensity of cross-border relations with the Czech Republic
Source: M. Halás (2006)

According to research by M. Halás (2006), the intensity of cross-border relations is very different in different parts of the Czech-Slovak borderland. It is especially high in the northern and southern parts of the borderland, though both sections are clearly different in character. In the southern part, besides good permeability of the state border making it possible to expand inter-settlement relations, short transport distances support the creation of relations. For the inhabitants in the northern part of Slovak borderland, the Ostrava-Karviná region in the Czech Republic is very attractive. These centres are more remote from the state border in comparison with Hodonín or Břeclav in the south, but are much more numerous and larger. In the central section of the borderland, the intensity of the cross-border relations is very low, as local communities mostly concentrate on the regional centres of the Central Považie region (Halás 2006) (Fig. 7).

3.4. Austrian-Czech-Slovak border region

The length of the Austro-Czech border is 466,3 km and it begins at the border tripoint formed by the Austrian, German and Czech borders. It then turns eastwards to end at the tripoint formed by the borders between Austria, Czech Re-

public and Slovakia. Its demarcation crosses the rivers Inn and Morava (Fig. 8). This border was established in 1918, with the end of the First World War, the fall of Austro-Hungarian Empire and the creation of Czechoslovakia. During the Second World War, the region was annexed by Germany, becoming the protectorate of 'Bohemia-Moravia'. The demarcation remained unchanged, with the border becoming a part of the 'Iron Curtain' during the cold war. On January 1, 1969, Czechoslovakia officially became a federation made up of two states, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, establishing the Austro-Czech border with the dissolution of Czechoslovakia on 31 December 1992 and the independence of the Czech Republic on 1 January 1993. Before the Czech Republic's entry into the EU, the Austro-Czech border was the crossing point for illegal immigrants coming from Eastern Europe to Western Europe. This border region is characterised by numerous protected natural areas that attract many visitors each year. Tourism is thus considered to be a potential factor in the development of the region (Mission Opérationnelle Transfrontalière 2014a).

Fig. 8. Austrian-Czech borderline
Source: edited by author

With the opening of the borders between Austria and Czech Republic in 1989, two contrasting economies and societies confronted each other. The remarkable economic contrasts still exist. In Austria, the GDP per capita is above

the EU average, while in the Czech Republic it is below it. Of course, the opening of the borders and the liberalisation of trade had the greatest impact in the border regions (Intensification of EastWest... 2000).

Since 1990, the Austrian-Czech labour market relationship emerged either in the form of cross-border labour migration or cross-border commuting, especially from the Czech regions to Austria. The regional labour market is characterised by one-way economic migration and commuting. Workers from the Czech Republic use the opportunity to find employment in nearby Austrian regions in such sectors as construction, tourism, social and private services, agriculture and forestry. Although the EU accession in May 2004 allowed Czech citizens to enter the Western Europe labour market without work permits, most EU15 countries, including Austria, introduced transitional provisions concerning free movement of labour lasting up to 7 years, which affect the bilateral labour market. The workforce of the border region is well-trained. Employed people with secondary education account for about 80% in the Czech Republic and 64% in Austria. As far as higher education is concerned, the index is 19% in Austria and 14% in Czech Republic. The Austrian-Czech border region has substantial disparities in wage and productivity levels in a national and a cross border context. While the immediate border regions in Austria are low wage regions, this applies only to some parts of the Czech border regions. Jobs with wages higher than the national average are found mostly in Czech cities. The labour market situation is much better in the Western part of the border region than in the Eastern part. The cross-border region also suffers from an unbalanced transport accessibility. Good accessibility only exists around the economic and population centres, while peripheral regions are weakly connected to the centres and to each other. This relates to the road and, even more, to the railway system of this border region. On the Czech, side the orientation and construction of transport infrastructure has been focused on the Prague-Brno-Bratislava axis, so the South Moravian region is one of the best-situated regions in Czech Republic. The City of Brno is the second most important intersection in Czech Republic. On the other hand, the development of north-south connections has been relatively neglected. The situation was very similar in the Austrian regions. Motorways still fail to connect some regions on the Austrian side, which results in a peripheral status of many areas and makes the economic and labour market centres of the region difficult to reach. Only Vienna, Linz and Krems, as well as cities and municipalities along the East-West route have high-capacity road and railway infrastructure. But it is not only the national, international and supra-regional connections that are lacking. The cross-border interregional infrastruc-

ture is insufficient as well (Operational Programme Objective European Territorial Co-operation Austria – Czech Republic 2007–2013.)

The Austrian-Slovak border is 91 km long and divided into three distinct spatial-functional areas: The first one is the northern part of the region (Wiener Umland-Nordteil, Weinviertel, Trnava), which is predominantly agricultural and lacks cross-border transportation links due to the natural barrier of the March/ Morava river. The second one is the agglomeration axis of Vienna-Bratislava. Vienna and Bratislava have a joint population of over 2 million and are the major centres of the region as far as population, jobs, infrastructure and industrial zones are concerned. The third one is the southern part of the region (Wiener Umland-Südteil, Nordburgenland, the city of Bratislava and the southern parts of the region of Bratislava), attractive as business locations. This is one of the most dynamic areas within the joint Austrian-Slovak border region. The border region is characterised by large urban-rural disparities. Both capital regions, Vienna and Bratislava are close to areas at extreme peripheral locations (e.g. Weinviertel, northern parts of the districts of Bratislava and Trnava) (Österreichisches Institut für Raumplanung et al. 2007) (Fig. 9).

Fig. 9. Austrian-Slovak borderline
Source: edited by author

The current demarcation of this border was established in 1993 with the creation of Slovakia, following the partition of Czechoslovakia. It had already been in existence since 1919 after Czechoslovakia's declaration of independence. In 1939, Germany invaded the region and divided it into several protectorates, subtly modifying the borders in favour of Austria. At the end of the war, the previous demarcation was re-established (with the exception of part of Bratislava). During the cold war, this border was part of the iron curtain and thus represented a real obstacle between the two countries (Mission Opérationnelle Transfrontalière 2014a).

Since the accession of Slovakia to the EU in 2004, there has been greater cross-border movement in the region, with people living on the Austrian side and working on the Slovak side, and vice versa (European Commission 2014.) The proximity of the two capitals, Vienna and Bratislava is also an important economic factor (Wilfried-Gunther 1996.) The strong growth dynamics of Bratislava is affecting the rural Austrian villages through increased demand for new settlements, leisure and recreational areas. Former villages are becoming suburban towns (European Commission 2014). Due to more affordable housing, many Slovaks have moved to Austria in recent years while continuing to work in Bratislava. Thousands of young Slovaks study at Austrian universities and an estimated 40,000 Slovak citizens has found employment in Austria. The number of Austrians studying and working in Slovakia is still marginal. In addition, the number of Austrian tourists visiting Slovakia for more than a couple of hours remains modest, whereas the duration of the visits of Slovak tourists to Austria has impressively grown in recent years. According to a survey that was conducted in the Austrian-Slovak border region in 2012, only 38% of Austrians welcomed the abolishment of border controls, while the accession to Schengen was greeted unequivocally on the Slovak side (Gruber 2014).

During the last 10 years, cross-border labour market relations in the border region gained an entirely new quality. The typical sign of the labour market is one-way economic migration – workers from Slovakia, mostly from the area around Bratislava, used the opportunity to find employment in nearby Lower Austria, Burgenland and Vienna. According to data of Arbeitsmarktservice Österreich, in 2005 about 7,300 Slovak people were employed in Austria. Parallel to labour migration, the number of daily and weekly commuters from Slovakia to Austria increased. Workers from Slovakia are employed in just a few sectors of the Austrian labour market, mostly in hotels and restaurants, in social and public services, and in agriculture and forestry (Österreichisches Institut für Raumplanung et al. 2007).

4. CONCLUSION

Summarising, the paper highlighted the historical and present-day relations in several border regions in Central Europe, with special regard to the cross-border movements and ethnic composition. All in all, we can say that this process has been especially strong since the breakdown of the border restrictions. This topic has also numerous other dimensions, which can be examined in the future, such as the activity of the entrepreneurs on the other side of the border, relations between several institutions and settlements, and so on.

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WESTERN BALKANS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION ENLARGEMENT PROCESS

1. INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War brought unimaginable changes to the European political landscape. It created new circumstances and offered new opportunities for political actors. Many in the European Economic Community believed it was time for 'Europe' to become an important global political actor. This new way of thinking resulted in the creation of the European Union (Baron 2002). The Treaty on European Union, signed in 1992, envisioned a deeper and wider collaboration among member states. One of the most important novelties was the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The CFSP was presented as the member states' common voice in the global political arena; as such, it has been seen as an essential tool in the EU's global political ambitions. Since the EU does not have its own military capabilities, the CFSP conceptualises the EU as a global civilian power (Orbie 2006, Bachmann and Sidaway 2009, Sjursen 2013). Civilian power uses 'soft power' or 'soft security' instead of 'hard' military power and advocates a multilateral approach instead of unilateral actions in global politics. The main goals of soft power are the promotion of democracy, market economy, good governance, and the protection of human rights (Sjursen 2013).

Ex-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe have become one of the focal points in the EU's global political aspirations (Rogelj 2006, 2008). Their political and economic transition and integration into the EU became the first and the most important showcase of the CFSP (Commission of the European Communities 1992a, 1992b) and its 'soft power' approach. The goal of the EU policy has been to use these 'soft power' instruments for the proliferation of a multiparty democratic system, a market economy, and good gov-

ernance for all the countries in the region. In accordance with the civilian power concept, the role of EU has been twofold. On one hand, it acts as a role model for applicant countries; on the other, it helps them with political, technical, and financial assistance on their reform path.

The author analyses the EU enlargement process in the Western Balkans from 1989 to 2014. The analysis is based on the study of a wide variety of official EU documents (reports, regulations, minutes of meetings, memos, official statements, etc.) from the selected period. The study of the documents revealed certain common features, but also some important differences in the policy throughout the selected period. These characteristics enabled the author to identify four stages in the EU enlargement process in the Western Balkans. The key features, main events, and most important novelties of each stage are presented in the first part of the article.

The second part investigates the causes for the changes in the EU enlargement policy. The enlargement policy is analysed in the context of the CFSP and EU's ambitions to become a global civilian power. Western Balkans represent one of the key regions for the CFSP, due to their geographical proximity and the EU's past experience in the region. The analysis reveals the interconnection between the development of the CFSP and the enlargement policy in Western Balkans. In conclusion, the author gives some thoughts on the current developments.

2. WESTERN BALKAN COUNTRIES AND EUROPEAN UNION

The European Unions' enlargement policy in Western Balkans after 1989 can be divided into four stages. The first stage lasted from 1989 until the end of 1995. During this period, Western Balkan countries were excluded from the enlargement process due to the military conflicts and tense political situation. The end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the introduction of the Regional Approach mark the beginning of the second stage. The Regional Approach brought the region back into the European integration process, although it did not offer it the prospect of full membership. The third stage began in 1999, when the Regional Approach was replaced with the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), and all the countries from the region were recognised as potential candidates for EU membership. The last stage started after the French and the Dutch rejected the EU constitution in the spring of 2005. It is characte-

rised by a growing discontent over the enlargement policy in general, which consequently slowed down the expansion process.

The main characteristics, events, and most important novelties of each stage are presented below. But first, it is necessary to identify the key features that have dominated the European Unions' enlargement policy in Western Balkans and the key instruments used by the EU. All of them reflect the EU's soft power approach and its civilian power concept.

The first two are conditionality and progressivity. The enlargement policy is designed as a progressive step-by-step process. At each step, the applicant countries have to fulfil certain conditions set by the European Union. Some of these conditions are general, applying to all of the countries, while some are country-specific, relevant only for a certain country. The European Commission monitors and evaluates the progress in meeting the conditionality requirements of each country and submits an opinion to the European Council. The Council finally decides whether a country can take another step in the process. The progressive implementation of the conditions leads to a progressive integration into the European Union.

The third common feature is voluntary cooperation. In accordance with the civilian power concept, the European Union does not exert any pressure on the countries involved. It is the responsibility of each candidate country to decide if, when, and how to implement the necessary reforms. No sanctions, whether political or economic, are brought on it if it fails to meet the prescribed conditions. In the case of a successful completion of the reforms, such country is entitled to certain economic (financial help and trade agreements) and political (contractual relationship and assistance programmes) benefits (full membership represents the final and biggest reward). While traditional powers usually use the so-called 'stick and carrot' policy, the European Union as a civilian power only uses 'the carrot' and hopes that the promised rewards are greater for the countries involved than the cost of fulfilling the conditions for the reward (Tomić 2013).

The last feature that has to be brought forward is regional cooperation as part of the wider integration process. One of the basic premises of the European Unions' policy towards the Western Balkans is that a wider integration of the region into the European Union is only possible if it is matched by a significant degree of cooperation between the countries in the region. Consequently, regional cooperation became one of the conditions for a closer integration into the European Union. Conditioning integration into a regional cooperation is quite unique and had not been used in any of the previous enlargements. Although unusual, it gave an important boost to political and economic cooperation among the countries of the Western Balkans.

The EU enlargement policy is based on the use of three interconnected instruments. The most basic instrument is the trade agreement, which normally includes Autonomous Trade Measures. The Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement represent the first form of contractual relations between the European Community/Union and a partner country. The main objectives of these agreements are the promotion of trade on the basis of non-discrimination and reciprocity and the elimination of specific quantitative restrictions applied by the European Community member states to imports from the region.

Financial aid through different programmes, such as PHARE, ECHO, OBNOVA, CARDS, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) favourable project financing is the second important instrument. The main aim of the PHARE programme and the EBRD is to finance different projects for furthering progress towards market-oriented economies and to promote private and entrepreneurial initiatives (Council of the European Communities 1989).

The most advanced instrument used by the European Community/Union is the bilateral contract or agreement. Soon after the start of the transition process, it became evident that trade agreements and financial aid could not satisfy the growing aspiration of the Central- and Eastern-European countries towards a closer political and economic integration into the European Community. As a result, a new instrument called the Association/European agreement was introduced (Council of the European Communities 1990b). Its aim was to expand and intensify cooperation. It offered further liberalisation of trade and expanded cooperation in other areas of economic activity (free movement of persons, services, and capital). It also provided a new institutional framework for political dialogue and anticipated closer scientific, technical, and cultural cooperation (Commission of the European Communities 1990). The European Agreement was later replaced by the Cooperation Agreement, and the Stabilisation and Association Agreement.

2.1. Stage one: transition and conflict 1989–1995

The European Union/European Community had been actively involved in the process of political and economic transition of the Central and Eastern European states from the very beginning. It provided valuable political backing and assistance to newly elected democratic governments, but its economic and financial support was even more important.

With the exception of Albania, countries in the Western Balkans already had very good economic relations with the European Community during their socia-

list period. Namely, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was the only socialist country that had signed the Cooperation Agreement with the European Economic Community prior to the start of the transition process (Council of the European Communities 1983). The deterioration of the political and economic situation and the spread of the armed conflict prompted the European Community to suspend the agreement in November 1991. With the collapse of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the agreement came back in force in February 1992, after the recognition of the newly independent countries. The European Union used this agreement to regulate trade with Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia until it was replaced by the Stabilisation and Association Agreements. Economic cooperation with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo) came to a complete halt after the international community imposed economic sanctions and a trade ban in June 1991. It took more than five years before trade resumed (Council of the European Communities 1996b).

Albania, on the other hand, had almost no economic connections with the West, due to the communist government's isolationist policy. While Yugoslavia was the first socialist country to sign the Cooperation Agreement with the European Economic Community, Albania was the last one. It concluded the Trade and Cooperation Agreement in May 1992, more than three years after Poland and Hungary.

Although Yugoslavia became eligible for the PHARE funding in September 1990 (Council of the European Communities 1990a), it never really participated in the program, because it was dissolved before the approved projects were implemented (Commission of the European Communities 1993). Due to the unstable political and economic situation and the spread of the armed conflict, none of the successor countries (with the exception of Slovenia) were allowed to participate in the programme from 1991 until 1996. Consequently, Albania, which joined the program in December 1991 (Council of the European Communities 1991), was the only country in the Western Balkans to benefit from the programme during this first stage.

Due to the slowness and incompleteness of the reform process, none of the countries from the region were able to start negotiations on a European agreement. The spread of violent conflict made the situation even worse. Although the conflict was spatially limited to Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, it destabilised the entire region. As a result, the region was detached from the European integration processes in its entirety. By the end of 1995, when their counterparts from Central Europe started to submit their official application for EU membership, none of the countries of the Western Balkans managed to build

any deeper economic or political ties with the European Union. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo) was politically and economically completely isolated from the Union. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Macedonia built their relations on an old Yugoslav Cooperation Agreement. Albania managed to conclude the Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement and was participating in the PHARE programme, but was unable to start negotiations on the European agreement.

2.2. Stage two: regional approach 1996–1999

The second stage of the European Unions' enlargement policy in the Western Balkans began after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords and the end of the war in Bosnia and Hercegovina. New political circumstances demanded the development of new, more intense relations with the countries in the region. It was generally believed that the new policy should not be based on a narrow state approach, but on a wider regional approach. According to the European Commission (Commission of the European Communities 1996), there were three main reasons in favour of a regional approach: firstly, long-term political stability in the region could not be achieved without a significant degree of cooperation between the countries in the region. Secondly, all the countries were facing similar problems, especially in their transition to a market economy. Lastly, it was believed that the international community's assistance would be more effective.

The origins of the Regional Approach policy can be traced back to the end of 1995. During 1996, the policy was developed further (Commission of the European Communities 1996), but it was only in April 1997 (Council of the European Communities 1997) that the Council set clear political and economic conditions to be fulfilled by the countries in order to develop deeper bilateral relations. The Regional Approach was designed for all the countries in South--Eastern Europe that had not concluded Association/European Agreements with the European Union (Albania and all the former Yugoslavian countries with the exception of Slovenia). The approach's main aim was to promote and sustain democracy and the rule or law, re-launch economic activity, stimulate the transition to a market economy, and encourage regional cooperation (Council of the European Communities 1996a).

The Regional Approach had envisioned the conclusion of the special bilateral agreements between the EU and the countries concerned, called Cooperation Agreements. These agreements represented a new type of contractual relations. In certain areas, they surpassed the first generation of Trade and Cooperation

Agreements, but offered less intensive and more limited cooperation than the European Agreements. Above all, they did not offer any explicit perspective of eventual membership in the Union. They also enabled countries to apply for the Union's financial instruments (PHARE, ECHO; EU money for projects aimed at fostering regional cooperation) (Commission of the European Communities 1996).

From the start, the Regional Approach included the element of political and economic conditionality. The conditions were general (applying to all the countries), as well as specific (applying to a specific country) (Council of the European Communities 1997). According to the policy, a progressive implementation of the conditions should lead to a progressive intensification of relations.

The results of the Regional Approach were very disappointing. None of the relevant countries made significant progress in its relations with the European Union (Commission of the European Communities 1999c). None of them managed to open negotiations for Cooperation Agreements for different reasons. Macedonia and Bosnia and Hercegovina became eligible for the PHARE funds in the first half of 1996, although the latter country was not entitled to full funding due to its slow progress in building state institutions and executing economic reforms. Croatia was still suspended from participating in the PHARE programme because of its inadequate compliance with obligations under the Dayton or Erdut Agreements. The economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were lifted in December 1996, only to be imposed again after the start of the Kosovo crisis in April 1998. The European Union never granted Autonomous Trade Measures to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The reports prepared by the Commission usually ended with the following recommendation: 'At this time, the Commission has therefore concluded that the present level of relations with the countries covered by the Regional Approach should continue' (Commission of the European Communities 1998).

2.3. Stage three: stabilisation and association process 1999–2005

The Kosovo crisis and the subsequent NATO military operation against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia provided a new turning point in European Union policy towards the Western Balkans. In mid-1999, the European Commission proposed enhancing the Regional Approach and transforming it into the Stabilisation and Association process (SAP). It was launched at roughly the same time as the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe and was considered to be its component.

At its core, SAP was very similar to the Regional Approach. Its main objectives remained the stabilization and development of the region through the consolidation of democracy, promotion of the rule of law, economic reform and development, reform of administrative structures, and promotion of regional co-operation. It used similar instruments: trade concessions, financial and economic assistance through different financial instruments, and contractual agreements. Conditionality and progressivity remained its central features.

The most important novelty of SAP was the inclusion of stronger incentives. The countries in the region were offered closer integration into the EU structures (Commission of the European Communities 1999a). At first it was unclear what that meant, but in June 2000, the European Council in Feira confirmed that the main objective of SAP is the fullest possible integration of the countries of the Western Balkans into the political and economic mainstream of Europe, and that all countries concerned were potential candidates for EU membership (Council of the European Communities 2000b).

The inclusion of stronger incentives was accompanied by a new form of contractual relations. The Cooperation Agreement was replaced by the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA). These were similar to the European Agreements that were used during the association process in Central and Eastern Europe (Commission of the European Communities 1999c). They represented a higher level of contractual relations and the first step towards the start of negotiations for full membership.

Another novelty introduced with SAP was the CARDS financial assistance program. In December 2000, the European Union launched a new community aid program for the countries participating in the stabilization and association process, called CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Democratisation, and Stabilisation) (Council of the European Communities 2000a). CARDS became the main source of financial assistance to the region from 2001 to 2006, when it was replaced by IPA (Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance).

Compared to the Regional Approach, the Stabilisation and Association Process proved to be very successful. By the end of 2005, all the countries from the region except Kosovo managed to start negotiations on SAA. Two of the most advanced countries, Croatia and Macedonia, not only concluded the negotiations, but they already filled out the application for full membership and got the confirmation of candidate status. Croatia even started the membership negotiations in June 2006.

2.4. Stage Four: From Association to Membership 2006–2014

The renewal of the enlargement strategy in 2006 marks the beginning of the last stage of the European Union's enlargement policy in the Western Balkans. This stage had been marked by growing discontent in the existing member countries over the enlargement process. The renewed strategy was based on consolidating the existing commitments towards the countries engaged in the process, applying fair and rigorous conditionality, and intensifying communication with the public on the enlargement (Commission of the European Communities 2006). Its fundamental goals and instruments remained the same; what changed was the overall attitude towards the process. Since the beginning in the early nineties, the enlargement had been understood as something self-evident (see Smith 2005), as a process that could not be stopped. Nobody doubted the end result; what remained undetermined was the speed of the process. Another seemingly unquestionable aspect was the Union's capacity to absorb new members. This was a non-issue before 2006. The only relevant question was: when would the candidate countries be able to assume the responsibility of full membership? All this changed after 2005. According to the renewed strategy, the EU must avoid overstretching its commitments. It will honour all existing commitments, but will be very cautious about assuming any new ones (Commission of the European Communities 2006). In other words, the doors to full membership for existing candidate and potential candidate countries are still open, but new countries will not be admitted into the process. The renewed strategy also places much more emphasis on the Union's capability and readiness to absorb new members. The EU reserves the right to decide when a candidate country is prepared for membership and when the EU is ready to accept new members. Although highly unlikely, a candidate country could complete all the phases in the accession negotiations, but would not be accepted as a full member.

The pace of the process and the implementation of the prescribed conditions in candidate countries is another area where important changes occurred. According to the strategy, the EU should not rush into new enlargements. The candidate countries will have to fully implement all the prescribed conditions, nothing will be overlooked. In the past, the EU sometimes intentionally overlooked poor implementations and executions of certain regulations in order to speed up the enlargement process. The renewed strategy anticipates a carefully managed accession process with rigorous monitoring of how the prescribed requirements are fulfilled (Commission of the European Communities 2006). It also envisions a suspension of the process in the case of a serious and persistent

breach of the EU's fundamental principles, or if a country fails to meet essential requirements at any stage (Commission of the European Communities 2005).

Many feared that all the changes in the strategy, the negative attitude towards the process, and the lack of political attention would slow down, if not halt, the enlargement and delay the accession of the countries of the Western Balkans for an indefinite period. The development and progress made in the past eight years does not support these claims. Despite everything, the enlargement process continued. With a few exceptions, countries in the Western Balkans managed to make significant progress on their way to full membership. Croatia was the most successful and became a full member in June 2013. Montenegro got the candidate status in 2010 and started accession negotiations two years later. Serbia and Albania were given candidate status and are expecting to start negotiations in the near future. Kosovo is opening the SAA negotiations in 2013 as the last country from the region. Bosnia and Herzegovina managed to conclude negotiations for the SAA, but its entry into force and application for candidate status will depend on the successful implementation of the constitutional reforms. Macedonia is the only country in the region that did not manage to make any progress since 2005, due to the block imposed by Greece.

3. ENLARGEMENT AND THE CIVILIAN POWER CONCEPT

The progress of countries in the Western Balkans towards full EU membership has not been a straightforward process, but a rocky journey, full of ups and downs. In order to understand the process' dynamics, it is important to understand the rationale behind the enlargement process and to place it into a wider political context. Enlargement is first and foremost a political process (Sjursen 2002). The decision on who can or will become a member is made by the existing member states. The leaders of the current member states are promoting accession primarily because they believe it to be in their long-term economic, political, and security interest and goals (Moravcsik and Vachudova 2003, Cameron 2007). Positioning the EU as an important actor in the global political arena is one of them.

The first ideas about political and military cooperation among member states appeared alongside plans for economic cooperation. None of them materialised due to the Cold War geopolitical situation and the lack of interest (Cameron 2007). The end of the Cold War gave rise to tectonic shifts in the global political environment. New geopolitical circumstances and the creation of an economic

and monetary union enabled the EU to move towards a political union. The advocates of a political union believed that the rising economic power has to be matched with corresponding political power. The CFSP is a central element of this political union. Due to the lack of military capabilities, the CFSP is based on the concept of the European Union being a civilian power[1]. Civilian power refers to an actor with the determination to shape international relations, but with consciously different goals and strategies than a classical great power (Bachmann and Sidaway 2009). Its main goals are the promotion of democracy, market economy, good governance, and the protection of human rights (Sjursen 2013). Its foreign policy strategy is based on the use of 'soft power' and 'civilian instruments'. As a civilian power, the European Union has a threefold role in the global political arena (Bretherton and Vogler 2005). Firstly, it acts as a role model for regional integration and the development of peace and prosperity. Secondly, it promotes civilianised values, norms, structures, and institutions. Thirdly, it acts as a counterweight to traditional 'hard powers'.

The enlargement process embodies the civilian approach in foreign policy. It represents one of the best examples of civilian power foreign policy in action. At its core, it promotes and proliferates civilian values and norms. At the same time, it also endorses the European Union as an important global political actor that acts differently than traditional powers. The EU acts as a mentor and as a role model for applicant counties. The enlargement created an idealised image of the EU and the member states, for which all applicant countries should strive. The EU's mission is to guide and help them on their reform path. A crucial element of the process is its voluntary nature. The EU does not assert any pressure on the candidates; it is up to them to decide if, how, and when the prescribed reforms will be executed.

Past experience has shown the acknowledged enlargement process to be one of the most powerful and most successful tools in the EU's civilian power arsenal. It has been a crucial impetus for political and economic reform in Central and Eastern Europe and has significantly strengthened peace and stability in Europe. It has spread the EU's influence in the region and strengthened its 'civil/soft power' image in the world. As such, the enlargement plays a central role in the CFSP and the idea of the EU as a civilian power.

[1] The concept of civilian power Europe was developed by Francois Duchene in the 1970s' (Orbie 2006, Bachmann and Sidaway 2009).

3.1. Western Balkans and the EU's Foreign Policy Ambitions

The rise of the idea of the EU as an important global power coincided with the start of the political and economic transition of Central- and Eastern-European countries. Countries in the Western Balkans[2] started the transition process at approximately the same time as their counterparts in Central Europe, but they soon lagged behind. They failed to fulfil the EU's expectations on the creation of a system based on the principles of democracy and a market economy (Commission of the European Communities 1990). The slow transition from a planned to a market economy, the lingering privatization, an aversion to foreign investors and, above all, the political instability had made the Western Balkans an unattractive partner for the EU. The spread of violent conflict in the former Yugoslavia deteriorated the situation even further. The EC/EU initially took the lead in the efforts to resolve the crisis. Many politicians saw the crisis as a perfect opportunity for the EC/EU to show the world its new geopolitical ambitions. The fiasco of the EU-led peace negotiations, the escalation of the violent conflict, and internal disagreements among the most powerful member states over the common policy towards the crisis forced the EU to cede its leading role and limit its actions to the field of humanitarian help. The EU's incapacity to solve the crisis disclosed all the problems and shortcomings of the CFSP (Smith 2004). It has seriously jeopardised the EU's global foreign policy ambitions and its civilian power image (see Woodward 1995, Pirjevec 2003).

The second stage (1996–1999) was characterised by the EU's growing interest in the region. The crisis in the former Yugoslavia clearly showed that in order to become an important global player, the EU must be able to play a crucial role in the political and economic development of the regions at its doorstep. As the main contributor of financial help, the European Union was assigned to lead and coordinate the post-war reconstruction and stabilisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Soon, it was obvious that this could only be achieved through stabilisation of the wider region. The stabilisation of the region and its integration into the EU became a test for the EU and its global power aspirations. The launch of the Regional Approach was a direct consequence of the EU's growing geopolitical interest in the region. The Regional Approach and its successor, the Stabilisation and Association Process, can be regarded as a new

[2] The term Western Balkans is used as a common label for the area covering Albania and all the countries that emerged on the territory of Yugoslavia, with the exception of Slovenia (Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Macedonia). It was first used in EU documents in 1998 (Rogelj 2006).

attempt by the EU to prove to the world that soft power can work. Although this new approach failed to deliver the anticipated results, it enabled the EU to improve its image and regain part of its lost credibility.

The Kosovo crisis marks the beginning of the third phase. The beginning of the crisis resurrected the troublesome memories of the EU's intervention in Croatia and Bosnia. Many were afraid the same scenario would recur. Consequently, the crisis was perceived not only as a threat to peace and stability in the region, but as a serious threat to the EU's foreign policy plans and ambitions. The EU reacted with a decisive and uniform stand. While NATO took the necessary steps for a military resolution of the crisis, the EU started to prepare an overall post-conflict strategy, based on the civilian power approach. In the middle of 1999, the European Commission proposed the enhancement of the Regional Approach and its transformation into the Stabilisation and Association process (SAP).

SAP used the same conditionality policy as the Regional Approach. The most important novelty of SAP was the inclusion of stronger incentives, namely the prospect of full membership. Stronger incentives required compliance with more demanding conditions, both political and economic, as well as greater emphasis on the need for regional cooperation (Commission of the European Communities 1999b). Compared to the Regional Approach, the Stabilisation and Association Process proved to be very successful. Three main reasons contributed to its success. The first and by far the most far-reaching were the political changes in the region. The prospect of full membership was the second important reason. The third reason was the political willingness of most of the powerful member states to push on with the process.

The last stage started with the renewal of the enlargement strategy in 2006. The renewal was a direct consequence of rising opposition and scepticism towards the enlargement process. The first doubts about future enlargements already appeared before the 2004 enlargement. The general public in the west associated the enlargement with the inflow of cheap workforce from the east. At first, these sentiments had no effect on EU policy. Things started to change after the French and the Dutch rejected the EU constitution in the spring of 2005. The French vote in particular was widely interpreted as a vote against the EU enlargement (Rachman 2006). A new test for the enlargement policy came after the advance of the economic and financial crisis in the Eurozone area in late 2008. The economic crisis gave a fresh impetus to anti-enlargement sentiments all over Europe.

For a moment, it seemed that the enlargement process would come to a halt, but that did not happen. Although the enthusiasm for the process dropped

considerably, the key actors in the EU never gave up on the idea of possible future enlargements. It seems there is a consensus among the European political elite that the EU cannot afford to abolish the enlargement process due to its central place in the CFSP and its civilian power concept. Abandoning it would not only considerably weaken the EU's position in the region, but it would have negative effects on its global position and image.

4. CONCLUSIONS

The fourth stage of the enlargement process in the Western Balkans was characterised by a passive and indifferent attitude of the existing member states. One of the most important consequences of the economic crisis was the shift of the political priorities in the EU. Prior to the crisis, the enlargement dominated the EU political agenda. For many years, it was one of the top priority issues. With the spread of the Eurozone crisis, it became a secondary matter. Past experience has shown us how strong commitment exhibited by the existing member states can remove different barriers and substantially speed up the process. It seems that no such commitment existed in the last stage (especially among the most powerful member states).

Some evidence suggests we are witnessing the start of a new stage in the enlargement process. After years of stagnation and setbacks, the EU has become very active in the region lately. Starting in 2013 and continuing in 2014, some new initiatives were launched aimed at lifting the stagnated enlargement process and boosting the EU's role in the region (see STA 2014, Žerjavič 2014). The changing attitude and a more proactive involvement in the region are a direct effect of the new geopolitical situation in Europe. The EU's undisputed leadership in Central and Eastern Europe came under severe threat lately due to the renewed Russian 'great power' aspirations under president Putin (Đorđević 2014). The first serious clash of interests between Russia and the EU already appeared during the conflict in South Ossetia in 2008 (Kuus 2011). But it was the start of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014 that intensified the rivalry. Many in Europe believe that Russian ambitions stretch beyond Ukraine and that the Western Balkans are the next in line (Đorđević 2014). The EU's neglect of the enlargement process and its preoccupation with the financial crisis enabled Russia to strengthen its position the region since 2005. The Russian growing power is most visible in the economy. Traditional economic links (the region depends heavily on Russian natural gas supplies) were reinforced recently

through participation in infrastructure projects and growing direct investments (Đorđević 2014, Spasovska 2014).

In order to hold its position in the region, the EU will have to reconsider its strategy. It is safe to say that the enlargement process and a prospect of full membership will remain a central part of the EU's policy. Although a radical change in policy is very unlikely, some smaller changes are expected. It will be interesting to see how the new political situation will influence key features of the enlargement process: conditionality, progressivity, voluntary cooperation, and the demand for regional cooperation. Will the EU change (lower) the conditions set in the past? Will the policy of 'only carrots, no stick' be replaced by the 'carrots and stick' policy? How will the differences between pro-Russian and pro-EU countries influence regional cooperation? The answers to those and other questions will not only decide the future of the Western Balkans, they will determine the future of the EU as a global civilian power.

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REGION and REGIONALISM
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INTEGRATION OF THE SOUTHERN DALMATIA THE CASE STUDY OF THE HERZEGOVINA--NERETVA CANTON

1. INTRODUCTION

The main aim of this paper is to present the consequences of the accession of the Republic of Croatia on 1 July 2013 to the European Union, taking into account the geographical location of the country. Croatia is a country without territorial integrity, which stems from the fact that the southern part of the tourist region of Dalmatia is separated from the northern part by the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina or, more specifically, the Herzegovina-Neretva canton. This in turn is a consequence of certain historical events. In 1699, the Republic of Ragusa ceded a narrow strip of coast to Turkish domination. This area found itself within the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina after the Dayton Agreement in 1995. Despite the abolition of the visa requirement for citizens of the European Union in 2006, the problem of crossing the border persists. Despite the expansion of border crossings, tourists may experience problems with more accurate checks when crossing to Bosnia and Herzegovina on their way to Dubrovnik. Prior to EU accession, crossing the Croatian-Bosnian border only required presenting a passport or ID card. Since 1 July 2013, documents entitling travelers to cross the border must be scanned, which extends the process of border checks. However, the EU's position in this case is quite clear. First of all, an agreement between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina has to be made on a mutually satisfactory solution.

At the moment, there are some potential solutions to the problem. They include:

– construction of bridges connecting the main part of Croatia with Dubrovnik using the neighboring islands;

– construction of a transport corridor in the form of a flyover over the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
– construction of a tunnel under the town of Neum.

All of these initiatives were effectively blocked by the government in Sarajevo before Croatia joined the EU. However, one of the conditions of Croatia accession was the promise that the problem would be solved within the next few years.

2. HISTORICAL BASIS

For centuries, the area of the Herzegovina-Neretva Canton, particularly the port of Neum, was an area of contention between different countries. Since the beginning of the tenth century, the canton was under the rule of Croatia. This did not prevent Venice's attempt to abolish the tribute for the kingdom of Dalmatia and Croatia paid in exchange for the free shipping on the Croatian Adriatic Sea. The situation changed after 997, when a civil war broke out between the sons of Držislav, the first king of Croatia and Dalmatia. Venice interfered and seized islands and towns along the Adriatic coast, breaking them apart which in agreement with the Byzantine emperor. Croatian authority over this territory was re-established by Stephen I. Due to his good relations with the Byzantium, it contributed to the collapse of southern Italy. Normans took the Apennine peninsula, which had a significant impact on international relations on the Adriatic coast for decades to come. By 1390, Bosnian ban Stephen Tvrtko I conquered the entire Croatia south of Velebit and assumed the title of the 'King of Croatia and Dalmatia, and Raška and Primorska'. Ladislaus of Naples interfered to win the Hungarian crown to gain influence in Bosnia and Croatia. He landed with his troops in 1403 in Zadar and was crowned as a king there. However, when he realised that he would not be able to get the Hungarian throne, he decided to betray the faithful Croats by selling cities such as Novigrad, Vrana and Zadar to Venice, along with his alleged right to Dalmatia. At the same time, in 1420 the Venetians took control of almost the entire territory of the Adriatic coast. The canton was ruled by the Republic of Venice, the Ottoman Empire, and the Kingdom of Croatia and Dalmatia.

Through the expansive policy of the Ottoman Empire, Bosnia fell in 1463, followed by Herzegovina in 1482. This was caused by the lack of desire to defend against the invasion and the relatively greater fear for the papacy than for the Turkish invasion.

Another opportunity to take control of today's Herzegovina came with the election in Hungary and Croatia. Through disagreements between the Hungarians and Croats in 1527, a civil war broke out, which was used by Bosnians to invade other parts of Croatia.

The origins of the division of the coastal area which is now considered Croatian dates back to 1699, when the Treaty of Karlowitz was signed (Pavličević 2004, p. 194). The Republic of Ragusa[1] ceded part of their territory (today's Neum) to the Ottoman Empire. This was done to ensure their own security from possible attacks from the Republic of Venice.

This area finally split from the Ottoman Empire on 5 October 1908 with the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This situation was caused by the economic overexploitation of the local population. In 1875, an uprising erupted in Herzegovina and in a few months spread to Bosnia. In a relatively short time, the uprising found support in the Principality of Montenegro and the Principality of Serbia. The Austro-Hungarian Empire with the support of the German Empire took the political initiative. On April 24, 1877, the army of the Russian Empire invaded the territory of Bulgaria. On March 3, 1878 a peace treaty in San Stefano was signed. Under the terms of this treaty, Bosnia and Herzegovina gained autonomy within the Ottoman Empire. This led to the empowerment of the Russian Empire in the Balkans, which in turn sparked opposition from other European empires. A peace conference was organised in Berlin. The territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina found itself under armed occupation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. At the end of 1878, the Croatian Sabor petitioned the emperor for the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Croatia. Hungary protested and the petition was rejected. By 1908, the final annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary took place.

After the First World War, the territories of Croatia and Herzegovina were united as a single country for the first time since the 14th century. On October 26, 1918, the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs was created, which on December 1, 1918 transformed into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Kingdom of SHS). It included the Kingdom of Serbia, the Kingdom of Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina under Austro-Hungarian rule, the Duchy of Carniola, the southern part of the Kingdom of Hungary, the Hungarian Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia and the Austrian Kingdom of Dalmatia (Giza 1994, p. 97). As a result of Puniš Račić's attack on members of the Croatian Peasant Party on June, 20

[1] Republic of Dubrovnik.

1928 (Benson 2004, p. 63), Alexander I Karadzordzević, King of SHS, decided on 6 January 1929 to suspend the constitution and dissolve all political parties in the Kingdom of SHS. On October 3, 1929 the name of country was changed to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (Giza 1994, p. 112). After the defeat of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in the war against the Third Reich, the Independent State of Croatia (Trawczyńska 2009, p. 153) was created on April 10, 1941, which joined the Tripartite Pact.

As a result of further military operations and activities of the National Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia, the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was formed on November 25, 1943 and, owing to the Constitution, became the federal republic of the Yugoslavia on January 31, 1946 as part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Felczak and Wasilewski 1985, p. 497).

3. SOCIAL BASIS – ETHNIC GROUPS

In 1961, 18 years after its formation, the territory of the People's Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was largely inhabited by Serbian population. It accounted for almost 42.9% of the population of the republic. Muslim population accounted for 25.7% and Croatians accounted for 21.7%. However, the inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina professing Islam could not define their nationalities. This situation began to change in the 1960s. In the census of 1961 the possibility of self-determination as a 'Muslim in the ethnic sense' was allowed. In the 1971 census, the expression 'Muslim in the national sense' was included for the first time. Announcement of national identity caused controversy among inhabitants of the country in terms of naming. In September 1993, the government decided to replace the term 'Muslim' with 'Bošnjak' (Tanasković, 1995, pp. 45–52).

Between 1961 and 1991, the share of the Muslim population increased from 25.7% to 43.5%, while the Serbian decreased from 42.9% to 31.4% and, despite a nominal increase in the number of residents describing themselves as Croats, their share fell down from 21.7% to 17.3%. The difficulty with Bosnia and Herzegovina was based on the location of various ethnic groups. Different groups lived in the same places or close to each other. These were mostly groups of Serbs and Muslims, which explains the fact that fights erupted most often between the two. In contrast, the population of Bosnian Croats remained concentrated near the border with Croatia, mainly in the area in question (Fig. 1). It should be noted that there are no recent data on the ethnic affiliation of the

population of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is caused by the lack of agreement on the census, which originally was to be held in 2011. However, as a result of the boycott of Bosnia and Herzegovina's government by Bosnian Serbs, the census was delayed by two years. Bosnian Serbs sought to include questions concerning ethnic origin in the census. At the same time, Croatian and Bosnian Muslims were strongly opposed to that idea. As a result of the agreement, questions of ethnicity were included as voluntary in the 2013 census. However, the lack of compulsion to answer all questions resulted in the inability to obtain information about the current ethnic structure of the country.



Fig. 1. Croatian minority in Herzegovina-Neretva canton in 1991
Source: own elaboration

According to unofficial data on the ethnic structure of the canton, more than 51% of the population declare themselves as Croatians. At the same time, when we analyse the national structure based on the 2011 Croatian census for the Split-Dalmatia County, which directly borders with the canton, we can see that the percentage of Muslim population in the various municipalities rarely exceeds 0.5%, with the highest concentration in the municipality of Podgora with 1.63%

of the total population. Overall, Bosnians are just 0.31% of the population in the county.

Such ethnic structure of the canton shows in the education system prevailing in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Education is managed by canton, city or school--level local authorities. Current education system is in disarray in terms of the curriculum. Sometimes two schools with different curricula, Bosnian and Croatian, occupy the same building. This is mostly reflected in history classes. This system was introduced in 1997 as a temporary solution and was to be changed by the end of 1998. However, continuous distrust between nations and a strong need to preserve the cultural differences have led to a situation in which that system has prevailed until today. In 2012, a hearing was held in the court in Mostar concerning the discrimination of students based on their national and religious backgrounds by application of different requirements at schools in Stolac and Čapljina. The court ordered the schools to merge Bosnian and Croatian classes into a single multinational class. However, the decision was not executed and the students continue to learn in separate schools, even though they are often in the same building. According to official sources, there are 34 such educational institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, most of them in Herzegovina-Neretva canton.

Despite internal divisions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia is one of the most ardent supporters of the country's integration with the EU and the integration of the whole Dalmatia. Croatia proposed that the EU move away from the traditional form of the accession negotiations and the preparation process in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Under these new rules, the accession criteria would not be reduced for a candidated country, but the EU would have to change certain activities. Currently, negotiations cannot start until all internal problems are solved. Croatia proposes that such problems be solved during the process. But to be able to start talking about integration, Bosnia and Herzegovina would need to get the candidate status. According to Croatia, the process would be able to start in October 2014, following the elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

4. THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES

High level of unemployment is a major problem in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the Hercegovina-Neretva canton. According to various estimates and depending on the recognition of the informal economy, it amounts to between 35 and 45% of the total working-age population. The situation is even worse among

young people. As many as 52.27% of people aged between 16 and 24 years are unemployed. The employment levels in the canton are similarly poor. In 2012, it amounted to 40.83% of unemployment for the general population and 74.52% for 16 to 24-year-olds (*Zaposlenost...* 2013, p. 53 and 115).

Such a high rate of unemployment and the almost effortless ability to obtain by a passport of the Republic of Croatia has led many of Bosnian Croats to seek employment outside of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Many of them are leaving for neighbouring Croatia where, despite the economic crisis, they can find a job much more easily. At the same time, after Croatia joined the EU, citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina holding Croatian passports have a better chance of working in the EU. Many Member States announced that they planned to end all work-related restrictions for Croats. Bosnian Croats finding employment in Croatia affects the growth of unemployment in the area, and is thus frowned upon by local population.

The need to pass through the town of Neum, which divides Croatia into two parts, is an additional restriction for the population of the Republic of Croatia in the Southern part of Dalmatia. After Croatia joined the EU, its border has becomes the external border of the Union. Related regulations require all passengers to be controlled and divided into transit passengers who are EU citizens and others. For this purpose the border crossing has been expanded in both directions from Neum. This resulted in a reduction of travel time with a simultaneous increase in the level of control.

At the same time, this feature of the territory of Croatia is one of the obstacles to it joining the Schengen zone. Consequently, almost since the end of the war, the government in Zagreb has been working to assure territorial integrity through different means.

5. DEVELOPMENT PATH

Croatia's accession to the EU on July 1 had many implications for the development of the whole region. As was the case with the countries joining the EU in 2004, there was an initial sharp increase in the number of tourists. The opportunity to use EU funds is an additional benefit of membership. Money obtained in this way can be used for the development of tourist infrastructure and restoration of monuments. The new possibilities associated with increased investment attractiveness will help develop accommodation facilities. Environment will also be improved. This will be possible through the introduction of a significant number of EU directives related to this subject. In the long term,

transport accessibility should also be improved. The country will also be able to acquire funds to complete the projected motorway network and attract more low-cost airlines. In the long term, this should also lead to increased tourism. This will happen through the accession of Croatia to the Schengen zone. However, this depends on the territorial integrity of the country. Croatia has been considering a few solutions in this regard.

Unfortunately, the Croatia joining the EU may have some negative effects. The first one, quite visible to the citizens, are intensified checks at border crossings with Bosnia and Herzegovina on the way to Dubrovnik. The EU's position is quite clear on that. First of all, the countries have to agree on a mutually satisfactory solution.

The first idea to provide territorial integrity was proposed by the government in Zagreb. It involved buying back or exchanging the narrow strip of land with the town of Neum on the Adriatic from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The government in Sarajevo rejected that idea arguing that the Bosnian Neum is a window on the world and a location for a future commercial port.

In 1997, the first plan emerged to solve the conflict that involved building a bridge connecting the Pelješac peninsula with Klek. This idea was rejected by Bosnia and Herzegovina, who argued that this would restrict the access to Neum. The idea was also protested by environmentalists, who argued that this would mean severe environmental degradation.

Ideas for solving the problem also included a proposal of building a tunnel under the city or an extraterritorial motorway flyover over Neum to connect two parts of Croatia. However, these idea involved significant financial outlay and were not supported by Sarajevo. The idea returned after July 1, 2013. The government in Zagreb hoped for financial support from EU funds. However, the European Commission has categorically rejected the plan, arguing that they would not release such a large amount for an investment that would be constructed outside the EU.

Considering the current geopolitical and economic situation in Croatia, the only possibility is the construction of the bridge. Many social groups argue about the actual economic viability of the investment and submit their calculations regarding other possibilities, but these do not include the cost of redemption of land for investment, nor the legal problems arising from construction works in another country.

However, none of these solutions will lead to the actual integration of the region of Dalmatia. They will instead result in longer and deeper differences between Croatian and Herzegovinian parts of Dalmatia. The lack of willingness is visible between the countries which were, until recently, a single state.

6. CONCLUSIONS

The political situation of the Republic of Ragusa in the late 17th century forced it to donate a small part of coastline to Turkey. It was a method of providing protection and independence of the country in the face of an invasion of the Republic of Venice. However, this event proved to be a key for today's dismemberment of Croatia into two areas, despite the time that passed.

If we analyse the situation in southern Dalmatia, it is not hard to see that the full integration of the region will not be possible within the next decade, perhaps even longer. The situation that prevails in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not conducive to deepening the cooperation between the regions since the war. The youth have been taught different, often conflicting, approaches to the events of the first half of the 1990s. Under the Dayton Agreement, the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina has become a smaller version of Yugoslavia from the early 1990s. Antagonisms and mistrust are still alive among its inhabitants. This situation is effectively used by the politicians, whose programs are based largely on nationalisms. It also has a direct impact on relations with its neighbours, both Serbia and Croatia. Any attempts at reaching an agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia regarding the territorial integration of Croatia have always been seen as an attack on the integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina and a betrayal of the national idea.

On the other hand, the integration of Croatia by any of the solutions proposed above may lead to further marginalisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the eyes of potential tourists and investors. Considering the current level of unemployment, this situation could lead to internal conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina with mutual blame for the failure.

One argument for the integration of the region is Croatia's position on the matter. They are the most ardent supporter of integrating Bosnia and Herzegovina into the EU. We should, however, take their support with a grain of salt and really consider if it is only a political move related to the investment they have been planning since the mid-1990s or a true striving for integration of the whole region.

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Section II

CONTEMPORARY CHANGES IN BORDER REGIONS – NEW CHALLENGES FOR POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY

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REGION and REGIONALISM
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BORDER LANGUAGE POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EUROPE SINCE THE NINETEENTH CENTURY)

1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN BORDER LANGUAGE POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Border language politics is here understood as language policy and language situation (and its changes) in border areas. Relationship between language politics in border areas and international politics is twofold: first, impact of the former (language situation and language policy in border areas) on political relations between neighbouring countries and, second, impact of language policy of national or regional governments, influenced by relations between the neighbouring countries, on language situation in border areas. In some circumstances these relationships can be very tense creating conflicts between neighbouring states, causing shifts of borders, changes in linguistic landscape of border areas by forced assimilation and ethnic cleansing. In other cases changes in language situation of border areas are gradual and almost invisible without causing political problems.

The aim of this paper is to present various situations, detect some general tendencies. The analysis is focused on developments in Europe since the 19th century. The choice of Europe results mainly from the fact that Europe is this part of the world where language has played the most important political role in shaping nations and states and has been used as argument or excuse for territorial claims being source of political conflicts.

2. ASPECTS OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BORDER LANGUAGE POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Five aspects of relationship between border language politics and international politics can be distinguished:

– distribution of languages/dialects spoken as indigenous varieties in border areas (objective factor),

– ethno-linguistic self-definition and linguistic attitudes of border communities (subjective factor),

– language policy and ethnic policy of national governments (sometimes also of regional governments) towards their part of the border area,

– language policy and ethnic policy of national governments (regional governments) towards the border area on the other side of the border,

– mutual relations between national governments resulting from their attitudes towards language and ethnic policy of their counterpart.

Distribution of languages/dialects. As regards the distribution of languages or dialects in border areas, of special importance is similarity or affinity of local dialects (languages) to standard official languages of bordering countries. It is because high affinity of a dialect (language) to a standard language suggests that this dialect (language) in fact belongs to the language area represented by this standard language. In turn, belonging to a language area implies that inhabitants of this language area belong to the same ethnic nation. In some historical periods, especially in the 19th and early 20th century in Europe, belonging to an ethnic nation was considered as a cause for territorial claims, according to the idea that a (ethnic) nation should live in its national state and that a national state should entail all members of this (ethnic) nation. In the case of similarity of a dialect of a country to the standard official language of this country, this similarity was considered as an evidence that belonging of speakers of this dialect to this country was just and correct. In the opposite case, if a dialect was similar to the official language of another country, this gave this country (its government) the reason to demand annexation (incorporation) of the areas of this dialect in the name of 'unification of the nation' or, at least, to demand special treatment of speakers of this dialect as a 'national minority'. Such demands, naturally, provoked tensions between the countries concerned.

It should also be noted that 1) until the 19th century (and quite often even later) state borders and borders of language areas were mutually independent, 2) language areas usually formed linguistic continua without clearly defined lan-

guage borders, 3) in areas of overlapping languages bilingualism was a frequent phenomenon. The first point means that the shape of state territories used to depend on other factors than distribution of languages or ethnic groups. As a result, each state territory was a mosaic of languages (dialects) and the same or similar languages or dialects were divided by state borders. Linguistic diversity usually was most pronounced in border areas as these areas were located far away from political and cultural centres of there countries, these centres being also centres of diffusion of a standardised national culture and language. Besides, border areas usually were relatively lately incorporated to the country, were subject of border (state belonging) shifts, and thus the time for implementing national culture and language there was shorter than in inner areas. The second point (linguistic continua) means that usually there were no clear-cut linguistic borders between similar dialects: similarity (and comprehensibility) of dialects depended on intensity of contacts between their speakers, and this, in turn, usually, on distance. More clear language borders existed between dialects belonging to unrelated (distant) language families, e.g. Slavonic and Germanic, Germanic and Romance, Slavonic and Hungarian, etc. It should also be remembered that until the 19th century (and later) most people spoke only or mostly their dialects, the emerging standard national languages were spoken only by a small minorities of intellectuals, aristocrats and state functionaries. To make the language situation in border areas even more complicated, in the case of stable political situation and long lasting contacts between speakers of various languages, bilingualism was a wide-spread phenomenon. Consequently, quite often it was hard to determine to which language a given person belonged.

Ethno-linguistic self-definition and linguistic attitudes. As can be concluded from the above comments, objective language situation usually left large space for interpretations or subjective attitudes regarding belonging of speakers of border areas to one or another language area, to one or another ethnic or political nation. It also should be taken into account that for various persons and various communities different factors were decisive in their self-definition as members of given ethnic nation, political nation or in defining their political attitudes. Apart from language, these factors were religion, culture, state allegiance, economic interests, etc.

From the point of view of the relationships between border language politics and international relations, three questions deserve special attention:

1. Whether inhabitants of an area define themselves as part of the dominant nation within the state they live in or as part of the nation dominant in the neighbouring state or as part of a third nation (ethnic group). As noted above, it

should be remembered that language was not the only factor determining national self-definition.

2. Whether speakers of a dialect (set of dialects) define their linguistic variety as a dialect of the dominant (national) language of the state they live in or as a dialect of the dominant (national) language of the neighbouring state or as a dialect of a third language. It should be noted that linguistic distance between linguistic varieties is not enough to define relationship between them, e.g. whether variety A is a separate language or a dialect of language B or language C. The final decision is always subjective and political[1].

3. In the case of linguistic affinity of the local variety with the language of the neighbouring state, the question is whether the local community is aware of it, whether this community accepts it, and if it accepts it – whether it masters and uses the standard (national) variety of this language. Three situations can be distinguished:

a) local community is not aware that on the other side of the border people speak the same or a similar language because of insufficient contacts,

b) local community rejects similarity of its dialect (language) to the language on the other side of the border pointing out to minor differences as crucial for distinguishing the two varieties (this happens when the given community for any reason does not want to be identified with people on the other side of the border),

c) local community does not master and not speak standard variety of the neighbouring country and use standard language of its country in contacts with people from the other side of the border.

Language policy and ethnic policy of governments towards their part of the border area. Needless to say, given that ethno-linguistic self-definition and linguistic attitudes largely depend on subjective decisions of inhabitants, governments try to influence them as well as try to influence the objective linguistic situation. A challenge for language and ethnic policies is (or has been) existence

[1] The case in point is the region called Spisz in Polish and Spiš in Slovak. Majority of this region now belongs to Slovakia. Despite the obvious greater similarity of its dialect to standard Polish (and other Polish dialects) practically all inhabitants of the Slovak Spiš declare themselves as (ethnic) Slovaks and their dialect as a Slovak dialect (or as irrelevant for their ethnic and national self-definition). Interesting and instructive is the case of the village Jurgów in Polish Spisz. All its inhabitants are of local origin, speak the same dialect and confess the same religion (Roman Catholicism). Some of them declare themselves as (ethnic) Poles, their dialect as a Polish dialect and in Church services they use standard Polish while others declare themselves as (ethnic) Slovaks, their dialect as a Slovak dialect and they use standard Slovak in church services (both groups use the same church) (Jagiełło 2000, p. 427).

on 'this side' of the border of linguistic varieties different from standard national language. Three questions result from this existence:

1. To recognize this existence or not? Official policies have four options:

a) to accept that a dialect on its territory is part of language area located mostly outside its territory (and consequently that its speakers belong to another ethnic nation),

b) to recognize a dialect as a separate language (and its speakers as a separate ethnic group),

c) to claim that the dialect in question is part of the language area on 'this side' of the border – this is possible if languages on both sides form a linguistic continuum,

d) to ignore it by not taking any official stance.

2. In the case of admitting existence of other varieties than the official national language, the question is: to what extent they are accepted in the public life? In such a situation:

a) the policy may accept the right of the local population for using its language in the public life (the range of spheres where this language is admitted in the public life may vary in time and space),

b) the policy may tolerate using other languages or dialects only in the private sphere,

c) the policy may aim at eliminating other languages (by assimilation or by removal of the concerned population) or at weakening demographic strength of other languages by settling down people of desirable language and ethnicity.

3. To what extent language policy is successful in replacing dialects and other languages by standard national language? The last question is important because replacement of dialects (and other languages) by standard national languages divide language areas by state borders, eliminates cross-border linguistic continua and accentuates linguistic differences between the two sides of the border.

Without going into details now (this issue will be dealt with later on in this paper) it should be noted that in the 19th and early 20th century practically all states carried out policies of linguistic homogenisation, including in border areas, by spreading the knowledge and use of their standard national languages. Recognising by governments of other languages on its own territory was mostly dictated by international agreements (usually peace treaties) or was tactical – to weaken a more dangerous national movement.

Language policy and ethnic policy of governments towards the border area on the other side of the border. Governments may influence the situation

on their side of the border but also on the other side of the border. They may also influence language and ethnic policies of neighbouring countries. Two questions are of special importance: 1) whether they try to influence ethnic and linguistic self-definition and linguistic behaviours of populations on the other side of the border, and 2) whether they accept language and ethnic policy of governments of neighbouring states towards populations living on both sides of the common border. As regards the first question, it should be noted that a) language and ethnic policy of a state may define population on the other side of the border as continuation of its own language and ethnic area (as its national minority or compatriots abroad) and promote its own standard national language among this population, b) language and ethnic policy may regard population on the other side of the border as 'related by affinity' and try to be its protector without promoting its own national language there[2], and c) language and ethnic policy may regard population on the other side of the border as not belonging to its language and ethnic area. Adoption of one of those three policies only to some extent depends on linguistic similarity of populations on both sides of the border, it depends also on cultural, socio-psychological and political considerations, and may change in time. When analysing the second question (attitudes towards policies of other countries) it should be pointed out that a) government (and public opinion in the given country) may accept or ignore policies carried out by neighbouring states, b) government (and public opinion) may consider policies of a neighbouring country towards population in 'our country' as unacceptable interference in 'internal affaires', c) government (and public opinion) may consider policies of a neighbouring country towards 'our compatriots abroad' as unacceptable discrimination and/or assimilation. In the latter case the extreme policy is to claim and annex territory of the neighbouring country in the name of protecting its compatriots.

The practice of influencing language situation and language policy on the other side of the border has been common, especially in central and eastern Europe in the 19th–21st centuries. What has been changing is the intensity, instruments and aims of this influence, the latter ranging from defence of human rights until territorial claims.

Mutual relations between national governments. Attitudes towards neighbouring country's language and ethnic policy can be an element defining

[2] As an example one may quote the case of Sorbians, a Slavic ethnic group in Germany, for whom the Czechs feel (or felt) a duty to be their protectors in matters related to defence of their language and identity without imposing Czech language or identity.

relations between governments. The impact of attitudes towards neighbouring country's language and ethnic policy on mutual relations can especially strong when there are objective factors existence of sizable ethno-linguistic minorities in one or both countries concerned, and subjective factors – disagreements related to policies of the counterpart country. Existence of minorities (of 'our' people on the other side of the border) and disapproval of other country's ethnic and linguistic policy can be a pretext for territorial claims and even wars, as was the case with German annexation of parts of territory of Czechoslovakia in the eve of the Second World War. The present (2014) conflict in Ukraine and crisis in relations between Ukraine and Russia has also to do with language politics (accusation of Ukraine by Russia and pro-Russian separatists for discrimination against Russian-speakers in Ukraine).

3. HISTORICAL TENDENCIES IN BORDER LANGUAGE POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (SINCE BEGINNING OF THE 19th CENTURY IN EUROPE)

The history of language politics (including border language politics) and of its relationship with international politics in Europe since the beginning of the 19th century can be divided into several stages. The following periods can be proposed:

1) the early stage of nation-state building – until mid-19th century,
2) the hottest period of nationalism – between mid-19th and mid 20th century,
3) 'post-nationalism' – after 1950 in most European countries (outside former USSR),
4) return of the idea of nation-state building – after the break-up of the USSR.

Differences between these periods relate to the intensity of the language question as a political question and to the way it influenced international relations.

The early stage of nation-state building – until mid-19th century. In this period no specific language and ethnic policy addressed towards border areas was carried out. State borders came across language areas which formed linguistic continua. Almost every state was multilingual, but within state boundaries or within ethno-linguistic areas intense process of language-building' (standardisation of languages and diffusion of their knowledge) took place. Standard national languages were usually based on dialects of capital cities or other central regions and the spread of them were the most intense in central regions thus leading to emergence of ethno-linguistic dichotomy: centre – periphery, where centre was relatively homogeneous with strong position of a standard

national language and linguistically differentiated peripheries. In some cases presence of relatively well developed standard languages in border areas was result of border shifts. The best example of this was the presence of Polish in western borderland of the Russian Empire, south-eastern border area of Prussia and northern borderland of the Austrian Empire, this being the result of the partitioning of Poland by the end of the 18th century.

The hottest period of nationalism – between mid-19th and mid 20th century. Symbolically, this period starts with the 'Spring of Nations' (1848) and ends with the end of the Second World War and the following shifts of borders and transfers of peoples (1945–1948). In this period the language became a first-rang political issue shaping internal and international relations. Generally speaking, in this period two tendencies were competing: adjustment of language to state territories (diffusion of the knowledge and use of the national language, elimination of undesired languages and linguistic varieties from state territories by assimilation or by expulsion of their speakers) and adjustment of state territories to language (emergence of relatively linguistically homogeneous states out of territories of multilingual empires, drawing borders of newly established states along linguistic borders, annexations of part of territories belonging to other countries populated by people speaking language of the annexing state). Both tendencies were source of intense international conflicts.

This period deserves special attention. Its main characteristics, in an ideal form, were the following:

– tight relation between state, nation and language: state was considered as a form securing existence of a nation, having a standard (national) language was regarded as a proof of being a nation, speaking a certain language was a proof of belonging to the respective nation, it was believed that a nation should live in one state and that a state should entail all territories where its national language was spoken leading to national unification movements (unification of Germany, Italy, Romania);

– ethno-linguistic homogenisation of states: standard national languages and national consciousness were diffused via education system, military service, religion institutions, etc., other languages were eradicated (by assimilation or by expulsion of their speakers) or were weakened by recognising of many languages out of similar dialects to avoid formation of strong ethno-linguistic groups or identification of local population with foreign nations and states (the best example being recognition of Kashubian, Silesian and Masurian languages, apart of Polish, by German scientists while Polish national movement considered them as merely dialects of Polish); the hottest 'battle for languages' took place in peripheral and border areas (practically in all European states in this period);

– emergence or consolidation of 'stateless nations' – ethnic groups created or revitalised their national standard languages and demanded autonomy or strived for independence as reaction to ethno-linguistic homogenisation policy of state governments – the most intensive movement of stateless nations occurred in peripheral and border areas; in some cases this movement lead to appearance of new states after the 1st world war (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) none of them being ethno-linguistically homogeneous, with border areas being especially ethno-linguistically heterogeneous; the latter phenomenon lead to legal institutionalisation of 'national minorities' (by the League of Nations) but only in central-eastern Europe;

– the need for ethnic (national) and linguistic self-definition by border and peripheral peoples: they were forced (by intense nationalist propaganda) to decide whether they were a part of the respective state nation (in which they lived) or a national minority (part of a nation living abroad – in a 'keen state') or a separate ethnic group; the choice of ethnic (national) self-definition usually determined their linguistic choices: to adopt standard language of the state they lived in or the standard national language of their 'keen state' (or the standard language of the 'stateless nation' with which a given ethnic group identified itself), to create its own standard language or to use standard language of the state of residence in some spheres while using local dialects in other spheres (the best example are Kashubians in Prussia until the end of the First World War: they 'exercised' all the above options, torn between using German, standard Polish, Kashubian dialects and the idea of creating a standard Kashubian language);

– international (inter-state) conflicts over state belonging of border areas, based on ethno-linguistic considerations and over policy towards border areas peoples: several states were accused for discrimination or assimilation of 'our' people on the other side of the border or, vice versa, were accused for interference into 'our' internal affaires (practically all states emerged after the First World War and their neighbours were involved in such accusations); in some cases conflicts took place over the definition 'what is a nation' with implication for territorial claims (whether a nation is a group of people speaking the same language or a nation is a group of people wanting to be part of this nation, regardless of their language – conflict was first of all between Germany and France over Alsace and Lorraine, where Germany stressed the role of language while France the role of 'will' and culture).

The final result of the above tendencies was the (almost complete) ethno--linguistic homogenisation of nation states (in most of western and central-

-eastern Europe) as a result of two processes: adjusting of state borders to ethno--linguistic areas and ethno-linguistic homogenisation (including assimilation and expulsion) of state territories. These processes were accompanied by conflicts, wars, discriminations, expulsions and sufferings.

'Post-nationalism' – after 1950 in most European countries (outside former USSR). In this period in western Europe and in most of the central-eastern Europe language cessed to be a serious political problem and source of international conflicts. In most countries in border areas there were no meaningful ethno-linguistic groups different from the main ethno-linguistic groups in their respective countries (minority ethno-linguistic groups used to concentrate in big urban centres as a result of immigration). Ethno-linguistic diversity (just like biological diversity) became a value, initiatives multiplied aiming at protection of (indigenous) ethno-linguistic minorities, especially in the last quarter of the 20th century (the most comprehensive of them being the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages adopted by the Council of Europe in 1992 and signed and ratified by a vast majority of European countries). It is worth noting that the protection of linguistic and cultural diversity did not encompass languages and cultures of immigrants, who otherwise often form more numerous groups than indigenous minorities. According to the then officially confessed ideology, supported by European institutions (the European Union, Council of Europe), minorities were 'bridges' between nations (nation states), therefore their existence in border areas should not only be accepted but also protected. This idea was inscribed into a broader concept of cross-border cooperation in the EU and the idea of multilingualism in border areas.

There were some exceptions to the above tendency, for instance tensions between Hungary and some of its neighbours (notably Slovakia and Rumania) over the treatment of Hungarian minority there or over interference of Hungary in internal affaires of these countries (e.g. granting Hungarian citizenship to ethnic Hungarians), or the conflict between Serbia and its Albanian minority in the 1990s. These conflicts and tensions were, however, exceptions and not the rule in Europe since mid-20th century.

Return of the idea of nation-state building – after the break-up of the USSR. Developments on the territory of the former USSR deserve a separate treatment. From the linguistic point of view USSR was an asymmetric federation with Russian being official language of its biggest part (Russia), the de facto official language of the USSR and one of official languages of each of the constituent parts ('republics'), located mostly in the broadly conceived border areas, of the USSR. In non-Russian republics Russian was in practice a privileged language and its speakers could do without the knowledge of local lan-

guages, and indeed, many of them, especially immigrants and indigenous ethnic minorities (they usually received education in Russian) did not speak them.

After the disintegration of the USSR (1991) newly independent states were faced with the language issue. Three of them – the three Baltic states – chose a radical policy of ethno-linguistic homogenisation (mixed with some tolerance towards ethno-linguistic minorities) to redress the legacy of Russian/Soviet (and Polish in Lithuania in a distant past) domination. Russian was downgraded to the position of a minority language, in Estonia and Latvia inhabitants not speaking local languages were deprived of citizenship, in all of the three (including Lithuania) countries minority languages (in the case of Lithuania the main minority language being Polish) are not allowed to be used in public administration, even in areas were those minorities form vast majorities, be used in place names, etc. The treatment of ethno-linguistic minorities, including language policy of these three countries, is a source of tensions between them and Russia or Poland.

Ukraine undertook a policy that can be called 'mild Ukrainisation' of eastern and southern Ukraine populated by Russian speakers. It meant that Ukrainian was declared the only official language on the whole territory of Ukraine (but only in the written form, while in oral Russian is generally used, even in Kiev and among state functionaries – similarity of these languages makes them mutually comprehensible), and Ukrainian was introduced as compulsory subject in schools all over the country. In Crimea situation was slightly different as the official language was Russian, but correspondence between Crimean authorities and the Ukrainian government had to be in Ukrainian and Ukrainian was a compulsory subject in schools. The lack of official status for Russian has been a source of dissatisfaction of some Russian speakers in Ukraine. During the political crisis in Ukraine in 2014 this dissatisfaction, together with some encouragement and direct support by Russia, was one of reasons, or excuses, of the revolt of eastern regions, bordering with Russia, against the authorities in Kiev. In this context it is worth remembering that one of the first decision of the Ukrainian parliament after toppling down of Viktor Yanukovych as president of Ukraine, was a ban on use of other languages than Ukrainian in the public life (aimed mostly against Russian). Although this was immediately vetoed and made invalid by the then acting president, it deteriorated relationships between the government in Kiev and populations of the east-most regions.

4. SOME EXAMPLES OF BORDER LANGUAGE POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE

Below are enumerated, without extensive description, just a few examples of border language politics and their relationship with international politics. They represent various types of issues as regards their political importance, kind of linguistic disputes, etc.

1. Whose is Alsace and Lorraine? In the second half of the 19th and the first half of the 20th century Franco-German relations were determined by the conflict over this border territory. The conflict had to do with the language issue as Germany claimed this territory because the language (dialect) spoken there was German and therefore the population was German, while France rejected the role of language in determining national identity and state belonging stressing the role of 'collective will' of inhabitants of this areas to be French[3]. Nowadays, Alsace and Lorraine being part of France are presented as a 'bridge' between France and Germany. Interestingly, in the process of promoting its regional languages France supports 'Germanisation' of Alsace as it accepts standard German language used in Alsace as 'regional' Alsatian language, instead of the true Alsatian dialect (language)[4].

2. Whose are Corsica and Sardinia? Since its establishment in the second half of the 19th century Italy claimed Corsica and occupied it during the Second World War. This was based on the assertion that the there dialect was an Italian dialect, and consequently, the there population was Italian. It can be said that the Corsican dialect was (and is) much more similar to standard Italian than to French and more similar to standard Italian than many dialects in Italy are. Otherwise, in the past, before Corsica's incorporation to France, standard Italian (Tuscany dialect) was literary language of educated people. At present Corsica is a French region, Corsican regionalists/nationalists retain that Corsican is a separate language, different from Italian. To confirm this claim they have elaborated a spelling that would distinguish Corsican from Italian. Otherwise this is a meaningless fact as most inhabitants of Corsica speak only French and in the public

[3] The idea of nation as a collective will is best expressed in the famous Renan's definition of nation formulated a few years after France lost the disputed area. On the political context and implications of the two (German and French) definitions of nation see i.a. T. Judt and D. Lacorne (2004).

[4] See for instance text in *Alsatian*, in standard German (Hochdeutsch) in W. Żelazny (2000, p. 333).

sphere domination of French is overwhelming[5]. As regards Sardinia, whose dialects (languages) were much more distant from standard Italian than the Corsican dialect was, after its incorporation by Piedmont and after unification of Italy Sardinian dialects, although unintelligible with Italian, were regarded as dialects of Italian and Italianisation of Sardinia has been carried out. Now most inhabitants of Sardinia speak only Italian and in the public sphere domination of Italian is overwhelming, despite the fact that, theoretically, Sardinian is recognized as a language and enjoys the status of co-official language (Ingrassia and Blasco Ferrrer 2009).

3. What was Friulan: an Italian dialect or a separate language? (Woźniakiewicz 2013) In the 19th century when the region of Friuli belonged to Austria, the dispute between proponents of the idea that Friulan was a separate language and those who defended the view that it was an Italian dialect involved the two countries. Assertion that it was an Italian dialect justified Italian claims for this territory while the contrary view weakened this claim. Austria being than a multi--ethnic empire could afford to grant status of language to any dialect.

4. To whom South Tyrol/Alto Adige should belong? This region, populated until the First World War almost exclusively by German-speaking inhabitant, during this war was annexed by Italy for security reasons. To strengthen its position there, in the interwar period Italy settled there ethnic Italians. For a long time this region was a source of conflict between Italy and Austria. The conflict was settled after the Second World War by granting the region autonomy within Italy including special linguistic rights for its inhabitants. It is probably the only region in Europe where an ethno-linguistic minority is not obliged to know the language of the state, and in fact many German speakers of South Tyrol do not speak Italian[6].

5. The 'battle' for Ruthenians in Austria (late 19th, early 20th century): are they Russians, Ukrainians or a separate ethnic group? Eastern Galicia was a peripheral region of Austria bordering with Russia. This location made self--identity of the local Ruthenian population strategically important for Austria's security. In interests of Austria was supporting non-Russian identity of this population, while in interests of Russia was just the contrary. Finally, the idea of

[5] On the Corsican language – its intra-linguistic characteristics and socio-linguistic situation see e.g. http://omniglot.com/writing/corsican.htm.

[6] More on the history and the present situation in the region can be found (in German and Italian) on the official web-side of the region Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol: http://www.regione.trentino-a-adige.it/default_d.aspx.

being Ukrainians, with the resulting idea of building standard Ukrainian language, took overhand[7].

6. How many Polish-like languages were in Prussia around 1900? According to German scientists there were at least four languages (Polish, Kashubian, Silesian, Masurian), the obvious aim was to weaken the Polish national movement with a hope that in the future none of those languages would exist, while Polish national movement retained that there was only one language – Polish, and it should exists for ever (Mańczak 2002). A similar question related to South Slavonic language or languages on the present territory of Slovenia around 1900, than belonging to Austria: according to Austrians there were at least four, while Slovenian national movement retained that there was only one, Slovenian, language in the form of several dialect (Mlinar 1994). Consequently, it formed one standard Slovenian language. Another similar question was: what was 'Slowjak' language around 1900 (in northern Hungary). According to Hungarian authorities it was a separate language different from Slovak, while according to Slovak nationalists there was no such language, it was a dialect of Slovak. In Hungary 'Slowjak' was widely used in the public life, in independent Czechoslovakia it was eliminated replaced by standard Slovak.

7. Elimination of undesired ethnicity and language from border areas: expulsion and forced emigration of Germans (and bans on using German in public life) from Poland and Czechoslovakia after the Second World War, extermination of Polish population by Ukrainian nationalists in what is now western Ukraine in 1943, exchange of populations between Poland and Soviet Ukraine after the war, emigration, mostly forced, of Polish population from former Polish territory incorporated by the USSR to Poland etc[8]. These were the most radical forms of adjusting language (and ethnicity) to territory.

8. Conflict between Romania and Russian Empire/USSR over Moldavian language, nationality and territory: is Moldavian another name for Romanian, or a separate language? Moldavia, once a separate duchy, was in the past divided into to parts. Its eastern part belonged to the Russian Empire, and, after the interwar break, to the USSR and now is a separate state. Western part remained

[7] There is abundant literature on the emergence of Ukrainian nationalism. One of the best specialists is Ukrainian-Polish-American scholar Roman Szporluk (see Szporluk 1997).

[8] On the expulsion of German population from Czechoslovakia and ban on use German (see e.g. Korbel 2002), on relations between Poland and its eastern neighbours (Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania), including exchanges of populations and forced migrations (see e.g. Barwiński 2012).

a separate state and together with another duchy (Walachia) formed today's Romania (Sobczyński 2001). Soviet authorities and now advocates of Moldavia as independent (from Romania) state retained (or retain) that Moldavian is a separate language or at least they use the name 'Moldavian' for the language of Moldavia. It is to confirm that Moldavians are a separate nation which justifies existence of independent Moldavia. Proponents of reunification of Moldavia with Romania, in both countries, claim that there is no Moldavian language and no Moldavian nation: there are only Romanians and the Romanian language (Heintz 2004).

9. Conflict between Bulgaria and Serbia/Yugoslavia over Macedonia: is Macedonian another variety of Bulgarian or a separate language? This conflict pushed in the first half of the 20th century three times Bulgaria to (lost) wars against Serbia/Yugoslavia. According to Bulgarians Macedonians spoke Bulgarian and were just a regional group of Bulgarians. Serbians at the beginning retained that they were Serbians, despite the fact that the Macedonian dialect was much closer to standard Bulgarian than to Serbian. Macedonians themselves were rather a borderland group without a clear ethnic (national) conscience. After the Second World War Yugoslav authorities decided to recognize Macedonian as a separate language, to establish standard Macedonian language, different from Bulgarian, to recognize Macedonians as a separate nation and to establish Macedonian statehood in the form of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia in the framework of the Yugoslav federation (Voss 2006). Now Macedonia is a separate state whose language has evolved independently from Bulgarian, and Bulgaria has finally accepted independence of Macedonia and, in fact, recognized Macedonian language.

10. The current conflict between Ukraine and Russia (and anti-Ukrainian separatists) over the status of Russian and state belonging of eastern Ukraine – see comments in chapter 3.4.

11. Expansion of standard languages cutting off members of an ethnolinguistic community living across the border: cases of Olivenza (a Portuguese dialect in Spain), Macedonian in Greece, Hungarian in Austria, Burgenland-Croatian in Austria, Flemish in France (rejection of the standard language as 'foreign')[9], etc. In these cases (except for Burgenland-Croatian) expansion of standard languages in detriment of dialects in the respective countries have accentuated a linguistic (and cultural) distance between speakers of supposedly the same language on both sides of the border. It has brought about several sociolinguistic outcomes: feeling of shame for not speaking standard national

[9] Some of these cases are dealt with in more detail in: S. Gal (2006).

language and using of standard national language of the country of residence in cross-border contacts (e.g. ethnic Hungarians in Austria prefer speaking German to Hungarians from Hungary to avoid speaking 'bad' Hungarian). Descendants of 16th–17th century Croatian migrants in Austria (in Burgenland bordering with Hungary) have rejected the 19th century reform of Croatian (it was for them too Serbian) and establish and still use a separate standard language called Burgenland-Croatian. Also Macedonians in Greece are about to reject standard Macedonian language which make them less resistant to assimilation to the Greek language.

5. BORDER LANGUAGE POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OUTSIDE EUROPE

Despite the fact that the language question is a serious problem outside Europe it has usually a 'technical' rather than a 'political' character, although with some socio-political implications (e.g. the choice between vernacular and colonial European languages or between local languages and Arabic in education and public administration in some African countries, introduction of Putonghua in China as all-Chinese official language, controversies over the role of pidgin and Creole languages in public life, etc.).

In the rare cases of strictly political language conflicts (e.g. in Canada [Quebec] over the status of French and English, in the Republic of South Africa during apartheid over the status of Afrikaans, in Pakistan shortly after its creation over the status of Urdu and Bengali in eastern Pakistan [today Bangladesh], controversies over the status of minority languages in Burma-Myanmar, etc.), with one exception mentioned below, they have internal character and have nothing to do with border language politics and international relations.

The only example of a serious international border conflict related to the language is Somalia (during the regime of Siad Barre or in Somali: Moxamed Siyaad Barre) and its territorial claims against Ethiopia (province of Ogaden) and Kenya (northern regions) motivated by the fact that these areas were populated by Somali-speaking peoples. This attitude was a result of the attempt to create Somalia as state of Somali-speaking people. This, in turn, originated from the decision by international forces to create Somalia out of former Italian and British colonies with the language as the only binding element. This created language-based Somali nationalism.

Absence of the relationship between language and international politics outside Europe results from a different, than in Europe, relation between language,

nation and state. From the point of view of the political role of language non--European countries can be divided into two groups: post-colonial countries with European languages as official languages (mainly in America and Africa), 'old monarchies' (mainly in Asia, but also Turkey and Ethiopia) and Arab countries. In the first group official language can not define territories of states as it is a foreign, brought from outside, language. In the second group, which is similar to European countries in the 'pre-nationalist' era (as described in chapter 3 of this paper), territories of states depended on non-ethnic (and non-linguistic) criteria. In the third group territories of states were largely determined by colonial powers and the chosen language as official language – (classical) Arabic – could not differentiate neither Arab countries nor distinguish them from non-Arab countries. The political role of language in all the three groups consists in the mechanism of adjusting language to territory within boundaries of individual states. The situation may change when and if there emerges a state based on ethnicity (and language), for instance free Kurdistan, whose mission would be unification of all territories populated by a given ethnicity.

6. FINAL REMARKS

As can be seen from the above discussion border language situation and policy can be a sensitive political issue involving international (intergovernmental) relations of neighbouring countries. This is especially true for Europe due to its specific role of language and ethnicity in forming contemporary states and their territories. More or less until the mid-19th century the relationship between border language situation and politics was reduced to expansion of official national languages of given countries into their border areas without provoking serious political conflicts (the then conflicts originated from other factors). Since the mid 19th century until mid 20th century, and in some cases until now, language became a hot political issue. On the one hand the policy of diffusing one national language (and national culture and identity) on the whole territory and elimination other languages in some states encountered opposition from the there populations defending their cultures, identities and languages. On the other hand the then popular idea of nation being a community speaking the same language and having the right for independence and unity gave rise to nationalist movements leading to unifying states using the same language, to breaking away ethno-linguistic groups from the existing multilingual and multi--ethnic states and creation of new states as well as to 'corrections' and demand

for 'corrections' of state boundaries to entail all people belonging to a given (ethnic) nation (speaking supposedly the same language) in one state. These processes inevitably caused conflicts between neighbouring states. Given that language, especially spoken dialects, is a quite 'flexible' matter without clearly defined territorial boundaries and given that objective language (spoken by a group) may differ from its subjective perception by its speakers and external observers, language in fact could hardly be a universal criterion for defining state boundaries giving space for politically motivated interpretations and internal and international conflicts. After the Second World War in most European countries language ceased to be a serious political problem due to a new attitude to the question of uniformity/heterogeneity of states, disappearance of sizeable ethno-linguistic minorities in border areas and to the general condemnation of nationalism as source of sufferings. As mentioned above, this does not mean that in some regions of Europe, especially in the 'late nation states', there is no discrimination against ethno-linguistic minorities in the name of nation-building.

The above paper focused on language problems and conflicts in border areas. Therefore it did not analyse other examples of language-based political conflicts, such as between the two main communities in Belgium (Flemish-speaking and French-speaking), conflicts in and around Catalonia, Basque Country or Galicia in Spain, etc.

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LANGUAGE BORDERS IN THE HEART OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE CASE OF BELGIUM

1. INTRODUCTION

Four years ago I published an article entitled: *Crises in the Brussels Capital Region. Will Belgium Survive 2011?* (Żelichowski 2011, p. 69). When I posed such a dramatically sounding question, the Kingdom of Belgium was in a deep political and constitutional crisis. Today I can say with satisfaction that Belgium not only has survived the crisis but seems to be going strong. Nevertheless, to solve the problems, which culminated around the Brussels Capital Region, it took the Belgian politicians many years. In the meantime on the political scene appeared a new political force – the New Flemish Alliance (Dutch: *Nieuw Vlaamse Alliantie*, N-VA) with a political program as radical as that of Flemish Interest (Dutch: *Vlaams Belang*, VB) but without the anti-emigration rhetoric. The main objective of the party has been to work out institutional reforms, which would gradually give more power and more autonomy to both Belgian communities. With an emphasis on its non-revolutionary character and pro--European attitude, N-VA won a convincing victory in the federal and regional elections and now is the main and decisive actor in any discussion about the future of the country.

The election slogans of the N-VA party, led by the charismatic leader Bart de Wever[1], leave no doubts. Their political objective is to release Flanders 'from Brussels dictatorship' and a future confederation with other member states,

[1] Bart Albert Liliane De Wever, b. 1970, a Belgian politician; since 2004 the president of the N-VA, a Belgian political party advocating independence for the Flemish region of Belgium within the European Union.

which would emerge from the old Belgium. Unlike the federal system, a confederation has no superior government and is not based on a central body which provides for the common defense and regulate relations between the member states, but instead has voluntary, autonomous states, which are bound by treaties of reciprocity and recognition[2]. N-VA does not plan revolutionary actions but only gradual, tough relentless and consistent implementation of the program of the party.

2. LANGUAGE

The dominating theme of the actions that N-VA undertakes is the protection of the cultural heritage, which consolidated the Flemish nation by centuries of common history. Since the beginning of the evolution of the territory, which comprises current Belgium, the question of the role and domination of one language over the other has always been the crucial issue. Although this question has been reflected in the Polish publications about Belgium, it does not underline its importance for the majority of people living there. What is worse, when analysing Polish publications, attentive readers may notice that they have been written from the position of the French-speaking population and, thus, may give the impression that this issue has been neglected, or not undertaken seriously. By writing from perspective of the French-speaking population, I mean mostly using and quoting sources written in the French language. As French has been much more popular among academicians, writers and journalists than Dutch, such an easy approach will tempt even the most objective investigator to accept opinions shaped by the French cultural or political circles, which generally are not favorable to the views of its opponents. It reflects a lack of sensitivity in such a sensitive matter, as the struggle for the proper position of the mother tongue of the Flemish majority living in Belgium. I find it particularly annoying when such opinions are formed in a country, whose inhabitants experienced in a similar painful history (e.g. Polish partitions).

[2] A loose association of states in which a central, subordinate and limited government structure is created for some common purpose (http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/C/Confederation.aspx). The Belgian regions and communities lack the necessary autonomy to leave the Belgian state. As such, the federal aspects seem to dominate. Also for fiscal policy and public finances, the federal state dominates the other levels of government.

Also geographical names in Polish-language publications about Flanders are full of French geographical names, such as the book published in the Polish series of Great Battles of the World on Kortrijk (1302), the most important battle of the Flemish people in the Middle Ages. In the battle known as the Battle of the Golden Spurs, the first symbols of the Flemish national consciousness was born (11 July is the Flemish national holiday). The Polish book bears the French title of the battlefield – *Courtrai*, that is, in the language of the enemy. I can imagine what reactions Polish historians and politicians would have if a comparable battle – Grunwald (1410) – was called the Battle of Tannenberg (i.e., the German name for the place). It would be certainly called anti-Polish provocation. Why then is there such a lack of sensitivity in the case of Kortrijk? I chose this example of language confusion because I do believe it should appeal to the imagination of the Polish reader but there are many other such examples.

More generally speaking, it is not much better if you browse the pages of popular publications and press releases in Western Europe or the United States on 'the state of affairs' in Belgium. One gets the impression that three official languages in a single country is nothing out of the ordinary (for example Switzerland or the United Kingdom), and the two languages are almost standard in Europe (Spain, the Netherlands, Finland). Why should we not be more attentive to the situation in Belgium? I will try to find answer to this question in the following chapters.

National identity and language. There has been much written and published on the role of language not only abroad but also in Poland. I would like to concentrate on the text delivered by Jerzy Bartmiński at the Congress of Polish Culture in Poznań in 2000, which bears the title *World language as the basis of national identity*. He used the following quote: whoever speaks like us is one of us, which implies 'Whoever does not speak as we do, does not belong to us' (Bartmiński 2000). The author posed the question to what extent the language is the benchmark which underlines our identification with a national or ethnic group. As he rightly notes further, the definitions of a nation, and ethnos (broader term) given in the dictionaries and encyclopedias refer almost without exception to language.

A practical dictionary of contemporary Polish language (Praktyczny słownik współczesnej polszczyzny), edited by H. Zgółkowa, includes the phrase: 'the nation, it is a permanent community of people created historically, with a common national awareness; an aggregation of people who speak the same language, has the same history, culture and a common economy and politics' (Zgółkowa 1999). Another author, who analyzed the semantic structure of the nation in different dictionaries, added also 'active' characteristics (features) such as terri-

tory, community, culture, history, origin, and 'a sense of belonging to the nation' (Puzynina 1998, p. 269). To give a language the chance to develop, the nation must be free, have its territory and national state. What happens, however, when in one territory there is competition between two languages, as it is case in Belgium?

To be able to objectively analyze the processes occurring there, it will be necessary to start with the removal of information noise coming from Brussels, where after the Second World War the European institutions were placed and, thus, transformed Belgian capital into a modern model of the Tower of Babel. Equality of languages of the members of the European Union in the official circulation creates the impression that the conflict between the Flemings and Walloons is just another local eruption of nationalism, which European countries have plenty of.

Nothing could be more wrong. The struggle for the language (Dutch: *de taalstrijd*) is an ongoing battle against the domination of the French language and French culture on the territory of Flanders, which has a centuries-long tradition. Luc Devoldere in his recently published collective work about the Franco-Flemish border (Istendael 2013, p. 35) makes a significant observation: it is a very strange struggle, with no death casualties on either side. Yet, it has had and still has enormous consequences for the Belgian State. I will focus on the origin of the conflict first.

The evolution of language. Dutch, which is currently the language of more than 23 million Europeans, primarily in the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Kingdom of Belgium, belongs to the family of Germanic languages. The contemporary standard German has developed from high-German dialects, found on the south side of the line Aachen-Frankfurt (Oder). The Dutch language developed to the North of this line.

> Dutch and German differ from each other not only geographically, but also historical and linguistic [...] In the Middle Ages, before the year 1500, the Germanic dialects, as well as those on the Mainland and those in England, were called, i.e. 'theodiscus' 'folk' – to distinguish the term from literary Latin, and derived from the Romanic languages and dialects. From the word 'theodiscus' was developed the term 'diets' or 'duits', as well as the English word 'Dutch'. Gradually they evolved into one common language, which was used independently, almost similar to local dialects (Vandeputte and Koch 1995, p. 11).

Standard Dutch language (Dutch: *Standaardnederlands*) has developed mainly from Brabantian and later from some Holland dialects. An important step towards a unified language was taken in 1618, along with the first translation of the Dutch Bible. The translation was created this way so that people from all

over the United Provinces could understand it. It used elements from various dialects but the linguists say that 'The Dutch language was born in Flanders, grew up in Brabant and reached maturity in Holland'[3].

* * *

The southern provinces of the Netherlands, which were under the authority of the Spanish and later Austrian Habsburgs, have used French as their official language for centuries. Higher classes of the Dutch-speaking provinces were Romanised very quickly. However, it is worth to add that due to the fact that each successive rulers wielded its power over the Netherlands 'from abroad', either from Madrid or from Vienna, so the use of the French language was a pragmatic necessity. It had also to do with position of the French language in Europe, which throughout the 17th century was the language commonly used in schools and universities (next to Latin) (Blom and Lamberts 2003, p. 217). Dominance of the French language and culture among European intellectuals and cultural institutions reached its peak in the18th century Europe (de Vries, Willemyns and Burger 1994, p. 97).

There is general consensus among historians of the Dutch language that the turning point for Dutch in Flanders came after the French occupation in 1795 (Vogl and Hüning 2010, p. 228). In order to effectively administer annexed lands, the French Revolutionaries published the decrees in local dialects, but French was the official language of the new authorities and only documents in French were considered to be valid. The French language prevailed in cities, but outside of their walls, people communicated in local dialects. Under such circumstances, the Dutch language in the southern Netherlands did not have prestige and those individuals having command only of Dutch did not have a chance to carry out official functions.

Although the period of French occupation and Napoleonic rule (1795–1814) are said to have been a period of successful Francisation/Romanisation (*ver-fransing*) of Flanders, the subsequent period is described as an unsuccessful 'Dutchification'[4] (de Haan 1990, p. 101).

The language and territory. The Congress of Vienna decided to merge the South and the North of the Netherlands into one state. The King of the Nether-

[3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Dutch#Standardization_and_Modern_Dutch

[4] Dutch: *vernederlandsing* or *neerlandisatie*, Eng. Batavianization or Batavianisation also known as *Dutchification*. It is the spread of the Dutch language, people and/or culture either by force or assimilation.

lands, Willem I[5], ordered to make the Dutch language, which was used by three-quarters of the citizens of the new state, equal to the French language. The Decree of 1819 stipulated that knowledge of the Dutch language was one of the conditions for the exercise of an office in the Kingdom of the Netherlands from 1 January 1823 onwards. Since 1823 the Dutch language was to be the official language in the army, the judiciary and administration in Western and Eastern Flanders, Antwerp and Limburg, and in 1827 in South Flemish Brabant, in the counties of Leuven and Brussels. The decree was only applicable in territories in which varieties of Dutch were in daily use and in which Dutch had played a role in administration through the centuries. Attempts to make Dutch the primary official language in the Kingdom of the Netherlands encountered resistance of the francophone aristocracy, Catholic clergy and Walloons, in particular. When in 1829 Willem I withdrew his decision, allowing for the return of the French language to Flanders, it was already too late (de Haan 1990, p. 101).

In the first months of the Belgian Revolution of 1830, the provisional government decided that the official language would be French. Flemish and German (Luxembourg's variety) were considered dialects. Created by the Western powers, the independent Kingdom of Belgium began its history as a French-language state. Meanwhile, a wave of romanticism, which appeared in European culture, influenced the revival of interest in own roots of the nations. As the authors of the cited work write:

> The 19th century is not only known as the century of nation state-building but also as the cradle of minority language revival movements. Examples are the Frisian, the Norwegian and also the Flemish movement, which all emerged in the course of the 19th century. No matter how different their backgrounds, means and goals may have been, generally speaking, they all focused their attention on the existence of 'other' languages used, or formerly used, within the nation state of the time. In this regard, they contributed to the re-emergence of a language ideology based on principles of diversity. On the other hand, they were deeply influenced by mainstream ideology which entailed a direct link between territorial, cultural and linguistic unity (Vogl and Hüning 2010, p. 228).

Hendrik Conscience's novel *The lion of Flanders* (Dutch: *De leeuw van Vlaanderen*, 1838) in which the Flemish people defeat *crème de la crème* of the French knighthood at the battle of Kortrijk, invoked a 'romantic enthusiasm'. There has been wide discussion over the shape of the language commonly called 'Flemish', however, as to its shape, there was no consent.

[5] William I, born *Willem Frederik Prins van Oranje-Nassau* (1772–1843), was a Prince of Orange and the first King of the Netherlands (1815–1840) and Grand Duke of Luxembourg.

3. FROM CULTURE TO SOCIAL ISSUES

At the end of the 19th century a qualitative change emerged. After a period of struggle for Dutch language and literature, there was a time of socio-economic issues. Reform projects in this field, proposed in 1858 by the Flemings Ahead! (Dutch: *Vlamingen Vooruit!*) and in 1861 by the Flemish Association (Dutch: *Vlaemsch Verbond*), were rejected by the authorities of the Kingdom of Belgium. 'These decisions resulted in part from the fact that all political forces concentrated around the King in the struggle for recognition by the contemporary political world of the so-called Belgian fact' (existence of Belgium). It is understood when one remembers that there was still the war conflict with the King of the Netherlands, who eventually agreed to recognise the sovereignty of Belgium only in 1839. Under pressure of many practical issues in the years 1873–1883 the so-called Language Acts (*Lexicon geschiedenis* 1994, p. 331) was introduced[6]. The first was adopted in 1873 and it regulated the issue of language in the criminal justice system in Flanders. Dutch was the main language although pleas and criminal proceedings could be offered in French. The so-called Second Language Law was adopted in 1878, and it concerned the scope of the use of the Dutch language by state administration in the provinces of Limburg, Antwerp, West Flanders and East Flanders, and in the *arrondissement*[7] of Leuven. From this year, messages and official regulations needed to be administered either in Dutch or in two languages (French and Dutch). Also the correspondence with municipal authorities in principle had to be carried out in Dutch[8]. For the *arrondissement* of Brussels, documents could be requested in Dutch. By 1900 most major Flemish cities along the language border, and the municipalities of the Brussels metropolitan area were still administered in French[9].

In 1883 the so-called Third Language Law was enacted. It defined the scope of use of the Dutch language in secondary education (previously it had been exclusively French).

Yet, it took 15 years to adapt the most important law – on the equality of languages in legal acts. The so-called Equality Act (French: *Loi d'égalité*, Dutch:

[6] http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taalwetgeving_in_Belgi%C3%AB

[7] An administrative level in Belgium, between the municipalities and the provinces.

[8] De Laet law: http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taalwetgeving_in_Belgi%C3%AB#1873:_de_tweede_taalwet

[9] Johan Slembrouck (2007-08-02). 'Sint-Stevens-Woluwe: een unicum in de Belgische geschiedenis', Overlegcentrum van Vlaamse Verenigingen (OVV).

Gelijkheidswet) (*Lexicon geschiedenis* 1994, p. 359, Łaptos 1995, p. 191) gave the same legal value to the texts of laws and Royal Decrees written in Dutch and French. It was a direct consequence of the law on the General Electoral Law of 1893, which gave every person over the age of 25 the right to vote. The most urgent need was to construct a network of schools with the Dutch language, which would educate intellectual end economist's elite. The Flemings started a fight for 'Dutchification' of the University of Ghent.

The resistance of the central authorities against the latter was reinforced by the attitude of the episcopate and Cardinal Mercier (Het Vlaamse Kruis, p. 11)[10] at the helm, who published on 5 September 1906 'Instruction', which negated the rationale for the use of the Dutch language in higher education (Het Vlaamse Kruis, p. 11). Allegations of 'the poverty' of the language, and the small scope of its effectiveness were absurd, since in the neighboring Netherlands this language served its purpose perfectly. Nevertheless, the Flemish had their success, when a year before the outbreak of the First World War, recruits could be trained in their own language (Kossmann 1986, p. 386). The practice, however, was different from the theory.

The turning point – the Great War. The Great War, which is how the First World War was called, was a shock for the Kingdom of Belgium. The traditional Belgian policy of neutrality was brutally violated by the invasion of the German troops. A portion of the army of the Kingdom of Belgium under the command of King Albert I resisted on the east bank of the river Ijzer.

Initially, Germany did not have a clear concept of their policy with respect to Belgium. There was a debate over the form of occupation, which would gain the support of the people living in those lands. So, the German Flemish policy (German: *Flamenpolitik*) was born. As a Polish historian rightly observes: 'any strengthening of the Flemish movement will serve to reduce the French advantage' (Łaptos 1995, p. 212). All historians cited here agree that the Flemish policy was shaped during the progressing war and it was not part of the assumptions of German politicians (Wils 1974, p. 29–30). This – what Vanacker calls 'the charm offensive' – was at odds with the approach of the military, who wanted to occupy the country and use its economic resources. These two

[10] Désiré-Félicien-François-Joseph Mercier (1851–1926), a Belgian Cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church, Archbishop of Mechelen Cardinal since 1907. Mercier is also known for opposing the use of Dutch language spoken by about 60% of the Belgian population. This was sparked by a conversation with a Flemish priest, to whom he said the following: Moi je suis d'une race destinée à dominer et vous d'une race destinée a servir (English: I belong to a race destined to dominate and you belong to a race destined to serve).

contradictory trends were fundamental principles of the Flemish policy (Vanacker 2006, p. 36). From 6 October 1914, the Dutch language replaced French in state publications and in January and February of the following year, the German authorities announced that correspondence in French would not be answered. Also on the bilingual borders, French was replaced by German. At the same time, the Germans began to separate prisoners of war from Wallonia and Flanders. There were even Teach Yourself books prepared for German officers and soldiers to learn the Dutch language.

The above practice clearly points out that the German political intention to divide and to dismantle the Belgian state was introduced earlier than the Flemish 'activism', a policy to defend Flemish interests on the basis of cooperation with the Germans. The adoption by many historians and publicists of the thesis about the so-called 'spontaneous' Flemish cooperation with German occupants poisoned relations between Walloons and Flemish population for the long postwar years (Wils 1974, p. 32). The 'activists', which were in favor of rapid implementation of the program of the Flemish Movement during the war, were dragged into interaction with the invader, which was ready to accept some Flemish demands[11] (*Lexicon geschiedenis* 1994, p. 9). 'Activists' considered Germanization to be the lesser evil than further functioning within Belgium.

Meanwhile, the German authorities consequently worked on opening the Dutch language University in Ghent. Only 40 students took part in the inauguration of the academic year of the only university teaching in the Dutch language in Flanders (Wils 1974, p. 167).

* * *

The breach of the Language Act of 1913 on 1 January 1917 by the Minister of War, which resulted in cancelling the bilingual education program of non-commissioned officers and officers, as well bilingual reports and messages on the front line, had far reaching consequences. From 1916 there was the constant growing belief that the army needed her own trade unions, representing their interests, but it had to be built from the bottom up. So the Front Movement (Dutch: *Front Beweging*) was born, which would change the existing situation. The fact that 80% of the recruits in the Belgian army were Flemish and less than one per cent of them knew French, constituted hard proof that the military units

[11] Activism is the name of the faction of the Flemish Movement during the First World War, which by collaborating with the Nazis sought to strive for independence (maximalists). Flemish patriots who refused to cooperate with the Nazis were called minimalists by their opponents: http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Activisme_ (Vlaanderen).

were, in fact, Flemish(!). On 21 March 1917 Governor von Bissing[12] announced that there would be a division of Belgium into the Flanders and Wallonia, with Brussels as the administrative capital for Flemings, and Namen for Walloons respectively. And that the Council of Flanders would be created. In reaction to the German statements, the Belgian government-in-exile issued a warning that any persons, which would help the enemy to create new institutions would be threatened with punishment from 15 to 20 years of forced labor, and with six months to 20 years for those who would cooperate with them. The Belgian Government announced also that immediately after the liberation, all nominations given by the Germans would be considered void.

In response to threats by the Belgian government in November 1917, the Flemish Council received orders from the German authorities to prepare elections, which would give the impression that the German Flemish policy had solid grounds for its continuation. On 22 December 1917, the Council announced its plan for the independence of Flanders, and in Brussels on 20 January 1918 Flanders was proclaimed free (Wils 1974, p. 223). This fatal decision of the Council made for bitter relations between Flemish-Walloon in post-war Belgium. The Flemish Council provoked a wave of hatred against the Flemish Movement. There was a great aversion to 'activists', especially among members of the Government of La Havre (in-exile), which led to their withdrawal from Dutchification of University in Ghent (*Lexicon geschiedenis* 1994, p. 9).

Inter-War Period. On 11 November 1918 Germany capitulated. King Albert returned to Brussels and in his throne speech announced universal suffrage along with special attention to language problems so 'each of our two nations in his own language would fully be able to shape its future' (Wils 1974, p. 240). In December 1918 and February 1919, provisions for the implementation of language laws in secondary education were published.

It is not easy to assess the effects of 'activism' for the position of the Flemings during the inter-war period. The behaviour of 'activists' had a far-reaching effect, primarily in bringing the Flemish cause to the attention of international forums and on the birth of an anti-Belgian ferment within the Flemish Movement.

The main result of this 'activism' was, however, the collision between the Flemish and Belgian ideas on the future of the state and national consciousness. The result was polarization and strengthening of contradictory attitudes about Flemish Movement. The most profound negative effects of 'activism' could be

[12] Moritz von Bissing (1844–1917, the German Governor-General of Belgium 1914–1917, and one of the chief proponents of the Flamenpolitik.

felt in Brussels. The Flemish life here has almost entirely been eradicated. In Wallonia, the anti-Flemish sentiments were strengthened to the extend that the Belgian Party of Working People, which traditionally supported the Flemish language request, withdrew from their support.

From 1928 in government circles, the prevailing thought was that Flanders must become a monolingual region of Belgium. The law of 31 July 1921 was based on the principle of territoriality. The language areas were outlined according to the principle of language of the majority of the population. The Dutch language became the official language for correspondence of the ministerial bodies of Flanders. The reform of the University of Ghent in 1923 gave students the choice to study two-thirds of their subjects in French or Dutch (Łaptos 1995, p. 222). The Socialists in the so-called 'the Belgian compromise' of 1929 took social moods into account and gave support to postulate the creation of one-language Flanders (Kosman 1986a, p. 114). The Belgian Government, without waiting for the initiative of the Parliament, carried out full Dutchification of the University of Ghent in 1930. Two years later, two of the acts laid down rules to remain one-language principle in the provincial administration and schools (primary and secondary, as well as private).

The 1932 law determined that a language census should be conducted every 10 years. A municipality could only change its linguistic status according to the findings of the census. This resulted in a more flexible principle of territoriality with the possibility for minorities representing at least 30 percent of the local population to obtain services in their language of origin[13]. The following years brought laws on the use of Dutch in the judiciary (1935) and in the army (1938). Although in the interwar years, the unitary state was still strong, the idea of federalism also gained popularity among Walloons. In the 1930s they even proposed the revision of the Constitution and the establishment of trilateral Federation of Wallonia, Flanders and Brussels.

4. THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The most profound effect of the ideology of 'activists' was the collaboration of Flemish nationalists during the Second World War. As Łaptos aptly notes:

> French-language historiography was strongly critical of the Flemish during the occupation. So, for the sake of the right proportion, it is important to recall

[13] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Language_legislation_in_Belgium#1873:_the_first_laws_on_the_use_of_languages

> that the attitude of the Flemish, in part at least, was a reaction to the aggressive position against them, especially by the Walloon press and especially the press which was edited in exile 'Le Vingtième Siècle [The Twenty Century]', where Fernad Neuray (1874–1934), favored the position of the French policy of annexation, which included Luxembourg, Limburg, Rhineland. The vision of the state dominated by Walloons equally could not raise enthusiasm. It should be added – for the sake of accuracy – that the Nazi occupants also had managed to find a group of collaborators in Wallonia, which led to the creation of the Walloon Council, which fortunately fled in 1918 along with the Nazis without leaving any successors, or heritage (Łaptos 1995, p. 212).

'Collective memory is selective', noted the author of an article published in the American weekly *Newsweek*. 'The Flemish, though small in number had actually collaborated, have suffered enough pains during both the German occupation and by incessant accusations of collaboration severely hurt them'[14].

* * *

Repression, which met German collaborators after the war again deeply divided Belgians (Witte and Meynen 2006, p. 422). On both sides of the barricades, people were guilty of collaboration. Sentences for collaborations affected both populations – Flemish as well as Walloons. After the war, the country was torn apart internally due to the conflict concerning King Leopold III, who was interned by the Germans in Austria. In 1951 when he tried to return to the country, the Belgian dissatisfaction with his attitude forced him to cede the throne to the eldest son – Baldwin (1953–1993). In the new political situation, it was clear that the Unitarian state, after many years had come to an end. Political life were steering the country toward federalism.

5. THE LANGUAGE ISSUE AGAIN

Although the war wounds were healed, the relations between the Flemish and Walloons populations became a major issue in the internal politics of Belgium. In 1959, Dutch was considered to be the legally functioning language (Dutch: *een rechtstaal volwaardige*) in Flanders. In the beginning of the 1960s, budget cuts from expenditure on the military intervention in Congo seriously affected

[14] *Pralinkowe królestwo. Czy Belgia trafi do podręczników historii jako największa pomyłka nowożytnej Europy? Walonowie i Flamandowie usilnie nad tym pracują* (Kingdom of Pralines. Whether Belgium will go into history books as the biggest mistake of modern Europe? Walloons and Flemings are working hard on it), http://www.newsweek.pl/artykuly/pralinkowe-krolestwo,7902,2.

the available funds that had been intended for social benefits. Austerity policies (under the name: Dutch: *Eenheidswet*/French:*Loi unique)* introduced by government of Prime Minister Gaston Eyskens[15], caused the so-called Winter General Strike in the years 1960–1961. This was the most important strike of the 20th century in Belgium. With the support of the Walloon Movement[16], which in the 1960s turned into a mass movement led by the Walloon wing of the General Federation of Belgian Labor (ABVV/*FGTB*), the working class started to demand federalism as well as structural reforms (Kesteloot 1998, p. 150). The Christian Flemish Union (Dutch: *Christelijke Vlaamse Unie*), created on the occasion of the election of 1954, placed the same slogan on party banners. So, unexpectedly, the wish to create a federation found support on both sides of the barricade.

It should be noted that the Flemish had in mind a division based on the cultural argument while Walloons wanted it based upon economic considerations. Nevertheless, animosity played an important role based upon the belief that the Flemings were still discriminated against, although their economic and political position was heading in a positive direction, and the Walloons were confident of the fact that they, indeed, were victims of revenge for their attitude.

In order to appease the social sentiments, which were deteriorating as a result of the marches organized by the Flemish Movement in Brussels, Parliament accepted two important laws on language. These were the Laws of 24 July 1961, which prohibited asking questions about language usage in the national census and the Law of 8 November 1962, which introduced the modification of the boundaries of the cantons and municipalities, with a view in mind to minimize language boundaries. The provinces, with the exception of Brabant, turned into single-language provinces. Their borders were based on language boundaries (van Istendael 1989, p. 86). Following these legal acts, the usage of language in education, administration and the judiciary was regulated, which strengthened the single-language structure of Wallonia and Flanders. The 1962 law determined which municipality belonged to which language area. From then on, modifications in the linguistic regime would only be possible by changing the law, which required a majority of each language community. In that same year, the municipality of Voeren (French: Fourons) went to the Dutch-speaking province

[15] Gaston François Marie, Viscount Eyskens (1905–1988), a Christian democratic politician and Prime Minister of Belgium. He was also an economist and member of the Belgian Christian Social Party (CVP-PSC).

[16] The Walloon Movement has focused on the defence of French as Belgium's sole official language. It was born in 1880 with the foundation of a *Walloon and French-speaking defence movement* following the first linguistic laws of the 1870s.

of Limburg, and Comines (Dutch: Komen) and Mouscron (Dutch: Moeskroen) to the French-speaking province of Hainaut. They obtained status of municipalities with language facilities for the minority language group.



Fig. 1. Belgium. Language divisions
Source: author

From the language border in the unitary state to the official language in the federal state.

The Flemish-Walloon Agreement on the delimitation of language borders (the language areas)[17] was signed in 1963. The border between the language areas was also called Belgian language or linguistic border[18]. It was based on the actual language border between the *sprachraums*[19] though it was not identical[20].

[17] The language areas were established by the Second Gilson Act, which entered into force on August 2, 1963.

[18] 'In Belgium the constitutional notion of language border not only refers to the demarcation lines between monolingual territories but also to the demarcation lines between monolingual and officially bilingual zones'.

[19] In linguistics, a *sprachraum* is a geographical region where a common first language (mother tongue), with dialect varieties, or group of languages is spoken.

[20] 'Als goede buren – Vlaanderen en de taalwetgeving – Taalgrens en taalgebieden'. *Vlaanderen.be* (in Dutch); 'Wallonia: birth of a Region'. CRISP.

The concept of 'language area' is a legal concept. The Dutch language not only is an area where Dutch is spoken but where Dutch is used for a number of domains that the law expressly defines – government, education, justice and business. The Dutch-speaking region of Flanders is monolingual Dutch.

For the first time, the language areas (unilingual Flanders and Wallonia) were precisely defined by the language laws of the 1930s. They were based on the principle of territoriality – the use of a particular language in a certain territory in education, justice and governance. This practice is written into the Belgian Constitution and is recognised by the highest national and international judicial institutions.

It is worth noting here that the Belgian federal model was built upon the principle of territoriality. It also can be found in Switzerland and Canada. A living language is rooted inextricably in its own territory in relation to the people who live in that territory. A language can only survive if it is spoken by a community and a community can only survive if they have a territory.

* * *

The language border runs near the town of Leuven (Dutch: Leuven, French: Louvain). Student protests which began in 1966, with varying degrees of severity, led to the division of the University on the Dutch-language University in Leuven (Dutch: *Katholieke Universiteit Leuven*) and the French Louvain la Nueve, which was moved to an area on the other side of the language border. A similar change occurred in Brussels. In addition to the Free University of Brussels (French: *Université Libre de Bruxelles*) a Dutch-language university equivalent was established (Dutch: *Vrije Universiteit Brussel*).

The outcome of the elections in 1968 and the readiness of the Prime Minister Gaston Eyskens to implement the radical reforms paved the way for constitutional changes. In September 1969, the Working Group for Solution of the Community Problems (the language), called the Group of 28 began to work.

> It is widely accepted that the Belgians bid farewell to the unitary on 24 December 1970, accepting the third amendment to the Constitution in the history of the independent state. There was no agreement, however, as to whether this farewell meant the transition to a federal system. The legislature in this regard was very moderate—it is tempting even to say, nostalgically so – and over the next 20 years, it has avoided using the notion 'federation'. However, finally at the beginning of 1993 stretched it to the institutions set up to live in 1970 (Łaptos 1995, p. 268).

Nevertheless, the changes have become a fact.

In 1970, upon the completion of the first state reform, four language areas were established by Article 4 of the Constitution. Since then, language affiliation

of municipalities can only be changed by a specific law. At the same time, language communities were established, with their language area in the areas of administration, education and interaction between employer and employee[21].

On 10 November 1973, the Dutch Cultural Community Council announced the Decree the Dutch confirming the official language of the Dutch community. In reality, it ended a nine-century-old process of the development of the Dutch language in the Southern Netherlands and 173 years struggle for its recognition as one of the official languages in the Kingdom of Belgium.

Final stages. The Second State Reform (1980) transformed cultural communities into communities with more competences related to personal matters. The Flemish and Walloon regions established the Brussels Capital Region in 1989. Communities and Regions got their own Parliaments and Governments.

Article 1 of the Belgian Constitution stipulates that Belgium is a federal state made up of Communities and Regions. This division into three communities and three regions is typical for Belgian federalism. Both types of entities have their own exclusive competencies. Their territories overlap geographically since, in fact, they correspond to different combinations of Belgium's four linguistic areas (Dutch, French, German and a bilingual area).

The three communities are:

1. The Flemish Community (corresponding to the Dutch language area, with particular competencies in the bilingual area of Brussels).
2. The French Community (corresponding to the French language area, with particular competencies in the bilingual area of Brussels).
3. The small German-speaking community (corresponding to the German language area).

The three regions are:

1. The Flemish Region (corresponding to the Dutch language area)
2. The Walloon Region (corresponding to the French and German language area).
3. The Brussels Capital Region (corresponding to the bilingual area)[22].

Belgium is administratively divided into 10 provinces and 589 municipalities (308 in the Flemish region) (Głowacki 1997, p. 51). A municipality is the lowest

[21] First state reform (1970) Cultural communities established (Flemish demand). Constitutional foundations for territorial regions (Walloon demand).

[22] 'Politics-State structure'. *Flanders.be*. Flemish Government. http://web.archive.org/web/20070927233218/http://www.flanders.be/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=MVG_FL/Template/MVG_FL_Html_Detail&cid=1072097196838&enablelasturl=1&p=1053963211306

rung of the administrative power of the state. In a complex situation of the country where the citizens can officially use three languages, which they do and where, rises to issue of substantial weight. In order to meet the needs of some local communities, an original Belgian formula of the so-called municipalities with the language facilitation (Dutch: *faciliteitengemeenten*) was created. These were the municipalities, which constitutionally guarantee municipal service, if it occurs, also in a language other than the language area. These other language services are called language facilities. They must deliver services in French, or respectively language facilitation must be offered on the Dutch territory. Similarly, in the case of Wallonia, municipalities with such status must provide services in Dutch or German.

At this moment on the territory of the Kingdom of Belgium, 27 municipalities with language facilitation[23]. It is difficult to predict how these municipalities will develop due to natural migration processes. Some of them will evolve into one language and become municipalities of Wallonia or Flanders. Others will continue to maintain their façade. For example, the municipality of Moeskroen on the French border, which in reality is the backyard of the big French city Lille (Dutch: *Rijsel*) and is on the other end of the border and the Dutch language is in decline.



Fig. 2. Language border and municipalities with language facilitation
Source: L. Devoldere (2013, p. 36–37)

These 27 municipalities are situated on both sides of the language border and six of them belong to the Flemish Periphery (Dutch: *Vlaamse Rand*). In these communities the other language community (for example Dutch-speaking in Wallonia and the French-speaking population of Flanders) is entitled to use their

[23] http://www.*wikipedia.org/wiki/Faciliteitengemeente*

own language in schools and in dealings with the local authorities. The language facilitations apply only to individual inhabitants. According to the law on the operational level, the language of the Flemish municipalities with language facilitations should only be in Dutch. Also the meetings of the City Council may only be conducted in Dutch[24].

The Flemish authorities have traditionally seen the provisions made in communities with the language facilitation on Flemish territory as a temporary solution, created to help French inhabitants to gradually integrate into the Dutch-speaking community. They are strongly opposed to the perpetuation of these facilitations. However, the percentage of French speakers living in the communities with the language facilitation has increased in the past decades as more French-speaking people working in Brussels moved to Drogenbos, Kraainem, Linkebeek, Sint-Genesius-Rode, Wemmel or Wezembeek-Oppem. The efforts of the Flemish authorities to adhere strictly to the territoriality principle repeatedly has led to public outrage on the part of the French-speaking population and attracted international attention (Vogl and Hüning 2010).

Table 1. List of municipalities with language facilitations

Brussels Periphery (municipalities around *Brussels Capital Region*)	French language area with language facilitations for Dutch-speaking	French language area with language facilitations for German-speaking	German language area with language facilitations for French-speaking
Bever (D) *Biévène* (F)	Edingen (D) *Enghien* (F)	Malmedy (G) *or Malmünd*	Amel (G) *Amblève* (F)
Drogenbos	Komen-Waasten (D) *Comines-Warneton* (F)	Waimes or *Weismes*	Büllingen (G) *Bullange* (F)
Herstappe	Moeskroen (D) *Mouscron* (F)	-	Burg-Reuland
Kraainem	Vloesberg (D) *Flobecq* (F)	-	Bütgenbach
Linkebeek	-	-	Eupen
Mesen *Messines* (F)	-	-	Kelmis (G) *La Calamine* (F)
Ronse (D) *Renaix* (F)	-	-	Lontzen

[24] http://www2.vlaanderen.be/taalwetgeving/vlaamse_rand.html

Sint-Genesius-Rode (D) *Rhode-Saint-* *-Génèse* (F)	-	-	Raeren
Spiere-Helkijn (D) *Espierres-Helchin* (F)	-	-	Sankt Vith (G) *Saint-Vith* (F)
Voeren (D) *Fourons* (F)	-	-	-
Wemmel	-	-	-
Wezembeek- -Oppem	-		-

Note: D – Dutch, G – German, F – French.
Source: http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Faciliteitengemeente.

The Flemish periphery (Vlaamse rand). Brussels Periphery refers to the 19 municipalities of the Flemish Region, which are located around the Brussels Capital Region[25]. The mass movement of French-speaking inhabitants of Brussels to the green belt around capital of Belgium has disrupted its originally Dutch-speaking character.



Fig. 3. The Brussels Periphery
Source: Mens en Ruimte, http://www.adjunctgouverneur.be/

[25] Dutch: *Brusselse Rand*, the 'Brussels Rim', or *Vlaamse Rand.*

The language laws of 1963 confirmed that these municipalities were part of the Dutch language area[26]. During the negotiations on the language legislation (1962–1963) the edge (periphery) municipalities were not joined at Brussels. They remained part of the unilingual Flemish language area. At the urging of the French-speaking inhabitants of six suburbs, they were given special rights (language facilitations).

It is necessary to add at this point that the Belgian Constitution recognizes only one official bilingual part: the 19 municipalities of the Brussels Capital Region (Deschouwer and Buelens 1999, p. 439). The six municipalities with language facilitations in the Brussels (Flemish) Periphery are, therefore, an integral part of the Dutch language area.

Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde (BHV) and the sixth constitutional reform of the state. The area which has the scourge of mutual Flemish-Walloon cohabitation problems are the three municipalities – Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde (BHV). Since the 1800s they comprise a constituency, which is composed of bilingual Brussels and the monolingual municipalities Halle-Vilvoorde, two of the largest cities in this region. This was the only constituency in Belgium that comprised more than one region (Flanders and Brussels-Capital Region) and, therefore, was not compatible with the Belgian Constitution. After four years of debate and some crises within the cabinet, an agreement was reached in 2013 about the conditions of BHV restructuring in accordance with the ruling of the Constitutional Court. The district was divided into following:

1. The municipalities on the Brussels Periphery were combined into a single electoral canton (Dutch: *kieskanton*) together with Sint-Genesius-Rode as the capital (Dutch: *hoofdplaats*), where the voters would have the opportunity to vote for the Flemish-Brabant list or for Brussels list.

2. The new judicial district of Brussels (Dutch: *gerechtelijk arrondissement Brussel*), which is divided into two separate *sub-arrondissements* for the city of Brussels and for Halle-Vilvoorde.

The largest of the 21st century constitutional crises, which started in 2004, had been solved. However, the national and federal parliamentary elections of 25 May 2014 have shown that in the future, the Belgian internal policy will be the subject of significant reconstruction. In the light of the victory of N-VA, reforms will be accelerated in the direction of transformation of the Federal State into Confederation. The leader of the party N-VA, Bart De Wever, meanwhile has called for the gradual liquidation of Belgium in its present shape, rather than for

[26] http://www2.vlaanderen.be/taalwetgeving/vlaamse_rand.html

the 'fragmentation' of the country. 'We don't want a revolution', he said recently in Brussels. 'We don't want to proclaim the independence of Flanders from day to day. However, we believe in a gradual evolution'[27].

6. CONCLUSION

The case of the Kingdom of Belgium puts raises the question why the state in whose territory three different cultures historically coexist, which speak different languages slowly but inevitably has tended to become separate national states. Why in the case of Belgium does the Swiss model not work? Why does the Federal State seems to be a less attractive option for the nations, which comprise contemporary Belgium?[28] (Deschouwer 2006, p. 422). What is even more surprising is the rate of the accelerated changes. Since the creation of the Unitary Belgian State (1830), the transformation to the Federal State has taken 163 years (1993). From the Federal State to the Confederacy, Belgium is moving much faster. The N-VA, the party, which puts on its banners confederacy slogans wins the election at both the local and federal level. Since 2014 this part has also achieved effective authority.

The answer lies not only in the history of the area under the rule of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The geographical language border was clearly shaped long ago and basically did not raise many doubts. Even the language struggle has not recorded victims on both sides of the frontlines. The strongest consequences for the nations living on the territory of Belgium was to legality to the language boundaries. The German Flemish policy has had enormous internal consequences for the unity of the Belgian state. Artificially induced antagonisms have caused waves of recriminations in the post-war periods and to a great extent, has made the relations between the two nations more complicated (Łaptos 2010, p. 217).

The Federal State has give the Flemings and the Walloons a chance to fulfill their aspirations, to function in their own respective cultures and languages. The negative effect upon the federalisation of political structures has been the breaking of many natural links on all state levels (for example disappearance of common political parties).

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[27] *Flamandzcy separatyści wygrywają wybory w Belgii* (Flemish separatists win elections in Belgium), Stephen Castle, *New York Times*/*International Herald Tribune* 2010, 14 VI, http://fakty.interia.pl/new-york-times/news/belgia-stoi-nad-przepascia, 1492093.

[28] K. Deschouwer (2006) describes Belgian Federal State as a typical example of pacifist democratic federation.

The delimitation of the official language border has proceeded smoothly (van Istendael 1989, p. 86). The unique Belgian idea of municipality with language facilitation, where despite the division of the state, one can use the language of the other side of the border, has solved the problem in the best possible way. Today the role of French in Belgium exceeds the use of English (case of Brussels). And the Flemings no longer have educational coercion to teach French as a second language in schools.

Paradoxically however, the future confederacy may hit the Flemish politicians hard. They can lose Brussels, the capital of Flanders, which is also the capital of the state. One thing is for sure though: the future boundaries of the Belgian state, whatever form they take, will be shaped by the language borders of its member-states.

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REGION and REGIONALISM
No. 12

BORDERS, ETHNO-NATIONAL TENSIONS, AND MINORITIES – THE CASE OF THE BORDER BETWEEN THE BALTIC STATES AND RUSSIA

1. INTRODUCTION

Within a hard border system of international relations – reinforced as an evident response to the erosion of sovereignty all over the world – and especially in Eastern Europe, the problems of nationalities continue to stimulate internal tensions, the politicisation of ethno-national identities, and even justifications for the imperial claims of former imperial actors, as demonstrated by the Ukrainian crisis and especially the 'piloted' secession of Crimea, and increasing pressures on Eastern Ukraine. It seems that respect for the borders established with the collapse of the Soviet Union can no longer be taken for granted.

After the Ukrainian crisis, it has become quite evident that the political use of minorities as a means of pressure is one of the most useful and effective tools in influencing other states or even changing the territorial and border status of regions and provinces[1]. There was an evident shift in the concept of borders:

[1] Russia's foreign policy concepts throughout Putin's presidencies have repeatedly claimed a right to protect the interests of Russian 'compatriots' living beyond its borders. It puts the limits of Russian national interests at the external borders of the former Soviet Union. It also implies that Russian interventions in defence of minorities can be justified without the permission of a legally constituted government of a state. Putin declared in March 2014 that he possessed the right to protect Russian-speakers in the *near abroad*, alarming Estonia and Latvia, which have large ethnic Russian minorities of their own. As declared by Lithuania's President Dalia Grybauskaite: 'Putin uses nationality as a pretext to conquer territory with military means'. Reuters, June 22, 2014. A similar alarm suddenly appeared in Kazakhstan (inhabited near the border by territorialised Russian minorities), where President Nursultan Nazarbaev even declared the country's possible exit from the 'Euro-Asiatic Union'.

they now present a linkage with ethnicity rather than statehood. Nowadays former soviet internal borders are defined in Russian official discourse by the nationality of inhabitants. The concept of borders based on nationality was the precondition for Russia's pressures on Crimea that ended in a 'punitive' land and grab.

The permanent lack of congruence between ethnicity and nation-states borders in Eastern Europe has given a way to a variety of territorial claims, not all of which necessarily followed by military actions. Moreover, the changes in the international order stimulate the growing tensions surrounding political influence and some unresolved territorial disputes. The effectiveness of external actors on domestic minorities depends in some cases on internal situation, but in the majority of cases on the type of pressure used by an external political actor. Anyway, historical memories are mobilised to support territorial claims, to address 'past injustices' or strengthen group identity, often using and perpetuating negative stereotypes of 'the other', especially using the idea that the 'Russian nation' became the biggest ethnic group in the world to be divided by borders[2].

This is the case of calculated interaction between an external actor and target audience, especially an ethno-national minority, using a variety of techniques to coerce certain actions such as mass communication propaganda, psychological operations, which serve national and military objectives. These tensions comprise the presence and the activity of the media. Propaganda has many aspects and an hostile and coercive political purpose. Russia's cultural and informational expansion to the Baltic countries for the purpose of propaganda and disinformation, provoking divisions within the Baltic societies is permanently on the agenda. Psychological operations include the alteration of information in order to sow confusion, distrust, rebellion and are conducted for the purpose of accomplishing nation-state political or military objectives. Sometimes this strategy has been associated with direct strategy: some Russian citizens specially go into Eastern part of Estonia and Latvia and try to initiate autonomy movements[3]. Russian speakers continue to get their man source of information from the Russian media. By using this 'compatriots' (*sootechestvenniki*) card the Kremlin is making people in neighbouring countries like Estonia and Latvia look at the Russian minority as a potential 'fifth column' inside the Baltic states.

Particularly dangerous is the case of 'territorialised' Russian minorities as those concentrated in Eastern part of Estonia and Latvia, close to the Russian border. This has been a major source of worry for the Baltic states, because in

[2] Putin's speech to Russian Duma of March 18th, 2014.
[3] One such effort was already stopped two years ago.

the recent past Russia has demonstrated a clear ability to annex territories and create puppet states in places as disparate as Eastern Ukraine, Crimea, Georgia's Abkhazia and South Ossetia and Moldova's Transnistria (Pridnestrovje) independent unit, using the ambiguous policies of protecting 'compatriots'. The strategy is clear: to reach the hegemony in the region using destabilizing factors such as the presence of Russian minorities in the Baltic states. In Lithuania this problem is almost irrelevant because the scale and intensity of the partisan war against Soviet occupation (1944–1953/56) made Soviet citizens more reluctant to settle in this country than in Estonia or Latvia. As a matter of fact, the effect of the Lithuanian resistance was huge and long-lasting: while ethnic Russians now make up a third of Latvia's population (33.8%) and a quarter of Estonia's inhabitants (29.6%), only around 6 percent of the population of Lithuania is ethnically Russian and those minorities have not been resident in specific regions, namely border regions, of the country (Kuodyte and Tracevskis 2006, p. 39, Tuchtenhagen 2009, pp. 93, 103). Nevertheless, Russian government is still perceived in Lithuania as one of he greatest threats to Lithuania's security. The situation in Latvia and Estonia is worse. The large number of ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers at the border ensures that Moscow finds it difficult to come to terms with the permanence of their independence or their need for borders. Minorities at the border are an evident tool of political (and territorial) indirect warfare that leads to forcing a course of action favourable to the Kremlin's interest. Historically, as is well known, Russia had undertaken nation and empire building simultaneously: so it was therefore difficult to locate where Russia began and ended. It has remained difficult to Russia to reconcile 'Russian' identity to that encompassed within the borders of the Russian Federation. Russia's psychological maps of its borders are not those of Russian Federation (Kuzio 1997, pp. 37–38). Moreover, it should be noted that the lines of contemporary borders between Russia, Belarus and the Baltic states have long been the subject of territorial disputes between neighbouring governmental entities and ethnic groups.

In the case of Russian pressures and political warfare the chief aspect is the use of words, images, historical examples of Russian minority groups persecuted and ideas (Smith 1989, p. 3) all of these are tools of 'indirect strategy' and serve as potential substitute for more direct military action. Indirect methods of political warfare are intended to influence ethnic minorities to force political and territorial change beyond the border as well as on the border. In Latvia, close to the Russian border, there are pockets where the population watches Kremlin-run television, which reports frequently on alleged discrimination against Russian-

-speakers in Latvia. Consequently, part of the Russians in Latvia live in a different informational sphere: the Russian one. Often the Latvian government is not able to communicate effectively with some of its citizens. Russian speakers are a majority in Narva, one of Estonia's border biggest cities, as well as in the Latvian cities of Daugavpils or Liepaja, although far from the border. It is also evident that political warfare acting on the minorities on the border is distinguished by its hostile intent and it may create potential escalation, difficult to control by the international community.

2. THE BORDERS IN THE BALTIC REGION

After the break-up of the Soviet Union the relevance of territoriality in Eastern Europe increased and became a point of conflict, especially when the spaces were linked to a territorial identity that implied a perceived historical continuity and national legitimacy. Estonia and Latvia followed this pattern up until the mid-1990s, when they renounced their nationalist territorial claims, due on the influence of the enlargement of Euro-western institutions. But on the contrary, up to the present, geopolitical considerations have been an important determinant in Russia's foreign and security policies and an emphasis on geographic territory has dominated Russian security policy thinking for centuries, especially after the worldwide affirmation of the nationalist ideology, at the beginning of the 20th century. This kind of ideology extended the value of territory from having a pure instrumental value in the thinking of the state to also include values that touched on deep issues of identity. After this process, territory became not a manifestation of state power, but at the same time a perceived authentication of the state's inhabitants' past, present and future. It thus created 'territorial identity' that objectified a perception of an ethnic, linguistic, and cultural homogeneity among the inhabitants of the state. Even if it is well known that everywhere state borders do not coincide with the boundaries of ethnic groups, this kind of vision of the nation-state as an ideal image of the world that emerged from the nationalist conception, full of 'organic' elements (the nation as 'living body' or 'organism', and so on), produced an idea of borders, very influential in Russia, considered as 'sacred' and 'eternal'[4]: in fact, a creation of

[4] In its efforts to legitimise its pretensions and occupation of the Baltic region, the Soviet Union emphasised the idea and myth of the Baltic rim as a time-honoured Russian land, with historical ties that dated back to the Middle Ages (Levinsson 2006, p. 102).

the state, not the nation (Brown 1995, p. 57). This perception often creates tensions not only within states (e.g. against whatever form of centrifugal forces or secession), but also among states. It is not surprising that by 1991 there had been some 170 ethno-territorial disputes in the former Soviet Union, 73 of which directly concerned Russia. Many of these conflicts have continued to plague Russia ever since. Territorial disputes in connection with minorities result from the loss of territory considered as a result of an 'unjust' and unrecognized division of the former common imperial state.

The Estonian and Latvian border disputes with Russia are no exception in this respect. The Baltic region experienced continual ordering and reordering of its territorial configurations of power and territories. The most important fact is that the Baltic boundaries were state boundaries in the past and were subsumed as internal administrative boundaries during the period of Soviet rule. The immediate result of the Soviet occupation was the abolishing of all international borders between the republics of the Soviet Union. The Soviet government replaced them with what it called 'administrative lines' that were never demarcated and did not have any practical, political, economic or geographical significance[5]. Consequently, the border between Russia and the Baltic states was complicated by change since their original inclusion into the Soviet Union. And since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the question of the precise territorial delimitations of the Estonian and Latvian borders with Russia has been a permanent source of tension and a point of irritation. For Estonia and Latvia, the border issue, with its linkages to historical legitimacy and cross-border minorities, has been in many ways an emotional question that hinges on the legality of the interwar state and the subsequent Soviet occupation. Both sides take different historical period and consequently different criteria of 'historical justice' in drawing borders. Disputes arise from different interpretations of history and the territorial shape of ancient powers and their dominations.

In this case territory is a multi-dimensional and dynamic factor and many dimensions of political territoriality help to explain the intensity of contemporary ethno-territorial tensions. Borders can also function as a thermometer that can measure the degree of tension between states and can be used to assess the significance of a particular security policy that defines the relationship between them.

[5] In fact, despite the frequency of international usage in communist ideology and its sharp dissociation from the former Tsarist Empire, the Soviet Union's official political rhetoric was not lacking in historical references to previous Russian possessions in the Baltic region (Levinsson 2006, p. 102).

While Lithuania gained territory from Poland after the Second World War, Estonia and Latvia lost territory to Russia. During the mid-1990s, Estonia and Latvia pleaded their case according to international law and demanded that the borders from the interwar period – based on the original Tartu and Riga Peace Treaties in 1920 –be restored, whereas Russia stuck to the borders of the former Soviet republics. In fact, both Estonia and Latvia based their attitude in the border disputes on the legality of the 1920 peace treaties of Tartu and Riga, which established the states' internationally recognised borders. Both states are advocating a principle of state continuity, wherein the contemporary government is seen as a continuation of the inter-war governments. The Lithuanians settled the border with Russia only several months after independence in 1991. Lithuania made territorial claims against Russia and this dispute was solved only in 1997, when a formal agreement was ratified by both Lithuania and Russian Federation. Estonia and Latvia, on the contrary, have had a much more difficult time gaining a recognised border with their eastern neighbour. They were told that progress of the Treaties for the delimitation of their borders with Russia would stall until the protection of compatriot rights was guaranteed (Šleivytė 2010, p. 129).

Fig. 1. The territorialised Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia
Source: author's own elaboration

In fact, Russia dictated the conditions for citizenship that Russian minorities must receive and the insistence that Moscow 'can rightly intervene in the Baltic states domestic and foreign policies owing to alleged discrimination against Russians' have been a permanent critical element of Moscow's Baltic policy. Russia is still trying to impose its political will beyond its own borders and *territorialised* minorities in Latvia and Estonia remain the main tool of its foreign policy in the *Pribaltika*, which follows a post-Soviet pattern attributing a great importance to a nation's territory and its territorial identity. Ever since its independence, Russia has been maintaining that the Soviet Union neither annexed nor occupied the Baltic states and both Estonia and Latvia 'joined the USSR voluntarily', as it was in Zhdanov's propaganda. As a consequence, Russia did not recognise the Baltic states' legal continuity and restoration of their inter-war state and the 'border corrections' that took place shortly after the Second World War are considered legal.

After Estonia's return to political independence in 1991, the question of its eastern border became critical. The implications in terms of identity are complicated in the case of both Estonia and Russia, especially because of the presence of a large number of inhabitants of mixed nationalities and languages[6]. Despite the fact that some agreements have been reached[7], border disputes and tensions in the Estonian-Russian case are still on the agenda and the new--imperial Russian thinking recently became a real threat both to the country[8] and to Western supranational and security institutions.

[6] The main minority in the country is Russian, immigrated during the soviet period. In 1992, the Estonian parliament instated a citizenship law which in effect restricted many Russian inhabitants in obtaining citizenship automatically, for the law only applied to immigrants of the Soviet era 'who could prove that they had supported legal continuity' (i.e. the fact that Estonia was illegally occupied by the USSR). Furthermore, only a marginal number of applicants were naturalised because of language requirements. It has to be noted, though, that these policies were inspired by strong reservations on citizenship issues rather than by any sort of xenophobia.

[7] Despite the fact that the situation is still firmly rooted in colliding, mutually exclusive visions on the Soviet era, an agreement on the borders between Russia and Estonia became possible in January 2013, in a period when there were no serious impediments in the borderlands to everyday border-crossing and transborder cooperation (Vitale 2014). However, this process reached another deadlock after the Ukrainian crisis of December.

[8] Baltic states have been among the most vocal and active EU states during the Ukraine crisis, urging Russia to abandon its military intervention and respect Ukrainian territorial integrity.

3. THE IMPACT OF THE EU'S BORDER AFTER THE ENLARGEMENT

After the enlargement in 2004, the EU sought to stabilise their Eastern border. The question of borders between Estonia, Latvia and Russia again became the subject of discussion after the Baltic states' accession to the EU. But, even if EU's integration process has helped to transform border conflicts and tensions in Europe into a more peaceful situation, having a positive effect on border disputes transformation, this effect is far from automatic, especially at the external dimension, because the impact of integration is complex and controversial. While borders are becoming more permeable in Western Europe, they are being constructed in other places, not least in those places where ethno-territorial conflict remains the order of the day. The legal status of large Russian-speaking minorities in Latvia and Estonia, the unresolved border questions, and the particular situation of Kaliningrad have proved to be the most pressing of these.

In fact, the same EU's concept of political integration, based on a rigorous system of inclusion and exclusion, defined by full membership status and by fortified, securitised and closed external borders, remains a tool created by an old concept of territoriality which is related to continued territorial and ethno--national disputes. The EU is engaging in a process of bordering and is creating a border regime which plays a crucial role in the making of institutional, hard and potentially conflicting borders. Conflict lines are inscribed in the EU's border regime. Indeed, EU's border management regime plays a key role in marking membership and when borders reflect belonging in the meaning of an 'us' and an 'other' it is quite evident that border conflicts can be understood primarily as 'identity conflicts' (Eder 2006, p. 265). EU's eastern border carries a serious potential for territorial disputes. In fact, the EU can act as a 'perturbator' of already existing tensions and conflicts: it means that the EU reinforces tensions by provoking a 'conflict within the conflict', which may affect conflicts at the EU's external border.

Borders structure the opportunities in which conflicting behaviour is more likely to occur and sustainable peace and security are instead linked to the softening of borders and the sharing of political power across multiple and multilevel politics. As many case-studies demonstrate, from an empirical perspective there are circumstances in which the impact of EU's integration process is to hinder cross-border cooperation and to introduce new border disputes or to exacerbate old contrasts (Vitale 2014, p. 214). This is the case with the Latvian-Russian and, especially, the Estonian-Russian border. On the

other hand, by keeping the territorial issue alive over alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians, the Kremlin demonstrated a lack of desire to improve bilateral relations with the EU.

4. TERRITORIALISED MINORITIES BEYOND THE BORDER

It is clear that Russia could interfere in the Baltic domestic affairs, even attempting to re-establish its direct domination over territories inhabited by Russian minorities. In fact, Russia has never come to terms with the Baltic independence. In Russian official statements, the Baltic states tend to be described as part of the outside world but there's an evident tension between this position and a 'neo-imperial' territorial approach. After the experience in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, Russian political class may realise that a similar game is possible in the case of Baltic region. Russia's domestic agenda had a direct reflection in the realm of foreign policy. This may happen under the pretext of protecting Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia. In the case of Lithuania, the likeliness of ethnic conflict is considered to be much lower. On the contrary, in the cases of Estonia and Latvia the possible conflict is not only, as in the past, based on the large-scale ethnically-based conflict, but it is much more based on territorial disputes, due to the fact that there are territorialised minorities beyond the border and the attempt is to exploit the issue of cross--border minorities in order to point out, according to the Westphalian logic and practice, the historical continuity of the territory and its borders. It depends both on the condition of the new post-Cold-War border and on the presence of territorialized ethnic minorities. Russia may try to provoke or activate ethnics--based political forces in Estonia and Latvia not only in order to create internal instability, but also to build some separatist movements on the border. In this sense, the potential of ethnic conflict is stimulated by the border.

5. CONCLUSIONS

Donald Rotchild and David Lake point to the following confidence-building measures in the management of the ethnic tensions: demonstration of respect towards ethnic minorities (particularly the elites), engaging minority elites in political decision-making, securing full election participation rights for ethnic

minorities, offering minorities some forms of self-government (regional autonomy, federalism) (Schön 2005, p. 391, Rotchild and Lake 1998, pp. 206–211). The Baltic states have rather inadequately followed those confidence-building measures in their relations with the Russian-speaking minority on their territory. Moreover, Estonia and Latvia have not engaged the Russian-speaking minority into the policy-making institutions and processes, and it may have consequences, especially where there are territorialised minorities. The ethnic conflict is the most destructive and most uncontrollable of all forms of conflicts. The Baltic--Russian conflict-management was successful in 1991–2010 because it was not localised and conflicting sides successfully avoided escalating the conflict into an ethnic one. But the border contributed to the exacerbation of already existing tensions and border disputes. Territorialised ethnic minorities easily and quickly became a possible target for territorial claims much more than dispersed minorities. Furthermore, the EU's external border configuration does not help to manage and solve this problem, and even contributes to create the premises for new minority problems where ethno-territorial tensions remain the order of the day and obstacles to achieving compromise or moving towards conflict resolution. The process of enlargement has not helped to remove border problems and 'zones of contention' between the Baltic states and Russia. The same thing can be said about the deployment of extra NATO troops along the border between the Baltic states and Russia and the symmetrical response of Russia in the Kaliningrad region.

The main question between Russia and Latvia that may continue to be an obstacle to the process of cooperation and developing a spontaneous security community in the Baltic Sea region is the question of Russian territorialised minorities. Hence, there are certainly many problems linked to this question that have to be solved between the neighbouring states in the Baltic Sea area. A geographically localised minority at the border may create a target both within and outside the state but it does not need to be. People can belong to multiple overlapping communities and loyalties, as it was in the past. And different communities may perfectly well maintain different legal systems. Diverse groups can even develop bodies of law appropriate for different circumstances and various kinds of disputes. Conflict resolution should recognise the potential of borders to function as bridges, not barriers as they are traditionally perceived. Borders could be seen as places of potential interaction, points of contact and transition between two neighbouring territorial or social entities: the borderlands or political frontier zones, where interaction takes place. For example, Euroregions could be a local and regional manifestation of spatial development policy

cooperation and provide an example of how collaboration regarding territorial inter-relationships can be deployed and carried out between regional actors across the EU's external border in concrete terms. Only through new institutional and discursive practices contested borders can be transformed into symbols of cooperation and of common historical heritage. Borders would remain as the territorial 'demarcators' of state control, citizenship and national identity but would become increasingly permeable in terms of the daily practices of the borderland residents enabling interaction and cooperation rather than barriers and sharp separation.

Only softening borders can undermine imperial claims and open up alternatives for cross-border linkages and new spaces of social cooperation and new forms of socio-political association.

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REGION and REGIONALISM
No. 12

CHANGES IN REGIONAL APPROACH IN ROMANIA – SOME RESULTS OF A MENTAL MAP RESEARCH

1. INTRODUCTION

In the last decade, Romania has been facing regional challenges owing to different factors. The accession to the European Union has been one of the relevant motives which influenced the country's regionalisation. The present regional division of the country has been criticised several times in different forums, and now the country faces an administrative and territorial reorganisation process which would lead to the creation of a more decentralised model. The authors of this paper wish to elaborate on this very important issue in the context of Romania.

The paper also aims to present the preliminary results of OTKA K 104801 study entitled: 'The analysis of politico-geographic spatial structures in the Carpathian Basin – system changes, possible co-operations, incongruities at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries'. This research aims to detect the transformation of the geopolitical situation of the Carpathian Basin in the above-mentioned period. This paper will present some preliminary results of this research connected to Romania.

2. REGIONALISATION PROCESS IN ROMANIA

During the process of accession to the European Union, Romania had to face the need to develop an effective regional policy. Therefore, this problem necessitated the reconsideration of the country's territorial and regional division. The act no. 151/1998 started the Romanian regional development and opened the way for decentralised development, since it established institutions and determined

regions to be developed. Under such conditions, Romanian regionalisation process started and eight NUTS II regions were determined: seven of them containing more counties and one covering the capital Bucharest and its surrounding agglomeration, the so-called Ilfov County. These development regions were not administrative regions and did not acquire legal status. Figure 1 shows the borders of regions and the numbers refer to the following region names:

1. North-East Region (Suceava, Botoşani, Iaşi, Neamţ, Bacău, Vaslui counties);
2. South-East Region (Vrancea, Galaţi, Buzău, Brăila, Konstanca counties);
3. South Region (Ialomiţa, Călăraşi, Prahova, Dîmboviţa, Giurgiu, Teleorman, Argeşi counties);
4. South-West Region (Gorj, Vâlcea, Olt, Mehedinţi, Dolj counties);
5. West Region, (Huniad, Arad, Timiş, Caran-Sebeş counties);
6. North-West Region (Bihor, Satu-Mare, Sălaj, Cluj, Maramureş, Bistriţa--Năsăud counties);
7. Central Region (Alba, Mureş, Sibiu, Braşov, Harghita, Covasna counties);
8. Bucharest-Ilfov Region (the capital city and its agglomeration – Ilfov County).



Fig. 1. The NUTS II regions in Romania since 1998
Source: B. Bodó (2003, p. 57)

This raises a question of whether these regions respect the peculiarities of Romania. Is this regionalisation process a real change in the regional approach and an authentic change of paradigm? Politicians, scientists, researchers and even citizens have focussed on this process since the NUTS II regions were formed in Romania. The present regional division of the country configured in 1998 has been criticised several times in different forums, and the topic of regionalisation frequently appears in various discourses, even in political ones. Romania faces an administrative and territorial reorganisation process which would lead to the creation of a more decentralised model. The year 2013 was said to be the year of transformation: several debates and speeches dealt with the regionalisation issue, but only the very first steps were made until now.

The Governing Programme 2013–2016 devoted a chapter to this transformation. This chapter, entitled 'Development and administration', presents important steps (Programul de guvernare 2013–2016, 2012). Another significant document is the so called 'Memorandum – Adoption of the necessary steps to start the process of regionalisation-decentralisation in Romania', which suggests the necessary organisational measures, such as the establishment of a body of strategic role in this issue. The Consultative Counsel of Regionalisation (CONREG) was established in 2013, with ten renowned academics selected as members. The main objectives of this body is to propose an optimal number of regions, to give suggestions regarding the system of the 'local/regional autonomy, the regional competencies, the status of the local/regional elected officials, the electoral system of the local/regional elected officials, the regime of incompatibilities, prefects' role in the new architecture of public administration, mode of financing, patrimony-related issues and proposals related to the establishment of the future regional seats' (Memorandum 2012, p. 4). This academic working group holds its meetings in weekly working sessions. Several working papers have already been written by the members of this group, with experts setting up the Polish regionalisation process as a model for the new Romanian process. Interestingly, the second report deals with the social development of existing regions, with cultural areas, and the role of historical regions of Romania in the regionalisation process (Disparităţi şi fluxuri… 2013).

The regionalisation process is also one of the main topics of disputes and discussions between the Romanians and Hungarians in Romania. Owing to the Hungarians' opinion, the existing regional division of the country has violated the European Union standards, the historical regions, the economic, cultural and environmental differences.



Fig. 2. The model by István Csutak for the Romanian regional division (2007)
Source: I. Csutak (2007, p. 44)

For example the number of inhabitants of two Romanian regions exceeds 3 million people. The main political party of the Hungarians in Romania (RMDSZ) conceived a regionalisation model containing 16 regions in 2007. The author of this new model, István Csutak, declared that this proposed regional division would serve the regional development better than the existing one. In this new model, based on the development data of the counties and different calculations, the so-called Ţinutul Secuiesc (Székelyföld, Szeklerland) historical region would be a separate development region. For the Hungarians it is a very important issue, because this area is inhabited mainly by the Hungarian minority. (Also see Csutak 2011 in this issue). Figure 2 shows this proposed regional division.

3. TRANSYLVANIA AND ŢINUTUL SECUIESC (SZÉKELYFÖLD, SZEKLERLAND) AS HISTORICAL REGIONS

Why are Ţinutul Secuiesc (Székelyföld, Szeklerland) and Transylvania so important for the Hungarian minority in Romania? Historically, Transylvania used to have a separate character, but it could also be interpreted as an organic

part of Hungarian history. The quasi-independent Transylvanian Principality was born in 1541, when the Ottoman Empire occupied Buda. Its independence lasted up to 150 years, but this separation was in danger during this period: the world--power countries wanted to limit (or abolish altogether) the independence of Transylvania.

The 1st and 2nd Diploma Leopoldium finally attached Transylvania to the Habsburg Empire, terminating the separation of the region. During the Rákóczi war of independence, Ferenc Rákóczi was elected suzerain by the Transylvanian Diet. With this act, the Diet wanted Transylvania to become independent again (before it, Rákóczi got the appointment as suzerain of Hungary from the Diet of Szécsény). Rákóczi needed this double appointment in order to enter into an alliance with Louis XIV. After the failure of the war for independence, Transylvania was returned to the Habsburg Empire, this time during the reign of Josef II. The Kaiser received regency with the seat in Nagyszeben (Hermannstadt). With this, the Habsburg Empire wanted to break Transylvania away from Hungary. The so called 'Twelve Points' formulated on 15 March 1848 declared the union with Transylvania, namely the fact that Transylvania was now a part of Hungary.

After 1919, based on these historical facts, the Transylvanian intellectuals emphasised the idea, that the so-called transylvanism should have been redefined. As a consequence, the ideological stream of transylvanism was born, which determined the Transylvanian Hungarians' cultural-literary and ideological--political movements for a long time. In Transylvania, the bottom-up regionalist processes are based on several pillars. They build upon the historic, ethnic and cultural uniqueness and the economic leader role of the region (see Miklósné Zakar 2007). The historical past of Transylvania has actually been supporting the argument according to which the region should be treated as a special entity. The ethnic map of Transylvania is also a good basis for regionalism. However, this peculiarity has undergone important changes during and after the Second World War. The proportion of Romanian-Hungarian-German-Jewish ethnic groups varied because of the deportation of Jews during the war, then owing to the modifications made in the Ceauşescu era, which transformed the ethnic map of the country and, especially, the ethnic balance in Transylvania. The main part of the German group moved to West Germany with the 'help' of Romanian government, which sold them to West Germany. The relocation of Romanians en masse from other parts of the country to the industrial areas of Transylvania resulted in both the migration of labour and the destruction of ethnic proportions in the region.

Nowadays, there are no areas with high concentrations of ethnic groups in any part of Transylvania except for a special area called Székelyföld in

Hungarian, where Hungarians are still dominant. This fact shows the existence of an ethnic-cultural border between Transylvania and the rest of the country.

Anyway, the multicultural diversity of Transylvania is unique and specific in East-Central Europe. The Transylvanian regionalism can build both upon this peculiarity and upon the economic development of the region, because the GDP per capita is higher than in other areas of the country, except for the capital and its agglomeration.

4. THE PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF OUR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

This paper also aims to present the preliminary results of the research OTKA K 104801 entitled 'The analysis of politico-geographic space structures in the Carpathian Basin – system changes, possible co-operations, incongruities at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries'. The researchers want to map the possibilities of different co-operations between the countries situated in the analysed area, the transformation of both regional approaches and different notions of space. The research includes a mental map survey which has been conducted among students in several neighbour countries of Hungary, as following the role of education in the shaping of mental space may prove interesting. The researchers are also interested in the political space and structure of the countries, in the changes of these structures in the examined period (public administration, town networks, electoral districts, directions of connections, development peculiarities).

This paper wishes to present some preliminary results of this research in the context of Romania. We have also conducted surveys in Romania: 198 university students were asked to fill in our questionnaires in Bucharest, Cluj-Napoca, Timişoara and Sibiu. The regional division of the country is an important debate topic between the organisations of the Hungarian ethnic group in Romania and the state institutions, and there is tension between these concepts. Therefore, we also asked students belonging of Hungarian ethnic group and studying in Hungarian to fill in separate questionnaires. 36 questionnaires were filled in by the 'Hungarian control group' in Romania.

Naturally, our survey was not representative. The respondents (youth from universities) obviously belonged to a more qualified and open group in the society than the average. Even so, their opinion is an adequate mirror to demonstrate the spatial approach of the society. This is due to the fact that public education forms our spatial approach through the books, textbooks and maps

used during education. The socialisation within the family, in which the peculiarities, ethnic features of our home place and the historic approach are taught are also very important. The state transmits its own spatial approach to its citizens through public education, insuring the unity of the state and the state nation conscience. Therefore, it is interesting to analyse and compare the geography textbooks of different countries with the textbooks and maps of different regimes in the same country.

The approach transmitted by the materials used in public education is usually modified or intensified by other common information and maps (even the maps seen in the weather reports on television, their division and peculiarities), the different state and non-state propaganda materials, conceptually coloured and ornamented maps depicting imaginary or concrete geographic-historic situations. They can all be considered 'top-down' effects on our personal spatial approach.

The personal impacts are also significant. These are the social impacts from the family, the personal interests, the deeper knowledge of the home place and other areas (such as regularly used routes, the travelling destinations).

As we noted, uniform basis is given by education. However, other factors can differ depending on ethnicity. People belonging to a given ethnic group have other relationships. They use different geographical notions in the family and in the ethnic group (especially in the case of Hungarian ethnic group in Romania, who live and act mainly in a certain region of Transylvania).

Territorial identification and spatial approach are very important in the formation of regions. Therefore, our research can help explain the different regionalisation concepts of Romanian and Hungarian ethnic groups. There are obviously other factors which cause the differences.

One of the first questions in the survey concerns the geographic space categories Romania belongs to? We enumerated politico-geographic categories such as Central Europe, South-Eastern Europe etc., including physical geographic factors which also had some political symbolic value in some countries of the analysed area. The Romanian respondents described Romania as a 'Carpathian' and 'Danube' country; the politico-geographic categories Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe were less accentuated as the characteristic of the country. None of these categories stood out from the rest, so there was no explicit identification in this issue (see figure 3).

There are thus close ties to two physical geographic elements: Carpathian Mountains and the Danube River. This fact is important in the case of Romania, as the Carpathian Mountains form the main inner dividing line in the country, while the Danube constitutes a long segment of the state border and the Delta area with the coast is one of the important gateways into the country. In addition,

the longest section of the above mentioned mountains and river are situated in Romania. It was surprising for Hungarian researchers that the respondents chose the spatial notion of 'Carpathian Basin' in similarly high proportion, as the notion is used in Hungary and in Hungarian geography for the basin-like area surrounded by the Carpathian Mountains, the Alps and the Dinarides. At the same time, this notion carries political meaning, it coincides territorially to a considerable extent with the area of the so called 'Great-Hungary' before the First World War. Therefore, the name is not used and not known in the neighbour countries, and if it is used, it represents the spatial concept associated with historical revisionism. As we can observe from the other parts of our questionnaire, Romanian respondents used the notion of Carpathian Basin instead of 'Transylvanian Basin', which is surrounded by the Eastern and Southern Carpathians, and Munţii Apuseni. The Transylvanian Basin is an important developing area of Romania.



Fig. 3. Distribution of answers to the question 'Which geographic space categories does Romania belong to?' (%)
Source: Questionnaires 2013

In order to gauge the respondents' opinion about the inner territorial units of the country, we asked them to draw regions on the map of Romania which constitute the country (historic, ethnic, geographic regions, not the NUTS II ones). This quality at which the task was completed differed, as the drawing ability and geographical knowledge among the respondents varied. The aggregation and

exact evaluation of answers have been a difficult task, but we can find some typical, standard answers.

The first important statement is that almost every appraisable answer contains historical units or their disaggregation: Oltenia, Moldova, Transylvania and Dobrogea. Even the roughest and worst variants of the graphic answers contain these regions and their boundaries are quite correct. Figure 4 below shows this basic variant.



Fig. 4. Map with four historical regions
Source: Questionnaires 2013

Differences can be observed within these units in the drawings. In the most common variant, students divided the country into 8–9 units, usually following the historical regions. This division seemed to be typical in the case of both Romanian and Hungarian respondents, differences could be observed only in the use of geographical names.

These units are: 1. Oltenia, 2. Muntenia (Greater Wallachia), 3. Dobrogea, 4. Transylvania or Ardeal in the Romanian answers, Erdély in the Hungarian answers (Transylvania), 5. Moldova, 6. Banat, 7. Crişana (in the Hungarian answers: Partium), 8. Maramureş, and in some answers 9. Bucovina (see figure 5).



Fig. 5. Map with nine regions
Source: Questionnaires 2013



Fig. 6. Example of a Romanian answer using smaller regions
Source: Questionnaires 2013



Fig. 7. Hungarian answer emphasising Ţinutul Secuiesc (Székelyföld, Szeklerland) within Transylvania
Source: Questionnaires 2013



Fig. 8. Hungarian answer using ethnographic units
Source: Questionnaires 2013

The Carpathians appeared as a separate region only in three answers when the respondents marked the borders of the area of the mountains. This shows that both the Romanian and the Hungarian respondents divide the country mainly into historical units.

The ethnical differences appeared in the further division of historical units. Romanian answers only rarely contained smaller territorial units than the above mentioned ones. There were only five Romanian respondents who divided Transylvania into the northern and southern parts, and only three respondents who divided other regions such as Valea Siretului, Făgăraş into smaller units.

Half of the Hungarian control group divided Transylvania into several smaller units (see figure 7).

Ţinutul Secuiesc (Székelyföld, Szeklerland) appeared in almost all Hungarian answers, but several other ethnographic and ethnic areas or regions were mentioned. Transylvania did not appear as a unit in just six cases (see figure 8).

5. CONCLUSIONS

Our main conclusion could be that the spatial approach acquired in the course of public education is present uniformly in the minds of respondents belonging to both Romanian and Hungarian ethnic groups. The socialisation variations based on ethnic differences have added some diversity in the use of geographic names and have resulted in the fact that the Hungarian respondents used smaller territorial units in their answers. This tendency is observable in the context of Ţinutul Secuiesc (Székelyföld, Szeklerland) and other Transylvanian ethnographic and ethnic territorial units (inhabited not only by the Hungarian minority), which shows their close ties with these regions and strong identity. This identity sometimes seems to be stronger than the Transylvanian regional identity. After learning these answers, it becomes obvious that the new regionalisation process should also take into account the importance of historical regions in Romania.

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REGION and REGIONALISM
No. 12

THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL RELATIONS ON CROSS-BORDER SHOPPING TOURISM A CASE STUDY FROM POLAND

1. INTRODUCTION

In the past 40–50 years, the purchasing patterns changed fundamentally, when customers' demands started to extend beyond the need for good prices and a wider selection of goods and into the sphere of experience, with emotions and sensations as defining factors in purchase decision (Danziger 2006, p. xvi). According to P. Williams et al. (2001), shopping is the 'new retail geography', consisting of 'an elaborate sociological game played out in sites loaded with meaning' (Crewe 2000 cited in Williams et al. 2001, p. 204). Shopping tourism, consumption across borders (Tömöri 2010) or cross-border shopping tourism refers to the activity of people travelling outside the boundaries of their own country in order to do shopping in the neighbouring one (Timothy 2005).

This form of niche tourism has gained popularity in recent years, as people has become more mobile, changed their life styles (Timothy 2005), and expanded their demand and curiosity for travel and consumption. Consumers felt encouraged to travel away from their local communities in order to benefit from a unique travel and consumption experiences. In the border regions, shopping tourists can also be described as local consumers, taking advantage of their geographical position, in this way enjoying the benefits of the offers of two different markets.

In Eastern and Central Europe, cross-border shopping has emerged as a natural result of the removal of border crossing restrictions, with the core locations serving meeting points between the developed and developing economies

(Powęska 2008). Daily, entrepreneurially rather than personally motivated (Minghi 1999) cross-border shopping trips quickly became a common activity, mainly for people living in the borderlands (Hall 2000). Price played a key role during the transition period in Eastern and Central Europe, and was perceived as a strong motivational factor for people to travel. Described as 'bazaar capitalism' (Smith 1997), the cross-border shopping activities conducted in Central and Eastern Europe after the fall of the Iron Curtain were strongly focused on items that could be resold rather than used for personal purposes (Timothy 2005). This practice demonstrated that there was a very thin line between cross-border shopping in order to help the household budget through resale, and helping friends and relatives to purchase as well. Cross-border shopping tourists from Belarus, Russia and Ukraine often travelled to Polish markets to buy or sell goods they had bought across the border (Wendt 2011).

As the political situation in Eastern and Central Europe started to stabilise and the border crossing procedures changed, partly due to European Union regulations, partly by mutual agreements between countries, new trends in cross-border shopping appeared. The motivations to cross the borders became more complex. They focused less on economical and trade factors, more and more often travelling for leisure and tourism.

The economic importance of cross-border shopping tourism has already been discussed in scientific literature (Di Matteo 1993, Timothy and Butler 1995). However, a business focussed solely on cross-border shopping may be risky and can become unprofitable over time, as the movement may always change direction or the customers may face unexpected difficulties in crossing the border (Bar-Kołelis and Wiskulski 2012). One way to optimise the benefits of cross-border shoppers' visits is to integrate their needs with local demand.

2. CROSS-BORDER SHOPPING TOURISM - SYSTEMIC COMPONENTS

Geographically, the tourism system consists of three main components: the place of origin which tourists leave from, the destination where tourists arrive and the transit locations, situated between the place of origin and the destination (Boniface, Cooper and Cooper 2012). In the case of shopping tourism, the places of origin can be represented by Country A (Fig. 1), the tourist's permanent place of residence (Medlik 2003), which they leave to seek new consumption opportunities. Country B can represent the tourist's destination, where the shopping

activity takes place. Like any tourist destination, these areas do not necessary need to be characterised by a 'pleasant climate' or 'fine scenery' (Leiper 1990), but rather need to have a particular motivational element that attracts visitors. The key element is the transit route, represented as an 'interval in a trip, when the traveller feels they have left their home region or country but have not yet arrived in a region or country they choose to visit' (Leiper 1990, p. 22). In case of cross-border shopping, the transit route includes a border that needs to be crossed by the tourist in order to complete their trip.



Fig. 1. A basic tourism system in case of cross-border shopping
Source: compiled from: N. Leiper (1979), B. Boniface, C. Cooper and R. Cooper (2009)

Each tourism system has its particular characteristics, depending on the development of each country or location, as well as its political or economical situation (Boniface, Cooper and Cooper 2012). The number of tourism systems is uncountable, as 'every itinerary route followed by one or more tourists represents' a new distinctive system (Leiper 1990, p. 28).

The most important and common characteristic of all tourism systems is that they are dynamic, not static, in permanent interaction (Gunn 1994), therefore in the case of cross-border shopping tourism, small changes to the internal or external economic or political issues can strongly affect the characteristics of the whole system.

The main motivational factors for shopping tourism can be divided in two general categories: economic, and psychological/sociological. The economic motivators obviously revolve around the price of goods and its determinant factors, like tax rates, VAT returns or currency exchange rates. However, the price is not the only criterion (Optem 2004), as complex psychological and

social reasons also influence this cross-border movement. These factors are related to such elements as fame and reputation that comes from travelling and purchasing goods abroad, the possibility of acquiring unique products, the proximity to the border or the opening hours of the shops, or simply due to language similarities (Timothy 2001).

Besides these motivational factors that can cause a significant contrast between two markets separated by a border, which customers are aware of, and thus willing to travel abroad to make purchases, there is also the element of border permeability (Leimgruber 1988, Timothy 2005). The borders are, above all, barriers – spatial, political or economic – with variable power (Więckowski 2010), real or perceived, created to limit human interaction (Timothy 2001). The real barriers can be physical obstacles that affect tourism through the obstruction of the flow of tourists, or indirect ones, such as border-related policies making travelling across a border difficult or impossible. In some cases, the perceived barriers are influenced by psychical obstacles, making border crossing an undesirable activity (Timothy 2001). In the case of cross-border shopping, the permeability of the border is a key determinant element for tourists deciding whether they should or should not take the trip. In ideal circumstances, the border is unproblematic and the border procedures not very time consuming. Nowadays, more and more borders can be crossed with little formalities and even without visas, even though their situation may not always stable, depending arbitrarily on political changes. Excessive formalities can be very discouraging for people planning to travel to the other side, regardless of the market contrast and their willingness to travel.

Like all forms of tourism, cross-border shopping tourism is also vulnerable to political problems or borderland crime. According to D.J. Timothy (2001, p. 13), they 'act as real barriers to tourism in terms of affecting the flow of tourists' and the development of tourisms industry.

In case of cross-border shopping tourism system, we can define two types of tensions, which represent a big threat to maintaining a functional system:

1. Internal tensions – may refer to the restrictions imposed by the country of origin in terms of access to travel or currency restrictions (Timothy 2001); the access and safety of tourists at destination, from the feeling of not being welcome, to the harm the tourists can suffer.
2. External tensions – between the two neighbouring countries can transform into specific restrictions for the citizens of the neighbouring country, the permeability of the border or the safety at the destination.

3. POLAND CASE STUDY

Between 2009 and 2013, I have conducted a quantitative research survey in Poland, at the external borders of European Union. The study focussed on Belarusian, Russian (from Kaliningrad Oblast) and Ukrainian cross-border shoppers, whose transit route included the crossing of the Polish-Belarusian, Polish-Russian and Polish-Ukrainian borders. The research was conducted on the Polish side of the border, in the cities of Gdansk and Lublin, which represented the tourists' destination areas. The goal was to determine the presence and impact of cross-border shoppers from outside the European Union in Poland, as well as the problems and difficulties they were facing when coming to shop inside the European Union territory.

The study included two types of subjects: cross-border shoppers and local retailers, who mainly contacted the cross-border shoppers, while also being the primarily benefactors of their visits. In the first part of the study, cross-border shoppers from Belarus, Russia and Ukraine were asked in a questionnaire survey to evaluate on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 represented the lowest and 5 the highest, the difficulties they face in the transit zone when they come to shop in Poland. The difficulties referred to visas or other papers they had to arrange in order to enter Polish territory (Fig. 2), waiting time at the border (Fig. 3) and cross-border conditions, in this case referring to the vigilance of the border guards and the border crossing procedures (Fig. 4). At the time of the study, Belarussian and Ukrainian tourists required visas in order to get into Poland. The Russians were required to have visas before 27 July 2012, when the local visa free agreement between the Polish and Russian authorities entered into force (Palmowski 2013).



Fig. 2. The difficulties that the cross-border shoppers face when shopping in Poland in terms of visa (or other papers) receiving procedures
Source: own research



Fig. 3. The difficulties that the cross-border shoppers face when shopping in Poland in terms of waiting time at the border
Source: own research



Fig. 4. The difficulties that the cross-border shoppers face when shopping in Poland in terms of cross-border procedures (the vigilance of the border guards, luggage check, goods they can transport)
Source: own research

According to their responses concerning visa procedures, Belarusian tourists complained the most, with majority of them (61.8%) choosing very high and high difficulty. Belarusian tourists complained about the amount of time it took and the paperwork they had to submit to the Polish embassy, as well as the problems they faced when trying to submit a visa application. Ukrainians reported the lowest difficulties in terms of visa, 50% of them declaring that receiving visa represents one of the lowest problems when coming to shop in Poland.

As far as waiting times at the border and border-crossing procedures are concerned, Belarusians again reported them as most difficult, with 74.4% and 56.8%, respectively, reporting very high difficulty. Based on the results shown above, we can conclude that from the three nationalities of shopping tourists from outside the European Union, namely Belarusians, Russians and Ukrainians,

the former face the most difficulties in terms of waiting time at the border and border-crossing procedures. According to these results, it would be logical conclude that Belarusian tourists are less likely than Russians or Ukrainians to visit Poland for shopping, due to the difficulties they face in the transit zone. However, the situation is opposite.

In the second part of the research, local retailers from Bialystok, Gdansk and Lublin were asked in a survey to evaluate on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 representing the lowest and 5 the highest, the presence and impact on the market and sales of cross-border shoppers from the neighbouring countries (Fig. 5). The results show that Bialystok experienced the highest presence and impact on sales and on the local market, coming from the Belarusian cross-border shoppers. 76% of the respondents reported the presence of the Belarusian shoppers as very high or high, while 64.3% and 66% reported their impact on the market and on sales as high and very high, respectively.



Fig. 5. Presence and impact of cross-border shopping tourists from the perspective of local retailers
Source: own research

The smallest impact on both sales and market was reported in Lublin, where 45.7% and 50.7% of retailers, respectively, reported the impact of Ukrainian cross-border shoppers on sales or market as low or very low.

These results allow us to conclude that the Polish-Belarusian border is the least permeable part of the external border of the EU for cross-border shopping tourists. However, despite this transit zone barrier, the Belarusian cross-border

shoppers are the most active cross-border shoppers from outside European Union, while overcoming the border-crossing difficulties. Overall, we can conclude that unfavourable political factors on a macro scale do not necessary influence micro-scale cross-border shopping tourism activities, especially when the attraction factors are strong.

4. A DIFFERENT TYPE OF CONCLUSION

In the above-mentioned study, local retailers from Gdansk mainly reported the presence and impact of Russian cross-border shopping tourists as average. With an increasing potential for development (Bar-Kołelis and Wiskulski 2012), the presence of Russians from Kaliningrad Oblast in Gdansk became more noticeable after July 2012, when local retailers from Gdansk chose to make parts of their offers specifically for these customers by hiring Russian language speaking personnel or using promotional materials in Russian language.

At the beginning of 2014, I have conducted a post-research qualitative survey, which included the observation and recording of (Amaratunga et al. 2002) cross-border shopping tourists from Kaliningrad Oblast in Gdansk. The survey took place at a time of political tensions between the European Union (whose policies and decisions on international political scene are shared by Poland) and Russia regarding the Ukrainian issues. The survey targeted Russian cross-border shopping tourists, who in the previous study were motivated by important dragging factors, and who benefited from constantly improving facilities of the transit zones (local visa-free agreement and opening of new border crossing points). The study found that this was a critical moment for Russian cross-border shoppers, which resulted in limited visits, restrictions of their leisure activities and a focus on maintaining a low profile during their shopping visits. Russian cross-border shoppers reported the feeling hostility and lack of security in Poland caused by political tensions between Russia and the European Union. These restrictions to cross-border shopping were indirectly politically motivated through negative micro-scale media campaigns, especially in Kaliningrad, where the cross-border shopping tourists were warned about the possible damage they could suffer while shopping in Poland.

The conclusion of this study was that political factors (especially negative messages) applied indirectly through media communication or manipulation can strongly affect the cross-border shopping tourism activities.

Comparing these two different results from the two studies, we can say that in case of cross-border shopping tourism systems, the impediments that appear

in the transit zone can be overcome by tourists, if the dragging factors are sufficiently strong. However, the difficulties related to safety and hostility towards tourists at the destination represent real impediments to the development of cross-border shopping tourism, even if the dragging factors are strong and the transit zone conditions favourable.

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DISPUTED AND TRANSFORMED: RECENT CHANGES IN THE SLOVENIAN-CROATIAN BORDER LANDSCAPE

1. INTRODUCTION: SLOVENIAN BORDERS

Positioned in southern part of Central Europe, Slovenia is a true 'border country'. Due to its relatively small size (20,273 km^2), a good half of the state territory is inside of 25-km border belt. Slovenia is bordering four countries: Italy, Austria, Hungary and Croatia. The total border length is 1,334 km; 17% with Italy, 25% with Austria and 8% with Hungary, while the remaining almost half of Slovenia's land border is with Croatia: 670 km (*National atlas...* 2001, p. 14). The Slovenian maritime border (towards Italian and Croatian territorial water in the Upper Adriatic Sea) is still (2014) disputed. The decision should be made through International Arbitrary Court in next years[1].

The border between Slovenia and Croatia is young, while the borderline is, for the most part, older, even up to a few centuries. Before 1991, the border had an administrative and political character, which created differences, but did not prevent cross-border contacts. Due to the language similarity and quite large number of ethnically-mixed Slovene-Croatian marriages, this area is distinguished by notable entwinement of relations at the elementary level. The borderline was never straightened out, making it adapt mainly to the property and ownership issues, and not security and strategic relations between both contemporary countries. This was a border line between Austrian and Hungarian part of 'double' monarchy throughout the 18th and 19th centuries. Regarding the linguistic (or, at

[1] Diplomatic representatives from both Slovenia and Croatia agreed in 2012 to abjure the boundary decision (maritime and terrestrial) to International Arbitrary Court.

that time[2], ethnographical) criteria, delineating clear border was not easy (Zajc 2006, pp. 95, 97–106). In rough terrain, it follows natural obstacles (waterways, watersheds), but often crosses them, creating a series of complex border situations. The border is commonly crossed by local paths, which were mainly interrupted after the establishment of control. To facilitate life for the local population, among which many own property or have family relations on both sides, several agreements and local regulations were required. The establishment of economic, police and military control thus required a series of diplomatic efforts.

With Slovenia and Croatia becoming separate countries, their border, along with a discussion on the exact position of the border line on land, water bodies and sea, acquired a series of characteristics, which it had not had for several centuries beforehand. The political border became a key factor in the shaping of border landscape. The purpose of the article is to present a systematic overview of the modern effects in the border areas all along the Slovenian-Croatian border.

2. SOME METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS

Border regions present a sensitive area, towards which countries often have specific, goal-oriented attitudes. This is expressed directly through the elements of infrastructural politics, spatial planning and various forms of spatial control: economic, legal, military, police, cultural and environmental. As a rule, countries are conservative in their approaches and often in conflict with the interest of the local borderside population, especially minorities. Indirect effects are a lot wider, varied and more difficult to predict. They are triggered by the interests of local population, which dynamically adjusts to borderline regimes, economic interests of the wider periphery and, ultimately, also the wider geopolitical situations. Local spatial circumstances, such as the geographic characteristics of surface, flora, water systems and, on the other hand, settlement system with roads and population structure, are often only an accompanying factor of the reshaping of the border areas. But under certain conditions, they may become an important or even key element. Borders are thus a factor or an agent and at the same time a very dynamic phenomenon. The borderline changes along with the border regime and the structure of the border area. It is important to emphasise the principle of succession, as every period leaves its mark, while today's

[2] I.e. at the turn of 19th and 20th centuries.

structure in itself represents an accumulation of all influences from all eras (Zupančič 2008, p. 84).

The research approach followed the chronological logic from the establishment of national borders onward. In a series of field research projects on the perception of the border and cross border relations in the period between 2006 and 2013, over 700 questionnaires[3] were completed. We have directed special attention to an analysis of field indicators in the following chosen test border sectors: along Mura river in the north-east, near Ormož, in Upper Sotla river basin, in the so-called Sava-river transport corridor, near Metlika in south-east and close to Dragonja river in maritime part (Portorož and vicinity). The most common result is quite strong interpersonal relations, while the institutional ones are barely represented, despite former common state of Yugoslavian federation[4]. As part of the research programme entitled 'Sustainable development of Slovenia', the structure of border area and population was studied more thoroughly and the documents on spatial development were analysed. Despite common political life in the recent past (i.e. during the Yugoslavian period), almost all the border area is purely peripheral on local level. The structural analysis of both sides of the border plays an important part in this methodological approach. The borderland is asymmetric: the Croatian regional urban centres are located much more closely to the border than the Slovenian ones. Zagreb, the Croatian capital, with almost one million inhabitants, is located just 17 km from the border, while Rijeka, the second largest city and the most important Croatian port, is only 22 km away. Slovenia has some smaller cities positioned just at the border (Ormož, Rogatec, Metlika) or very close to it (Portorož – Piran, Brežice, Rogaška, Lendava), but they are pretty small in comparison. On the other side, there is similar situation along Slovenian – Italian border (Triest, Monfalcone (Slovenian Tržič) and Gorizia (Slovenian Gorica), but they have in some regards comparative counterparts: Nova Gorica, Sežana, Koper). The functional analysis highlighted the third important feature of disputed borderlands: the complementarity. This might be explained as a 'logical' result of structuralisation in the socialist Yugoslavian period. Slovenia, as the most industrialised and developed among all Yugoslavian federal units, attracted the workforce from Croatia, despite the

[3] Most of them were done trough systematic students field research work, Department of Geography, Ljubljana.

[4] Actually, there are quite similar relations along Slovenian-Italian border. The institutionalisation of cross- and trans-border formal (or institutional) relations and cooperation was evidently weaker. Excellent relations (as explained elsewhere) are due to strong Slovenian minority in Italy.

Croatian side having much bigger cities (Zupančič 2002, pp. 146–147). There is a special bilateral issue in form of nuclear power-plant near Krško (Slovenia). The structure was built in the 1980s by both countries, but due to the civil war in Croatia, the country neglected it[5].

3. THE GENESIS OF SLOVENIAN – CROATIAN BORDER

The Slovenian-Croatian border is mainly drawn along the old line of the administrative border[6], which was delineated between the 16th and 18th centuries, when provinces in the Austrian (Carniola, Styria) and Hungarian parts (Croatia) of the Habsburg monarchy were formed (*Zgodovina Slovencev* 1979, pp. 189–196). In spite of somewhat different competences, the conditions had been provided for the formation of a settlement structure, traffic laws, property law and other public and private regulations, forming the cultural region. Life was different, but due to related languages and the same (Catholic) cultural provenience, there were many contacts, as well as many mixed marriages. The regions lived in intense contact. Towards the end of the 18th century, the cadastral measurement began to form, but differed in details (techniques as well as surveying starting points). In the Žumberak region (today Gorjanci mountains), the border line was drawn according to the possession of land-owners residence and adopted a heavily 'meandering' line, forming some enclaves (or exclaves) in the area (see Celar 2002, p. 103), perhaps because of special rights of the settlers in the region, a real 'frontiermen' – Uskoki[7]. Once the double monarchy was formed according to the Austro-Hungarian agreement of 1866, the introduction of the internal economical control between Hungarian and Austrian lands saw the implementation of partial harmonisation and straightening out of the border line, which serves as the legal predecessor of today's 'cadastral' border. Later, in the

[5] There were three important questions opened after both countries declared independency: the borderline (and particularly the maritime sector), Krško nuclear power-plant and Ljubljanska banka.

[6] The perception that political borders between Yugoslavian federal republics were only administrative is completely wrong. The federal republics had considerable autonomy and competences and were, above all, political entities structured like states (countries). But they were not secured by armies, police and customs.

[7] Uskoki – people of mainly Serbian ethnic origin, who were refugees from areas under Ottoman rule, and settled on the frontier of Habsburg Empire. They have special competences and rights for compensation for military border service.

Yugoslavian era, it went through several re-drawings; those are where most of the non-harmonised cases of the cadastre route of the border line of the current Slovenian-Croatian border stem from. The border on the Mura river was drawn inside one common cadastral measurement (Hungarian part of double monarchy), so that the contemporary differences appeared later during the Yugoslavian period. In the Istria sector, the border is entirely new and was formed by agreements after the Second World War. This part is still a subject of dispute due to a series of unclear aspects within the border line drawing process itself. Beside this, the area of Istria was under the rule of the Republic of Venice for a long time and therefore has some Venetian juridical traditions. Austrian authorities just adopted them after conquering the area in the 18th century (*Zgodovina Slovencev* 1979, p. 234). Another source of border issues stems from the erosion and accumulation processes by Drava, Mura and Sotla rivers that changed some characteristics and access to property. The third source of issues is the layout of the infrastructure, especially traffic-related, since it crosses the border line several times and there is no clear competence regarding maintenance and control. A series of open question relates to energy facilities (hydroelectric power plants, nuclear power plant in Krško) directly at the border or close to it. The fourth group of problems includes interventions, which were formed after the establishment of the countries. There were several shortages because of the border. All these circumstances significantly influenced the considerable dynamic of changes of the border cultural landscape.

4. THE DEVELOPMENT OF BORDER LANDSCAPES ALONG THE SLOVENIAN-CROATIAN BORDER

The development of the border cultural territory may loosely be divided into four main phases:

A. Development before the establishment of the state border.

B. Initial phase after the establishment of the border.

C. Maturity.

D. Control loosening.

The first phase was chronologically the longest and lasted over a century. Then, the cadastral and administrative border lines were formed, the latter of which went through later changes. A specific cultural landscape was formed, which the ‘border’ indirectly affected: the majority of the present border area has been a periphery for centuries before!

In the second, initial, border stage, which began in 1991 by proclamation of independency of both Slovenia and Croatia, and lasted for a few years, a political border was established with the elements of economic and security monitoring and a certain level of symbolisation. This is a period of the most dynamic structural changes, which where, in the largest part, influenced by state institutions.

In the third phase, due to international circumstances (mainly European integration), measures of structural balancing in border areas gradually followed; opportunities for changing cultural landscapes were, at that time, mainly dependent on local factors. Slovenia joined to EU in May 2004 and the Schengen-area in 2007 (along with the euro-zone). The security of the border zone was strengthened as necessary obligation of EU outside political border.

Fourth and last stage began when Croatia joined the EU in 2013. The border control measures were gradually loosened with national (state-) and international factors playing the most important roles and mechanisms were implemented to de-peripherise the border, such as the establishment of marginal (where local factors dominate). The cross-border influences of strong Croatian cities (like Rijeka in the coast and Zagreb in continental region) might be expected in the near future.

5. CONTEMPORARY CHANGES OF BORDER LANDSCAPES

The most obvious signs of the establishment of the border are its symbolic marking and the establishment of institutionalised control. Border crossing installations were set up at road and railroad crossings, along with police, customs and sanitary services. Many local paths and roads were closed, or traffic was limited and submitted under strict conditions. The securing of the borderline triggered the formation of two types of zones in the border area: intensification zones along the traffic corridors and peripherisation zones in the areas with less traffic. In the case of the Slovenian-Croatian border, the investment pressure in the first type of areas increased after the end of the Balkans military conflicts in 1995; then, the traffic increased rapidly. This was followed by the tartarisation of the border area, which replaced the older industrial-agricultural paradigm. On the other hand, new infrastructure was provided to entirely remodel areas in the Gorjanci and Kočevsko regions. Due to military and strategic reasons, several

roads were renovated and built[8] over a short period of time, with other forms of technical infrastructure being installed, which was meant to aid the local population and, at the same time, be at the disposal to the security forces controlling the border.

The second significant change is mainly symbolic in character. The border area is important for countries and as such it is frequently, if not always, also an area of symbolisation. The border is marked with boards and signs directly on the border line as well as the traffic corridors, which cross the border. Gradually, a symbolic aspect can evolve for the elements of the cultural and historical heritage and natural monuments: all of them speak of 'our' country. These elements are generally also attractive and thus subject to visits. Symbolisation then gradually leads to the expansion of services in border areas and the case of the Slovenian-Croatian border was not different.

A special variation of symbolisation is the establishment and maintenance of parks, understood as a strategy of protecting the border area, especially when control is loosened. The protection of the border area, where various 'valuable' elements of animate and inanimate nature, as well as of material cultural heritage, are recognised makes sense at first sight, as it neatly complements the visibility of the local environment and contributes to its tourist promotion. However, protection is also a form of new, indirect control over the border area, which heavily restricts and controls a particular part of other development perspectives. This vastly increases the national care and the supervision of the local environment, which is mainly motivated national, and thus conservative, causes: it attempts to maintain the border area intact. Most of the area surrounding the Mura and Drava rivers is within 'Nature 2000' while certain smaller reservations have an even stricter regime. There is the Kozjansko park along the Sotla river which includes the Jovsi wetland and certain areas of upper Sotla river area. The design of the park dates back to the 1980s, similarly to Gorjanci, Kolpa river area and Snežnik. More than two thirds of the border area is under a certain protection regime. The most interesting habitat of all is surely the salt pans of Sečovlje, the maritime part of which continues into the shallow and sensitive area of the Northern Adriatic: the Piran Bay. However, due to its border location and two decades of a border disputes, the area underwent a completely different process of symbolisation. In a rushed attempt to prove the ownership of this area, both countries tried to prove the 'Slovenianness' or 'Croatianness' of Piran Bay. While Slovenia declared the protection of this area

[8] Two completely new local roads, built exclusively for supplying small military base on Gorjanci mountain slopes are not discussed here.

and also limited it, Croatia introduced a different name for it, Savudrijska vala (Kladnik et al. 2014, pp. 12–26), and called for the development mariculture (by far the most intense in the entire area of Western Adriatic), development of tourism (two casinos directly at the border located, according to Slovenian law, in a protected natural area) and finally also construction works in areas which have previously been entirely vacant, of the cape of Savudrija, with upscale villas and an apartment complex (Zupančič and Pipan 2012, pp. 24, 28–29).

The third form of influence in the border area is represented by its total abandonment. This is especially present in the 'mature' phase and later, when the broad range of border infrastructure if not necessary any more. To avoid border disputes in a time when such issues are settled by international arbitration, the countries abandoned the use of it. This was the case with the border sand quarries on Mura and Drava rivers. Maintenance of certain levies has also been abandoned and farm use in certain peripheries has also ceased. The exploitation of sand, rubble and lignite deposits by Mura is now nearly non-existent. To keep the energy buildings in use, many compromises had to be made. The use of railway by Sotla river was nearly abandoned[9] but is still maintained due to its border location. With Croatia's entry into the EU, the need for broad border infrastructure should slowly be reduced, with said infrastructure being abandoned and possibly decaying.

6. CONCLUSION

The processes that will occur in the border area after Croatia enters the Schengen zone may be predicted based on experience from other Slovenian border regions. The process may even be called a recycling of border territory. Abandoned border infrastructure may serve small enterprise, tourism, public activities and other purposes. We can expect further pressure to protect the border area. This means that control will be maintained, while the area may justify leaning more heavily on state support and subventions. Old elements will gain new meaning, and regain their active role. These changes are much more common in border areas than elsewhere and depend mainly on the political border relations.

[9] Despite its border location, this railway is in a terrible condition and probably out of use anyway.

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Section III

HERITAGE OF BORDERS AND BORDERLANDS IN GLOBALISED WORLD

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REGION and REGIONALISM
No. 12

ON THE NATURE OF BORDERS IN THE CONTEXT OF JÓZEF TISCHNER'S PHILOSOPHY

Seek not the truth, but friends.
J. Tischner

1. INTRODUCTION

Łopuszna is the place where the late Polish philosopher Józef Tischner was born. It is situated near the Polish-Slovakian border, and in itself is a cradle of Polish highlanders' culture. All transborder areas are of great interest; they are magical places of human encounters. Enclosed by the surrounding mountains and exposed to harsh climate, highlanders have developed their own specific language and unique solidarity. They are characterised by close relations and curiosity. It is there that various cultural influences clash, resulting in a pluralistic variety. I myself come from Upper Silesia, an area of Polish, Czech, and German components. In the past, before the Second World War, there were many mixed, Polish-German, marriages. Usually, the spouses were both Christian and they used to say the same prayers: he in Polish, she in German. A fascinating example comes from a Polish-German marital couple. They both recited their prayers from their prayer book entitled *The Road to Heaven* (her version was *Der Weg zum Himmel*). But the intention of their personal plea was obviously the same. I remember some of my neighbours, whose Polish was still poor many years after the war. Before the war, Poles, Germans, and Jews lived together. I could even venture to say that my district resembled what Jews called a shtetl.

In this paper I would like to focus on Fr. Józef Tischner's philosophy and elicit from his writings some universal elements that constitute an interpersonal encounter. I mean elements that are essential irrespective of our individual circumstances. In his analysis, Tischner focuses on the unique character of interpersonal relations that result from human encounter.

2. THE QUESTION OF IDENTITY

Tischner gave one of the shortest definitions of identity. In one of his humorous stories about his fellow highlanders, and he had created plenty of them[1], he tells us how a certain musician died and appeared at the heavenly door. He knocked at the door. From the inside he heard St. Peter's voice: 'Who's there?' 'It's me' – answered the musician (Ponikło 2013, p. 12). 'It's me' seems to be the most concise definition of identity. But what does 'me' mean? It provides no restrictive predicates as to who this 'me' is. We do not know if 'me' is a teacher, a doctor, or a singer. The highlander does not even say that he is a musician, or that he is that musician from this particular village. We can imagine that the answer 'it's me' varies with regard to someone's pitch of voice, whether it is high- or low-pitched, whether it trembles or is soft, husky or whispering. The answer, therefore, or its physical characteristics do not say anything about the person's merits, cultural background, his likes or dislikes, his hopes or fears. They are all hidden in his 'me'.

What is the essence of all 'mes' or all 'Is' of the human world? Is there something like one general and universal 'me' (I)? If I say 'it's me', it is taken for granted that I know my own person. But does that mean that I would be able to give a simple answer (when asked) who I am? Perhaps it would be more correct to say that by answering 'it's me' the musician could only vaguely feel that he knew who he was. I have always expressed myself as 'me', I used myself to tell my mind. I even feel awkward when enquired to explain myself. Therefore, it appears that the most intricate border is inside man himself; it is the border between experiencing one's self and reporting (defining) what this self means. And of equal importance is the border between two different selves, when one self is called to respond to another self's needs, or to give a true account of what he really is; that is, in another context, of what he really needs. The encounter of human selves becomes even more complicated when they confront one another in transborder areas, when they come from different cultures, from different political systems, and from different languages.

The reason why we find it difficult to respond to others' needs is that we are full of illusions and stereotypes with regard to ourselves and to others. Tischner writes that we must be freed from illusions, therefore we 'need revelation' (Tischner 2008, p. 38). Not a better knowledge, not a more rigorous method of

[1] Let it suffice to mention his famous *Historia filozofii opowiedziana po góralsku* [*A History of Philosophy Told in the Polish Highlander's Dialect*], which is an example in point here.

investigation – as rationalists would like to have it – but revelation, i.e. being told what to do, being enlightened. Once we penetrate ourselves in an effort of self-reflection, searching for an answer, the outcome often misses the point. What makes the encounter extremely complicated is the fact that our selves are hidden in our human bodies; we use our bodies (gestures, looks, mimicry) always trying to render the exact meaning (intention) of the self within us. Another thing is that we are not beings out of nowhere; we are placed within concrete social, political, and cultural contexts that shape our perceptions of the world. More often than not, we yield to prejudices, opinions, and idols (as Francis Bacon put it).

3. VARIETIES OF THE SELF

Who do I mean when I say 'it's me'? I mean me, but who is me? We seem to be turning in a vicious circle. Is there anything common to all 'mes', a class (set) of common elements that can denote them? When I say 'me' do I mean myself as a teacher, a lawyer, a doctor, Pole, Czech, American, Russian, or rather someone unnameable with whom I have been acquainted ever since I was born? At the same time, I know that this particular 'me' is called John, Mark or Mary. In each case, 'me' is composed of some internal and external elements. The internal elements in turn are composed of individual thoughts, choices, emotions, personality traits, hopes, fears, likes and dislikes. Someone's being a father, a mother, a doctor, Pole or Czech constitutes the external elements.

'Me' as the core of everyone's personality is something static and dynamic at the same time: it is and it is being created throughout each individual life. I think we might call the process of the creation of 'me' a process of sedimentation that is subject to constant changes in which we, so to say, revolve around something stable and solid. In this circular, or rather spiral, movement we absorb certain values and reject others, we achieve our goals or fail. Then, when confronted with another 'me', one is called to render himself, to present himself, to introduce himself, to define himself, to tell who he really is, to tell the substantial from the contingent. This process is at times painful, especially when two entirely different characters meet, in border regions, where two or more cultures encounter. There we have to adjust our language, our cultural idiosyncrasies, in order to make this encounter possible. Personal and cultural (social, political) elements come into play here. Every person is active in the course of creating his or her own self, absorbing certain elements and eliminating others. Let us add

that this rendition of one's self is best manifested in action. Frequently, it is not words that are needed but actions. For Tischner, actions are better ways to manifest our identity than words.

When we say ‘it's me’ without any qualifications, we thereby approve of the person's transcendent value. In this process of absorption, somewhat miraculously, we stay in touch with the personal core, with the transcendent, with the innermost heart of our personalities. This contact saves us from total dissipation. The transcendent is what I called here the unnameable sphere within our personalities. To respect the other person is, first and foremost, to respect the transcendent ground that resides in each person. All other rights are derived from this truth.

Tischner would comment that his fellow-highlanders had this inborn sense of the transcendent truth and he used to jokingly remark that there is no truth, if it cannot be translated into the Polish highlander's dialect. Therefore people, and this is what I understand by the term ‘people of the mountains’, live not only close to nature but, first and foremost, close to one another. It is out of this natural solidarity that the knowledge of the transcendent value of the person is given.

This looking for a man leads to solidarity. People seek to understand one another, and the truth is somewhere in the background, it is presumed; otherwise, why should anyone strive to understand others. Is it not because we are all striving after the truth, but we abstain from calling it? There are certain values that Tischner lists as the most important in human relations: freedom, justice, honour. In his *History of philosophy*, freedom is ‘the most precious treasure’ (Tischner 2009, p. 82).

When the simple highlander appeared at the heavenly door and answered ‘it's me’, he undoubtedly meant ‘it's me, the person’. He intuitively grasped the contents of his person contained in the word ‘me’; this kind of intuition can hardly be verbalized. It seems also that the level of ‘me’, i.e. the personal level, is the most universal upon which anyone can encounter in peace and understanding. Once we concentrate on the respect for the dignity of the other person, we most certainly stand a chance to overcome whatever barriers there are: cultural, ethnic, linguistic, and intellectual. ‘Me’ is the most important core of our identity, of our personality, so the musician from the anecdote does not feel it necessary to specify his ‘me’. Thus ‘me’ is inexpressible, something taken for granted, something theoretically presumed, unnamed and yet alive, vital and essential.

Walter Ong, an American Jesuit, the late professor of English literature and philosopher observed in his book:

> Interiority and harmony are characteristics of human consciousness. The consciousness of each human person is totally interiorized, known to the person from the inside and inaccessible to any other person directly from the inside. Everyone who says 'I' means something different by it from what every other person means. What is 'I' to me is only 'you' to you. And this 'I' incorporates experience into itself by 'getting it all together'. Knowledge is ultimately not a fractioning but a unifying phenomenon, a striving for harmony. Without harmony, an interior condition, the psyche is in bad health (Ong 1988, p. 72).

Indeed, when the highlander from Tischner's story said: 'it's me' he had a clear notion of his 'I'. He grasped his personal identity with one act of his awareness. If I feel, speak, suffer, enjoy, can see, have a name I must be someone.

4. IDENTITY AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS

Pope John Paul II wrote in his encyclical *Veritatis splendor* (*The splendor of truth*):

> In the political sphere, it must be noted that truthfulness in the relations between those governing and those governed, openness in public administration, impartiality in the service of the body politic, respect for the rights of political adversaries, safeguarding the rights of the accused against summary trials and conviction, the just and honest use of public funds, the rejection of equivocal or illicit means in order to gain, preserve or increase power at any cost – all these are principles which are primarily rooted in, and in fact derive their singular urgency from, the transcendent value of the person and objective moral demands of the functioning of State (John Paul II 2014, par. 101).

Political systems can help us define our identities, but more often than not they impose on us inauthentic lifestyles. Much depends on whether they respect human freedom, i.e. whether they respect the 'transcendent value of the person'. They can, for instance, polarize the world by diving it into friends and enemies. Accordingly, the whole social system becomes bipolar and its inhabitants feel safe when they find themselves enlisted as friends of the authorities, i.e. the work of identification is simple. Such are totalitarian systems. The lines of division can run not only along borders, political groups, often arbitrarily defined by the authorities, but even across families. When writing about the central European transformations (especially in Poland), Tischner used the term of *Homo sovieticus* (Soviet man). The Soviet man here epitomises someone who is enslaved by a political system, cannot think for himself, gives in to imposed stereotypes, and blindly follows instructions. He must be told what to do,

otherwise he is incapable of individual and responsible decisions. When granted political freedom, *Homo sovieticus* is at a loss. He yearns for the good old days of slavery. He is well aware that he was not free then, but at least he was safe. He will eagerly give up freedom for the sake of safety. He does not believe in activity, unless it is initiated and monitored by the state (Tischner 1992, *passim*).

This situation changes and becomes complicated when the demands of the system loosen, and strict divisions give way to an accepted pluralism of values. When the pressure from without diminishes, the central forces withdraw, move to the outer area, causing dispersal of values. The former slaves look around and, having no well-defined enemies, try to redefine them. They felt safe within determined political frameworks and have learned to obey orders from without. But now that the time of pluralistic debate has come, the argument of power has become of less importance. The citizens have to practice the power of persuasion in a democratic game. They discover that reality is not so simple as they thought, and it is impossible to live in a world divided into friends and enemies, when the underlying principle of this division is highly arbitrary.

For Tischner, man's vital experience is that of a drama, of a special tension in which he creates himself and he creates the relationship with the other man. It is the situation of being and becoming. I am *someone* and I am becoming *someone*. The two kinds of someone, paradoxically, often differ. Besides, I am someone for others. Others are someone in themselves, and they are someone for me. And this is our drama: this inconsistency between being and becoming, between what we are and what we appear to be. We seek to make up for it by dialogue and persuasion. I introduce myself to others.

Man is never as such, but he is always surrounded by many layers, he is always embedded in something, rooted in his world. Man is in the world and at the same time is outside of this world; he is the builder. In this sense, Karol Wojtyła similarly describes the human person in his *The Acting Person*. The person is a builder and is being built. For Tischner, man is open to (moral and aesthetic) values. Values are like challenges: they inspire man to action. It is man who applies his measure to all matters at hand.

Irrespective of man’s origin, he or she has an inalienable dignity that must be respected. No matter how close to one another we can be, we remain forever mysteries, and this mystery in the other person must be taken for granted. The mystery is inherent in our very being. It is not related to a mere cultural or linguistic differences, which are naturally components of any mystery; the others seem naturally more mysterious, if we cannot communicate with them. But the level of communication is insufficient to explain the inherent mystery.

We are living in ourselves and for others, we are living in what Husserlian phenomenology has coined as our *Lebenswelt* (world-life). Thomas Luckmann defines precisely in his article:

> The descriptive phenomenology of everyday life […] describes the universal structures of subjective orientation and action: lived space, lived time, the elementary structure of face-to-face situations, the levels of anonymity, the biographical-historical subscript to all experience, the lived intersubjectivity of communication in everyday life, and so on (Luckmann 1978, p. 252).

The world-life shows the mode we are embedded in our space, time, our biography and history. Phenomenology is vitally interested in this lived experience, in this special liaison between our inner and outer perception. The world-life is the site where our personal choices, culture, and history encounter. We are beings marked with individual traits of our past, our present and the future (envisioned in phenomenology as the things hoped-for). Not only geographically does it matter where you are from: from the South or the West, from the North of the East, from a village or a city. Lived experience that is meant in phenomenology is the experience of our own selves: how we evaluate the world around, what choices we make, what we deem as important or of no value.

5. FELLOWSHIP RATHER THAN TOLERANCE

In order to accept fellowship instead of tolerance, I need to recognize my neighbour in the other person. The French philosopher put it nicely in his paper entitled *Who is my neighbour?*:

> I prefer the word fellowship to 'tolerance,' for it connotes something positive – positive and elementary – in human relationships. It conjures up the image of travelling companions, who meet here below by chance and journey through life – however fundamental their differences may be – good humouredly, in cordial solidarity and human agreement (Maritain 1949, p. 945).

The notion of travelling is especially in point here. In his writings, Tischner is often referring to the idea of travelling. Travelling can be understood as an overall metaphor of life. We are all travellers[2], and we are fellow-travellers of others.

[2] Some are literally travellers due to their professions (voluntary travellers), others are refugees and immigrants (enforced travellers) as a result of military conflicts or political situations.

In the mountains, where one lives close to nature and has often to struggle against it, this idea of fellow-travellers is crucial. Under such circumstances, man learns the value of solidarity. Solidarity is grounded not on state institutions, but is born out of this human proximity (Tischner 2009, p. 18). A totalitarian regime can weaken human independence because the essence of all totalitarian regimes is to make their subjects dependent.

It is in this context of human fellowship, of our natural dependence as neighbours that Tischner formulated his well-known belief that we should seek friends, rather than the truth (Tischner 2009, p. 37). This declaration obviously refers to the well-known picture from Diogenes, showing the ancient philosopher, strolling about town, in full daylight, with a lamp in his hand. When asked, he said: I am looking for a human. What does it mean to seek friends rather than the truth? What does it mean to look for men? Obviously, this does not mean a physical quest. Diogenes was on the marketplace, surrounded by crowds. And yet he was looking for a man. We may say that this mysterious operation certainly denotes something more profound, something that goes beyond the outer outlook. In terms of phenomenology, we are talking about inner perception, i.e. man's individual place from which he or she evaluates himself or herself and the world around.

The nineteenth-century theologian and philosopher, John Henry Newman, wrote in his famous *Grammar of Assent* that in matters of religion, metaphysics and ethics 'egotism is true modesty' (Newman 1955, p. 300). Geographically, politically, socially, and individually, we are situated amidst various spaces; they all affect our perceptions. Our individual biographies determine to a certain extent the ways we visualise ourselves. Our reasons walk their individual paths in arriving at certain conclusions, bearing on their individual exemplifications (cf. Tischner 2009, p. 38). How can one expect to meet a man, to understand him, to make him understand us without even trying to dwell on the other's paths? The other person is never totally open, always hidden behind certain barriers, always placed amongst the intricate networks of individual meanings, or shades of meanings, attached to otherwise commonly used concepts. The concepts used by others in their world-lives are always tainted with individuality. Therefore the claim that 'egotism is true modesty' has nothing to do with moral relativism, nor has Tischner's claim that we should seek friends first. Can we say that there is no objective truth, and each has his own truth? No, but we have to say that the way to reach the truth is in each case individual. Truth is important, but we need to find man first and only afterwards help him find the truth.

6. ETHOS AND VALUES

Man lives amidst values – they constitute his ethos: truth, justice, faithfulness, honestly, and magnanimity. This is the universe of languages we should use in communication with others. The others are calling upon me and to become a person, depending on my decisions, i.e. how I respond to their call. I have 'the power to take on or reject the human face' (Tischner 1982b, p. 55). Man builds himself because he is a potentiality. The driving force is man's hope to build his ethos. The elements that used in this edification are values. Values are objective (not subjective) and they call on man to be realized. Man is the creator, not of values, but of their embodiment. I experience injustice through the mediation of an unjust man; and I learn about justice because I met someone who was just. It is within my ethos, composed by my personal endowment and external circumstances, which I have to respond to a given situation. My response does not have to be ideal, nor am I capable of giving an ideal response. The most important thing is to be true to myself, to what I have found as my duty. And if I fail to respond respectively, I have to face up to my guilt, without looking around and trying to justify it. I have to take responsibility for my action and for my guilt (Tischner 2008, p. 39).

I can fail to help the other in three ways: by enforced encroachment upon the other's ethos (violation of his individuality), by hiding behind a veil or by putting on a mask. The difference between the veil and the mask is that the first hides something, whereas the latter deceives. What does the veil hides? It hides the face. Only the face is a true representation of my self. Whatever comes in between, i.e. between my true self and the other's perception, becomes an isolation that inhibits our encounters. The veil and mask intrude: the veil intends to hide something, and the mask is bound to deceive.

I am looking for my ethos, and the other is looking for his ethos. I can help him to find his, and he can help me to find mine. Our encounter, however, is not because of usefulness or some aesthetic value. We mean here ethical values. The primeval situation is always irretrievably related with the other person. It is in response to his need, to his quest that I grow or belittle, I develop or retreat (withdraw).

Values are objective, a fact that does not mean that they are real. They need to be realized, to be made real, to be put into practice. Objectivity is not the same as reality (Tischner 1982b, p. 59). Values are objective, which means that they 'stand before us as a task, as something that affects us, as something that obliges us' (Tischner 1982b, p. 60). Values emanate towards us. We can illustrate what we have said thus far in the following scheme:



We help each other to reach our ethos, that is, to become more human. What blockades our response to values is fear. When we have been hurt in our encounter with the other person, we tend to generalize it and distrust every person. When we are courageous enough to respond to this calling from the other person, we become virtuous.

The objective existence of values is sometimes called ideal because they are ideals of human behaviour, i.e. an ideal response to a given situation. The point is to find a possibly ideal solution to someone's problem, to help him restore his ethos.

Ethical values can be positive or negative, like justice and injustice, they are higher or lower. Man is thrown into the world. The best test of our response to values, our test of humanity is a border situation. It is such a situation that calls for a prompt action, and leaves little time for deliberation. In like manner it is the best test of our true nature, of what human beings we are. There is no time for putting on a mask.

Tischner enumerates various values on the scale of the lowest to the highest (hedonistic, vitalistic, spiritual). The most important thing is not to mistake a lower value for a higher value.

Another point of departure is to let people be as they are, that is, the starting point of ethics and morality (Tischner 1982b, p. 72). This is unlike Marxian postulate: to change the world in the first place. No, first let it be, and then change. The foundation is magnanimity, and magnanimity is still rooted in holiness. Be magnanimous to let people be, and only then will you be able to apply a proper measure. Only then will you be able to overcome ethical subjectivism. It is subjectivism that makes people will to appropriate everything.

The hierarchy of values begins with those that last only for a short moment and ends up with those that last forever (Tischner 1982b, p. 77). I have to realize myself and can help the other to realize himself. The primary starting point for my ethical action is the other person. The other person is ‘the true source of our ethical experiences’ (Tischner 1982a, p. 85), for it is in response to the calling

from the other person that I feel obliged to act. This calling does not have to be articulated in words. The other person may be lying on the ground wounded and helpless. Tischner's favourite example here was the parable of the Good Samaritan. When a proper response is given, like in the latter parable, the objective value of the person is made real. The border territory is filled in with a dialogue without any encroachment upon the other person's integrity. Tischner was right when he said that Kantian formal ethics says 'how we should act, but does not say what we should do' (Tischner 1982a, p. 86), the 'what' of my action is given by my interpretation of the given circumstances. For that interpretation I need empathy for the dignity of the human person. There are no ready-made scenarios. One needs to be always on the watch in order to respond to a given situation. Justice and injustice are always concrete callings: they call us to react. We are not dealing with abstract concepts. Justice comes through the action of a just person. Such a person has allowed justice to be born, i.e. has realized justice. We can take up the challenge or shrink back and turn away. Then the border between persons turns into an impenetrable obstacle.

We need to appreciate values for values' sake. One needs heroic magnanimity. We need to approve of justice for justice's sake, for trustworthiness for trustworthiness' sake, without having any for some approval from others. One needs to be courageous enough to stand alone with values, without awaiting any encouraging confirmation from others (Tischner 1982a, p. 44)[3]. Obviously, one needs both kinds of freedom: internal and external, or, following well-known Berlin's distinction: positive and negative. I need to be free vis-à-vis others, to be free from fear, from false shame; and I need to be free from external oppression. This is important in our interpersonal relations. To approve of others in this sense is unconditional. I should not accept them as human beings when they begin to share the world of my values.

If I refuse to respond to someone's basic need, I enter – what Tischner called – 'the horizon of betrayal' (Tischner 2000, p. 85). I may enter this horizon in two ways: either I refuse to respond to someone's basic need or I transgress the personal border encompassing the other person without permission. The second type of betrayal can be called intrusion. Who can betray? The person, in whom I entrusted my hope, says Tischner. In other words, I can betray when I have met the other person, his basic need, and yet decided to act contrary to what I have learned. I can run away from my neighbour (friend) at the moment of trial. Why is that kind of action called betrayal? This is because the border area between the

[3] It is noteworthy that these particular words come from his text entitled 'To Trust One's Existence'.

two persons has become transparent, has been translated into acts of communication.

Betrayal is an ever-present possibility because we are living in the circumstances of continual changes. We constantly betray the old for the sake of the new. Loyalty and its counterpart, betrayal, are possible only between those people who have managed to be integral in their persons. To be integral means to be capable of becoming a neighbour to the other person.

Tischner writes that 'the agent's subjective intentions are incapable of changing the objective state of affairs, which is determined by the hierarchy of values' (Tischner 1982b, p. 81). The art is to help the other find his ethos and at the same time respect his freedom.

7. THE LANDSCAPE OF PERSONALISM

We, as individual human beings, impress the world with our individual personalities. There will never be two identical templates. We proceed forward towards the truth without being able to name it. The truth is like the air in which we are immersed. We breathe it, we owe it our very being, but we are hardly aware of it. This is contrary to modern thinking. Rationalism was born in the seventeenth century and has so far been the mainstream of our thinking about the world and other fellow-creatures. We tend at certainty, we seek to grasp the human world, to conceptualize it and determine. We want to communicate and be intersubjectively communicable. This is a natural procedure on the level of science, but can cause reductionisms in our world-lives. Commenting on Heidegger, Tischner writes: 'things are true, but only our ways to them are complex and full of traps' (Tischner 1982a, p. 154). Let us add that our ways are always individual.

The claim to seek friends rather than truth, let me stress again, does not mean that Tischner ignores the importance of truth. In a text of 1971 he writes:

> Truth as a value unveils its categorical character. We are […] aware of it today better than yesterday, that the truth about the world and the truth about values is the basic condition of living in the world and of embodying in it the values for which we sacrifice our lives (Tischner 2000, p. 58).

And the author proposes a certain order of importance in which wisdom is before activity, magnanimity before success, and listening before speaking (Tischner 2000, p. 59). Aside to truth, Tischner focuses on freedom (of which mention has already been made in another context). Here we learn that just as

'truth is man's key to the world, so freedom is the key that opens for a value a way deep down into man' (Tischner, 2000, p. 59). There is no morality without freedom. Freedom is the core and the root of being human, the essence of humanity. This is because the way I make use of my freedom is the trademark of my person. A value becomes a personal value when the person freely chooses it. No one, for that matter, can another person make just by way of coercion. Man becomes just when he 'chooses justice as a value for himself' (Tischner 2000, p. 60).

The essence of our being is fear and trembling (Kierkegaard), care (Heidegger), stewardship (Marcel). In the philosophy of Marcel, Tischner found the famous dichotomy: problem and mystery. We solve problems, but the mystery is above us. We rules problems, we have to respect mysteries. We participate in mysteries, and they resemble certain supernatural orders. The human being is a mystery, not a problem. This happens when I seek to possess the other person. Possession destroys the other's integrity.

Now after many military conflicts, the two major world conflicts, we are still amidst new conflicts. Subjectively and locally, they may not be that impending, but as the world is becoming more and more global it is naïve to think that what is going on thousands of kilometres away from my house is of no concern to me. We have to rethink our understanding of man? We need to keep rethinking it?

The starting point is the following. We are facing each other immersed in various values (Tischner 1982b, p. 51). The other man 'asks questions and expect answers, warns against something and invites to something, makes sacrifices and expects sacrifices' (Tischner 1982b, p. 51). For Tischner, the key to ethics is experience. The way to the other is facilitated by values. I am a value, the other man is a value, and our interpersonal relation is a value. We all need to find our own ethos: our own individual place, our place in relation to others. Something that I can call MINE. Each man needs to find his own ethos. This is directly related to the fact that man is, by nature, 'an ethical creature' (Tischner 1982b, p. 53). In other words, someone who has to find, for the sake of his development, his own personal ethos.

8. CONCLUSION

Tischner was in love with his local highlander culture. This culture was his ethos, and it is from the inside of this ethos that he decided to evaluate the world around. We cannot isolate ourselves from our ethos, neither do we have to. The most important thing is whether I can be free within my ethos to realize what I

am called to realize, whether I am ready to put into practice the values that stand before me as my obligation.

Values are waiting to be realized. No matter how important they are, they need to be realized in freedom in order to bear a human face. There are no shortcuts here and nothing can be accelerated. The human being needs time to grow, and his growth can only be authentic in freedom. And human freedom is a risky area. We are never sure about its results. And there are no substitutes; we cannot find a substitute for someone. If the key word is creativity, so I myself must be the creator of my own life, otherwise I shall always treat it as something foreign and imposed from without. What we need is patient and each time an individual and often arduous path to the human being to make (help) him or her realize what he or she has been called to realize, to help him fulfil his obligation. The starting point for all kinds of reconciliation is the most intricate transborder area between two human beings.

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REGION and REGIONALISM
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POLISH HERITAGE IN THE MULTICULTURAL BORDERLAND – THE CASE OF VILNIUS REGION*

1. INTRODUCTION

In modern Lithuanian geography, there is no such geographical area as 'Vilnius Region'. There is no such area in Polish geographical literature either, especially in physical geography's divisions. However, this idea persists in the awareness of many generations of Polish geographers as the specific territory surrounding Vilnius (Kida 2010). As M. Kowalski claimed (2008), the Vilnius region is an area with many characteristic features of the ethnic borderland of Lithuania and Belarus, as well as of the religious borderland between the Catholic and Orthodox denominations. All of these features make it unique and culturally different.

The Vilnius region had been inhabited by the Baltic tribes and later found itself under the influence of Polish and Eastern Slavs. Following the Polish and Lithuanian unions, this region became a multicultural territory under conflicting Polish and Lithuanian influences in the 20th century (Leśniewska and Barwiński 2011).

The definition of the territorial extent of Vilnius region is very difficult. We may assume that the region encompasses the historical Central Lithuania, which became part of Poland in 1922 (Kiaupa 2002, Kowalski 2008). It should be noted, that this area was connected with Catholic population, which declared Polish nationality in 20th century (Leśniewska and Barwiński 2011).

For the purposes of this article, the extent of Vilnius region described by P. Eberhardt (1997) was adopted, namely the 'New Vilnius Region' or the terri-

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tory of present-day eastern Lithuania. Lithuanian geographers divide the area into 9 regions: Vilnius, Širvintos, Trakai, Šalčininkai, Varėna, Zarasai, Moletai, Švenčionys and Ignalina.

2. POLISH HERITAGE IN VILNIUS

The Vilnius region has had ties to Poland for more than 600 years and, even though it has not been part of the Republic of Poland for 75 years, there are still large groups of Poles living there. There are still many traces of the region's long-lasting affiliation with the Polish state, which results in considerable interest from Poles and Polish authorities. Many great Poles were connected with the region over the centuries, and the traces of their cultural, social and political activities can still be observed[1]. Renowned Poles with connections to the region include poets Adam Mickiewicz, Juliusz Słowacki, Józef Ignacy Krasicki, Czesław Miłosz and Konstanty Ildefons Gałczyński, composer Stanisław Moniuszko, politicians Józef Piłsudski and Joachim Lelewel, painter Ferdynand Ruszyc or photographer Jan Bułhak. All of them identified as Poles but they felt the connection with Vilnius and considered Vilnius Region to be their homeland (Kudirko 2007).

Despite centuries of Polish and Lithuanian religious unity, catholic churches and many other buildings and places associated with religious rituals remain the most important and most characteristic elements of Polish cultural and national heritage in the Vilnius region.

The Archcathedral Basilica of St Stanislaus and St Vladislav is an extremely important religious building in Vilnius, for both Poles and Lithuanians. The beginnings of the cathedral date back to the second half of the 13th century, but the present building was built in neoclassical style in the late 19th century. The underground catacombs of the cathedral contain the tombs of Alexander Jagiellon (Polish king between 1501 and 1506), Elizabeth Habsburg (Polish queen between 1543 and 1545), Barbara Radziwiłł (Polish queen between 1550 and 1551), and the heart of King Władysław IV Vasa (Kłos 1923, Remer 1990, Maroszek 2007).

One of the most important places, for both Poles living in Lithuania and Polish tourists on sentimental journeys and pilgrimages to Lithuania, is the Gate

[1] The cultural heritage of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in modern Poland has been widely discussed in such works as: A. Rykała (2013), M. Kulesza and D. Kaczyńska (2013).

of Dawn (lit. *Aušros Vartai*, pol. *Ostra Brama*). Along with a fragment of the wall directly adjacent to it, it is the only remnant of the old defense fortifications of Vilnius (Briedis 2012, Maroszek 2007). The chapel located on the inner side of the city which was added to the gate in the 18th century, includes a painting of Our Lady of the Gate of Dawn, Queen of the Polish Crown (Kłos 1923, Remer 1990). Masses in the chapel are held in both Lithuanian and Polish languages.

Fig. 1. Archcathedral Basilica of St Stanislaus and St Vladislav in Vilnius
Source: M. Barwiński

Fig. 2. The Gate of Dawn in Vilnius
Source: K. Leśniewska

Fig. 3 The image of Our Lady of the Gate of Dawn, Queen of the Polish Crown
Source: M. Barwiński

Since Soviet times, the temple in Vilnius which is a synonymous with Polishness is the Church of the Holy Spirit (lit. *Šventosios Dvasios bažnyčia*), which was intended for Poles under the decision of the Soviet authorities. The church was built in baroque style in 1770. To this days, it is the only church in Vilnius where the masses are held only in Polish language. In 1993, a meeting of Pope John Paul II with the Lithuanian Poles took place in the Church of Holy Spirit. Until 2005, one of the lateral altars of the church hosted the original painting of 'God's Compassion' by Eugeniusz Kazimirowski, painted on the instructions of Sister Faustyna Kowalska. However, following the decision of the Curia of Vilnius and despite the protests of many Poles, the image has been transferred to the Holy Trinity Church – Divine Mercy Sanctuary (Kabzińska 2009).

One special place in Vilnius where many traces of Polishness can be found is certainly the Rossa Cemetery (lit. *Rasu kapines*), which was founded in 1769. The cemetery was named after the owner of the land or after the pagan festival of Rosa. The oldest preserved tombstones in Rossa date back to the 1820s. The military part of the cemetery includes Piłsudski's mausoleum, in which the symbolic heart of Marshal Józef Piłsudski and his mother were buried. The tombstone includes two quotes from Juliusz Słowacki – the Marshal's favourite poet. The mausoleum is surrounded by graves of Polish soldiers who died in 1919–1920, including Żeligowski's troops, and in 1944 in Operation Gate of Dawn (Marczyk 2009).

The most valuable part of the cemetery is located on the vast hills. Due to the shape of the surface the demarcation of parcels was impossible, so their distribution is quite random. Mostly Poles are buried in the cemetery, though Belarusian

and Lithuanian names can also be found. It is also worth mentioning that the authorities tried to make the cemetery much more Lithuanian, as evidenced by conspicuous new Lithuanian tombstones. Renowned Poles buried in a cemetery that are worth mentioning include Joachim Lelewel (historian), Antoni Wiwulski (architect, designer of the monument on the Hill of Three Crosses), Euzebiusz Słowacki (father of Juliusz Słowacki), Świętopełek Karpiński (poet) and many more (Małachowicz 2005).

Fig. 4. Polish celebration in Rossa Cemetery in Vilnius
Source: M. Barwiński

Fig. 5. Rossa Cemetery in Vilnius
Source: K. Leśniewska

Over the years, many prominent Poles have been connected to Vilnius region by being educated in the city, working or looking for inspiration for their work. The most famous Pole related to Vilnius is the national bard Adam Mickiewicz. Houses where he lived have signs in Polish and Lithuanian language commemorating this fact (including Literatu 5, Pilies 11, Bernardinu 11 and Didžioji 22).

Fig. 6. Memorial plaque on Adam Mickiewicz's house's facade in Vilnius at Didžioji 22
Source: M. Barwiński

Fig. 7. Adam Mickiewicz monument in Vilnius
Source: M. Barwiński

In 1823, during a stay in the apartment in Literary Alley (Literatų 5), Mickiewicz was arrested and imprisoned at the Basilian Monastery at Aušros Vartų 7. Both events are commemorated by plaques above the entrances to the buildings (Kudirko 2007).

The house in the Bernardine alley (Bernardinų 11) is now a museum of Adam Mickiewicz (lit. *Adomo Mickevičiaus muziejus*) founded in 1911. Since 1955, the museum has been run by the Vilnius University Library. The most valuable collections include the armchair, table and chair of the poet, as well as the register of students at the Vilnius University. The old apartment of the poet now hosts a permanent exhibition entitled 'Adam and Lithuania', and evenings of poetry are held in the Gothic Literary Hall (Šalina and Piotrowicz 2012).

Among the traces of Adam Mickiewicz in Vilnius, his monument designed by Giedyminas Jokubonis and built in 1984 by the Church of St. Anne, is especially important. The poet is presented in pilgrim's coat and his face is turned toward the streets of Vilnius' Old Town. Mickiewicz leans against a broken column, which symbolises his banishment from Vilnius (Kudirko 2007).

Fig. 8. Reconstructed Konrad's cell in Basilian Monastery
Source: M. Barwiński

Fig. 9. Memorial plaque on the facade of Juliusz Słowacki's house in Vilnius
Source: K. Leśniewska

Many Polish poets located the plots of their literary works in Lithuania. The greatest Polish poet Adam Mickiewicz started his epic *Sir Thaddeus* with *Lithuania, my fatherland*!. His other work, *Dziady*, took place in the Church of the Holy Trinity and the Basilian Monastery (lit. *Vilniaus Švč. Trejybės Graikų apeigų katalikų bažnyčia*) in Vilnius. That is why Konrad's cell, the room of one of the main character of *Dziady*, has been reconstructed.

Juliusz Slowacki is another romantic poet connected with Vilnius. The apartment where his family lived is located at Pilies 22. Słowacki graduated high

school in Vilnius, then studied at the Faculty of Moral and Political Science at Vilnius University. Painter Ferdynand Ruszczyc, lived in the same apartment a few decades later. The plaque commemorating this fact is located on the inside wall of the house (Wisner 1988, Kudirko 2007).

Another writer connected to Vilnius, Józef Ignacy Kraszewski, came to the city in 1829 to begin his studies at the Faculty of Literature at the University of Vilnius. He lived at Pilies 24. The memory of the writer in Vilnius is still alive. One of the streets bears his name and he is also the patron of the school, which includes a memorial chamber of the writer (Kudirko 2007).

Fig. 10. Stanisław Moniuszko monument at St Catherine church in Vilnius
Source: K. Leśniewska

Fig. 11. Memorial tablet at facade of Józef Ignacy Kraszewski house in Vilnius
Source: K. Leśniewska

Eminent Polish composer Stanisław Moniuszko lived in Vilnius for 18 years. Moniuszko was an organist at the church of St Johns, a conductor at the Theatre of Vilnius and a private music tutor. *Halka* premiered in the city in 1854 (Narkowicz 2014). The facade of the house at Vokiečių 26 now includes a plaque in Polish and Lithuanian commemorating the fact that the composer lived there.

The most important contemporary Polish cultural organisation in Lithuania is the House of Polish Culture (pol. Dom Kultury Polskiej – DKP) which was created in 2001 on the initiative of the Union of Poles in Lithuania and the 'Polish Community' association (pol. Wspólnota Polska). The institution mainly organises concerts, theatre performances, competitions, exhibitions of contem-

porary art, screenings of Polish movies, etc. DKP cooperates with many Polish organisations in Vilnius, giving them access to the offices (currently over 30). Income from tickets for cultural events at the DKP do not cover the maintenance, so the organisation's primary income comes from the restaurant and hotel 'Pan Tadeusz' (Leśniewska 2009, 2014).

Fig. 12. The head office of the House of Polish Culture in Vilnius
Source: K. Leśniewska



Fig. 13. Academic Church of St Johns in Vilnius
Source: K. Leśniewska

Fig. 14. The bust of Adam Mickiewicz commemorating the 100th anniversary of his birth
Source: K. Leśniewska

Vilnius University, founded in 1579 by the Polish king Stefan Batory, has for centuries remained a very important place for Poles in Vilnius. This is one of the oldest universities in Eastern and Northern Europe, and now the largest university in Lithuania. For a long time, the university was the only higher education institution in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, established to promote Polish culture in the lands of the north-eastern Commonwealth. The teaching staff have included Piotr Skarga and Jakub Wujek – former rectors of the academy. Up until the November Uprising (1830–1831), the university experienced a brief period of glory as the scientifically strongest Polish university. In this period, two famous Polish romantic poets Adam Mickiewicz and Juliusz Słowacki studied there. The university still gives the opportunity to learn in Polish by including Polish philology (Leśniewska 2014).

Nowadays, the Polish heritage in Vilnius is mainly cared for by the Poles living in the city. According to the results of the last census in 2011, they comprised approx. 16.5% of the total population of Vilnius (more than 88 thousand)[2].

3. OTHER EXAMPLES OF POLISH HERITAGE IN VILNIUS REGION

The most 'Polish' region in Lithuania is arguably the Šalčininkai region. According to the results of the 2011 census, about 78% of the population was Polish. There are 19 educational institutions with Polish language of instruction in the area. Since 1998, the center of Šalčininkai includes a monument of Adam Mickiewicz built to commemorate the 200th birth anniversary of the poet. In 1821, at the cemetery in Šalčininkai, the poet had watched pagan rites called *Dziady*, which he later described in his drama (Kołosowska and Palewicz 2006).

One of the most prominent symbols of Polish culture in the Vilnius region is the village of Zułów (lit. *Zalavas*) – the birthplace of Marshal Józef Piłsudski. The first mention of Zułów dates back to the second half of the 17th century. In 1856, the estate of Zułów was inherited by Maria Bilewiczówna, and then became her dowry in marriage with Józef Wincent Piłsudski. In December 1867, the future Polish head of state was born in the manor house belonging to Piłsudski family. In its glory days, the manor house was surrounded by a brick fence. On both sides of the gate were rural buildings, including workshop, stables, coach houses, a distillery and a granary. A larchwood manor house with

[2] http://statistics.bookdesign.lt/table_046.htm?lang=en (22.08.2014).

stone foundations and covered with a shingle roof consisted of 12 rooms. In 1875, the house was completely burnt down and the Piłsudski family was forced to move to Vilnius. At the end of the 19th century, the estate was taken over by the Russians (Paczkowska 2008).

Fig. 15. Adam Mickiewicz monument in Šalčininkai
Source: K. Leśniewska

In the interwar period, attempts to rebuild the manor house were made, but none of them was effected. In 1937, a decision to create a Memorial Reserve in Zułów was made. An oak was planted at the location of the former room of Marshal Józef Piłsudski and a symbolic was created around it. Until the Second World War, Zułów was the site of many tours and hikes. During the war and throughout the Soviet era in Lithuania, the area of the old mansion was completely destroyed and the only element that survived was the symbolic oak. A state farm was created in Zułów, which led to even greater devastation of the area. In 1993, on the initiative of the Polish embassy in Vilnius, the area of the old mansion was cleaned (Paczkowska 2008).



Fig. 16. The project of memorial site in Zalavas in Švenčionys region
Source: http://www.dworekmarszalka.pl/upload/Zulowkoncepcja_50x70-4c.pdf (24.12.2013)

In recent years, the Union of Poles in Lithuania (ZPL) in cooperation with the Association of Polish Community have started works on the reconstruction of the mansion. After the reconstruction, it should become a 'sanctuary of Poles in the Vilnius region'. An area of 4 hectares where the manor house was located was bought by ZPL, who now continues to gather funds for the project. In 2013, the destroyed buildings were demolished, the area was cleaned and oaks were planted in the Avenue of National Remembrance (Leśniewska 2014).

Fig. 17. Tyszkiewicz Palace in Užutrakis
Source: K. Leśniewska

Polish authorities also act to protect Polish heritage in Lithuania. One of the best examples of such initiatives is the research project in cooperation with the Lithuanians on the conservation of Tyszkiewicz family palace and park in Zatrocze (lit. *Užutrakis*). Since 2009, the ongoing restoration works have been carried out jointly with specialists of the Wilanów Palace Museum (Janiszewska-Jakubiak 2010). The revitalisation of the palace and park are financed from EU structural funds, the budget of the Lithuanian Ministry of Culture and Ministry of Culture and National Heritage of Poland.

4. CONCLUSION

Many Poles have perceived the old borderlands (*Kresy*) of the First and Second Polish Republics as an obligatory trip which everyone should take at least once in their lifetime, mostly for family and sentimental, but also patriotic

or religious reasons. Every year, many Polish tourists visit the former eastern Polish territories, mainly Lviv and Vilnius, perceiving these two cities as much more Polish than Ukrainian or Lithuanian. The Vilnius region is identified with the region formed by the merging of many cultures. Polish culture still remains one of the most visible one, and the material traces can be observed not only in Vilnius but also in the whole region. For centuries, the region was dominated by the Polish people, language and culture. For 25 years since the independence of the Republic of Lithuania, the process of Lithuanisation has been progressing in Vilnius and the region. Many material traces of Polish culture, often devastated during the Soviet Union era, now regain its former glory. The massive inflow of Polish tourists increased especially after the accession of both countries into the EU. This gives hope for the survival of the memorabilia of joint Polish--Lithuanian history and the return to mutual knowledge and understanding between the two nations.

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REGION and REGIONALISM
No. 12

THE FORMATION OF THE POLITICAL BOUNDARY IN THE KARKONOSZE MOUNTAINS

High mountain ranges have long been in the natural barriers, which was often used for delimitation of political and administrative boundaries. One of such massifs in southern Poland, apart from Carpathians, are the Sudetes (Sobczyński 1986). The highest range of the Sudetes – Karkonosze (Riesengebirge in German, Krkonoše in Czech), culminating in Śnieżka (Schneekoppe in German, Sněžka in Czech – 1603 m above sea level) has also been a very good natural division between the historical Silesia and Bohemia.

However, unlike many high mountain ranges, the Sudetes were not an ethnic barrier, as the areas to the north and south of the Sudetes were inhabited by Western Slavic tribes of Serbs, Czechs and Ślężanie. In earlier period, it seems that the Sudetes could have been the northern border of the area of influence of Celts (3rd century BCE, though this people later came to Silesia) (Könemann 2009, p. 90), then German tribes of Marcommani (4th century) and Lombards (6th century) (Rudolf and Oswalt 2009, pp. 61, 69). Slavic tribes did not appear in Silesia until the 7th century (Żerlik 2007, p. 38).

The first political structure south of the Sudetes was the Franco-Slavic Samo's state (7th century) that withstood the invasion of Avars from the east (Pułaski 2001, p. 148). Its extent has still not been determined, but the association of Czech-Serbian tribe probably lived along the Elbe and did not pass the inaccessible, forested southern slopes of the Sudetes.

To the south of the Sudetes, in the Bohemian Basin, statehood formed several dozen years earlier than on the northern side. One of the core areas of this statehood was located near Prague, in Levy Hradec (the Přemyslid dynasty), while the other was located in the Czech Foothills of the Karkonosze (in Czech physical geography regionalisation – Krkonošsko-jesenické podhůří) between Hradec Kralove and Libice and Kouřim, where the Slavník dynasty had their

seats (Semotanova 2002, p. 25). The Czech lands underwent Christianisation in the second half of the 9th century, from east from the Great Moravia, which was more advanced at the time (Barciak 1994, p. 27). At that time, the area of the Czech Republic, was not a political whole, with several centres of power, whose range did not extend to the Karkonosze range (Łowmiański 1967, p. 192). The first Czech Christian prince Borivoje did not even have control over the whole Bohemian Basin (Barciak 1994, p. 32). We can, however, assume that both the Oder and Nysa rivers, as well as the Sudetes masif constituted a significant political border back in the early 9th century, as they separated the lands formally loyal to Charlemagne from the Barbaricum.

The political significance of Bohemia increased after the fall of the Great Moravia in 906, and the Christianisation of the area was done from the German city of Regensburg (Barciak 1994, p. 37, Pułaski 2001, p. 149). Probably in 973 or 974, the Prague bishopric was established within the borders delimiting the Czech statehood (the first known bishop dates back to 976). The jurisdiction of the bishop extended not only to Bohemia and Moravia, but also Silesia, the land of the Vistulans, Czerwień towns to Bug and Styr rivers (Labuda 1994, p. 74). This means that already in the tenth century, Sudetes (including Karkonosze) ceased to be a political or administrative border. It was until mid-10th century that a political structure other than tribal territories (or an association of tribes – Moździoch 2000, pp. 176–178) formed in the northern slopes of the Sudetes, which means that Karkonosze could have served not as a border but as the northern extent of Bohemian duchies. Since 929, they became the border of the Holy Roman Empire (Fig. 1A).

Another political change involving taking Silesia from the Czechs occurred after the formation of Polish statehood and was initiated by Polish prince Mieszko I who, according to German chronicler Thietmar, did it in 990 (Jedlicki 2005, pp. 61–62, 285). The conquest of Silesia was probably gradual and lasted several months (Tyszkiewicz 2003, p. 39). The Sudetes thus became a Polish--Czech border, though much shorter and simplified, and Poland, by way of the Kłodzko Valley, gained direct contact with the Slavnik state from Libice (Labuda 2005, p. 175), which were incorporated in Bohemia in 995 (Moździoch 2000, p. 185). The Karkonosze mountains did not serve as a border, as the jurisdiction of Mieszko probably extended as far as Polish settlements, to the borderland wilderness and the Polish-Czech clearing (Maleczyński 1961, p. 20). Silesia and Lesser Poland still remained under the jurisdiction of the Prague and Olomouc bishops until 1000 when the Gniezno archdiocese and the Wrocław bishopric were erected that bordered the Prague bishopric in the Sudetes (Labuda 1994, pp. 90–91).



Fig. 1. The formation of the political boundary in Karkonosze Mountains. Border: A – at the beginning of the Polish and Czech statehood (Source: Olczak 2008, p. 28); B – at the period of feudal disintegration of Silesia in 14th c. (Source: Olczak and Tazbir 2007, p. 26); C – Czech-Hungarian after 1474 (Source: Semotanova 2002, p. 69); D – internal of the Habsburg monarchy (Austria) after 1526 (Source: Rudolf and Oswalt 2009, p. 183); E – Prussian-Austrian after 1742 (Source: Rudolf and Oswalt 2009, p. 185); F – internal of the Third Reich (Germany) after 1938 (Source: Rudolf and Oswalt 2009, p. 329); G – Polish-Czechoslovakian after 1945 (Source: Olczak 2008, p. 446).

The conquests of Boleslaw the Brave in 1003–1004, who conquered the whole Bohemia, got rid of the Sudetes border for a short time (Lehr-Spławiński et al. 1947, p. 34, Zakrzewski 2000, p. 186). Another disappearance of the

Karkonosze border, this time caused by Bohemian aggression, occurred in 1039–1050, when Bohemian duke Bretislaus conquered not only Silesia, but a large portion of Poland (Janowicz 1936, p. 19).

Casimir the Restorer returned Silesia to Poland in 1050 and, four years later in German Quedlinburg, obtained the consent of the German emperor (Ślusarczyk 1992, p. 13). The border between the Polish and Bohemian territories in Karkonosze was maintained until 1138, i.e. the division of Poland. It persisted, but between the Bohemian Kingdom and the Silesian region, where further divisions occurred. In 1096, the Kłodzko region was taken by Bohemia for two centuries (Natanson-Leski 1964, p. 36).

Any consideration of the role of the Sudetes, including Karkonosze Mountains, as a political barrier, must take into account that due the foreland areas on both sides of the Sudetes that have been uninhabited until mid-13th century, the border in the Karkonosze range actually means a zone of at least a dozen kilometres. Slavic people did not settle in higher parts of Sudetes' foreland, nor in Karkonosze. Since the 12th century, colonisation of these areas on the Czech side consisted primarily of German population from Alpine regions, which gradually moved northwards along the upper reaches of rivers, until it reached the slopes of Karkonosze. Initially, the settlers were mainly miners searching for precious stones and ores, woodcutters exploiting forests, as well as glass-makers, which included Venetians. The intensity of German colonisation of the southern slopes of Karkonosze grew after the Hussite wars (1419–1436) and the thirty-year war (1618–1648). On the northern side permanent settlements before the 14th century did not exceed the level of 650 m. Therefore, Karkonosze remained a wilderness (Walczak 1968, p. 235). Colonisation of the upper parts of the mountains involved German population, seeking mainly mining ores, construction materials and glacial clay. At the same time, Walloons appeared in Karkonosze, mainly in Stara Wieś Szklarska (Szklarska Poręba), looking for gold and precious stones. Glass-making developed in Jelenia Góra valley on the slopes of Karkonosze. In Karkonosze themselves, scattered shepherd settlements appeared in late 16th century (Walczak 1968, p. 237). The range was cut by two communications routes from north to south – Silesian and Bohemian. Forests on the mountain slopes were being exploited, with permanent settlements of Szklarska Poręba, Karpacz, Płóczki, whose inhabitants grew cattle, emerging around the clearings. Women were mostly weavers. After the establishment of the Austrian-Prussian border along the ridge of Karkonosze in 1742, smuggling became an additional source of income (Walczak 1968, p. 238). Thus, from the 14th century on, both sides of Karkonosze were inhabited mainly by Germans and did not serve as a civilisation barrier.

Formally, the two slopes of Karkonosze were someone's estates. In Church terms, the Sudetes belonged to the Wrocław (north) and Prague bishoprics (south), but this border moved northward to Owl and Golden Mountains in the Kłodzko Valley. In terms of ownership, the Order of St. John of Jerusalem from Cieplice Śląskie owned land north of Karkonosze, while the Cisterians of Krzeszowo owned land east of the Okraj Pass. Since the orders came to Poland from Bohemia, they kept tight relations with the southern side of the Sudetes and were part of the common provinces (Barciak 1992, p. 13). Rulers giving borderlands to monasteries was a common practice. The ruler gave guarantees to the monastery and its estate, and this guarantee was supported by the papal administration, which served as a substitute for today's international guarantees (Barciak 1992, pp. 47–48). The Cysterian monasteries in the Sudetes foothills in Henryków, Kamieniec and Krzeszów, which expanded their estates by taking over the forested border buffer with Bohemia from the north, played a significant role. On the Bohemian side, colonisation of Karkonosze was done by the Benedictine monasteries in Police on Metuje (starting in 1213), as well as Opatowice monks from the Monastery of the Virgin Mary in Klašterci near Vrchlabi. In Kłodzko, there was the Bohemian Order of St John (Barciak 1992, p. 59). On lower areas of the Polish-Bohemian borderlands, as well as in the Moravian Gate, there was a rivalry for land between Polish and Bohemian bishoprics. The Sudetes' ranges, especially Karkonosze, were not a positive factor in such struggles, as they served as a clear barrier in communication. The lands not under the jurisdiction of monasteries were taken over by wealthy chivalry and magnate dynasties, forming vast estates. Since 1378, the northern slopes of Karkonosze were being colonised by the von Seydlitz dynasty. After 1381, they were joined by knight Gotsche Schoff, the predecessor of the Schaffgotsch dynasty. The south side of the mountains was colonised by the magnate dynasty from Švabenice (Barciak 1992, p. 60).

In the thirteenth century, there appeared a need for closer delimitation of national territories. In 1241, when the Zagost land was linearly separated (south--east of Zgorzelec around the Seidenberg mountain) from Budziszyn, the same document mentioned the lack of such separation between the Zagost and Polish lands (Barciak 1992, p. 64). The first known delimitation took place on the border between Opole and Moravia around 1255, on the rivers Oder and Ostravice. The Silesian-Bohemian in the Sudetes was set up at the end of the thirteenth century, based on watersheds. In 1295, the boundary between the estates of the Kamieniec monastery and the Bohemian Kłodzko area was delimited, becoming an international border (Barciak 1992, pp. 66–67). To the east of Karkonosze, the border of the Duchy of Jawor-Schweidnitz was de-

limited in 1289, based on watersheds and expanding the Polish area southward (near Kamienna Góra) to Mieroszów. However, these delimitation were not permanent because the borderland lords were selling their villages to their neighbours across the border, thus changing the border several times (Barciak 1992, p. 71).

In the 14th century, Karkonosze served as a divider between Bohemia and numerous independent Silesian duchies, that gradually started to lose their sovereignty when they were annexed into Bohemia. The Duchy of Jawor-Schweidnitz, stretching south to Karkonosze, was the last to be annexed in 1392 (Kamler 2000, pp. 335–336) (Fig. 1B). Earlier, in 1327, the boundary of the Holy Roman Empire moved to the Silesian-Great Polish borderland, so Karkonosze ceased to serve as the border for the empire, though independent Silesian duchies not included in the 1st Republic persisted in the Sudetes' foreland.

Between 1474 and 1490, all of Silesia and Moravia became part of Hungary, rules by Matthias Corvinus, formally elected to be the king of Bohemia as well, though the Kingdom of Bohemia ruled by the Jagiellonian dynasty remained sovereign in the Bohemian Valley and Karkonosze became the Bohemian-Hungarian border (Fig. 1C). After the death of Matthias Corvinus both Bohemian and Hungarian thrones were taken by Ladislaus Jagiellon. Until 1526, Bohemia remained in personal union with Hungary (Heck and Orzechowski 1969, pp. 121–122). Although the affiliation of Silesia was not formally resolved, the border in Karkonosze was *de facto* dismantled again.

In 1526, the Bohemian-Hungarian throne was taken by the Habsburg Austrian rural Ferdinand, with pretenders including the Frederick II, the Duke of Legnica from the House of Piast (Heck and Orzechowski 1969, p. 137). The border in Karkonosze was thus still an intrastate one (Fig. 1D). The Habsburg rule on both thrones lasted until 1619, when, following the death of the emperor and the Bohemian-Hungarian king, Bohemia elected Ferdinand II as their ruler (Heck and Orzechowski 1969, p. 157). After the defeat of the Bohemian ruler in the battle of White Mountain in 1620, which was a slaughter of Bohemian nobility, the Habsburg rule in Bohemia lasted until 1918 (Heck and Orzechowski 1969, p. 159).

The border in Karkonosze only lost its internal character in 1740, when Prussian army took Austrian Silesia, becoming a *de facto* (and then, in 1742, also *de iure*) border of the Austrian Empire and the Prussian Kingdom (Koneczny, 1897, pp. 195–196). The names of the two states have changed (Austro-Hungarian Empire from 1868, the German Empire from 1848 to 1849 and from 1871 to 1918), but the interstate border remained in Karkonosze (Fig. 1E).

As a result of the First World War in 1918, both empires fell. South of Karkonosze, the Austro-Hungarian Empire became Czechoslovakia, while north of Karkonosze, in Silesia, it became republican Germany. The border in Karkonosze remained international.

This condition lasted until October 1, 1938, when the German Third Reich annexed the border areas of Czechoslovakia, still largely inhabited by German population, where the new administrative unit of Sudetenland was created with its capital in Liberec, which was annexed into Germany (Kozeński 1989, p. 64). The border in Karkonosze has thus become an intrastate German border (Fig. 1F). This lasted until the end of the war in 1945, when the Czechoslovakian Republic restored on April 3rd regained these areas, and Silesia was given to Poland. The peace conference in Potsdam delimited new borders, which gave Poland the area reaching Oder and Nysa rivers, thus creating a border with Czechoslovakia in the western section, including Karkonosze. It also agreed upon the displacement of German population from the territories given to both Poland and Bohemia, i.e mostly from the former Sudetenland (Krasuski 1990, p. 77) (Fig. 1G). This way, both borderlands in the Sudetes lost their population, with Polish population from the pre-war eastern border taken over by the Soviet Union coming to the northern part and people from the central regions of Bohemia and Slovakia, as well as Wolhynia and Yugoslavia, coming to the Sudete borderland (Hack and Orzechowski 1968, p. 410). Karkonosze thus separated the border fairly heterogeneously as far as the structure was concerned, with the western Slavic element again dominating both sides. On both sides the population was almost entirely immigrant. Political uncertainty resulting from being on the eastern side of the Iron Curtain and the lack of guarantee that the acquired land would remain permanently within Poland and Czechoslovakia, did not favour investments or even current maintenance of the existing and fairly advanced infrastructure, which gradually fell into disrepair until the dissolution of communist rule in both countries. In addition, the legal situation of Czechoslovakia proved more difficult than Poland, due to the so-called Beneš decrees, issued by the president when he was still in emigration in 1945 and concerning the forfeiture of all German possessions. After the political transformations and the creation of the Czech Republic, Germany (especially Bavaria) raised the issue of the illegality of this decision and requested its cancellation. This is why Liechtenstein, whose rulers lost castles and estates due to this decree, did not maintain diplomatic relations with Czech Republic until 2009.

Despite the changes in the names of both countries, as well as their political systems, the border in Karkonosze has remained international until this day, serving as a Czech-Polish border since 1992.

On December 21, 2007, with the accession of the Poland and Czech Republic to the Schengen treaty, any border control on this border was abolished, and it can now be crossed in any location. Crossing it in Karkonosze National Park and the Jizera valley nature reservation is still prohibited. The complete history of the Karkonosze border is shown in table 1 and the changes of the border on figure 2.



Ryc. 2. Stability of the political boundary in Karkonosze Mountains and its variation in 10th–21th c.
Source: author's own elaboration

Table 1. The history of the boundaries in Karkonosze Mountains

Period	Location in relation to Karkonosze	
	south	north
3rd century BCE	The Celts	no tribal structures
2nd century BCE	The Celts	The Celts
3rd century	Marcomanni	Vandals
6th century	Lombards	West Slavs
7th century	Samo's state	Silesian tribal structures
9th century	Feudal lands of Charlemagne	Barbaricum
early 10th century	Christian Czech states	Silesian pagan tribal structures

974–990	Duchy of Bohemia, Holy Roman Empire	Duchy of Bohemia
990–1003	Duchy of Bohemia, Holy Roman Empire	Duchy of Poland
1003–1004	Duchy of Poland	Duchy of Poland
1004–1039	Duchy of Bohemia, Holy Roman Empire	Duchy/Kingdom of Poland
1039–1050	Duchy of Bohemia	Duchy of Bohemia
1050–1138	Duchy/Kingdom of Bohemia, Holy Roman Empire	Duchy of Poland
1138–1172	Duchy/Kingdom of Bohemia, Holy Roman Empire	Duchy of Silesia
1172–1248	Duchy of Bohemia, Holy Roman Empire	Duchy of Wroclaw
1248–1274	Kingdom of Bohemia, Holy Roman Empire	Duchies of Legnica and Wrocław
1274–1290	Kingdom of Bohemia, Holy Roman Empire	Duchies of Jawor and Wrocław
1290–1392	Kingdom of Bohemia	Duchy of Jawor-Schweidnitz
1392–1474	Kingdom of Bohemia	Kingdom of Bohemia
1474–1490	Kingdom of Bohemia	Kingdom of Hungary
1490–1526	Czech-Hungarian Kingdom	Czech-Hungarian Kingdom
1526–1740	Austrian Empire	Austrian Empire
1740–1848	Austrian Empire	Kingdom of Prussia
1848–1849	Austrian Empire	1st German Reich
1849–1868	Austrian Empire	North German Confederation
1868–1871	Austro-Hungarian Empire	North German Confederation
1871–1918	Austro-Hungarian Empire	German Empire (Second Reich)
1918	Austro-Hungarian Empire	German Republic
1918–1938	Czechoslovak Republic	Nazi Germany (Third Reich)
1938–1945	Third German Reich	Third German Reich
1945–1952	Czechoslovak Republic	The Republic of Poland
1952–1960	Czechoslovak Republic	Polish People's Republic
1960–1989	Czechoslovak Socialist Republic	Polish People's Republic
1989–1990	Czechoslovak Socialist Republic	The Republic of Poland
1990–1992	Czechoslovak Federal Republic	The Republic of Poland
1992–	Czech Republic	The Republic of Poland

Source: author's own elaboration.

The appearance of the granite border posts is an interesting material testament to the variability of the political border in Karkonosze. The letter Č for Česka Republika is engraved on the Czech side. These were ČS for Československo in Czechoslovak times, but the letter S was removed after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. In contrast, the letter P on the Polish side is twice as big as the Czech symbol, as it was created by drawing a bar down from the letter D for Deutschland from the inter-war period (Fig. 3).

Fig. 3. Border posts on the Polish-Czech border in Karkonosze Mountains
Source: http://images.photo.bikestats.eu/zdjecie,600,211384,20110821,dziwne-slupki-graniczne.jpg; http://wisniowysad.blogspot.com/2009/06/wyprawa-w-karkonosze.html

Established in 1945, the Polish-Czechoslovak border in Karkonosze was entirely aligned with the former Czechoslovak-German border. But it was corrected as early as 1958, June 13 near Jakuszyce Valley (the so-called Jakuszyce bag) (Fig. 4).

Polish village of Tkacze located near the Izera railway line, which served as a border station was given to Czechoslovakia, along with a tunnel and half of a bridge over Izera. Since then, Polish trains have been terminating their lines in Szklarska Poręba Górna. It was not until the accession of both states to Schengen in 2010 that traffic returned to this line. Today, the village is called Mýtiny in Czech and is an administrative part of Harrachov. The railway station bears the same name. The border change in Tkacze was made up for to Poland by Czechoslovakia, who gave up a forested slope of Kocierz mountain near the road from Szklarska Poręba to Jakuszyce, where the Babiniec ski lift is now located. Corrections to the Polish-Czechoslovak border were not completed in 1958, creating the so-called 'board debt' of the Czech Republic towards Poland, amounting to 368.44 ha (Kościński 2011).



Ryc. 4. Polish-Czechoslovakian border changes in 1958 nearby Jakuszyce
Source: author's own elaboration according to:
http://users.fuw.edu.pl/~michalj/kolej/izery/krk2.jpg (28.02.2015)

However, this threatens Polish control over the so-called Jakuszyce bag, i.e. the fragment of land on the northern bank of Izera river, which cuts into Czech territory west of Harrachov, where the best cross-country skiing trails in Poland are located. As the Polish opencast lignite coal mine in the so-called Turoszów bag located its overburden heap directly near the Czech border, it lead to the devastation of the forest on the Czech side, caused by erosion and surface run-off, as well as underground penetration of poisoned water from the heap to the Czech territory, especially the villages of Kunratice and Višňová (*Środowiskowe...* 2012, p. 16). The Czech Republic proposed transferring the devastated area to Poland in exchange for a compensation in the so-called Jakuszyce bag, in

the form of these cross-country skiing trails. Fortunately for Poland, local authorities in the Czech villages where owners would lose their land given to Poland want this compensation to be located nearby, i.e. near Zawidów, which would include arable land. This can save the uniquely valuable recreation area of Jakuszyce (*Minister wyjaśnia*... 2011). Another idea is to transfer the devastated terrains as a repayment of the aforementioned border debt, i.e. without the need for compensation from Poland.

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REGION and REGIONALISM
No. 12

THE CULTURAL HERITAGE OF RURAL SETTLEMENT IN POLISH ORAVA

1. INTRODUCTION. PHYSIOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS OF THE REGION

Orava is the traditional name of a region situated in northern Slovakia and partially in southern Poland. Orava is a small geographical and historical region, and a classic example of a transborder region. It has been shaped by various factors regarding its physiographic situation, unstable political history and the local settlement development (Roszkowski 1995, pp. 53–63, Sobczyński 1998, pp. 141–149).

Polish Orava is situated in the valley of the Black Orava river, which forms the axis of the region. The northern borders of the valley are marked out by the Beskid mountains and the massif of Babia Góra; to the west – on the Slovakian side – by the Kysuckie Beskids, and from the south – by the Mala Fatra. The region is surrounded by mountains from almost all sides. The northern part of the Orava Valley is a relatively wide depression between the Tatra and the Beskid mountains. The area is flat, so the European watershed between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea catchment areas practically disappears here (Ładygin 1985, Matuszczyk 1997, Balon et al. 1995, pp. 117–130). It is very characteristic, that the closed valley is in fact the best transit region of the whole mountain system and the most convenient route through the mountains for peoples wandering from the south to the north (Jostowa 1972, Fitak 2002, pp. 45–55).

The map presents the land use of Orava region with special regard to settlement network. The morphology of the area, along with woods and main roads are marked (Fig. 1).



Fig. 1. Land use of Polish Orava with special regards to settlement
Source: study based on topographic maps and K. Miraj (2010, p. 8)

One can easily observe the influence of geographical environment on the settlement network. As we can see in this figure, the villages are located in the river valley and the settlements are surrounded by mountain ridges (Guzik 1992, pp. 55–71, Miraj 2010, pp. 41–56).

2. POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF THE REGION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The political history of Orava begins with its formal affiliation with the Great--Moravian State into which it was probably incorporated in the 9th century, though the area was sparsely settled back then. In the 10th century, Orava got under Czech rule. There is no doubt that after incorporation of the whole Upper Hungary, including Orava into Poland by Boleslaw the Brave, the Orava Valley

belonged in principle to Poland continuously for almost 200 years. The beginning of division of the Orava land between its neighbours at the turn of 13th century, between Hungarian-Polish Tvrdošin in the south, and Jabłonka in the north, marked out the effective reach of the state administration. Hungary, who colonised Orava more efficiently, received effective jurisdiction over its southern part. Formal Hungarian authority did not mean efficient colonisation of the Orava lands, which were practically ruled by Polish families until 1588. The next change of the Oravian borders was recorded in the 18th century, when the Hungarians moved north to the Beskid ridges, taking the whole Orava into their possession (Sobczyński and Zawadzka 1988, Przyboś 1995, pp. 147–168). Until that time, the Polish element had probably dominated over the whole Orava region and only that political change prompted a serious transformation of ethnic structure of the region in the course of intensive Hungarian and Slovak colonisation (Kamocki 1990, pp. 121–126). For the next 146 years, the border on the Orava river was still an interstate border (between the Austrian Empire and the Hungarian Kingdom).

Fig. 2. Contemporary geopolitical location of the Orava region
Source: own study based on T.M. Trajdos (1991)

In 1918, along with the revival of Polish and Czechoslovakian statehood, the matter of Orava became an international conflict again (Orlof 1990, pp. 37–55). The border established in 1920 cut through not only the two communities but also through individual farms. The next possibility to correct the course of the Orava border was related to the fragmentary partition of Czechoslovakia in 1938

(Sobczyński 1986). The following year, the Republic of Slovakia revindicated all of Orava, regaining the border existing until the first partition of Poland. After the Second World War, the two countries were forced in Moscow to accept the inter-war course of their border (Fig. 2).

3. DEVELOPMENT OF SETTLEMENT NETWORK AND FORMS OF SPATIAL LAYOUT OF VILLAGES

To explain the forms of settlement, it is necessary to look at the history of the settlement network. In the course of reconstructing the spatial layout of villages, the author used source material in the form of historical documents, such as incorporation charters or acts of privileges and inventories from the modern period.

Around the 3rd century, the Slavic population started to wander south through various Carpathian passes, such as Orava Valley. In the course of settlement of Orava, Slavic tribes quickly underwent the process of Magyarisation. Due to the considerable expansion of the Polish State territory to the south by Boleslaw the Brave until the end of the 12th century, the southern border of Poland included Orava. The colonisation process from the south followed upwards along the Orava valley and its tributaries. Since the 14th century, the southern part of the region was pursued by Slovak, German and Hungarian settlers. The northern, thickly wooded part of Orava was already colonised by Polish settlers from the north, because it belonged to the Cracow land. Since the 16th, century the scope of that forest colonisation of the south Beskid slopes was marked out by the Magura Oravska range. The Polish colonisation element in Orava grew stronger in the times of the Jagiellonians' struggle for the Hungarian throne. Two centuries of Polish rule over the Hungarian Orava left traces in the form of significant settlement of Polish population. After 1588, Orava was governed exclusively by Hungarian Thurzo family. At the turn of 18th century, Polish rulers lost their interest in Orava so the process of colonisation was almost exclusively pursued by the Hungarian nobility using settlers of Slovak origin. At that stage, there was little participation of pastoral population and of peasants from the Żywiec region (Semkowicz 1932, Gotkiewicz 1939, Górka 1995, pp. 219–232). The first village founded in Polish Orava was Jabłonka, which was a custom-house established by Casimir the Great in 1368. The remaining villages were founded in the second half of 16th and the first years of 17th century (Tab. 1).

Table 1. First mentions in historical sources about villages situated in Polish Orava

Name of village	First historical mention
Jabłonka	1368
Bukowina	1565
Podsarnie	1567
Orawka	1585
Podwilk	1585
Piekielnik	1588
Podszkle	1588
Harkabuz	1597
Zubrzyca Górna	1604
Lipnica Wielka	1606
Lipnica Mała	1608
Zubrzyca Dolna	1614
Chyżne	1619
Kiczory	1638

Source: own study based on archival documents and inventories collected in W. Semkowicz (1932–39).

In the region of Polish Orava, all villages are laid out in the form of double--row forest villages (called *Waldhufendorf*). In contrast to open-field villages where each farmer owned one parcel in each communal field, here every farm was assigned an elongated strip of equal size initially covered with forest. The plots had their narrow edges along the route on the valley floor and then stretched upwards along the slope to the ridge (Fig. 3). The farmers have built their houses at the bottom end of their plots along the road. In broader valleys, plots were allocated separately on each side of the valley, while in narrower ones a single plot crossed the whole valley, from one ridge to another. Houses, separated from each other by roads giving access to fields, were loosely distributed all along the the village. Double-row forest villages were typically established *in cruda radice* after primary forests were cleared or burned down. Adaptation of village shape to natural conditions is clearly visible in all villages founded in Orava in 16th and 17th centuries under the so-called Walachian law (Burszta 1958, pp. 59–65, Schramm 1961, Szulc 1995, pp. 5–58). The colonisation advanced from two opposite directions – from the valleys up and from the

ridges down – and was connected with two different economic systems: farming and pastoral. Their spatial arrangement was similar to double-row villages. Each villager was given a strip of land, typically of one hide. The difference was that the plot always stretched from the valley floor up to the ridge, symmetrically in both directions (Koter and Kulesza 2006, pp. 43–59).



Fig. 3. Examples of archival plans from 19th century showing the spatial layouts of villages in Polish Orava (Harkabuz, Podsarnie, Lipnica Mała)
Source: archival maps collected in W. Semkowicz (1932–39)

The state of preservation of historical spatial layout of rural settlement in Orava region is highly diversified. As we can see in aerial photographs, some of the villages have only slightly changed their morphological form, while others

have undergone a process of total transformation. In most settlements, one can observe the changes involving the development of habitats along the valley and the internal divisions of fields. In some villages, in connection with the increase of population due to socio-economic development and administrative position, one can identify the expansion of rural habitat outside the axis of the valley, the formation of many side roads and uncontrolled division of parcels.

4. FORMS OF CULTURAL HERITAGE OF VILLAGES AND THEIR CONTEMPORARY STATE OF PRESERVATION

Orava has architectural monuments in almost every village. The state register of monuments covers 17 objects in Polish Orava located in 3 different communities. The most valuable of them include the examples of wooden cottages and churches. Old popular architecture can be found in all villages of Orava. Some of them are located *in situ*, i.e. the building still stands in its original location. Others were transferred, with the biggest modern concentration in the open-air Museum in Zubrzyca. The museum showcases the unique architecture and culture of the region. Scattered in a large park, the buildings illustrate everyday life of peasants. Its history dates back to 1937, when the last village administrator, from the Moniak family, bequeathed their estate stipulating that a museum be established on his land. Thus, the village leader's manor and the surrounding park became the core of the Museum. The grounds opened to the public in 1955 (Pilch 2003).

In Orava region, one can identify diverse building types. In figure 4, we can see a nineteenth-century building with characteristic Oravian top floor. The distinctive and unique local timber-building tradition includes the Oravian *wyżka* (vyzhka) cottage. It is a residential building with the top floor used as utility space (usually a granary). An open gallery, often used for drying flax, runs along the building's wall at the upper level. It can be reached by stairs attached on the outside of the building. Such houses were constructed of thick spruce logs. It is characteristic that the cottage has one arched door, situated at the edge of the building. Such houses consisted of two rooms, 'black' and 'white', separated by the entrance hall. The 'black room' where everyday life took place had a fireplace, while the 'white room' was official, richly decorated and only used on special occasions. It was a bedroom and a store for valuable items (Reinfuss 1950, pp. 36–55).

Fig. 4. Oravian cottage with characteristic top floor called *wyżka*
Source: private collection

Other types of cottages can also be found in Orava. One of the most popular types of buildings is a cottage with half-hipped roof and an elongated cottage with side annex called *zachata* (Fig. 5). Many cottages of later origin are classic wooden buildings with gabled roof. It is very characteristic, that in Polish Orava one can observe not only single isolated traditional buildings, but many of them form preserved whole farmsteads, where the residential buildings are connected with farm buildings. It is also a possible to identify some complexes of farms situated side by side along one street.

Fig. 5. Examples of Oravian cottages with half-hipped roof (left one) and with side annex called *zachata* (right one)
Source: private collection

Unfortunately, large part of the old buildings in Orava were destroyed, with new buildings replacing them. They are modern in architectural form and not consistent with the regional tradition. It is worth noting, that last years saw a good tendency of constructing buildings showing excellently the continuity from traditional to modern forms of architecture (Fig. 6), such as a shopping

centre in Jabłonka, an elementary school and clergy house in Lipnica Mała, a post office in Zubrzyca Górna, and many examples of dwellings with modern form of *wyżka* located in all Oravian villages.

Fig. 6. Examples of contemporary buildings in Polish Orava with modern form of *wyżka* in Lipnica Mała: elementary school (left) and building of clergy house (right)
Source: private collection

Another type of monuments are the residences of modest gentry. The Moniak farm is a manor complex, which includes six buildings that have been here for over 300 years. These inlude an ancient manor, sheepfold, cart hall, pigsty, manor stables and a cellar. The Moniak family acted as village administrators from the establishment of the village in the 16th century. The manor house is characteristic because of its whitewashed walls, blue window frames and doors. It is covered with a pediment roof and features a small attic and a balcony. Presently, it houses the museum offices, while temporary exhibitions are organised in the attic. In addition to the heritage of residential buildings, the Orava region also includes many preserved examples of preindustrial or early industrial buildings, such as a sawmill, a forge, an oil mill in Zubrzyca Górna or the famous 18th-century dye-works located in Orawka (Pilchowa 2001, pp. 21–29).

One of the most important element of heritage of rural settlement in Orava region comprise the old sacral architecture with special regard to churches. The church of John the Baptist in Orawka is the only wooden church preserved in the upper Orava valley. It dates back to mid-17th century. It is also certainly one of the most valuable examples of wooden sacral architecture in southern Poland, of great importance to the history of culture of the region and of exceptional artistic value. As such, it is permanently under special care of the state conservation services. These values are apparent not only in the attractiveness of the traditional form of the architecture, but also in the exceptionally rich decoration of the interior from the 17th and 18th centuries, a variety of paintings, wood carvings, and sculptures, as well as artistic craftwork.

Fig. 7. Examples of sacral heritage in Polish Orava: wooden church of John the Baptist in Orawka (left) and Loretan bell-tower in Zubrzyca Dolna (right)
Source: private collection

In Polish Orava, one can identify other valuable churches from 18th and 19th centuries, such as the Church of St Lucas in Lipnica Wielka, constructed in late baroque style, and two classical churches: in Podwilk (church of St. Martin) and Jabłkonka (church of Transfiguration of Jesus). One of the most characteristic elements of sacral space of Orava region are the Loretan bell-towers (preserved in Chyżne, Jabłonka, Lipnica Mała, Lipnica Wielka, Zubrzyca Dolna and Górna). Such bell towers were built in the fields in Orava, in areas remote from the church, but where their bell could be easily heard. The bells also served to 'drive away the clouds' during the coming storm, which was the belief of farmers working in the field. It is also necessary to mention the elements of so called small architecture: wayside shrines, showing the Crucified Christ, Our Lady of Sorrows, Holy Trinity or St John of Nepomuk (Barabasz 2001). They are very common in Orava region and they vary considerably in size, architectural form and historic value (Fig. 7).

5. CONLUSIONS

Orava is not among the largest regions of Poland but, in terms of both its culture and landscape, an exceptionally interesting one. At present, part of Upper Orava lies within the borders of Poland. A comparative study of traditional architecture of the Orava region indicates that its rural heritage has certain

specific and unique features, which must be protected. From this point of view it is necessary to:

– deepen the knowledge about old architecture of the Orava region,

– encourage as many local societies as it is possible to save the national heritage,

– continue research concerning the rural heritage and create some databases,

– increase the interest among tourists in getting to know the relics of the Orava region,

– inspire people to be interested in folk art,

– increase the number of people visiting these poorly known and seldom visited places,

– enhance cooperation at the level of heritage protection, with special regard of transborder cooperation with all those who are interested in activities concerning saving traditional buildings in the Orava region and objects which say a lot about the culture of this region.

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MEDIEVAL HERITAGE OF SMALL TOWNS IN THE STATE OF THE TEUTONIC ORDER IN THE REGISTER OF MONUMENTS

1. INTRODUCTION

Today, the territory of Northern Poland is a very interesting area rich in historic monuments. Since the 13th century, the State of the Teutonic Order in Prussia emerged and formed on the southern shore of the Baltic Sea. Well-managed, with a strong economy and considerable military potential, it was at that time, as they say economic historians – the only state without a debt in medieval Europe. Existing until the secularisation in 1525, the monastic state was not monolithic. Subordinate to the pope, it consisted of the lands ruled by the Teutonic Knights, but also local bishops and chapters, more or less dependent on the Order. Church-owned dominion occupied a large area, one-third of the territory of the state (Czaja and Nowak 2013, p. 17). Large Prussian cities also played an important role, most of all Gdańsk, Elbląg and Toruń. The thick network of smaller, in both population and area, Prussian towns had a slightly smaller impact on the economy and politics. However, it is this network that mainly determines the exceptional character of the material cultural landscape of the area. The basic framework of the medieval structure of urban settlement of the Teutonic state has survived in almost unchanged form to this day. Despite the passage of time and the turbulent history of this land, we can now admire the numerous monuments of urban planning and architecture of small towns of the monastic state.

The main objective of this paper is to determine the size and provide a brief characterisation of the resource of medieval architectural monuments and city plans of the Teutonic state. The article omits the already mentioned largest medieval cities in the region, which, due to their size, diversity and richness of

their historic tissue, require separate studies in the field of cultural heritage. The author focused his attention on small towns. The paper revolves around objects created through the order's direct initiative, as well as the heritage of the church's control and secular investors, namely municipal authorities and wealthy townsmen. Analyses were based on provincial registers of historic monuments, as well as publications on this topic and regional conservation programmes. Medieval monuments include not only well-preserved structures, but also relics, ruins and reconstructed buildings that contain listed medieval elements. Some registry entries refer to groups of historic buildings. In such cases, unless otherwise indicated, all objects in a group were considered as a single entry. Unfortunately, we should remember that regional registers are not perfect. For example, they lack any indication as to the time of construction of some structures. This results in the need to seek such information from other sources.

2. RESEARCH AREA

Before the Teutonic Knights received the Chełmno region and smaller endowments in Kujawy from Duke Konrad of Masovia in 1228 (Czaja and Nowak 2013, pp. 11–12), the lands on the southern Baltic shore were divided between Prussian tribes and Pomeranian dukes. Vistula served as a boundary between zones of influence. Through armed conquest, diplomacy, purchase and endowments, the Teutonic Knights were able to form a powerful state. The Teutonic territory and governance of the Church, which jointly formed the so called State of the Teutonic Order in Prussia, can be divided into three main parts. The Chełmno region, which represented a starting point for further territorial conquests, Prussia proper, which was conquered by 1283, and Pomerania, which the Polish State lost to the Order in the early fourteenth century (Tandecki 2013). The entire territory of the State of the Teutonic Order had an area of about 58 thousand square kilometres, with about 140 thousand Prussians, as much Slavic people and about 200 thousand of German origin (Czaja and Nowak 2013, p. 14). Today, this area is located within Kuyavian-Pomeranian, Warmian-Masurian and Pomeranian provinces. Small fragments once included in the Teutonic State are now in Western Pomeranian and Masovian provinces. The territory of the former Teutonic dominion was obviously bigger and, after merging with the lands owned by the Brothers of the Sword, reached Livonia. Those areas, however, are not discussed in this paper. The final end of the monastic state came in 1525, when the Grand Master of the Order Albrecht Hohenzollern secularised Prussia and paid homage to the Crown. Secular Duchy

of Prussia was transformed in the 18th century into the Prussian State, whose existence and actions contributed to the downfall of the Republic of Poland and in the 20th century became a hotbed for the Second World War[1].

3. SELECTION OF CITIES

The Teutonic presence on the southern coast of the Baltic Sea from 1228 to 1525, left a number of material traces, including the aforementioned settlement network. The Teutonic Knights in Prussia founded about 1000 villages and nearly 100 cities. 15 cities were founded in Chełmno Land, 60 in Prussia and 21 in Pomerania[2], for a total of 96 urban centres (Czaja 2013, Czaja and Nowak 2013).

Despite its apparent simplicity, the task of determining the number of cities where there are monuments from the period of the State of the Teutonic Order poses some difficulties. It is the author's view that an analysis of the cultural heritage of the Teutonic State only in places that are now cities would be an oversimplification. The main problem was the need to simultaneously take into account several factors when selecting the cities: the variability of the Teutonic State borders, the course of contemporary national borders of countries and regions, the date of obtaining city rights and the current status of the town, as well as the presence of medieval monuments. Additionally, some cities, particularly in Prussia proper, lost their charters due to depopulation after the Second World War. Some of them eventually recovered them, while others did not. The following are now considered villages: Kurzętnik (Kuyavian-Pomeranian), Gardeja, Biskupiec (Pomeranian), Dąbrówno, Srokowo (Warmian-Masurian).

After excluding the cities located beyond the border of today's Poland, we end up with 83 centres incorporated before 1525 within the former Teutonic State. This number also contains so-called twin cities[3] (Kranz-Domasłowska

[1] According to M. Czaja and Z.H. Nowak (2013), a recent study by Tomasz Jasiński, call into question the hitherto recognized date of 1226 as the date when Emperor Frederick II, issued a document (the so-called Golden Bull) for the Teutonic Knights affirming their supremacy and rule over Prussia and confirming the Konrad of Mazovia's endowments.

[2] Currently, one city, historically belonging to the Gdańsk Pomerania, namely Biały Bór (1382), is located in the West Pomeranian Province. The provincial register of immovable monuments lists no objects/areas in the city.

[3] The term New Town corresponds to: Old Town – New Town, Altstadt – Neustadt, which means the existence of a settlement complex consisting of two systemically differ-

2013). Twin cities in Prussia included: Gdańsk[4], Toruń, Elbląg, Braniewo, Królewiec (Königsberg)[5]. Chełmno never gained such status. After excluding Gdańsk, Toruń and Elbląg, and including Braniewo as modern single city, we end up with 75 cities. The analysis omitted the towns located in the former monastic state which have Medieval monuments listed in the register, but received their city rights in the modern times[6]. The study also excluded areas that were under Teutonic rule temporarily, for a short period of several to several dozen years, such as Kujawy, Dobrzyń area, Zawkrze area, Wizna area, Słupsk area (Nowak 2000).

4. PRUSSIAN TOWNS

There were two main categories of cities in the medieval Teutonic State. The first consisted of big cities, so-called great cities of Prussia, with significant social and economic capital. The largest and oldest Prussian cities include six so-called great cities – members of Hanza: Main City of Gdańsk, Old Town Elbląg, Old Town Toruń, Chełmno, Old Town Braniewo and Königsberg (Czaja and Nowak 2013).

These were very rich urban centres conducting far-reaching international trade and having real influence on regional politics. Two of those cities, namely Chełmno considered the monastic capital and Old Town Braniewo founded by Warmian bishops and the chapter, have never gained a role as significant as

ent but spatially adjacent cities (Krantz-Domasłowska 2013). Twin cities in Prussia included: Gdańsk, Toruń, Elbląg, Braniewo, Królewiec. Chełmno never gained such status.

[4] Gdańsk actually consisted of three cities: Gdańsk Main Town, Gdańsk Old Town and the Gdańsk Young City.

[5] Today's Kaliningrad, the capital of the Kaliningrad region.

[6] These are: Ełk (1560), Olecko (1560), Gołdap (1570), Węgorzewo (1571), Giżycko (1612), Pisz (1645), Biała Piska (1722), Mikołajki (1722), Ryn (1723), Szczytno (1723), Orzysz (1725), Ruciane-Nida (1958), Korsze (1962) in Warmian-Masurian Province, Miastko (1617), Wejherowo (1650), Nowy Dwór Gdański (1880), Sopot (1901), Kartuzy (1923), Skórcz (1934), Pruszcz Gdański (1945), Rumia (1954), Władysławowo (1963), Reda (1967), Jastarnia (1973), Brusy (1988), Żukowo (1989), Krynica Morska (1991), Czarna Woda (1993) in Pomeranian Province and Jabłonowo Pomorskie (1962) in Kuyavian-Pomeranian Province. In the above list, Ełk is an interesting case, as despite receiving its charter in 1435, the incorporation was not successful and the town was officially a village for 125 years. Ełk has been using its municipal rights since 1560 (Czubiel and Domagała 1969, 126). According to R. Czaja (2013, p. 91), Ełk received a charter first around 1440, and then in 1669.

Gdańsk or Elbląg and over time lost their initial importance. Other Prussian cities included in the second group were decidedly less influential. Some of them evolved over the centuries and now their population exceeds 30 thousand. These are Iława and Ostróda in the Warmian-Masurian Province, Tczew, Starogard Gdański, Chojnice, Malbork, Kwidzyń and Lębork in the Pomeranian Province and Grudziądz in the Kuyavian-Pomeranian Province. Initially small, Olsztyn (Warmian-Masurian) even rose to become the capital of the province. However, the vast majority of cities still rank among small towns with less than 20 thousand residents, as well as very small towns with small spatial scale.

Fig. 1. Cities of the State of the Teutonic Order between the 13th and 15th centuries
Source: M. Czaja (2000), modified

The density of the urban settlement network of the Teutonic State varied. In the entire state, it was 1/320 km^2, with 1/200 km^2 in the densest areas and 1/770 km^2 in Gdańsk Pomerania. Distances between cities ranged from a few to 25–30 km (Biskup 1980 cited in Kulesza 2011). In the mid-15th century, urbanisation of the monastic state was over 20%, which is a significant value. The

network of towns of the area between the 13th and 15th centuries is shown in figure 1.

A large part of Prussian towns developed spatially and functionally only in the 19th century, with economic development of Prussia and the appearance of railway in the area (Achremczyk 2008). As a result, and despite considerable damage of the First and Second World Wars, spatial layouts of many cities have retained distinct characteristics of their charter layouts, and in some cases also traces of pre-charter settlements.

4.1. Historic urban layouts

Among the cities founded in the State of the Teutonic Knights before 1525, the majority (63) have historic spatial arrangements and old town districts listed in the register of monuments[7] (Tab. 1 and Fig. 2). Cities in Prussia in most cases formed on the raw root (*in cruda radice*), sometimes out of settlements surrounding a castle, as centres of bishop's rule, out of Prussian market settlements or at the locations of Prussian castles. According to M. Kulesza (2011), 40% of religious settlements in the monastic state were founded to replace earlier Prussian settlements, most often markets. Until mid-13th century, mostly irregular settlements around castles were developing, later founded based on German town laws, and thus shaped into the more regular form of a Gothic medieval city. Since the 14th century, there was dynamic development in colonisation and the incorporation of new urban settlement with markets, parish churches and city walls, often also accompanied by a castle. The incorporation of towns in the area was modelled on Magdeburg Law, which was later modified and adapted to local circumstances as Chełmno Law (Czaja 2000, Wysocki 2009, p. 87, Kulesza 2011). Among 96 Prussian towns, most were located under Chełmno Law, with just 7 receiving Lubeck Law: Old and New Town Elbląg, Łeba and Hel located by the order, as well as Klaipéda (Memel), Braniewo and Frombork located by the church (Gołembiowski 1990, Czaja 2000). Such cities would sometimes later be converted to Chełmno Law.

[7] According to M. Kulesza (2011, pp. 279–280), other cities in the region, which received municipal rights after the secularisation of the Order in 1525, also have interesting spatial arrangements. Such towns as Barciany, Biała Piska, Ełk, Giżycko, Gołdap, Mikołajki, Olecko, Orzysz, Węgorzewo and Wielbark, founded and developing as early settlements and villages as part of the defence system, later gained some significance. Some settlements (Pisz, Węgorzewo, Ryn, Orzysz and Biała Piska) kept their arrangements without a clearly defined and unified market square even after receiving municipal rights. In such linear towns, a wide street served as a market square.

Table 1. Number of medieval urban layouts and old town districts in small towns of the former State of the Teutonic Knights entered in the provincial registers of historic sites

Province	Town and date of location
Kuyavian-Pomeranian (6)	Brodnica (1298), Chełmno (1232), Golub (1310–1326)[a], Grudziądz (1291), Nowe (1282), Tuchola (1346)
Pomeranian (16)	Bytów (1346), Chojnice (1309 i 1360), Człuchów (1348), Gardeja (1334), Gniew (1297), Kościerzyna (14th c.), Kwidzyn (1233 and 1360), Nowy Staw (1343), Lębork (1341), Malbork (1276, 1286), Prabuty (1305–1321), Puck (1348), Skarszewy (1320), Starogard Gdański (1348), Sztum (1416), Tczew (1260)
Warmian-Masurian (41)	Barczewo (1364), Bartoszyce (1332), Biskupiec Pomorski (1325), Biskupiec Reszelski (1359), Bisztynek (1385), Braniewo (1254 Old Town and 1342 – New Town), Dąbrówno (1325/26), Dobre Miasto (1329), Działdowo (1344), Iława (1305), Frombork (1310), Górowo Iławeckie (1335), Janowo (1421), Jeziorany (1338), Kętrzyn (1357), Kisielice (1331), Kurzętnik (1330), Lidzbark Warmiński (1308), Lidzbark Welski (1325), Lubawa (1301–1311/1326), Miłakowo (1490), Miłomłyn (1335), Młynary (1329), Morąg (1327), Mrągowo (1405), Nidzica (1381), Nowe Miasto Lubawskie (1325), Olsztyn (1353), Olsztynek (1359), Orneta (1313), Ostróda (1329), Pasłęk (1297), Pasym (1386), Pieniężno (1312), Reszel (1337), Sępopol (1351), Srokowo (1405), Susz (1305), Tolkmicko (1299/1351), Zalewo (1305)
Total number of towns	63

[a] Today Golub-Dobrzyń.

Source: own study on the basis of: conservation programmes (Pomeranian for 2011–2014[8], Warmian-Masurian for 2012–2015 and Kuyavian-Pomeranian for 2013–2016), registers of historical monuments for Pomeranian, Kuyavian-Pomeranian, West Pomeranian and Warmian-Masurian provinces (as of 31.03.2015), R. Czaja (2013).

In reference to M. Książek (1996), M. Kulesza (2011) distinguishes the following three morphological types of cities:

– regular city, cities with chequered (orthogonal) streets;

– genetically older towns, where 'wide street' served as a market and the main communication route; this arrangement is characteristic of port towns (Old

[8] No newer studies were available at the time this paper was written.

Town Elbląg, Old Town Toruń, Main City of Gdańsk, New Town Braniewo) and for the cities located in the hinterland, like Malbork or Pasłęk;

– chequered town with a triangular or rectangular market, characteristic mainly in smaller towns, where communication played a significant role (Brodnica, Nidzica, Dąbrówno, Miłomłyn, Olsztynek, Górowo Iławeckie, Tolkmicko) (Kulesza 2011, p. 148).



Fig. 2. Number of medieval urban structures and old town districts in small towns of the former State of the Teutonic Knights entered in the provincial registers of historic sites
Source: author's own elaboration

Some of the cities founded under Chełmno law, such as Olsztyn, Ostróda, Kętrzyn, Olsztynek, Reszel, Biskupiec or Barczewo that can be included in the first group according to M. Kulesza's (2011) division, are characterised by bold urban planning and distinguishing features of local provincialism (Conservation programme for Warmian-Masurian province in 2012–2015, p. 16). Significant regularity in spatial arrangement is one of the distinguishing features of monastic cities, 'which can be explained by both destruction during the conquests of our settlements and the maturity of measuring workshops brought from Germany by the colonists' (Kulesza 2011, p. 138).

Kisielice and Iława cannot be classified in any typological group, so they should be considered a separate type. Both were located in early 14th century, but they remained private property. Iława survived in this form until early 19th cen-

tury. Kisielice was destroyed during the Second World War and only a church remained of the original buildings. The historic centre is now a wasteland (Conservation programme for Warmian-Masurian province in 2012–2015, p. 16).

Large number of Prussian towns (93%) did not exceed 10 ha, 29 towns occupied an area of less than 5 ha, and 56 cities between 5 and 10 ha (Czaja 2013). The dominance of small towns is thus clearly visible. Only a few have developed small suburbs.

Despite their apparent uniformity, medieval, regular centres of the monastic state are highly diverse, e.g. in terms of market sizes and proportions, communication routes, locations of churches (Kulesza 2011, 282), but also in terms of spatial relations between the castle and the town (Czubiel and Domagała 1969, Kajzer, Kołodziejski and Salm 2007, Musiaka 2013).

4.2. Churches and monasteries

Compared to the spatial arrangements of cities, historic architectural tissue has suffered much more damage during the Second World War (Salm 2006, Wysocki 2009, Lewandowska 2012). The destruction in some historic Prussian city centres, such as Miłomłyn or Pieniężno reached 90%. Despite such huge losses, most urban churches survived to our times. Many of them kept their distinct stylistic features and, owing to their continued sacred function, as well as the care of the Church and the followers, their modern technical condition is usually good or very good.

When they came to the southern shores of the Baltic Sea in the 13th century, Teutonic Knights did not build the local Church administration from scratch. There already was a network of parishes and churches in the Chełmno area and Gdańsk Pomerania. The situation was different in the area of Prussia proper, where the network of town and parishes had to actually be built from the ground up. According to M. Biskup (2013, p. 146), there were 948 parishes, including 97 urban ones in Teutonic Prussia of the early 15th century, operating in the Bishoprics of Chełmno, Pomesania, Warmia, Samland, as well as Włocławek, Gniezno, Płock and Kamień. Parish churches in cities served not only as places of worship. They were also an important link of local government, economic and intellectual lives of the burghers (Biskup 2013). In addition to castles and town hall towers, they constituted the main (sometimes the only) landscape dominant in small Prussian towns.

Churches in cities were located in squares near one of the corners of markets, in the quarter or directly adjacent to the walls. In addition to parish churches,

monasteries were created in some towns, mostly Dominican and Franciscan. Monastery buildings were very often built at some distance from the market and included in the outline of municipal walls. Robust temples (both town churches and monasteries) thus served an important defensive role. Architectural models were derived from cathedrals in larger cities. Kwidzyn cathedral was a model for the Vistula region, while churches in Warmia resembled the Frombork cathedral. Great longevity of the Gothic was another architectural feature of the monastic state. Buildings in this style in the Eastern Masuria were erected until the 17th century (Wysocki 2009, pp. 125–128). It is worth noting that Teutonic castles are actually monasteries-fortresses, which also served religious functions. Episcopal and chapter buildings were slightly different, but there always were castle chapels there.

Table 2. Number of sacred buildings in small towns of the former State of the Teutonic Knights entered in the provincial registers of historic sites

Province	Churches and monasteries (number of objects and building complexes)
Kuyavian-Pomeranian (18)	Brodnica, Chełmno (3 and 1 complex), Chełmża (2), Golub, Grudziądz (2), Kowalewo Pomorskie, Łasin, Nowe (3), Radzyń Chełmiński (2), Świecie
Pomeranian (17)	Bytów, Chojnice, Dzierzgoń, Gardeja, Gniew, Hel, Kwidzyn[a], Lębork, Malbork, Nowy Staw, Prabuty (2), Puck, Skarszewy, Starogard Gdański, Tczew (1 and 1 complex)
Warmian-Masurian (45)	Barczewo (2), Bartoszyce (2), Biskupiec Pomorski, Biskupiec Reszelski, Bisztynek, Braniewo (2), Dąbrówno, Dobre Miasto (2), Działdowo, Frombork (2 complexes), Górowo Iławeckie, Iława, Jeziorany, Kętrzyn (2), Kisielice, Kurzętnik, Lidzbark, Lidzbark Warmiński, Lubawa (2), Miłakowo, Miłomłyn, Młynary, Morąg, Nidzica, Nowe Miasto Lubawskie, Olsztyn, Olsztynek, Orneta, Ostróda, Pasłęk, Pasym, Pieniężno, Reszel, Sępopol, Srokowo, Susz, Tolkmicko, Zalewo
Total number	80

[a] The Co-cathedral in Kwidzyn is listed as part of the castle complex.

Source: own study on the basis of: conservation programmes (Pomeranian for 2011–2014, Warmian-Masurian for 2012–2015 and Kuyavian-Pomeranian for 2013–2016), registers of historical monuments for Pomeranian, Kuyavian-Pomeranian, West Pomeranian and Warmian-Masurian provinces (as of 31.03.2015).



Fig. 3. Sacred buildings and complexes in small towns of the former State of the Teutonic Order entered in the provincial registers of historic sites
Source: author's own elaboration

We can find especially intense concentration of sacred buildings in Chełmno. The register of monuments lists 4 Gothic churches[9]. Such a large number of churches and monasteries was related to the planned capital function of the city. Especially valuable is also the cathedral defence complex in Frombork, which was associated with capital function for Warmian dominion.

80 religious buildings and complexes survived to our times in the small towns of the Teutonic State (Tab. 2 and Fig 3). The more highly valued objects that survived to this day include urban Gothic churches in Chojnice, Gniew, Lębork, Nowy Staw, Puck, Tczew, as well as the cathedral in the castle complex in Kwidzyn in Pomeranian province, Brodnica, a complex of four churches, the chapel of St. Martin and Benedictine monastery complex with the church of SS. Johns Baptist and Evangelist in Chełmno, buildings in Chełmża, Golub-Dobrzyń, Grudziądz, Kowalewo Pomorskie, Łasin, Nowe, Radzyń Chełmiński, Świecie in Kuyavian-Pomeranian province, as well as the stronghold and cathedral complex in Frombork, Gothic parish churches in Orneta, Jeziorany, Reszel, Barczewo, Olsztyn, Bartoszyce, Pasłęk, Morąg, Pasym, Sępopol, collegiate complex in Dobre Miasto, fortified church of St. George in Kętrzyn, and others.

[9] One entry concerns the Benedictine monastery.

4.3. Castles

The area of the former Teutonic State is characterised by a high density of castles unified in form to a degree unique in Europe. When conquering new areas, the Teutonic Knights would quickly fortify them with strongholds, watch-towers and castles. Researchers still do not agree how many such structures were erected in the Teutonic State. According to B. Guerquin (1983, 14, cited in Pawłowski), the number of Teutonic castles in total exceeded 120. P. Zaniewski (2005) concurs, quoting the number of stone fortifications as over 120[10]. M. Arszyński (2000, pp. 40–41) uses the phrase 'well over a hundred'. Bieszk gives a more precise number by saying that the total number of castles erected in all parts of the State of the Teutonic Order is 163 (Bieszk 2010, p. 9).

The network of strongholds in Prussia proper and the Chełmno area was based on the rule that castles should be located no further that one day of travel on horseback from one another (usually no more than 30 km). Initially, the monks erected wooden objects[11], but since the end of the 13th century castles were built of stone. The oldest of them is the castle of the Teutonic Knights in Toruń built in 1255–1300 (Guerquin 1984, 311). Monastic stone castles were characteristically rectangular, with an internal yard and one or more outer yards serving commercial and military functions. Over time, a specific type of monastic castle formed in Prussia, namely the conventional castle, which was at the top of the administrative ladder of Teutonic strongholds (with the obvious exception of the capital of the State).

M. Jackiewicz-Garniec (2006, p. 40–41) put forward an interesting theory that a four-step hierarchical structure of Commander – mayor – procurator – bailiff corresponds to the four architectural types of castles: Commander's, mayor's, procurator's and bailiff's. Administratively, the castles belonged to the order or were owned by the church (bishop or charter). Knight castles were practically absent in this area. Strongholds in Prussia were castles belonging to the state administration. Castles built by Teutonic Order, bishop chapters and bishops themselves served different functions in the Medieval times: military, commercial, administrative, sometimes judicial, monastic (in the case of monastic castles), residential, and others.

[10] P. Zaniewski (2005, p. 9) defines 'Teutonic castles' as 'all castles existing within the former Teutonic State, regardless of their ownership, including monastic, episcopal, charter and knights' castles'.

[11] As a building material, wood was cheap, easily accessible, did not require specialised construction techniques and allowed for quick construction.

Spatial relations between castles and towns varied (Czubiel and Domagala 1969, Musiaka 2013). From completely separated to tightly connected (combined) defensive complexes. Regardless of the degree of connection between the castle and the city walls, they served a key role in the city's defence.

Only some of them remained to our times in an almost unchanged state. Most were converted or survived in the form of more or less preserved ruins (Arszyński 2000). There are also some that we only learn about from written sources. 37 stronghold or their remains can currently be found in the cities included in the analysis (Tab. 3 and Fig. 4).

The most valuable and still used castles in the area in question are obviously Malbork, the former capital of the monastic state, as well as several lesser strongholds, such as Bytów, Gniew, Sztum and the charter castle in Kwidzyn in Pomeranian province, Golub-Dobrzyń, Nowe and Świecie in Kuyavian-Pomeranian province, as well as Działdowo, Kętrzyn, Nidzica, Ostróda and the Warmian charter castle in Olsztyn, bishop's castle complex in Lidzbark Warmiński and the bishop's castle in Reszel in Warmian-Masurian province.

Table 3. Number of medieval castles in small towns of the former State of the Teutonic Order entered in the provincial registers of historic sites

Province	Castles
Kuyavian-Pomeranian (8)	Brodnica, Golub, Grudziądz, Kowalewo Pomorskie, Nowe, Radzyń Chełmiński, Świecie, Wąbrzeźno
Pomeranian (10)	Bytów, Czarne, Człuchów, Gniew, Kwidzyn, Lębork, Malbork, Prabuty, Skarszewy[a], Sztum
Warmian-Masurian (19)	Barczewo, Braniewo, Dąbrówno, Działdowo, Jeziorany, Kętrzyn, Kurzętnik, Lidzbark Warmiński[b], Lubawa, Miłakowo, Morąg, Nidzica, Olsztyn, Olsztynek, Orneta, Ostróda, Pasłęk, Pieniężno, Reszel
Total number	37

[a] The castle was built by the Knights of the Order of St John of Jerusalem and eventually sold the Teutonic Order.

[b] The castle complex in Lidzbark Warmiński consists of the bishop's castles, the palace of bishop Grabowski, two administrative wings and elements of fortifications (keep and bastion).

Source: own study on the basis of: conservation programmes (Pomeranian for 2011–2014, Warmian-Masurian for 2012–2015 and Kuyavian-Pomeranian for 2013–2016), registers of historical monuments for Pomeranian, Kuyavian-Pomeranian, West Pomeranian and Warmian-Masurian provinces (as of 31.03.2015).

Fig. 4. Medieval castles in small towns of the former State of the Teutonic Order entered in the provincial registers of historic sites
Source: author's own elaboration

A large number of castles survived as ruins. The Teutonic one in Radzyń Chełmiński is especially valuable. Many fortified structures can also be found in cities founded in modern times, such as Ełk, Giżycko, Ryn, Węgorzewo and others, as well as in the countryside.

4.4. City walls and defence equipment

City fortification is another important feature of the cities in the Teutonic State. Even small and very small towns, such as medieval Olsztynek (Sikorski 1999) and many other towns, had such fortification. As was the case with castles, cities were initially surrounded with wood and earth fortifications, and moats. Later masonry installations were most often made of bricks on stone foundations.

City walls, turrets, towers and gates ceased to serve their original functions in the 17th and 18th centuries (Bogdanowski 2002). In the 19th century, a great majority of them were demolished (Wysocki 2009). The ones saved from demolition were usually adapted to serve a residential function. Some towns were open and did not have any fortifications (such as the Nowy Staw on Żuławy located by the Malbork stronghold). The number of fragments of walls, defences and defence complexes listed in the register of monuments is 47 (Tab. 4 and Fig. 5).

Table 4. Number of city fortifications and defence equipment in small towns of the former State of the Teutonic Knights entered in the provincial registers of historic sites

Province	City walls, defence equipment and defence complexes
Kuyavian-Pomeranian (8)	Brodnica (1 complex), Chełmno (1 complex), Golub, Grudziądz (1 complex), Kowalewo Pomorskie, Nowe, Świecie, Tuchola
Pomeranian (9)	Chojnice (1 complex), Debrzno, Gniew, Kwidzyn, Malbork (1 complex), Prabuty (1 complex), Skarszewy, Starogard Gdański (1 complex), Tczew
Warmian-Masurian (30)	Barczewo, Bartoszyce, Biskupiec Pomorski, Bisztynek, Braniewo (1 complex), Dąbrówno (1 complex), Dobre Miasto (1 complex), Frombork (1 complex)[a], Górowo Iławeckie, Iława, Jeziorany, Lidzbark Warmiński (1 complex), Lubawa (1 complex), Miłakowo, Miłomłyn, Morąg, Nidzica, Nowe Miasto Lubawskie (1 complex), Olsztyn (1 complex), Olsztynek, Ostróda, Pasłęk, Pasym, Pieniężno, Reszel, Sępopol (1 complex), Susz, Tolkmicko, Zalewo (1 complex)
Total number	47

[a] City walls are listed as one main entry consisting of 9 elements.

Source: own study on the basis of: conservation programmes (Pomeranian for 2011–2014, Warmian-Masurian for 2012–2015 and Kuyavian-Pomeranian for 2013–2016), registers of historical monuments for Pomeranian, Kuyavian-Pomeranian, West Pomeranian and Warmian-Masurian provinces (as of 31.03.2015).



Fig. 5. Medieval fortifications and defence equipment in small towns of the former State of the Teutonic Knights entered in the provincial registers of historic sites
Source: author's own elaboration

The most complete circumference of defensive walls in the cities under analysis, with 90% of it saved, can be found in Pasłęk (Conservation programme for Warmian-Masurian province... 2011, p. 33). Significant fragments of walls were also preserved in Kowalewo Pomorskie, Nowe, Świecie, Dobre Miasto, Morąg and Reszel.

The most visually stunning parts of city fortifications were undoubtedly the gate buildings. City gates constructed in the era of dominance of gates and turrets were the most sensitive and open to attacks in the defensive ring. Therefore, they were strongly fortified. City gates were preserved in Człuchów, Chojnice, Debrzno, Gniew, Kwidzyn, Lębork, Malbork, Puck, Skarszewy and Tczew in the Pomeranian province, Brodnica and Grudziądz in Kuyavian--Pomeranian province, and in Bartoszyce, Bisztynek, Lidzbark Warmiński, Lubawa, Nidzica, Nowe Miasto Lubawskie, Olsztyn, Olsztynek and Pasłęk in the Warmian-Masurian province.

4.5. Other objects

Public use buildings are equally interesting, though far less of them remained to modern times. We can include town halls in this group. They were mostly located in the centres of medieval markets or along main communication routes when there was no typical market square. Medieval town halls or their fragments were preserved in Chojnice, Kościerzyna, Lębork, Malbork, Kwidzyn and Gniew in Pomeranian province, Brodnica in the Kuyavian-Pomeranian province, Barczewo, Górowo Iławeckie, Morąg, Orneta, Olsztyn and Pasłęk in the Warmian-Masurian province. Public buildings also included the so-called Latin school (currently a modern building sits on the Gothic foundations) in Malbork and the hospital of the Holy Spirit (listed as a hospital complex). Other interesting medieval monuments include residential burgher buildings. Only fragments survived, mainly foundations and cellar ceilings (e.g. in Chełm, Nowe Miasto Lubawskie, Orneta, Reszel or Sępopol). Urban plot divisions were preserved more frequently. One of the most interesting market square building complexes can now be seen in Gniew. It consists of a row of 8 tenements from the 14th and 15th centuries located in the western frontage. These are the so--called 'Gniew leby'. Monuments of technology are another group of interesting medieval remains. The area of study includes seven granaries with Gothic elements in Grudziądz, the former salt granary (currently a Pentecostal church) in Lębork, the upper mill in Malbork with 15th-century elements, relics of the castle mill in Olsztyn or the remains of watermill in Młynary. Interesting monuments of medieval technology can also be found in Reszel, where two

Gothic bridges and a system of channels and waterworks is listed in a register of immovable monuments. In Frombork, a water channel dating back to the 15th century is also listed. Other objects from the period include the 'old' presbytery in Chojnice, as well as the former presbytery, and now a residential house, in Olsztynek or the so-called 'Klasztorek' in Nidzica.

5. CONCLUSION

Over the centuries, Prussian cities have undergone physiognomic and morphological changes. Their contemporary shape and preserved heritage are the result of natural, evolutionary development of cities, as well as revolutionary events, such as fires or war. 17th century was an important era for medieval monuments in Prussian cities. It was then that the demolition started on medieval fortifications, ordered by Prussian authorities and continuing into the 19th or even 20th centuries. 19th century brought dynamic industrial development, expansion of the railway network, as well as a hike in population due to the agrarian reform, which also influenced the morphology of settlement units. The First World War destruction, especially severe in Masuria, were another important factor which influenced the spatial arrangement of the centres of towns of the former monastic state (Salm 2006). The reconstruction of Eastern-Prussian towns was conducted on a grand scale and often involved planned regulation of streets and plots, which in many cases erased the elements of medieval arrangement. The Second World War was particularly tragic for Prussian cities (Lewandowska 2012), as the west-bound front line almost levelled a number of historic city centres. The post-war period was not a very good time for the destroyed cities in the Recovered Territories either. In the first period, a significant portion of construction materials was moved to Gdańsk and Warsaw in order to accelerate the reconstruction of these important cities. In subsequent years, the modernisation of transportation routes and, above all, the construction of multi-family buildings in the historic centres caused irreparable transformations in the landscape.

One very visible example of such reconstruction can now be seen in Malbork, where the magnificent castle complex is now located next to a housing estate on the Nogat embankment. The image of urban landscape transformations in the former monastic state is also shaped by modern architectural and planning endeavours. They are not always thoughtful and harmoniously blended with the surrounding. Despite these negative factors, the number of historic urban arrangements and architecture can be considered significant. These include both

international-level structures such as the Malbork castle listed by UNESCO, the Frombork cathedral considered as an medieval gem, or the 'Wawel of the north' – bishop's castle in Lidzbark Warmiński, but also lower-rank structures such as the Orneta town hall, fragments of fortifications in Kowalewo Pomorskie, the spatial arrangement of Górowo Iławeckie or the remains of the Radzyń Chełmiński castle. Numerous initiatives involving the restoration and revitalisation of historic centres in the region give us hope for the continuous improvement of the technical condition and a new life for historic monuments and areas. They apply to both large cities, such as Elbląg, and smaller ones of a couple thousand inhabitants, as is the case with Nowy Staw in Malbork district[12].



Fig. 6. Total number of medieval architectural monuments and complexes in small towns of the former State of the Teutonic Knights entered in the provincial registers of historic sites
Source: author's own elaboration

Today, the medieval heritage that survived to our times (Fig. 6) may be perceived in two ways – as a hindrance to local development and an onerous duty, or as an economic, social and cultural potential. In recent years, we have witnessed many processes of functional and ownership changes related to the technical condition of monuments. And we, the citizens, can also help decide what direction the transformations will go. This is why discussing the themes of cultural heritage of cities is so important.

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