UNIVERSITY OF WARSAW
Institute of Space Economy

REGIONAL and LOCAL STUDIES

DEVELOPPMENT LOCAL EN L'EUROPE. L'EXPERIENCE ET L'AVENIR

•

LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN EUROPE. EXPERIENCES AND PROSPECTS

5

REGIONAL and LOCAL STUDIES

5

UNIVERSITY OF WARSAW
Faculty of Geography and Regional Studies
INSTITUTE OF SPACE ECONOMY

DEVELOPPMENT LOCAL EN L'EUROPE. L'EXPERIENCE ET L'AVENIR

LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN EUROPE. EXPERIENCES AND PROSPECTS

Editors:
ANTONI KUKLIŃSKI
BOHDAN JAŁOWIECKI

WARSAW 1990

Editors of the Series:

Antoni Kukliński
Bohdan Jałowiecki
Mirosław Grochowski
Paweł Swianiewicz

ISBN 83-900056-8-9

Address: Warsaw Uniwersity
Faculty of Geography and Regional Studies
Institute of Space Economy
Krakowskie Przedmieście 30, 00-927 Warszawa
Tel. 200-381 ext. 643, 748

CONTENTS

Bohdan Jałowiecki
AVANT-PROPOS 7

Remigio Ratti
CENTRALISATION - DECENTRALISATION: UNE TENSION PERMANENTE ENTRE REVOLUTIONS JACOBINES ET REFORMISME GIRONDIN 17

Antoni Kukliński
POLAND - THE DIFFICULT STAGE OF TRANSFORMATION 33

Kazimierz Z. Sowa
POLISH CRISIS AND POLISH REFORM IN CENTRAL AND LOCAL DIMENSION. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DILEMMAS OF POSTCOMMUNIST COUNTRY 41

Zbyszko Chojnicki
THE ANATOMY OF THE CRISIS OF THE POLISH ECONOMY 55

Bogdan Kacprzyński
STATE INTERVENTIONISM VS. THE POLICY OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENTS IN A PERIOD OF TRANSITION RELATED TO RESTRUCTURING 89

Jean-Philippe Leresche et Martin Schuler
LE RENOUVAU DU "LOCAL" ET SES LIENS AVEC LA "QUESTION REGIONALE": QUELQUES REFLEXIONS 107

Zdravko Mlinar
AUTONOMIE ET SOCIALISATION DANS L'ESPACE: QU'AVONS-NOUS APPRIS? 123

Bogdan Kacprzyński
GLOBALITY-LOCALITY RELATION
IN THE CASE OF WIELKOPOLSKA (GREAT POLAND) 151

Dominique Joye et Martin Schuler
LE LOCAL, UNE GRILLE D'ANALYSE? 179

Dominique Joye et Martin Schuler
DEVELOPPEMENT ET GOUVERNEMENT "LOCAL"
OU L'IMPORTANCE DES LIEUX **191**

Gertjan Dijkink
SHIFTING VALUES IN LOCAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY **203**

Antoni Kukliński
LOCAL POLAND - PRIORITIES OF RESEARCH
AT THE TURN OF THE XX AND XXI CENTURY **211**

Antoni Kukliński
LOCAL DEVELOPMENT - EXPERIENCES AND PROSPECTS **221**

Grzegorz Gorzelak
GENERAL IMPLICATIONS
OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM IN POLAND **241**

Grzegorz Gorzelak, Krzysztof Mularczyk
NEW LOCAL GOVERNMENT LEGISLATION IN POLAND **255**

Paweł Swianiewicz
LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN POLAND. THE TRANSITION FROM THE REAL-SOCIALISM MODEL TO THE LOCAL DEMOCRACY **277**

Bohdan Jałowiecki
LES ELITES LOCALES, OU LE DEPART POUR LA DEMOCRATIE **303**

Bohdan Jałowiecki
LA NAISSANCE DE LA DEMOCRATIE DANS LA POLOGNE LOCALE **325**

Janusz Hryniewicz
DIFFERENTIATION OF SOCIAL-POLITICAL ATTITUDES
DEPENDING ON THE PLACE OF RESIDENCE **341**

Anna Turska
CREATIVE AND DESTRUCTIVE FACTORS
IN THE ACTIVITY OF LOCAL COMMUNITIES **365**

Krzysztof Herbst
POLISH WAY TOWARDS EUROPE AND WESTERN AID **379**

Gabor Szabo
THE HUNGARIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM IN TRANSITION **397**

Francis Seydoux
BULLE. DEVELOPPEMENT ECONOMIQUE ET IDENTITE CULTURELLE **403**

Antoni Kukliński
WHAT HAS HAPPENED IN EUROPE IN 1989 AND 1990 **411**

Antoni Kukliński
NEW EUROPE - GEOGRAPHY OF NEW EUROPE - RESEARCH PRIORITIES **419**

Roger Bivand
BERGEN VIEWS ON A GEOGRAPHY OF THE NEW EUROPE **425**

Zdenka Vajdová
LOCAL COMMUNITIES BEFORE THE FIRST DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA **429**

Antoni Kukliński
THE DIAMOND **431**

AVANT-PROPOS

Dans les années 1985-1990, l'Institut de l'Economie Spatiale près l'Université de Varsovie réalisa un vaste programme d'études sur le développement régional et local, intitulé "Développement régional. Développement local. Autonomie territoriale", auquel collaborèrent quelque 200 chercheurs de plus d'une dizaine de centres scientifiques. Les résultats de ces travaux furent publiés dans 46 tomes, dont 31 dans la propre série d'édition de l'Institut. Outre les publications en langue polonaise, il fut publié 6 tomes en français et anglais afin de propager les résultats des études à l'étranger également. Le tome actuellement présenté est la septième publication en langues étrangères du Programme.

Au cours de la réalisation du Programme, on s'était efforcé non seulement de diffuser les résultats des études à l'étranger, mais aussi de développer la coopération internationale avec des centres scientifiques de nombre de pays, en organisant entre autres de nombreux symposiums en Pologne comme à l'étranger.

Le tome présenté sous le titre *Développement local en Europe. L'expérience et l'avenir* est justement l'un des exemples de cette coopération internationale et constitue la continuation de la discussion amorcée à Lausanne, en 1988, au cours du colloque organisé en collaboration avec la Commission Nationale Suisse pour l'UNESCO. Les matériaux de ce colloque ont été publié en Suisse en 1989.[1]

La problématique du développement local est à la mode dans les sciences sociales dès le milieu des années 70. Cela était lié aux phénomènes crisiques qui avaient alors fait leur apparition dans de nom-

breux pays, soit à l'échelle globale. Dans cette situation, il était naturel que l'on cherchât de nouvelles voies de développement, ausssi avait-on remarqué les possibilités – inutilisées, semblait-il – résidant dans les systèmes locaux et dans les communautés locales. La nature du problème est bien rendue par la sentence: *penser global, agir local.* Mais que signifie agir local de nos jours? C'est à cette question qu'essaient de répondre, depuis une quinzaine d'années, les chercheurs chargés de la problématique locale. Ils décrivent et analysent diverses situations sociales existant à la micro-échelle d'une village, d'une petite ville, d'un quartier, d'un quartier de grande ville, etc., à la recherche des facteurs de la dynamique locale favorable aux processus généraux d'évolution.

Bernard Ganne demande: "Comment aujourd'hui ne pas parler "local"? De quel côté que l'on se tourne, en recherche comme en politique, dans le domaine rural comme au niveau urbain, au travers de l'économique comme du culturel, en histoire, en sociologie, voire en anthropologie, tout désigne le local comme la nouvelle évidence, le nouveau champ qui s'impose. Le local nous envahit".[2]

D'autre part W. Giełżyński écrit: "Le local est à la mode. Au moins plus d'une dizaine de circonstances importantes animent l'intérêt porté à cette problématique (y compris la décentralisation, l'autonomie locale, les initiatives communautaires). On l'examine tant au point de vue des impératifs et des barrières du développement socio-économique qu'au point de vue du contexte de l'existence humaine".[3]

L'intérêt croissant porté à cette problématique, dont les débuts – comme déjà évoqué – remontent au milieu des années 70, non seulement ne faiblit pas, mais encore gagne de nouveaux pays, tant industrialisés que sous-d'eveloppés.

On se demande aussi si la renaissance du local sera un facteur réel de développement, ou si l'on n'a affaire – comme certains le veulent – qu'à une mode passagère, occasionnée par la crise économique et sociale que l'on peut observer à l'échelle globale depuis une quinzaine d'années. Dès que les sociètes respectives et l'économie mondiale retrouveront leur ancienne dynamique de développement, l'intérêt porté à la problématique locale et la crise disparaîtront.

Le mot crise comme le mot local sont aujourd'hui à la mode et tout le monde en parle. La crise touche de multiples domaines du quotidien. Nous avons donc la crise de l'économie, la crise de l'énergie, la crise des villes, la crise de la religion, la crise de l'école, la crise du service de santé, la

crise de la famille, la crise de l'art, etc., etc. Sans trop exagérer, on peut affirmer qu'il n'y a aucune sphère du réel qui ne serait touchée par la crise. Si tout est en crise et si elle est omniprésente, la notion même de crise devient peu utile en tant qu'instrument d'analyse du réel. Cette notion est cependant non seulement employée constamment dans les travaux des scientifiques, qui s'efforcent d'éclaircir une réalité de moins en moins transparente, mais est devenue partie intégrant de la conscience courante. Malgré une étendue très indéterminée de cette notion, elle n'en est pas moins réelle, car les phénomènes qu'elle désigne sont des faits économiques et sociaux; ces phénomènes sont fortement enracinés, par ailleurs, dans la conscience collective où les faits se confondent avec des interprétations mythifiées, des convictions courantes et des représentations stéréotypées. Ces convictions deviennent elles aussi des faits sociaux avec lesquels doivent compter les corporations industrielles, les organisations bureaucratiques et les structures du pouvoir.

Le mot crise nous décrit donc aussi bien des phénomènes objectifs, que l'on peut mesurer avec une exactitude plus ou moins grande, que l'état de conscience d'individus engagés dans des processus sociaux dont le sens est de plus en plus confus. On se demande à ce propos pourquoi la réalité qui nous entoure devient de plus en plus difficile non seulement à être comprise, mais aussi à être observée tout simplement. C'est indéniablement l'un des plus grands paradoxes du XXe siècle. En effet, d'une part l'humanité dispose du plus parfait des systèmes d'information ayant jamais existés et du plus grand potentiel scientifique de tous les temps, de l'autre – par contre – la possibilité d'interprétation et de compréhension des différents phénomènes intervenant dans le monde ne semble pas être plus grande qu'auparavant, sans parler de la gestion des processus économiques et sociaux, régis par des forces incontrôlées dont la nature est de nouveau inconnue.

Il vaut la peine de rapporter ici une brève citation du livre d'Edgar Morin *Pour sortir du XXe siècle*:

"A un premier regard, la crise se manifeste non seulement comme fracture dans un continuum, perturbation dans un système jusqu'alors apparemment stable, mais aussi comme accroissement des aléas donc des incertitudes. Elle se manifeste par la transformation des complémentarités en antagonismes, le développement rapide des déviances en tendances, l'accélération de processus déstructurant/désintégrant (feed-back positifs), la rupture des régulations, le déferlement donc de processus incontrôlés

tendant à s'auto-amplifier d'eux-mêmes ou à se heurter violemment à d'autres processus antagonistes eux-mêmes incontrôlés.

Or, nous ne sommes pas seulement dans une société où une crise culturelle a surgi (acmé 1968), où une nouvelle crise économique s'étend, sous l'effet de causes exogènes (renchérissement du pétrole) qui réveillent les causes endogènes latentes dans nos sociétés. Nous sommes dans un devenir où la crise nous apparaît, non comme un accident dans nos sociétés, mais comme leur mode d'être (...), et je dis ici sous une formulation qui n'est pas mienne, mais d'Antonio Negri: "La crise n'est pas le contraire du développement, mais sa forme même".[4]

Zygmunt Bauman, comme d'ailleurs d'autres auteurs, s'interrogeant sur l'essence des transformations contemporaines, constate que notre civilisation entre dans une période de *postmodernisme*, qui se distingue par un accroissement du relativisme et du pluralisme, ainsi que par une opacité croissante du réel. A ces trois traits caractéristiques de la charnière du XXe et du XXIe siècle, on doit ajouter le retour au local.

Beaucoup de personnes s'interrogent: que s'est-il passé au juste? Il n'y a pas si longtemps de cela, une vingtaine d'années plus tôt, le développement semblait être pourtant un processus irrêversible. Dans les pays capitalistes industrialisés, le revenu national ne cessait de croître systématiquement, le bien-être des sociétés augmentait, l'avenir semblait être certain et plein d'optimisme. Les pays du Tiers Monde vivaient encore dans l'euphorie de l'indépendance recouvrée, et leur, considéré comme l'héritage du colonialisme, semblait être facile à surmonter en un laps de temps relativement court; dans les pays dits socialistes, par contre, régnait une satisfaction nullement troublée des réalisations actuelles. La crise signifie évidemment l'apparition de facteurs de modération, qui ne sont cependant pas toujours faciles à découvrir et à identifier avec précision. La *machine*, qui fonctionnait bien jusqu'à présent, commence à se détraquer et nul ne sait vraiment ce qui lui est arrivé et comment on peut la réparer à peu de frais. Dans cette situation, on voit donc émerger diverses conceptions et idées proposant les changements les plus variés dans le domaine économique, politique et social. Ces vues rassemblent un nombre de partisans plus ou moins grand et, succombant ensuite à une verbalisation encore plus poussée, axée sur des intérêts déterminés, se transforment en idéologies de mouvements plus ou moins importants. Ce schéma nous est bien connu de l'histoire, qui montre quelles actions, dans une situation de crise donnée, avaient été entreprises pour renverser le cours défavorable

des événements. Bien entendu, une leçon d'histoire, bien que parfois très utile, est souvent rebâchée sans trop de résultats. Les théories sociologiques du développement, bien qu'elles puissent être utiles à l'explication des processus sociaux, ne fournissent pas non plus, voire ne sont pas en mesure de fournir des recettes toutes prêtes pouvant servir à résoudre des problèmes sociaux bien déterminés.

Si l'on essaie de trouver une explication à la prise de conscience de plus en plus répandue de la crise, il faudrait la chercher non seulement dans les indices de croissance du revenu national de plus en plus petits dans des pays variés, non seulement dans les descriptions de problèmes de plus en plus difficiles à résoudre, dont les plus dramatiques sont la famine dans de vastes territoires du globe terrestre et les conflits armés éclatant constamment à divers endroits, mais aussi dans le domaine de la conscience collective. On a évoqué ci-dessus qu'il existe comme une contradiction entre l'opacité croissante du réel et l'ensemble croissant d'informations sur le monde qui nous environne. Peut-être bien que ce paradoxe n'est qu'apparent, et que c'est justement dans cette énorme vague d'informations affluantes qu'il faut rechercher les difficultés à décrire et à comprendre le monde, car il n'est pas encore possible de mettre en ordre ces connaissances d'une manière appropriée, d'élaborer une théorie adéquate et ensuite d'éclairer ce qui se passe au juste. Sans aucun doute, le phénomène d'évasion du réel vers le privé et vers le local, qui est observé depuis un certain temps, est justement provoqué par l'opacité de la réalité.

Est-ce que l'intérêt porté à la problématique locale n'est donc qu'une mode passagère issue de la crise, ou est-il une chance de développement *à partir de la base*, qui utilise les possibilités résidant dans les initiatives individuelles et dans l'effort commun de petits groupes sociaux? L'intérêt porté au local découle de la recherche de voies nouvelles, quoiqu'il comporte sans doute aussi une certaine dose de mode. A un certain moment, à peu près vers le milieu des années 70, commencèront à faire leur apparition en nombre croissant des études sur les structures locales dans lesquelles il était fait état de phénomènes restés inaperçus auparavant. Nombreux étaient les chercheurs qui découvraient avec étonnement que, sous la couche des phénomènes et processus globaux, des grandes structures économiques ayant un caractère supranational, de l'omnipotence de l'Etat-providence et de la société de masse, il existe de nouveaux phénomènes et tendances allant pour ainsi dire à la rencontre des processus de développement des dernières décennies. Les découvertes de ces études sont la

debrouillardise, l'économie informelle, la culture et les moyens de communications non officiels, mais surtout les nouvelles attitudes et les nouveaux comportements sociaux.[5] Mais pas seulement cela, car on a remarqué également qu'il existe toujours des communautés locales qui conservent leur caractère distinctif et ne se confondent pas avec la société de masse, alors qu'il n'y a pas si longtemps encore certains sociologues clamaient le déclin des communautés locales en général. On a également constaté l'existence de traditions locales qui n'ont pas succombé à la pression de la culture de masse, ainsi qu'un degré important de sentiment d'appartenance et d'identification locale. La mode des études a révélé, comme le constate Antoni Kukliński, un *potentiel endormi*, susceptible d'être utilisé pour l'animation du développement dépérissant. Il semble que le local devient actuellement non seulement une mode, pas seulement une chance de développement, mais encore une sorte de point de vue, partagé à travers le monde par un nombre de plus en plus considérable non seulement de simples citoyens, mais aussi d'industriels, de managers et de politiques.

Les phénomènes et processus observés à l'échelle globale et à l'échelle locale s'entremêlent étroitement et se conditionnent réciproquement. Il est évident, que la guerre menée au Proche-Orient, le tremblement de terre en Arménie et d'autres phénomènes de ce genre non seulement ne se répercutent pas avec éclat à travers le monde entier, mais encore influent sur l'existence de gens habitant à des milliers de kilomètres des endroits où se déroulent ces événements. D'autre part, cependant, le travail patient de millions de paysans habitant des villges lointains, les innovations apparemment pas très grandes et l'activité quotidienne des membres des communautés locales se reflètent également, bien que d'une manière moins spectaculaire, dans le déroulement des processus globaux. On ne peut donc pas opposer le local au global. Ce sont les deux faces, les deux perspectives du même monde.[6]

Le développement local se rattache également à un autre phénomène: la désintégration des régimes communistes autoritaires de l'Europe du Centre-Est. L'édification des fondements de la démocratie, la décentralisation des structures étatiques et la formation du pouvoir local autonome placant cette problématique au beau milieu des centres d'intérêts non seulement des chercheurs mais aussi des politiques et des administrateurs gestionnaires. Dans ce contexte, la connaissance des solutions

mise en oeuvre dans ls démocraties occidentales et l'échange d'expérience sont choses importantes.

La fin de l'ordre de Yalta, la réunification de l'Allemagne, le *retour* à l'Europe de la Pologne, de la Tchécoslovaquie, de la Hongrie et d'autres Etats postcommunistes signifie l'établissement d'une nouvelle géographie de l'Europe, donc la nécessité d'un regard nouveau sur les problèmes se rapportant au développement régional et local à l'échelle supranationale.

Dans le tome présent sont publiés des articles décrivant les résultats des études faisant état des expériences et réflexions actuelles sur l'avenir du développement local. De la manière la plus large sont présentés des exemples suisses et polonais. La Suisse est particulièrement intéressante de notre point de vue en raison de son expérience séculaire en matière de démocratie locale et de développement local. D'autre part les études polonais peuvent également être intéressantes, car on peut à leur exemple suivre le processus de transition du système autoritaire à la démocratie.

Le Programme d'études locales en Pologne a été réalisé dans une période de changements politiques, économiques et sociaux de grande ampleur, qui furent soumis à une accélération considérable au printemps 1989. A l'issue des débats de la *table ronde*, des élections de juin et de la formation du premier gouvernement non communiste d'après-guerre, la scène politique polonaise a changé d'une manière fondamentale. La Pologne est déjà un autre pays, le socialisme réel s'achève, le processus de sortie du système totalitaire est en train de se dérouler. Cette forte précipitation des processus des changements dans la macrostructure politique se répercute toutefois dans la Pologne régionale et locale. Elle se répercute cependant avec une force variée. Il existe des communautés et des structures locales dans lesquelles ces changements interviennent à une allure plus rapide, mais il en est aussi dont le conservatisme et le marasme ne permettent pas de libérer le *potentiel endormi* qui y réside peut-être.

La grande diversification de la Pologne régionale et locale fait que les processus des changements économiques et sociaux se dérouleront inégalement. Certaines régions deviendront bientôt des pôles de développement, alors que d'autres seront en stagnation ou s'enfonceront dans le retard. Il en sera de même dans le cas des structures locales. Il existe des structures qui dénotent déjà aujourd'hui une grande dynamique intérieure et une forte activité sociale en faveur de l'amélioration de leur propre sort,

mais il en est cependant aussi, et ce beaucoup plus, qui attendent que quelqu'un vienne de l'extérieur et améliore leur sort.

Le principal élément de la structure sociale des communautés locales sont les groupes fondés sur la fammille et la camaraderie, qui façonnent dans une grande mesure les comportements de leurs membres. Ces attitudes sont caractérisées grandement par des névroses accentuées, par un accroissement de l'agressivité potentielle, par de l'opportunisme, par la tendance à respecter tout d'abord les normes de groupe. Elles se distinguent aussi par un égalitarisme envieux, par des attitudes autoritaires et des orientations revendicatives. Les attitudes décrites ci-dessus s'amplifient dès que l'on passe des communautés urbaines aux communautés locales. Ainsi, nous avons affaire, grosso modo, à une division en Pologne urbaine et en Pologne locale.

Une autre grande division, déjà richement documentée d'ailleurs par d'autres études, y compris des études réalisées plus tôt, est limitée par les frontières des Etats ayant occupé la Pologne jusqu'en 1918, ainsi que partiellement par la frontière occidentale d'avant la Seconde Guerre mondiale. La Pologne se compose de quatre territoires visiblement différents, correspondant en gros aux anciennes zones d'occupation prussienne, autrichienne et russe et aux terres obtenues après la guerre. Chacun de ces territoires a un *profil* social et économmique différent. Ces disparités sont confirmées par de nombreux ouvrages, par exemple par les études sur la situation socio-économique et financière des communes, sur la stratégie du pouvoir local, sur les préférences politiques dévoilées lors des élections de juin 1989, etc. En caractérisant très brièvement cette situation, on peut dire que ls attitudes novatrices/créatrices sont plutôt le fait des communautés locales situées en Grande Pologne, en Poméranie et dans l'ancienne Galicie, tandis que les attitudes conservatrices sont plus répandues dans les territoires occidentaux recouvrés et dans l'ancien Royaume du Congrès. Les attitudes du premmier type sont aussi plus fréquentes dans les communautés locales situées en bordure des grandes agglomérations urbaines.

La grande part de minorités nationales ou ethniques est un facteur de dynamisation des communautés locales, ce qui est confirmé par les études effectuées dans la commune de Punsk, habitée par des Lituaniens, ainsi qu'en Cachoubie.

Les études du Programme ont également confirmé que les communautés locales ont une grande faculté de mobilisation sociale

lorsque les intérêts de groupe sont en danger, sont plutôt enclines à agir contre quelqu'un ou contre quelque chose qu'en faveur de quelqu'un ou de quelque chose. En un mot, il est plus facile de les mobiliser pour des actions contestataires que pour des actions créatrices. Cela est démontré entre autres par nos études sur les mouvements sociaux locaux.

Les études consacrées au pouvoir local en place jusqu'à ces derniers temps montrent qu'il s'était doublement éloigné: de la classe politique qu'il servait et de la communauté locale dont il aurait dû représenter les intérêts. Cette double aliénation résultait entre autres de la solution fatale, mais bien pensée au point de vue des intérêts de l'Etat stalinien, introduite en 1950 et mettant en place le principe du *pouvoir étatique unitaire*. Le caractère dualiste du pouvoir, qui pratiquement était principalement l'émanation du pouvoir politique central sur le terrain, a provoqué une démoralisation très poussée non seulement du pouvoir lui-même, mais aussi des élites locales qui s'efforçaient de réaliser leurs propres intérêts au moyen de stratégies adaptatrices consistant à éluder la loi, voire à la violer.

Dans la plupart des cas, le pouvoir local agissait selon le principe spécifique du *flair*, en dehors de toutes régulations juridiques. Il en était ainsi, parce que le droit en vigueur était contradictoire non seulement à ses intérêts, mais aussi aux intérêts des communautés locales dans lesquelles il fonctionnait. Les stratégies adaptatrices consistaient également en un système de marchandages avec le pouvoir de l'échelon supérieur ou avec des entreprises d'Etat locales, ainsi que dans la mise à profit de tout un système de copinage et de prestations réciproques. Un tel fonctionnement des élites dirigeantes et d'influence locales faisait que la loi était chose inutile. Aussi les représentants du pouvoir communal ignoraient-ils tout simplement la loi qu'ils avaient pour devoir d'observer dans leur activité. La situation existante impliquait pour ainsi dire la mise en place d'un réseau très ramifié d'unions ayant souvent un caractère de maffia. Il sera difficiel de changer cette situation et de démonter le réseau actuel de liaisons dans les structures locales, et le temps nécessaire pour ce faire sera long.

L'étude de *l'économie noire* a démontré la grande étendue de ce phénomène, tant au point de vue des ménages que de celui des enteprises d'Etat. L'ingéniosité en matière de mise à profit de situations avantageuses, la connaissance des brèches dans le système de réglementation des comportements sociaux, un *esprit d'entreprise* spécifique et l'art de s'adapter aux conditions imposées, voilà des traits qui peuvent en imposer

dans toute l'acception du terme. Malheureusement, ces connaissances, qui minimisaient les insuffisances du socialisme réel, sont peu utiles dans les conditions nouvelles de la société normale, pour laquelle elles sont des indices de démoralisation et de pathologie sociale.

Quelques-uns des résultats des études sur la Pologne locale sont présentés dans le tome présent. Les expériences polonaises sont complétées par des exemples yougoslaves et hongrois, et l'image des pays de l'Europe du Centre-Est est confrontée – d'autre part – aux expériences propres à la Suisse et aux Pays-Bas. Il convient d'exprimer l'essoir que cette confrontation sera intéressante pour le Lecteur, tant en Europe occidentale que dans l'Europe de l'Est.

Bohdan Jałowiecki

Varsovie, septembre 1990

---

[1] Colloque européen sur La dynamique locale et sa gestion. Textes réunis et présentés par Michel Bassand et Laurent Bridel, Commission Nationale Suisse pour l'UNESCO, Berne, 1989.

[2] B. Ganne, *Du notable au local. Transformation d'un modèle politique*, Les Annales de la Recherche Urbaine, 28/1985.

[3] W. Giełżyński, *Lokalizm: samosprawdzająca się prognoza* (Le local: un pronostic autovérifiant), Państwo i Kultura Polityczna, t. 5, 1988.

[4] E. Morin, *Pour sortir du XXe siècle*, F. Nathan, Paris, 1981.

[5] Cf. le programme français d'observation des changements sociaux: L'Esprit des lieux. Localités et changement social en France, Edition du CNRS, Paris, 1986.

[6] A. Kukliński, *Globality versus Locality*, Varsovie, 1990.

Remigio Ratti
Professeur d'économie régionale et des transports
à l'Université de Fribourg;
Directeur "Istituto Ricerche Economiche", Bellinzona, SUISSE

CENTRALISATION - DECENTRALISATION: UNE TENSION PERMANENTE ENTRE REVOLUTIONS JACOBINES ET REFORMISME GIRONDIN

La célébration du bicentenaire de la Révolution française a provoqué, entre autres, un débat salutaire sur la dynamique et les processus de centralisation-décentralisation, de changements radicaux ou réformistes, qui ont marqué l'histoire des pays européens durant les deux derniers siècles[1]. En particulier, le débat entre Girondins et Jacobins évoque l'existence de moments forts, de changements brusques et radicaux ainsi que de processus moins éclatants mais pas moins performants. D'autre part, le processus de démocratisation de la société et le rapprochement de l'économie vers le système de marché, dans les pays d'Europe orientale, demandent, en prospective, un énorme effort intellectuel et pratique pour se donner de nouveaux moyens de gestion du pouvoir[2].

Chaque pays a bien sûr sa propre histoire et ses spécificités. Cependant, il nous a été utile, pour comprendre et expliquer, par exemple, le cas de la Suisse[3] et pour le comparer avec celui de la France, de trouver une clé de lecture ou modèle simplifié qui puisse permettre une certaine généralisation.

Dans cet exposé, nous voulons tout d'abord esquisser les éléments essentiels d'un modèle explicatif des tensions et du processus dynamique gérant la problématique centralisation-décentralisation. Ensuite, comme illustration, nous présenterons les caractéristiques du parcours girondin de la Suisse opposé à celui, plus centralisateur et jacobin, de la France. Il nous faudra comprendre la logique du système réformiste helvétique pour la

comparer au modèle des révolutions françaises, autrement dit, des changements brusques et parfois violents des structures économique, sociale et politique de la France.

1. UNE CLE DE LECTURE POUR EXPLIQUER LE JEU DES TENSIONS ENTRE CENTRALISATION ET DECENTRALISATION

Nous inspirant de l'analyse des systèmes, nous pouvons considérer un pays, un territoire institutionnellement défini, comme une entité ouverte et en interrelation avec l'extérieur. L'identité et la dynamique de développement du territoire en question dépendent de la capacité que possède ce dernier à gérer ses ouvertures tout en sauvegardant, à son intérieur, un degré suffisant de cohésion et en poursuivant la meilleure réalisation de ses objectifs.

En particulier, le système national se subdivise en trois sous-systèmes:
- les structures socio-culturelles,
- les structures économiques,
- les structures politico-administratives.

Chacun de ces sous-ensembles est évidemment relié aux deux autres, ainsi qu'aux systèmes et sous-systèmes extérieurs.

Chacun de ces sous-systèmes a sa propre finalité et peut, de manière autonome ou par l'influence des autres - situés à l'intérieur ou à l'extérieur du système national - avoir soit une tendance à la centralisation (politique), à la polarisation (économique), à l'uniformisation (socio-culturelle), soit une tendance à la décentralisation (politique), à la diffusion (économique), à la différenciation (socio-culturelle).

Figure No 1 Schéma des facteurs principaux régissant le rapport de forces "centralisation-décentralisation"



Ratti, R, IRE, 1990.

Schématiquement, les combinaisons envisageables sont alors au nombre de 8 (cf. graphe des combinaisons). Les deux cas extrêmes sont ceux dans lesquels les trois sous-systèmes tendent dans la même direction avec la même intensité. Dans tous les autres cas, les divergences de tendance de ces sous-systèmes créent des tensions que le système doit rèsoudre en trouvant un nouvel équilibre. Dans une situation comme dans l'autre, l'ensemble est fondamentalement dynamique et, selon les cas, il pourra donner lieu à des processus décentralisateurs ou centralisateurs.

ure No 2 Graphe de combinaisons envisageables pour les trois structures proposées



ESUF 1989.

Quelques exemples, tirés de l'expérience historique suisse, permette ›préhender le phénomène de manière plus concrète:

En 1830, la société helvétique comme son économie aspirent à plus ‹ libéralisme. Du côté politique, par contre, les structures sont celles ‹ l'Ancien Régime. Il y a donc une tension entre ces sous-systèmes, q est résolue par des réformes cantonales allant dans le sens de démocratie et du libéralisme.
Le milieu du XIXème siècle est, en Europe, une période de montée d nationalismes. La Suisse n'échappe pas à ce phénomène et la structu socio-culturelle est, malgré le Sonderbund, porter vers un certa

sentiment national. Du côté de l'économie, le besoin de créer un marché national s'explique par le développement de l'industrialisation. Résultat: la structure politico-administrative doit être modifiée en fonction de ces éléments. La Constitution de 1848, qui marque une centralisation certaine, répond à ces attentes.

- En 1937, c'est après une période de rapports sociaux relativement tendus et pour éviter un règlement par l'Etat, qui entendait désigner des tribunaux arbitraux étatiques et interdire les grèves, que travailleurs et patrons s'entendent pour établir, de manière consensuelle, la "Paix du travail". L'idée d'un arbitrage étatique est rejetée tant par les syndicats que par les patrons. Les partenaires sociaux entreprennent alors des négociations, qui aboutissent à la convention de 1937, valable d'abord pour deux ans, puis renouvelée tous les cinq ans.
- A la fin des années 1950 et, encore plus, au début des années 1970, les individus aimeraient voir se concrétiser leur droit à la différence, alors que l'économie se polarise spatialement autour des grandes villes et structurellement par l'intégration de firmes. Pour résoudre les tensions, le milieu politique répond en élaborant une politique de développement régional.

2. QUELQUES CARACTERISTIQUES MERGENTES DE L'HISTORIQUE DU LIEN CONFEDERAL

Tout d'abord, le système dynamique suisse trouve ses équilibres grâce aux *processus de réforme, de consensus.* Les modifications qui interviennent dans le système politique, lorsqu'elles ne sont pas imposées par l'extérieur, ne sont jamais brusques, ni violentes. Au contraire, elles sont le résultat d'un long processus de consultation entre les partenaires. Toutefois, le système ne doit pas être considéré comme fermé et autosuffisant; c'est de l'extérieur que viennent les chocs mettant en marche et "rajeunissant" le processus de consensus. Par exemple, la "République Helvétique" de 1798, l'Etat unitaire imposé par la France, s'est révélée être un échec total, que Napoléon devait reconnaître lors de sa médiation, en 1803: "la nature a fait votre Etat fédératif, vouloir la vaincre n'est pas d'un homme sage" (lettre du 19 frimaire, an XI). "Libérez-nous des libérateurs" s'écriaient, de leur côté, certains citoyens helvétiques qui n'étaient pourtant

pas hostiles aux idées de la Révolution. Cependant, il était inconcevable à ces derniers d'oublier l'autonomie locale à laquelle ils étaient attachés, ainsi que la démocratie politique, qu'ils pratiquaient depuis longtemps. La nouvelle histoire de la Suisse[4] dépasse la vision manichéiste. Les idées de la Révolution ou les mouvements libéraux jouèrent, d'une part, le rôle d'*accélérateur et de catalyseur* mais, d'autre part, ils ne firent qu'*accompagner* ou mettre en valeur les efforts de la bourgeoisie urbaine - industriels et commerçants - qui propagea les idées de l'illuminisme sans être pour autant révolutionnaire. Elle voulaît simplement donner une base légale à ce qui se faisait déjà.

Le fait, qui vient d'être mentionné, explique une autre caractéristique de la Suisse: les habitants de ce pays *n'aiment pas les hommes politiques du type "leader"*. En Suisse, du fait que le pays est moins une nation qu'une coalition de résistances, il n'est pas possible qu'un homme incarne le pays. Demandey à un Confédéré de vous nommer un chef d'Etat du pays: il y a fort à parler qu'il ne pourra pas citer de nom, pour la simple raison qu'il n'y a jamais eu de chef d'Etat en Suisse, comme il y en a eu en France. Si De Gaulle ou Mitterand étaient nés en Suisse, ils seraient peut-être devenus Conseillers fédéraux, mais, le Conseil fédéral étant un collège gouvernemental, ils n'auraient pas pu en devenir des figures aussi émergentes qu'ils le sont en France. D'ailleurs, le système militaire de milice, tel qu'il existe en Suisse, empêche également, en temps normal (seul le Général Guisan pourrait y avoir fait légèrement exception durant la deuxième guerre mondiale) que les élus ne deviennent des "gourous" de la politique. Certains diront alors que les Suisses n'aiment pas les hommes d'Etat trop brillants. Cela est peut-être vrai !

Ensuite, un autre élément doit être mis en relation avec le principe du réformisme helvétique: très souvent, *les arrangements privés ont précédé les lois*. Ainsi, des caisses-maladie et des fonds de pension ont été créés par certains patrons bien avant que cela ne devienne une obligation légale. Dans l'industrie, les conventions collectives ne sont faites sans contrainte légale. D'ailleurs, si les grèves sont exceptionnelles en Suisse, c'est grâce à l'accord dit de "Paix du travail", passé entre employeurs et syndicats en 1937, qui régit encore les relations de travail, sans l'appareil législatif de l'Etat. Un autre exemple qui doit être mentionné est celui de la convention de diligence qui règle certains comportements en milieu bancaire.

De plus, les cantons qui, avant la révolution industrielle, étaient à

régime corporatif sont ceux pour lesquels la tendance était le monopole économique (à l'inverse de la diffusion) et c'est cette structure économique qui pesait de tout son poids lors des éventuelles tensions avec les deux autres structures. Les cantons aristocratiques, par contre, sont ceux pour lesquels la structure politico-administrative tendait invariablement vers la centralisation. C'est elle qui était déterminante lorsque les tension devaient être résolues. Or, les anciens cantons à corporation sont ceux qui, pour la plupart, sont devenus libéraux après la révolution industrielle et les anciens cantons aristocrates sont devenus en majorité consevateurs. On l'a vu dans la première partie, surtout dès 1830, les libéraux demandaient une certaine centralisation politique au niveau national, alors que les conservateurs la refusaient absolument. Il est dès lors intéressant de constater que, selon l'époque et l'échelle scalaire, les caractéristiques des groupes en présence peuvent varier amplement;

Finalement, il faut bien admettre que *le fédéralisme était, et est encore, la seule voie possible pour la Suisse.* On l'a dit, les cantons se sont groupés, non par un idéal de Suisse fraternelle et pacifique mais pour échapper à la tutelle de "maîtres" extérieurs. Le lien fédéral a été noué pour des raisons de sécurité de vivre en commun. Les différences, les divergences de vue, qui existent entre les cantons, font que ceux-ci n'auraient pas pu accepter un pouvoir supracantonal contraignant. La Suisse n'a pas eu le choix entre fédéralisme et centralisation. Le premier terme de l'alternative s'est imposé, parce que les solutions centralisatrices étaient impraticables. C'est ce qui nous permet d'affirmer que, pour la Suisse, la controverse entre Girondins et Jacobins est un faux débat, parce que le fédéralisme est à la fois la condition et la raison d'être du pays. A cet égard, la comparaison de la Suisse avec la CEE est intéressante. Comme les cantons suisses, les pays de l'Europe des Douze sont très hétéroclites et, du moins pour certains, ne sont pas prêts à concéder leur souveraineté à un pouvoir supranational. L'Europe des régions ne serait-elle pas alors le seul choix raisonnable?

Bien sûr, le fédéralisme, équilibre entre le besoin d'une autorité centrale et le désir d'autonomie des parties, a des avantages certains: il adoucit le statut des minorités, sauvegarde les diversités, vulgarise l'exercice du pouvoir, contribué à éviter les risques d'arbitraire. Mais, il ne faut pas cacher qu'il comporte des risques, dont certains existent aussi pour d'autres systèmes politiques: lenteurs, chevauchements, répétitions inutiles, actions contradictoires, difficulté de mener une politique globale.

3. Le système des révolutions françaises

Il n'est pas dans notre propos de refaire ici l'histoire de la France. Plus modestement, nous aimerions comparer le système helvétique avec ce que nous savons du système français.

La question peut être posée de la même manière. Trois structures nous intéressent particulièrement pour cette analyse:

- la société (structure socio-culturelle);
- l'économie (structure économique);
- la politique (structure politico-administrative).

Le problème qui se pose est celui de la dynamique du système, de la recherche du nouvel équilibre résolvant les tensions.

Les différences marquantes entre les systèmes suisse et fraçais sont les suivantes:

- le système français trouve ses équilibres à travers des *changements brusques, parfois violents*: la Révolution de 1789 - au départ, les députés avaient cru une réforme possible: n'avaient-ils pas crié "vive le roi" lors de l'ouverture des Etats généraux? -, la Terreur, l'Empire de Bonaparte, ..., la Vème République. Ces révolutions se caractérisent par une modification massive et rapide des préférences révélées par les individus - phénomène qui peut être expliqué par la différence entre les préférences exprimées publiquement et les celles politiques "privées" qui s'exprimaraient dans un scrutin à bulletin secret[5] - et elles conduisent à une transformation profonde de l'ordre social. Les changements de majorités parlementaires sont aussi l'occasion de procéder à des revirements brusques, coupant le suivi de la vie politique;
- ces révolutions, petites et grandes, ont à leur tête des chefs d'Etat, des élites bien définies, des majorités n'accordant pas de concession aux minorités;
- il est logique qu'une telle nation ne puisse pas s'accomoder des particularités régionales: *dans un Etat où la forme du régime est contestée*, comme la France du XIXème et du début du XXème siècle, la centralisation est une facilité dont aucun gouvernement n'ose se passer[6]. Au XIXème siècle, face à un doctrinaire comme Tocqueville, qui estimait que la centralisation étouffe les énergies créatrices du citoyen, républicains et bonapartistes répondent qu'elle est

nécessaire pour deux raisons: d'une part, elle est une condition de la modernisation du pays; d'autre part, elle a pour effet une libération du citoyen par l'Etat, face aux castes locales plus oppressantes qu'un pouvoir lointain[7]. Ce dernier argument est également soutenu par Durkheim en 1899. Cependant, surtout dès les années 1960, le courant décentralisateur reprend des forces en France, notamment grâce à des penseurs tels que Raymond Aron (qui fait revivre les idées de Tocqueville dans ses cours), Alain Peyrefitte ou Michel Crozier. Or, en même temps, la légitimité des institutions françaises n'est plus aussi contestée qu'elle le fut au XIXème siècle. La deuxième guerre mondiale a rendu incontestable la forme républicaine du régime. Comme le dit Krulic: "Le débat sur la décentralisation a connu aux dix-neuvième siècle son apogée intellectuelle mais sans résultat pratique à l'époque, car l'absence de consensus sur le régime et la modernisation semi-autoritaire favorisaient alors l'Etat centralisé. Le débat a repris dans les années 60, une fois assurés la relance économique et l'établissement d'un consensus plus large sur la forme du régime"[8];

- il est intéressant de constater que, pour la Suisse - comme, à un autre degré, pour la RFA ou l'Italie -, par contre, la régionalisation va de soi. Le problème est plutôt celui de trouver une identité nationale à cet ensemble quadrilingue. En France, c'est la centralisation jacobine qui est allée de soi et ce sont les réformes décentralisatrices qui posent problème: le rejet du projet de régionalisation (référendum du 27 avril 1969) décide De Gaulle à démissioner de la présidence; en 1981-82, ce n'est pas sans difficulté que les lois Defferre ont été acceptées. Les réformes ont d'ailleurs surtout profité aux départements, moins aux régions ou aux communes. Or, dans la perspective de 1993, des leaders politiques français de différentes tendances se sont exprimés pour la suppression de l'un des trois échelons des collectivités territoriales situés au-dessous de la nation (commune, département, région). Parfois explicitement, d'autres fois implicitement, ils ont émis l'idée de diminuer, voire supprimer, les compétences du département, au profit des régions, qui devraient d'ailleurs elles-mêmes être redéfinies[9];
- il convient, en outre, de préciser qu'il est important de distinguer le fédéralisme de la décentralisation. Les accords fédéraux sont, certes, une manière de décentraliser un régime politique[10] mais une grande part de la décentralisation peut n'avoir aucun rapport avec la formation

et la structure d'entités nouvelles. Elle ne ferait qu'attribuer certaines fonctions, pour des raisons de commodité gouvernementales, à des entités territorialement dispersées, alors que, dans les systèmes fédéraux, les éléments constituants possèdent une représentation distincte et efficace pour participer à la législation et à l'élaboration de la politique de l'Etat et une représentation pour l'amendement de la charte constitutionnelle[11].

il faut, enfin, bien répéter ce qui a déjà souvent été dit lors de la commémoration du bicentenaire de la Révolution française, à savoir que, pendant que la France accomplissait, du point de vue des performances économiques, un "bond en arrière" entre 1789 et 1815, celle que certains appellent "la vraie révolution", c'est-à-dire la révolution industrielle, avait déjà commencé en Suisse comme en Angleterre. Ce dernier pays était d'ailleurs passé sans révolution d'une monarchie absolue à une monarchie parlementaire.

4. Les nouveaux défis de l'"Europe sans frontière": conséquences pour le modèle du consensus helvétique

La Suisse est, aujourd'hui à nouveau, confrontée à d'importants chocs extérieurs: par exemple, le dynamisme avec lequel la Communauté Européenne s'achemine vers une "Europe sans frontières" ou, mieux, vers une "Europe des régions" est un sérieux défi pour l'îlot helvétique. La conséquence en est, pour le pays, une nécessité de toujours vérifier ou réviser la pertinence de sa position politique (neutralité, universalisme), économique (l'impact de 1992) et sociale (solidarité avec les pauvres, lutte contre les effets des grandes concentrations et pour les équilibres spatiaux et écologiques).

Une fois de plus, *les Suisses semblent bien ne pas être totalement pris au dépourvu* face à la situation nouvelle: ils ont dû et voulu pratiquer une politique d'ouverture et d'échanges internationaux et se trouvent donc, de fait, dans l'une des régions économiques qui est la plus intégrée à la CEE, tout en assurant, du même coup, une présence constante sur la scène de l'économie mondiale. En tant que petite nation, la Suisse est profondément touchée par les nouvelles dimensions spatiales de l'économie qui est devenue mondiale. Ainsi, les interférences entre les différents niveaux

spatiaux y sont marquées[12]. La transformation de l'espace économique dans un contexte de concurrence mondiale est accompagnée d'un développement important de la transnationalisation, phénomène qui est perceptible à travers l'accroissement du nombre de conglomérats ou autres firmes à activité internationale. Il en découle de nouveaux rapports entre les blocs économiques, ainsi qu'une sensible restructuration des relations et des flux d'échanges. Or, toute transformation économique comporte des implications spatiales. Comment pouvons-nous envisager une modification des rapports internes et externes qu'entretient actuellement la Suisse? Quelle garantie de stabilité ou, mieux, quel nouveau défi pouvons-nous prévoir pour le modèle du consensus ?

La thèse de la flexibilité externe maximale compensée par la stabilité interne maximale

Il est intéressant de s'arrêter quelque peu sur la thèse selon laquelle l'internationalisation de l'économie suisse n'aurait été possible, jusqu'à présent, que grâce à une flexibilité et une disponibilité d'ouverture très grandes, cette flexibilité étant elle-même étroitement liée à une politique de stabilité, une politique économique et sociale s'exerçant par des mesures de protection sectorielle et de compensation sociale[13].

La réalisation de la stabilité interne, qui semble être la condition vitalepour la compétitivité de la Suisse sur les marchés internationaux, relève d'une attitude politique que l'on appelle "*corporatisme démocratique*". Cette façon de régler les problèmes est un processus complexe et, en partie, un système original permettant de trouver des solutions, moins par la formule de la participation que par celle d'une élaboration raffinée d'un consensus entre les partenaires économiques, sociaux et politiques (cf. le modèle proposé au point 1). La justification politique de ce processus trouve son fondement dans une sorte de "prise de conscience collective" qui se base sur trois caractéristiques: la première, d'ordre idéologique, se manifeste à travers un "contrat social" implicite (comme, par exemple, la Paix du travail); la deuxième est l'expression de la relative centralisation et concentration des intérêts du groupe; la troisième est constituée d'un processus continu de formation d'un consensus politique, basé sur la consultation permanente des parties.

Le résultat d'une telle politique est, en fin de compte, d'avoir procuré à la Suisse un avantage de localisation. Celui-ci constitue l'indicateur

synthétique d'une rente de position, facteur déterminant du bien-être actuel et futur.

Une stabilité politique interne garantie à jamais ?

La règle d'or de notre prospérité actuelle restera-t-elle pertinente dans le futur? Quelques éléments peuvent nous donner une certaine inquiétude, non pour la règle en elle-même, mais, pour ses conditions d'application. Le processus de corporatisme démocratique pourrait être menacé selon quatre modalités, qui ne s'excluent pas mutuellement:

- le passage de *l'internationalisation à la transnationalisation de l'économie suisse.*

Les liens entre le capital et l'entreprise suisse avec le territoire national et ses composantes socio-politiques sont essentiels du moment que l'économie mondiale peut encore être qualifiée d'économie d'échanges internationaux entre économies nationales. Notre siècle nous en a donné maints exemples. Or, de nos jours, le processus de transnationalisation de l'économie, dans lequel la Suisse est fortement impliquée par ses groupes industriels de la chimie, de l'agro-alimentaire ou des machines, transfère la production et les investissements à l'extérieur du territoire suisse. On parle alors d'une sixième Suisse (venant après les quatre groupes ethniques du pays et les Suisses de l'étranger), celle-ci étant constituée des biens et des activités de l'économie transnationale helvétique. Il est clair que, dans ce contexte, le capital et certaines entreprises peuvent se comporter de manière relativement indifférente au milieu national, dans lequel la stabilité interne reste un bien recherché et apprécié. Celle-ci ne représente cependant plus un facteur déterminant la création et l'exploitation des rentes de localisation.

Ainsi, on peut remarquer, par exemple, qu'une partie du secteur industriel suisse s'intéresse plus à la gestion de "holdings industriels" qu'à la production sur le territoire national. D'un autre côté, les intérêts du monde bancaire et financier se sont écartés, fondamentalement, de l'économie industrielle. D'autre part, les banquiers craignent relativement peu les effets de l'intégration européenne, même si, à côté des avantages dus à la libéralisation des activités bancaires et financières au niveau européen, ils redoutent l'éventualité d'une perte de la rente différentielle. De toute manière, les banquiers suisses ne peuvent se contenter de vendre à

l'extérieur les vertus de la seule garantie de stabilité politique. Ils subissent en effet une concurrence arude et demandent à être libérés de certaines contraintes fiscales (droit de timbre, droits d'émission et sur les transactions de titres). En conclusion, il faut bien noter que les intérêts de l'économie pousseront la Suisse, dans le futur, à être *moins disposée à faire des concessions ;*

- *l'étiolement de la force syndicale.* L'autre acteur du modèle corporatiste helvétique voit s'éroder une partie de sa légitimité de participer au pouvoir, ainsi qu'une certaine dépréciation de son rôle. La première difficulté est liée, en même temps, à la réduction des taux de syndicalisation, à la perte de pouvoir des syndicats et au progrès technologique, dont les possibilités d'automation et de robotisation libèrent toujours plus la production du besoin de travailleurs manuels. D'autre part, l'époque durant laquelle le consensus pouvait s'établir en offrant aux travailleurs des compensations à caractère social semble aujourd'hui révolue. D'autres revendications (protection de l'environnement, sécurité individuelle, qualité de la vie) mobilisent plus de monde;

- *d'autres acteurs et mouvements, caractérisés par leur fragmentation, sont apparus sur la scène politique.* Le modèle helvétique du consensus s'est quelque peu compliqué par l'apparition de nouveaux acteurs ou, plutôt, de mouvements présentant la particularité d'occuper un "marché" politique fortement segmenté. Il en découle, pour les partis politiques traditionnels et pour la coalition du gouvernement fédéral, des difficultés stratégiques et de gestion. Le danger est alors visible: la formule prudente des cantons suisses qui s'étaient alliés - tout en restant ouverts - plus en fonction de la défense de leurs propres intérêts que pour un projet commun est simplement remplacée par une solution de fermeture vis-à-vis de l'extérieur du système. Celle-ci se réalise au nom de la sauvegarde des intérêts individuels, de la protection de l'environnement ou encore du maintien d'une identité mal définie. Plusieurs exemples sont explicites. A la fin du XIXème siècle, les agriculteurs suisses sont mécontents du régime de libéralisme économique. En guise de compensation, le pouvoir économique du pays accepte alors le principe du protectionnisme agricole; après tout, mieux vaut payer les denrées alimentaires plus cher, si c'est là le seul moyen de retrouver la paix intérieure. Or, en cette fin de XXème siècle, cette option semble remise en question, si l'on en croit les résultats

de votations populaires récentes. Le rôle fonctionnel de la subdivision du pays en cantons extrêmement hétérogènes est également sujet à nombre de critiques. Ainsi, alors que l'Europe réalise le projet "Erasme", le cantonalisme suisse ne permet pas encore une réelle mobilité des étudiants, chercheurs et professeurs dans les différentes universités du pays. Un autre problème et celui du système démocratique des niveaux communal et cantonal, qui est constamment court-circuité par la nécessité de créer des organismes de coordination et de consortium. D'un autre côté, la réalisation de l'intégration européenne pose la question de la coopération transfrontalière, qui se développe aujourd'hui de manière peut-être désordonnée et qui ne manquera pas de créer de nouvelles alliances et de nouveaux processus de régionalisation (par exemple, l'Arc Alpin)[4]. Enfin, dans le domaine des problèmes régionaux, l'actuelle division des zones de pouvoir et de compétence entre de manière importante dans la discussion sur l'intégration de la Suisse à l'Europe;

- *l'utilisation perverse du modèle.* Des exemples récents ont montré que le modèle basé sur le consensus peut être utilisé à des fins peu honnêtes. Notamment, la confiance accordée aux institutions financière n'a-t-elle pas permis à certains agents peu scrupuleux de recycler des montants considérables d'argent sale? Ce type de comportement, même s'il reste minoritaire, fait perdre sa crédibilité au modèle helvétique. Il en constitue une sorte de sabotage.

Conclusions

Il faut relever encore une fois que les profonds changements des rapports entre espaces économiques et politiques au niveau mondial interfèrent sur la structure d'un pays. Ainsi, la gestion des composantes spatiales et institutionnelles se posent en des termes nouveaux.

Comme le démontre le cas suisse, les modifications possibles des modalités du modèle de consensus, ainsi que les mutations externes - le processus de construction européenne - obligent à vérifier le fonctionnement-même du modèle. De manière incontournable, il faudra procéder à une discussion de type "Girondins-Jacobins".

A l'intérieur d'un cadre suisse qui apparaît, par rapport à l'extérieur, encore extrêmement stable et qui a permis aux acteurs et aux institutions helvétiques une capacité d'adaptation remarquable apparaissent de

nombreux phénomènes nouveaux, renforcés par des mutations externes. Ce *nouveau défi* rend légitime et opportune la question de la réelle capacité que possède la formule du consensus à résoudre automatiquement les problèmes qui émergent. A contrario,, le vieux débat centralisation-décentralisation ré-apparaît en se présentant dans des termes nouveaux qui concernent la gestion des transformations spatiales dans un contexte économique désormais devenu mondial. Si l'on regarde ces problèmes à travers une grille d'analyse interdisciplinaire et selon les différents niveaux qui les englobent, on s'aperçoit qu'ils constituent, pour une bonne part, des questions relevant de la dimension régionale et locale. *La Suisse ne peut pas éviter de se remettre en question, ou, simplement, de vérifier ses propres mécanismes de gestion:* le modèle du consensus, la possibilité d'équilibrer les forces externes par sa dynamique interne, la répartition effective du pouvoir et des compétences.

Or, l'exemple que nous avons privilégié nous montre bien comment le débat centralisation-décentralisation doit être dynamique et mis en relation avec les forces de l'environnement extérieur. Les solutions, propres à chaque pays, demandent parfois des changements radicaux mais, surtout, un processus continu et intelligent d'adaptation des parties aux orientations du système global, dans lequel s'insèrent les communes, les régions et les états.

---

[1] Cf. Colloque de ASRDLF (Association de science régionale de langue française, Bordeaux, sept. 1989, "Thème 1: 1789-1989 La décentralisation: leçons de l'histoire, pratiques et prospective" (à paraître fin 1990).

[2] Nous remercions les organisateurs du colloque de Jadwisin pour nous avoir stimulé à approfondir cette problématique, en parlant d'abord de l'analyse "du terrain qui nous est plus familier".

[3] RATTI, R., PERRIARD, M., "*Deux siècles de faux débats Girondins-Jacobins*" (cf. Colloque Bordeaux, note 1).

[4] Kreis G., Der Weg zur Gegenwart. Die Schweiz im neunzehnten Jahrhundert, Basel, 1986; cf. en particulier l'appréciation de Marie-Claude Jéquier.

[5] Pour une présentation détaillée de la théorie économique de la révolution, cf. Lafay J.-D., in Analyses de la SEDEIS no 70, juillet 1989.

[6] Krulic J., *La décentralisation, histoire d'une idée*, in Projet no 216, mars-avril 1989; cet article expose le débat de la décentralisation en France, aux XIXème et XXème siècles.

[7] Marrast, dans la discussion de la Constituante de 1848.

[8] Krulic, J., op. cit.

[9] A ce propos, cf. Arnaud et Guigou, in Eurépargne no 33, juin 1989.

[10] Théoriquement, quel est le degré optimal de décentralisation? Un raisonnement simple de finances publiques permet de résoudre le problème. Pour chaque prestation de service public, il faut se demander quel est le coût de la centralisation (uniformité des solutions, concentration du processus décisionnel, etc.) et quel est le coût de la décentralisation (difficultés liées à la coordination verticale et

horizontale, ainsi qu'à la coordination sectorielle, etc.). Lorsque la somme des deux coûts est minimale, l'optimum est atteint. Le même type de raisonnement peut d'ailleurs être appliqué s'il s'agit de connaître le nombre optimal de corporations de droit public dans un pays.

En ce qui concerne la Suisse, en moyenne, la Confédération est la source de 30 % des dépenses publiques du pays, les cantons, 40 %, et les communes 30 %. Les dépenses de la Confédération concernent avant tout la prévoyance sociale (22 %), la défense nationale (20 %), les transports et l'énergie (14 %). En ce qui concerne les cantons, les trois domaines principaux sont l'enseignement et la formation (28 %), la santé et les hôpitaux (17 %) et la prévoyance sociale (12 %). Les communes, quant à elles, dépensent surtout dans les domaines de l'enseignement et de la formation (12 %), la santé et les hôpitaux (15 %) et la protection de l'environnement du territoire (11 %) [Source: Annuaire statistique de la Suisse, Berne, 1989, pp. 326-335].

[11] Cf. Germann R.E., Weibel E., Manuel *Système politique de la Suisse*, tome 3, Fédéralisme, Berne, 1986, et Encyclopedia Universalis, chapitre "Fédéralisme".

[12] Gaudard G., *Transformation de l'espace économique et transnationalisation*, Fribourg, 1989.

[13] - Borner S., Hamisegger K., Knöpfel C., *Die Internalisierung der Schweizer Wirtschaft*, Schweizerischer Wissenschaftsrat, Forschungspolitische Fruherkennung B. 10, Berne, 1986.

- Kiener U., *Die Schweiz auf dem Weg zur Dienstleistungsgesellschaft?* Schweizerischer Wissenschaftsrat, Forschungspolitische Fruherkennung B. 9, Berne, 1985.

[14] Comitato per la cooperazione tra le regione dell'Arco Alpino, op. cit., vol. 2.

Antoni Kukliński
Institute of Space Economy,
University of Warsaw

POLAND - THE DIFFICULT STAGE OF TRANSFORMATION*)

I. INTRODUCTION

The year 1989 has been a turning point in the modern history of Poland. Poland has regained its independence. The experiences of the semi-totalitarian Third Republic, being a semi-satellite of the Soviet Union are a closed chapter. For the new Fourth Republic the nineties are a very difficult stage of political, economic and social transformation. The success of this transformation is a conditio sine qua non for Poland to enter the family of European countries as a normal member and not a second-class periphery.

II. POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION

The first stage of this transformation has already been accomplished. The elections of June 1989 eliminated the monopoly of the power of the communist party and the decision of the new Parliament has created a coalition government, formed in September 1989 by Tadeusz Mazowiecki.

The leading force of the new government is Solidarity as a political and social movement and as a labour union.

In the last months of 1989, a rapid process of the disintegration of the Polish United Workers Party (the communist party) took place. The act of autoliquidation of the Party was performed in January 1990.

In December 1989, the Parliament decided to close the chapter of Polish People's Republic (Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa) and to open the chapter of Polish Republic (Rzeczpospolita Polska) thus returning to the historical name and tradition of our state.

---

*) This paper was originally published in Italy: „La Polonia è già cominciata la stagione della quarta republica". *L' Opinione*, 31.07.1990.

In May 1990, we will have the first free local elections in Poland after the World War II. These elections will be an important element in the political transformation of the country and will open a new chapter in the history of local self-government in Poland.

This magnificent political process is developed very successfully under the leadership of Solidarity as a force dominating in the Polish political landscape at the present moment. There is no doubt that Poland is moving very fast on the road from a semi-totalitarian state to a real parliamentary democracy. However we still have a long way to go to enter the paradise of a well functioning system of parliamentary democracy. The cornerstone of this system is built on modern open-minded tolerant and efficient political parties having the capacity to be responsible members of the government or of the opposition. At the present moment, we have the Solidarity movement, some parties related historically to the Third Republic and about 200 political associations of different types. I hope that similarly to the Spanish experiences this dispersed and hazy political landscape will – in about two or three years – transform itself into a political scene with 4-7 actors as valid and modern political parties having capacity to lead Poland to the XXI century.

In this process of the formation and development of political parties in Poland three sources of inspiration and experiences have already emerged:

a) the current economic, social and political experience of the Polish society and the different visions of Poland's future emerging in our country,
b) the historical experience of the Second Republic (1918-1944) and some attempts to return to the traditions of political parties functioning in the Second Republic both in Free Poland and during the time of World War II (the Emigration in the West and the Underground in the country),
c) the experiences of the political parties in the Western countries; in this field, a very interesting discussion is already going on concerning the number of political parties in Poland: should we follow the Anglo-Saxon example of the two-party system or should we rely rather on the experience of continental Europe and develop a system of about 4-7 political parties. With all due attention to the efficiency of the Anglo-Saxon solution we have to say that it would be very difficult to sqeeze the Polish political individuality into the dual framework.

It is rather easy to anticipate that the Polish political landscape of the

XXI century will be grosso modo a political landscape characteristic of continental Europe.

I would like now to ask the question concerning the scale of the political spectrum in Poland. Using the classical terminology of left, center and right we can say that the greatest problems would be the formation of strong parties of the center including a Polish Liberal Party. The historical weakness of Poland is related to the absence of a strong middle class. Let us hope that from this point of view the experience of the Fourth Republic will be better than those of the First and Second Republic, not speaking about the negative period of the Third Republic. The experience of the nineties will answer the question concerning the new system of political parties in Poland, including the existence of a new strong Polish Liberal Party.

III. ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION

The economic transformation is still more difficult and complicated than the political transformation. In this field, three types of change are most important:

1) from a centrally planned to market economy,
2) from state to private economy,
3) from low to high technology.

The creation of market economy in Poland cannot be seen in simplified terms of the XIX century laissez faire. In modern capitalistic countries the market is not a jungle but a well organised system of coordination with an explicit role of the state, using different instruments of economic, social and financial policies. So we need a well designed set of alternative scenarios analysing different trajectories leading to the development of a modern market economy. This is a new role of our Central Planning Office.

The implementation of the Balcerowicz Programme, inspired by the philosophy of IMF and neo-conservative economic ideology, is only the first very dramatic introductory stage in the introduction of the market economy in Poland. It remains to be seen if – after the successful elimination of hyperinflation in Poland – we do not enter a state of recession described as the well known low-level equilibrium trap.

Let us assume, however, a fully optimistic outcome of the Balcerowicz Programme. Even in this case it is a long way from the creation of diffe-

rent markets of commodities, labour and capital at the local, regional and national level to the creation of a holistic integrated system which can realistically be called – the market economy in Poland.

The creation of private economy in Poland, as the leading type of economic activity, is somehow easier since we always had a large private sector in Polish agriculture. Nevertheless the Polish industry is in 95% represented by state enterprises organised in a very stiff and inefficient way. This huge state industry should grosso modo be divided into three categories :

- one third representing totally outdated technologies and products which should be dismantled and liquidated as an element of the industrial system,
- one third which should change ownership from state into private of both Polish and foreign denomination,
- one third which should be transformed into state joint stock companies using all the experiences of state industries in West European countries, and especially Italy and France.

The third type of economic change is the creation of high technology industries in Poland. Without those industries Poland will not be a fully European country with a modern and efficient economy.

It is sad that the wrong economic policies of the Third Republic have created a pattern of national wealth which structurally and technologically is not to be adapted to the needs of the XXI century. Eventually we can say that the great effort of the whole generation of Poles has – to a large extent – been wasted. So in the history of Poland we have not only the huge destruction of the World War II but also the misguided investment policies of the Third Republic. The scale and urgency of the economic transformation of Poland in the nineties is one of the most challenging historical tasks in the history of our country.

IV. SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION

The transformation of the Polish society at the turn of the XX and XXI century is a most complicated and difficult problem. There will be no successful political and economic transformation without parallel changes in the system of values, patterns of motivations and behaviour. We need a new political culture of the society to create the conditions for the real development of parliamentary democracy in the climate of freedom,

responsibility, efficiency, and tolerance. We need a new economic culture of the society to develop institutions and mechanisms of market economy and private enterprise. The Polish society has to develop and internalize the psychology of competitive society recognizing high rewards for individual abilities and efforts, for innovative approaches in all spheres of life. The Polish individuality must be released from the different pressures of collectivist climate promoted by the Third Republic.

The dilemma 'equality versus efficiency' must be solved in favour of efficiency, naturally within the framework accepted by the general practice of modern societies. In order to develop the mechanisms of individual motivations we need an 'optimum' amount of inequality. If the inequality is too great then the misery and despair destroys the motivation for good economic performance. This is the case of many Latin American countries. If the inequality is too small then the motivation is also diminished as it is the case of Sweden. The problem of a new interpretation of equality and efficiency is one of great importance in Poland, not only from the economic but also political point of view. The social transformation in Poland also means the acceptance to replace the hidden unemployment on the job by open unemployment and by the rules of the normal labour market.

The different social groups in Poland must demonstrate the abilities of sometimes painful adaptations to the new conditions created by the progress in the development of the competitive market economy. Three social groups will suffer most seriously.

The first group is the large army of the political and economic bureaucracy of the Third Republic, and particularly those members of this army who represent very low professional qualifications.

The second group are the workers of big inefficient industrial enterprises which not being competitive – have to be either restructured or liquidated.

The third group are small inefficient farms that sooner or later will be ruined by the competitive market economy, even if the state intervention slows down that inevitable process.

The last social problem, I would like to mention in this article, is the problem of élite. The Polish society must stimulate processes of the development of an élite that will be competitive on the European scene. We already have the relatively strong Polish political, cultural and intellectual élites. In these fields, very good starting points were created by

the Polish history. In one important field we are, however, very weak. It is the field of the economic élite and entrepreneurship. It is our national duty to rapidly develop this élite that should stimulate large-scale programmes of activities to be implemented in cooperation with Western countries.

V. PROCESSES OF TRANSFORMATIONS AND THE VISIONS OF THE FUTURE

At the present moment, there is a national consensus in Poland that we have to solve three immediate urgent problems:

1. to build the foundation of parliamentary democracy,
2. to build the foundation of market economy,
3. to overcome the most serious crisis in the polish modern history.

The more distant vision of the future of the society, of the economy and of the state is, however, subject to many political and ideological interpretations. I think that in the early and middle nineties, the emerging political parties and associations will start to prepare and publish different vision of Poland's future – thus opening to the Polish society the possibilities of conscious and well documented choice. I think that at least four such visions will emerges a social democratic vision, a liberal vision, and a neo-conservative vision.

In this anticipated climate of political change, the newly created Polish Club of Modern Liberalism is planning to prepare a 'White Book' on the liberal vision of Poland. We have already started the discussion in this field, outlining the set of issues involved in the topic "The Road of Poland to European Economy". I think, however, that the Polish discussion should be incorporated in broad European terms of reference. In this spirit I have prepared a tentative proposal of a comparative study to be sponsored by the Liberal Parties of Western Europe. I would like to present that proposal as the conclusion of this article.

VI. THE TRANSFORMATION OF CENTRAL AND WESTERN EUROPE.

A PROPOSAL OF AN INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH PROGRAMME UNDER THE AUSPICES OF WESTERN EUROPEAN LIBERAL PARTIES.

It is proposed to design and implement a research programme as above. The time horizon of this programme will incorporate:

1) the evolution of the experiences of the eighties,

2) the short-term prognosis of the nineties,

3) the long-term prognosis of the first quarter of the III century.

It is necessary to outline a typology of the trajectories of transformation of central and East European countries in the years 1970-2000. One should define the specific and more universal features in these trajectories.

The comparison of the Polish, Czechoslovak and Rumanian experience is indicating how different are the routes of changes. This typology of trajectories would be much richer if we also take into account the transformation of such countries as Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Ukraine, and the Baltic States.

These studies will explicitly accept political value judgements expressed in three diagnostic and prognostic scenarios:

1) a social democratic scenario,

2) a liberal scenario,

3) a conservative scenario.

These studies will be prepared in the framework of political and academic discussions involving participants from Western, Central and East-European countries. The studies could also involve the efforts of North American and Latin American scholars and politicians interested in the analysis of the Central and East European experiences. These studies should lead to the preparation of a 'White Book' presenting a liberal scenario for Central and Eastern Europe. This scenario would be a document useful in European discussions on the future of our continent. It will also be useful for all existing and potential liberal parties in Europe.

The processes of rapid change creating a very differentiated political,

social and economic landscape in Central and Eastern Europe are, at the same time, stimulating the urgent demand for general visions of the future prepared via an honest and comprehensive diagnoses of the recent historical experiences.

The proposed international research programme would create a new liberal 'library' of knowledge on Central and Eastern Europe. The 'library' will create a background not only for academic but also for political activities in the spirit of modern Liberalism.

Warszawa, march 5, 1990.

Kazimierz Z. Sowa
University of Rzeszów, Poland

POLISH CRISIS AND POLISH REFORM IN CENTRAL AND LOCAL DIMENSION. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DILEMMAS OF POSTCOMMUNIST COUNTRY

1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

In autumn 1989 a young actress announced in the evening TV news that 4 June marked the end of communism in Poland. Although the June elections started quick disintegration of communist power, the totalitarian structures of social and economic life, after 40 years of communist dictatorship, were anything but changing then. A most characteristic feature of Polish contemporary reality, as well as other post-communist countries in Europe, is enormous dynamics of political processes and extreme static of socio-economic structures, that have got petrified over the decades. Therefore, processes of real, radical reforms in those countries will be long and complicated.

Post-communist European countries share many common features, but on the other hand they remain highly specific due to different political histories and cultural traditions. So to understand their actual level of civilization it is not enough to know mechanisms of communist rule and its outcomes, though this rule is clearly responsible for the acute crisis that is pestering the countries in question.

The condition of Polish society and economy, with which we shall

briefly deal here, will not be properly understood and assessed if considered only from the point of view of the last 40 years and the factors operating on macro-level (i.e. the level of central authority). It is true that Polish contemporary reality is direct outcome of authority centrally exercised by the communist party, or more exactly by the party leaders and appointed by them nomenclature. But such rule and its operation, as well as certain socio-economic outcomes would not by possible if they had not been historically and locally conditioned.

Let us begin from history then.

2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Below I briefly outline six factors which, according to me, caused the present critical condition of Polish economy. The sixth one-communism, will be dealt with in more detailed in the next part of this paper.

2.1. It was bourgeois society that gave birth to technical civilization and market economy, for which the Poles long so much now. It is not only that technology and market are urban 'inventions'. What matters is that in European town there originated and developed a cult of production and growing rich through work, thriftiness, industriousness (industry) and not plunder or exploitation. In Poland, since the beginning towns had always been underdeveloped, and middle class-the weakest in society. A considerable part of middle class-in some periods even majority, consisted of non-Polish population, with two dominant elements: Jewish and German. Both were often removed from the Polish scene by history. Polish middle class prospered mainly in the Poznań region. So Polish modern nation grew from two basic classes: peasantry and gentry.

2.2. The earliest capitalist-market relations developed most fully in Protestant countries (with the exception of some cities in Northern Italy). It is largely true that Reformation laid the foundations of capitalism. Different factions of Protestantism, and especially Calvinism with its theory of predestination, created favourable conditions for the development of work ethos, Laboriousness was synonymous with piety and became the simplest, generally accessible way to heaven. Poland preferred counter - Reformation to Reformation. Therefor Poland always was and still very much is Catholic country. Dissidents had never been fiercely persecuted

here, but then they were mostly of non-Polish origin. The Poles, en masse, have remained a Catholic nation, where prayer was usually more imporant and reliable way to redemption than work.

2.3. Modern European societies assumed shape in the 19th century under the influence of certain market processes and rules; I mean the emergence of new socio-economic elites and the formation of new stratified structure. Meanwhile, the Poles in the 19th century had neither their own state nor society, as they had been mechanically divided and incorporated into three different communities of alien states. They had been deprived of Polish social institutions; they had to content themselves with family and church only. In social consciousness, civic society was replaced by the nation, which from the point of cultural survival was beneficial for the Poles. A society is always a definite structure of hierarchy and strata, this being functional necessity, while a nation remains a one-dimension community of equal people, compatriots, or 'brothers'. To me, that seems to be source of Polish egalitarianism, slogans about the same stomachs and antipathy towards above-the-average persons or groups. The statement of C.K. Norwid, a great Polish poet, that the Poles are a magnificent nation but poor society, proved right only after regaining the independence. In the 19th century Poles simply could not be a good society.

2.4. Modern societies rest on broad, open but clearly isolated elites. The process of elite selection grew more intense in Poland after 1918. Although painful and complex, it had been in progress until 1926. Piłudski's May coup and the rule of so-called 'sanacja' regime led to the imposition by force of one elite which had little to do with democratic ethos of the middle class. Natural process of elite selection barred then, had not revived in Poland until... 1989. Inter-war period in Poland contributed very little to building of modern industrial society. However paradoxical it may sound, the thirties laid the foundation for Stalinist rule rather then democratic government in Poland. Let's not forget though that democracy in Europe was in retreat then.

2.5. Poland was the country which in 1939-1945 bore the most extensive and severe losses, although it was counted among the victorious countries. In World War II Poland lost almost one quarter of her territory, one third of the population and half national property. Contemporary

political history does not know such crippling ravages. Most severely afflicted was Polish social structure. The war can be said to have cut off Poland's head, by getting rid of intelligentsia ranks. The majority of this stratum suffered death. Those who survived often took a decision to emigrate. Only few stayed in the country. Their voice and action however, were insufficient to channel Poland's development in the right direction, the more so that other social classes and groups were badly affected too in that defensive war. The war influenced not only the Polish society but the nation as cultural community, too. There is little exaggeration in saying that the war left Poland with just 'working masses of towns and villages'. Systematic attempts made to process these masses into a new society partially succeeded, but the efforts to form a new nation were a complete failure.

2.6. Last of the major factors for the Polish status quo is the so-called real socialism or socio-economic system which had been in operation since 1945 (or 1948) until 1989. I am not going to deal with the complex matter of legitimization of that system. Neither do I mean to assess it thoroughly. I just want to draw attention to those of its elements which negatively determined the condition of Polish society and economy today. Three such basic elements are:

a) errors of the doctrine, on which socio-economic practice had been mechanically based
b) ensuing erroneous conception of industrialization (economic growth), and
c) monopolization of power and responsibility in the hands of one organization, that is Polish United Workers' Party.

The above factors have been largely contributive to the present state of Polish economy and social life, characterized by rampant inflation (especially in the eighties), fall in productivity, dropping living standard, strikes, thriftlessness, corruption and so on.

3. THE OUTCOMES OF COMMUNISM

3.1. Economic outcomes

The great international religious ceremony held in September 1, 1989 to mark 50th anniversary of the outbreak of World War II was said to be the symbolic termination of the war. Indeed, for fifty years, 1939-1989,

Poland had been governed by military methods. All basic institutions of the system were introduced and maintained by force, against the will of the prevailing part of the society. After the collapse of communist rule, some of these institutions, especially political ones, fell down too or soon died a natural death, like the Polish Communist Party. Some economic institutions however, remained. They are the ones firmly incorporated into socio-economic macrostructure. To get rid of them will require laborious efforts at restructuring the whole socio-economic system.

A fundamental communist dogma, arbitrarily and mechanically inculcated in all communist countries, declared the necessity to get rid of private ownership of means of production, perceived as the main source of wrong and social injustice. In the years 1945-1950, practically all Polish industry, trade and services had been nationalized. The only exception turned out to be agriculture, in spite of repeated efforts to nationalize it, too. The state however, managed to take over the entire network servicing agriculture, i.e. purchase, supply, trade, processing etc. Of marginal importance in the collectivist economy were small in number craft workshops and unimportant service points and shops. The whole economy was subjected to the central plan of economic development. The state become an exclusive, monopolistic investor and the investments were for the most part channelled into heavy industry and mining.

A cardinal feature of collectivist economy was the concentration of enterprises and monopolization of production. Firms of the same line, functioning in different parts of the country were being combined in various associations and concerns, and submitted to unified central management, which secured them monopolistic position in economy. Market was practically non-existent then. Let us illustrate the concentration ratio with numbers. Poland has about 7,8 thousands state enterprises which currently employ over 10 million workers. It is easy to work out that an average workforce of one enterprise reaches almost 1300 employees. Besides, there are around 600 000 small private enterprises with statistically 2,1 workers per each. State sector yields about 89 per cent of non-agricultural production, whereas private sector about 11 per cent, and the tendency for the latter one is to grow. One should remember that 99 per cent of fixed assets in extra-agricultural economy belongs to the state sector.

The absence of private owners of means of production, or to be more precise, absence of any owners at all, in Roman interpretation of law, is the main cause of inefficiency and, eventually, decline of the state

economic sector. In a state enterprise, the workers are not motivated to undertake rational economic action for the good of their enterprise. They are very much interested in attaining immediate gains (pay, numerous additional performances, the employer's confidence, etc.), which often happens at the expense of decapitalization of the assets in the enterprise. What is more, it is virtually impossible to carry out rational, economic calculation to see whether certain production is worthwhile, in situation when economic principles do not work and production is ordered by planner, who also supplies materials and other means for production. Economic rationality in Weber's understanding of the concept is entirely alien to the state collectivist economy.

Although communist dictatorship in Poland is over, the economic system it created is not. New authorities do realize that to get Poland out of crisis they need to introduce rational market economy, that is to privatize larger sections of the state sector. To get rid of central planning is not enough because to render independent the enterprises which have no owners will only cause quicker decapitalization of the assets. Moreover, monopolistic structure of these enterprises burdens the clients with any increase in costs of production, and forces the enterprises to constantly lift prices as the main way of increasing their profitability. As a reaction to marketization of economy, started in 1989, state enterprises raised prices of their products alarmingly, and at the same time lowered the level of productivity.

Relative equilibrium between supply and demand was attained through curbing the demand. In the first quarter of 1990 the production fell by 30 per cent, but the consumption - by 41 per cent. The government is aware that only privatization of industry will help to increase productivity and at the same time keep the level of consumption low. That is going to be an extremely difficult and complicated operation due to a vast size of state sector, its structure and concentration. Another serious obstacle is the lack of capital that could be used in the process of privatization in Poland. Therefore, it is essential to support Polish industry from outside - by foreign capital. Only privatization can bring about the desired restructuring and modernization of Polish industry.

3.2. Social outcomes

Communist system also destroyed traditional social structure and majority of institutions of democratic society. The whole Polish society, except peasants, was made proletarian. 97 per cent of professionally active population were, and still are, employees hired by state and cooperative enterprises; cooperative movement was nationalized long ago. Traditional social divisions were replaced by a new order which had so far been unknown in social history of modern Europe. Communist society was divided into:

1) caste of 'nomenclature' people, that is those who were allowed by the party supreme officials to take up posts of authority
2) party members
3) all the others who can, after Orwell, be referred to as prolets.

The proportions of these new 'social classes' were: 2:8:90 (in Poland excluding peasants).

In the public life totally controlled by authority (i.e. party, secret police, censorship, etc.), such traditionally democratic institutions as social organizations and associations, trade unions, local governments of all descriptions were powerless. Only a handful of meaningless forms were left as peculiar democratic ornaments of the new, 'just' social system. This led to social tensions and frustrations, and eventually to psychological subduing of the people and the resulting passivity in public life. Present condition of the Polish society is well rendered by the following statement: "In social sphere one can witness both totalization and atomization. Subordination of the whole society to one centre, that is the party, destroyed social bonds on supra-family level and led to atomization of individual people by ideological apparatus, schooling system and mass media. The chances to associate were strictly limited to licensed institutions, read: those controlled by the party. This, in effect, converted the society, though not completely, into social mass or aggregate susceptible to manipulation. Such mass is characterized by passiveness, apathy and claiming attitudes. They were induced by ideological promises, which never stood a chance of being carried out, owing to the inefficiency of economy that in turn resulted from the said indifference (...) Incapacitation of citizens deprived them of knowledge and competence necessary to control their own affairs. 'Real socialism' formed solely

adaptive attitudes which, on the one hand helped to bear pains and worries of the system and to find lacunae in the law, but at the same time it destroyed creative attitudes and innovators, because the patent for creating the reality was reserved by the party and its apparatus." (B. Jałowiecki, G. Grzelak – Foreword to the book by J. Bartkowski, A. Kowalczyk, P. Swianiewicz – "Strategies of Local Authorities", Warsaw University, 1990, p.6).

Passivity, wait-and-see attitudes and excessive claims is what hinders Polish reforms most. These hindrances may only be overcome by brutal economic necessity which is beginning to be felt in Polish economy. Lasting changes in the attitudes can be expected, in at least some parts of the Polish society, only after larger sectors of the economy are affranchised or privatized.

Another important feature of socialist society was peculiar 'magization' of political actions. In other words, political decisions and activities were ascribed causative power in economic and social spheres. That meant constant debating and putting through various bills by different party bodies, government departments and parliament. This magical understanding of politics became so prevailing in society that even Solidarity movement was not free from its elements. Weber's 'Entzauberung' or 'demagization' of political action is an important of effectively resolving the economic crisis in Poland. That however will require time long enough for individuals and social groups to become a carrier of rights in all spheres of social life.

3.3. Changes in ecology and countryside

Pre-revolutionary socialism was one of the most severe critics of industrial urbanization, if only to mention the writings of Frederik Engels. Still, the socialist countries took the way of intensive industrial urbanization. The development of big industry was admitted to be the main and practically unique factor responsible for the process of urban development. In Poland the acceptance of the principle of even and proportional industrial development, as it was referred to, resulted in rather rapid industrialization of the majority of Polish cities. This fact had no doubt a positive meaning for restoring the country from war damage.

First, industrialization consisted in developing heavy industry, using

the obsolete know-how imported mainly from the Soviet Union. The most devastating and dramatic effect of such economic policy was the environmental damage and pollution on an alarming scale. The alarm at the degradation of the Polish habitat is most strongly voiced by Upper Silesia, Kraków region, vicinity of Płock (border line of Kujawy and Gdańsk Pomerania), and the Sudetic Mountains – that is the regions worst affected in the whole Europe. 70 per cent pollution of Polish rivers far exceeds maximum limits.

The situation is dramatically grave in Silesia and Kraków (Cracow). Contemporary Kraków, occupying 0.1 per cent of the total Polish area, emits 13 per cent of gases and over 5 per cent of dusts of all industrial emissions in Poland. It also participates in environmental pollution by 5 per cent of total waste and by 13 per cent of sewage waste. Kraków's air pollution, caused mainly by sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxide and flour compounds, and carbon dioxide, has exceeded the limits many times and in some districts of the city it is ten or more times greater than the acceptable norms. The wear out rate of building materials in Kraków is estimated to be 4-40times higher than normal. In the case of some materials whose wear is caused by flour, the rate of devastation is up to one thousand higher than maximum limits (!). The main source of Kraków's poisoning is a large steel plant, a gift for Poland from USSR. Until January 1990 it had born the name of Lenin.

Intensive industrialization was accompanied by considerably impetous increase of urban areas and agglomerations. The increase manifested itself first and foremost by dynamic development of housing. This state-cooperative dwelling construction was very strictly specified and restricted by state norms and building standards whose fixed forms were compulsory throughout the whole country. The most spectacular result of these conditions is unusual monotony of the physical structure of new quarters and districts of Polish cities. The housing estates consist of typical 5-11 storey blocks of flats, repeating the shape, functional structures, exterior elevations and even colours. This uniformity pertains also to accompanying buildings/objects such as schools, kindergartens, workshops and service points, etc.). These objects were built throughout the country according to fixed design patterns and in accordance with compulsory norms. This monotony of physical structure has blurred regional differences in architecture and unified the appearance of towns. Local and re-

gional divisions of the country gave way to fundamental, dichotomic division into urban (urbanized) and rural areas.

This postcommunist heritage, both in the sphere of ecology and countryside, will influence the quality and character of Polish space for many years to come.

4. 'URBAN' AND 'RURAL' POLAND. AREA OF DIFFERENTIATION AND CONFLICTS.

As was mentioned before, Polish agriculture managed to escape collectivization, in spite of attempted efforts to realize the dogma about the necessity to collectivize all means of production. Extra-agricultural economy however, went fully collectivist. According to the classic notion, the socialist city is deprived of bourgeois population. Practically there has never been either grand or small bourgeois (middle classes)-except for a small number of individual craftsmen, shopmen, stall keepers and a few representatives of the learned professions. Even the most classic free professions, such as doctors or lawyers, were in a specific way collectivized in communism. These occupational categories amount to only few per cent of the total population of professionally active city dwellers. The basic substance of the urban population is made up of proletariat, hired workers employed in state enterprises, offices and institutions. Thus, according to their relation to means of production, the inhabitants of socialist city constitute a highly homogenous population. In Poland this population differs markedly from the community of country-folk which is composed mainly of small individual producers. Thus, in the Polish society one can observe a socially important, specific dichotomy: post-socialist, proletarian city and the village with small traders' population.

This division is of primary importance in Poland now.It is the Polish village that extricate the country from crisis or rather save Poland from total economic collapse, this being an indispensable condition if reforms are to succeed. Metaphorically speaking, private agriculture can, which is not clearly realized by the new authorities, act as an anchor able to hold back the Polish economy from drifting towards ever-growing inflation and falling efficiency of production. Russian economy is bad enough example of this actually happening due to weak agriculture. Polish agriculture can

and should become a base or a bridge-head in establishing market economy.

Unfortunate as it may be, there is a conflict growing between rural and urban populations in Poland, or more exactly, between peasants (farmers) and the new government. This results from the fact that Polish new authorities strive to spread the load of crisis evenly on the whole society including peasants. Peasants rational economy, always based on a principle of economic calculation, is made to bear the costs of (and in practice to subsidize) irrational, ineffective state industries. This happens through a certain policy of taxes and credits, but also through releasing the prices of machines, equipment and production means made for agriculture by state factories. Under communist rule the prices at issue were totally controlled by government. What takes place then is unequal economic game between entirely free but disintegrated market of agricultural produce and monopolistic, or oligopolistic, market of industrial goods produced for agriculture. If this situation persists, the effect is likely to be drastic decrease of agricultural productivity and renewed march of spiralling inflation.

Essential circumstance is also the fact that rural population is relatively strong from economic point of view, but weak socially. Polish peasants are quite well-off although the communist politics were often directed against them. Value of property in an average peasant family by several times exceeds the one of industrial worker, in spite of the fact that working classes 'had governed' for over 40 years. The wealth of peasant families is not accompanied by adequate level of technical and social infrastructure in villages. As compared with urban areas, villages are considerable underdeveloped in terms of rad network, telecommunications, shopping facilities, service centres, schools, health service centres and so on.

This results from mismanagement by central authorities as well as the weakness of local government. For 40 years Poland could not afford autonomous peasants' parties, independent organizations, free associations or any other forms of rural self-government. Local authorities were in fact nominated by the party and kept under close supervision. Only May elections to local governments gave Poland a chance of profound change of the situation. For obvious reasons, clandestine anti-communist movement could not develop in rural areas like it did in big agglomerations. The peasants, however, preserved the ethos of hard, voluntary work and proper understanding of market economy rules.

In contemporary Poland all political and social movements, ranging from Workers' Defence Committees and Solidarity to ecological clubs, sprang up in large industrial agglomerations. Although the communists claimed to have formed large industry working classes they had to watch helplessly the birth and development there of Polish political opposition. The industry workers for quite some time now have had at their disposal strong grass roots organizations, both professional and political, as well as various pressure groups and groups of special interest. It was the working masses that greatly cherished the communist ideals of 'social justice', even if understood as primitive egalitarianism. Many representatives of this class firmly believe that "Mazowiecki's government will give them all that socialism used to promise but in shorter time, more efficiently and with more generosity". (See Jan Szczepański) Paradoxically, the social forces which had the largest share in subversion of communism in Poland may now most obstruct the introduction of radical economic reforms.

5. CONCLUSIONS. THREE OPTIONS OF REFORM

As I have tried to prove, problem number one in Poland is how to transform the inherited economic structure. 90 per cent of non-agricultural economy and as much as 99 per cent of fixed capital is nominally owned by the state, but in fact belongs to nobody. The state-run enterprises are characterized by a high concentration ratio, inflexible structure, obsolete technical arm-ament and out-dated technologies. Besides, these enterprises have never participated in normal market economy. No society ever faced such challenge.

The so-called Balcerowicz plan is not an economic reform proper, as its architect himself admits. It is a short-term, temporary scheme whose aim is to combat inflation. The government is working on the reform but it is not certain at all whether the drafted proposals will be implemented or not. Three different lines of reform are suggested and discussed in Poland. They can be respectively called: self-government option, option of transforming the existing structure and option of parallel development. All three pursuit the goal of transforming the ownership relations in economy. In brief, they can be characterized as follows.

1) Self-government option. This variant of reform would involve the conveyance of state enterprises into the hands of workplace staff. Two

scenarios are possible. In one, the enterprise would be gratuitously conveyed to the working personnel after the fashion of Jugoslavia. It does not have many followers and is mainly backed by members of the post-communist trade unions (OPZZ). Its chances to by realized are practically nil. The other variant provides that enterprises will turn autonomous through workers becoming shareholders. The shares of these enterprises would be sold exclusively or mostly to their employees. The shares would be sold 'on instalments' mainly by deduction from wages. This option is viewed favourably by some of post-communist trade unionists, part of the former PUWP apparatus (now acting as Social Democrats) and some Solidarity activists. Just as 'Jugoslavian version' it has many more adversaries than followers, and not only because both self-government variants petrify the existing economic structure. The chances to put it into operation are again very meagre.

2) **The option of transforming the existing structure.** This trend of reform advocates privatization of economy together with deep transformations of its structure. That would mean wide sale of state assets practically to any buyers, including Polish capitalists, broad circles of population, but also foreign investors. On sale would be whole firms and factories or their parts suitable for starting up new enterprises. The assets would be sold in the form of commonly available shares on condition that on home market precedence would be given to small holders. Thus the reform would opt towards so-called popular capitalism. Foreign capital could buy up to 25 per cent of shares, some postulate as much as 49 per cent. Privatization would take place gradually, and the role of the state would be to prepare the enterprises for sale. It is taken for granted that inefficient enterprises will have to go bankrupt. After privatization the state would only keep the enterprises of key importance to national economy. In this version of reform, supported first and foremost by governmental circles, an important factor of privatization would be the reproduction of communal property.

3) **Option of parallel development.** Critics of option two consider it to be unrealistic because it is not possible to transform the structure of state economy according to requirements of modernity and market rule. It is impossible to sell the people all shares of state-run enterprises because there is shortage of potential buyers, not to mention the lack of home capital indispensable at such giant operation. Representatives of this option maintain that necessary conversion of state economy into a market one

can occur only by way of parallel (to the existing structure) intensive growth of private sector. Priority should be given first of all to small family workshops yielding production and services. Such policy of development may be a crucial factor of activating local communities in Poland and it can help people to solve a number of local economic problems with their own means. Extensive development of small, and later medium-sized, private businesses will ensure healthy competition for state enterprises and also suck off the labour surplus from state industry. In the long run the private sector, as more dynamic and effective, is bound to eliminate or fundamentally transform the public sector by imposing its rules on the whole economy. This option is most of all fostered by neo-liberal circles, the right wing of Solidarity and Lech Wałęsa himself. It seems that if the government programme fails, this last alternative has the finest chance of political victory. For this to happen though, public consent will have to be given to social effects of this line of reform.

Zbyszko Chojnicki
Institute of Socio-Economic Geography and Spatial Planning, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań, Poland

THE ANATOMY OF THE CRISIS OF THE POLISH ECONOMY

It is a wide-spread opinion that the Polish economy is in the grip of an extremely acute crisis jeopardising civilisation and capable of inciting social unrest as a result of a drastic drop in the standards and quality of living.

This is how Norman Davies, an eminent British historian and expert on Polish history, writes about the Polish crisis:

> Poland's economic regression defies any simple explanation. In rational economic terms, it is impossible to explain why a country which is so rich in economic resources, which possesses great reserves of fertile farm land, industrial plants, energy potential, mineral deposits, and skilled labour, should be plunged into the pit of economic destitution. It is even stranger to see that the majority of Western analysts attribute Poland's present distress to simple economic causes. "Economism" - the contention that economic performance determines political events - is rampant in much prevailing comment, and is shared by Western and communist economists alike. Time and again, one reads that the emergence of Solidarity in 1980, and the popular revolt against the Party was caused and not just abetted by the grave mistakes in economic policy in the 1970s. Economic analysts (...) declare that the vital clue to the Polish crisis can be found in Gomułka's overaccumulation of investment capital, in Gierek's over-dependence on foreign loans, or on this, that, or the other economic deficiency. Opinions of that variety are à la mode; but they put the economic cart before the political horse (Davies 1986: 417).

Hence, the question that arises at this point is: **what is the nature of the crisis of the Polish economy, and what are its symptoms?**

In reflections on the crisis much attention has so far been devoted to changes that have taken place in the Polish economy since the war, and

especially to the negative effects of the wrong socio-economic policy based on the Communist ideology. The claim has often been advanced by economists associated with the Party that the principal cause of the crisis has been the misconceived socio-economic policy of the government and the failure to introduce various reforms at appropriate time. Thus, it has been declared that "the chance to stave off the crisis was still there in the late 1970s, because a reform could have removed the mounting difficulties created by the drastically dwindling financial possibilities of development based on foreign credits and inflation. A better management of human labour and the productive potential would have checked the slowdown in the rate of growth of national income" (Bożyk 1983: 8).

However, the view that has been gaining ground recently, advocated by many economists, is that it is not so much the mistakes of the socio-economic policies of successive governments that are at the root of the crisis, but the wrong socio-economic system, and that it is impossible to reform the economy while adhering to the system; hence, it must be changed.

Thus, I shall start with the presentation of (1) the system-related causes of the crisis, and then (2) structural and functional determinants of the crisis and (3) its symptoms.

1. THE SYSTEM-RELATED CAUSES OF THE CRISIS

The fundamental cause of the crisis lies in the economic system of Poland. Therefore, the first issue to be dealt with is the principal properties of this system. They are:

1) a directive-distributive mechanism,
2) central planning,
3) state property, and
4) state-run enterprises.

1.1. The directive-distributive mechanism

The basic organisational feature of the Polish economic system was its directive-distributive mechanism employed to direct economic units and associated with a specific organisational structure. Hence, the term "a

directive-distributive economy" suits this type of economy better than "a socialist economy" (because this can also be a market one) or "a planned economy". The organisational principles of this economy derive, not so much from Marx' theory, but rather from the war-time practice of capitalist countries, especially Germany during the First World War.

The directive-distributive mechanism "consists on the one hand in the allocation of production assignments in the form of addressed directives, and on the other, in the allocation of means or the fixing of limits of their spending. Its manifestation is the detailed central plan. (...) Applied at the highest managerial level, the mechanism unavoidably triggers off an avalanche of directives at successive levels which ultimately ends up at the level of the workplace and basic territorial units, which deprives them of their independence" (Balcerowicz 1981: 158).

The logic of this economy consists, not in a rational management (i.e. an effective utilisation of the factors of production), but in the maximisation of material effects, irrespective of the means that have to be employed to achieve them. Concrete figures to be obtained are determined by political goals of the authorities oriented towards the subsistence and expansion of the system (Kochanowicz 1988: 102).

From the point of view of the authorities, a directive economy has two advantages: 1) it makes possible a higher accumulation than through voluntary savings, and 2) it allows the concentration of means on arbitrary targets, which is supposed to offset the inefficiency of the directive economy (excessive consumption of capital, materials, energy, and labour).

Directives were formulated by the political authorities whose core was the **aparat** and activists of the Communist Party (i.e. the Polish United Workers' Party). They fixed economic goals and supervised their accomplishment. They exerted current control through their personnel policy known as **nomenklatura**. The ranks of activists were replenished by co-opting, and they did not bear constitutional responsibility for decisions they made.

This structure had the shape of a pyramid with a lot of intermediate levels which changed decisions of the upper ranks to promote their own interests.

The organisation of the **aparat** operating this system had the following characteristics (Balcerowicz 1981: 158-159):

1) the official subordination of lower-rank managers to higher-rank ones, with no strict division of competence between them,

2) an expansive central administration embracing numerous branch ministries,

3) the grouping of industrial plants in larger organisations on the basis of their production lines, which made easier their management through directives, but reinforced monopolisation and obstructed co-operation among them,

4) a uniform pattern of organisation in all the sectors of the economy, with a high degree of concentration and the same number of rungs, e.g. in the chemical and food industries, and

5) the deformity of the functioning of the aparat consisting in the development of units whose sole task was to transmit directives from above and reports from below, and the absence of units capable of independent analytical work, e.g. studies of the demand.

Apart from these basic characteristics, there were also a number of derivative features, such as:

1) crippled money as a result of the central distribution of materials and financial limits. Money was a planning fiction. This diminished the effectiveness of any financial tools;

2) lack of a real economic calculus, replaced by the allotment of means by superior authorities;

3) the monopolisation of production reinforced by the distribution of products in which the recipient was assigned to the supplier, and the absence of competing imports;

4) the deformity of direct links among plants, regulated in their totality by superior authorities and not the parties involved; and

5) defective prices, either established administratively from above, or, in the case of decentralisation, highly exaggerated due to excessive monopolisation and an unlimited issue of money.

1.2. Central planning

Central planning is the fundamental instrument of a directive economy regulating, especially in the period of "total" planning, all the processes taking place in the economy, and serving to transform the structure of society along Marxist-Communist lines.

In spite of attempts to reduce the role of central planning undertaken in the periods when reformist tendencies intensified (1956, 1970, 1981), its invariable elements have been:

1) The concentration of all major planning decisions in the hands of the political centre, i.e. the Political Bureau of the Party and its subordinate Party and government authorities, with the decision-making process beyond societal control. The range of decisions included not only the strategy of economic development, investments and income distribution, but also the price and wages policies, the lines of production and subsiding of enterprises, services, cultural activities, etc.

2) The subordination of all the economy to the political and ideological goals of the Communist programme of the transformation of society, rather than to economic principles. The practical result was e.g. the development of the heavy industry at the cost of other domains, mostly the consumer goods industry, agriculture and services, as well as making capital-intensive investments (e.g. the Katowice steel-works) ignoring their profitability. The centre was not subject to financial restrictions primarily due to the uncontrolled issue of money and lack of a proper economic calculus.

The effectiveness of central planning was diminished by such properties of the directive economy as the following (cf. Koźmiński 1982: 60-61):

1) poor qualifications of decision-makers for planning resulting from their ignorance of actual economic mechanisms and their "ideological faith"; in other words, a bureaucratic rather than managerial approach,

2) a widening discrepancy between real possibilities of economic activity and ambitious economic projects, resulting in the negotiation of foreign loans for ineffective goals, and

3) a relaxed execution of investment and production plans following from their unrealistic character and from the crumbling economic system and lack of appropriate material resources.

However, as the economic experience of Poland and other socialist countries proves, central planning is incapable by its very nature of ensuring the economy an effective operation and satisfactory development. According to Kornai 1971), it is only on assumptions drastically departing from reality that a central plan can be proved to be capable of an efficient management of the national economy, and such assumptions could never be satisfied in practice.

One of the main sources of failures of central planning is its anti-market character. Without going into the details of the conception of the incompatibility of central planning and a market economy (e.g. von

Mises), it should be stated that in no country with central planning have attempts to introduce market mechanisms been successful. The chief reason is the fact that a market economy turns on free price movement due to which prices ensure a balance between the current demand and supply, and are also a sign for producers to expand, maintain or reduce production, and for consumers to buy or not to buy certain goods. Moreover, a market economy requires a free flow of factors of production from ineffective branches of production to highly profitable ones (Dymarski and Juja 1988: 59).

In practice, none of the conditions of a market economy has ever been fulfilled in Poland. Although prices were divided into official, regulated and contracted, there was a tendency to convert contracted prices into official ones fixed on the basis of cost accounting. The notion of "glaringly big profits" was introduced and highly profitable enterprises were treated with suspicion. Also, there was no mechanism guaranteeing an automatic flow of factors of production from unprofitable enterprises to highly profitable ones (Dymarski and Juja 1988: 59).

The absence of a proper market economy brings about the absence of a capital market (Lipowski 1989: 112). For the capital market to function, it would be necessary to give state-run enterprises even greater freedom in the disposal of their assets than in the commodity market, as well as to put into circulation various components of the assets, title-deeds (stocks) and securities. However, no circulation of title-deeds relating to state-owned property has developed in the directive economy, which is connected with the nature of the state-run enterprise.

1.3. State property

State property, called enigmatically social property, is the fundamental element of the directive economy. In principle, property is divided into three types: state-owned, co-operative and private, but the economy is often divided into socialised and non-socialised (private). In 1987 the gross value of state-owned fixed assets amounted to 78% and productive fixed capital 80% of the total.

The criticism of state property dominating in the economy focuses on two aspects. First, on the alienation of the employee, his indifference towards this form of ownership. This makes state property nobody's property. Secondly, it is emphasised that the present forms of state

ownership make impossible a flexible allocation (relocation) of assets on the basis of criteria of micro-effectiveness. State administration is supposed to protect state property by extra-economic means; on the other hand, however, it shows no interest in increasing its market value. The problem is, how to make this property bring its owner financial, not only material, effects (Lipowski 1988: 16).

1.4. State-run enterprises

State-run enterprises are units performing not only economic, but also political, social, educational and cultural functions. Management is identified with being on duty, and directors consider themselves state officials whose task is to carry out directives and plans sent down from above (Szczepański 1989a: 103). They are also units subordinated to higher-level units (associations) in which settlements are made, so that their economic subjectivity is blurred. At the same time they are submitted to permanent control by the Party organisation of each enterprise and endowed with wide authority, especially in personnel matters. The politicalisation of enterprises was supposed to guarantee the accomplishment of the goals of the Party and to facilitate control of their economic and extra-economic activity.

These mechanism, however, turned out to be ineffective, and since 1980 big industrial plants have been the main centres of fight against the Party. That is why the principal element of the present programme of reforms is the transformation of enterprises into truly economic units and the removal of the Party from workplaces.

2. STRUCTURAL AND FUNCTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS

The structural and functional determinants of the economic crisis are those factors that are negative consequences of the basic properties of the system. Hence, they do not come solely from the economic system, but from the whole of the social system whose components are the political and cultural subsystems, besides the economic one.

They embrace:

1) sectoral-structural factors,
2) material-technical factors,
3) civilisation-related factors, and
4) socio-political factors.

2.1. Sectoral-structural factors

Among factors which have contributed to the development of the crisis are the incorrect proportions in the sectoral structure of the economy. Their manifestations are:

1) the dominance of industry over the other sectors of the economy, and of the heavy industry over other industrial branches, and

2) the weakness of agriculture.

When examining the proportions between these two sectors of the economy in 1988, we can find that industry generated nearly a half of national income (49%), employed 30% of all working people, and made use of 44% of productive fixed capital. In turn, agriculture generated about 12% of national income, employed 28% of all working people, and utilised 29% of productive fixed capital. While agriculture has been increasing its production in absolute terms, its share has constantly been diminishing.

It is hard to determine the share of services in national income, because Polish statistics does not list this entry. According to the doctrine adopted, activity in the non-material sphere does not generate national income, and is a constituent of the consumption of this income.

2.1.1. The dominance of industry over the other sectors of the economy, and of the heavy industry over other industrial branches

This dominance is a result of forced industrialisation ordered by the Communist authorities as part of their six-year plan (1950-1955). According to the doctrine they adopted, and which as applied in the USSR in the 1930s, industry was supposed to be the most important component of the economy, and the development of the producer goods industry was to precede the development of the consumer goods industry. In principle, this doctrine was thought to be valid till the end of the 1970s.

In 1946 industry was nationalised, which did not raise objections at the time because most industry was destroyed, and anyway only a small part

of it was Polish property. Those enterprises were to be nationalised which employed more than 50 people; in practice, however, all privately-owned industry was eliminated. Its injurious effects became evident especially when it came to the development of industries requiring the co-operation of many small plants; hence e.g. the difficulties with the development of the car industry.

Thus, industry was the sector which developed the quickest and most dynamically, with a clear dominance of the producer goods industry, especially the heavy and machine-building industries. The forced industrialisation caused a shift in the distribution of national income from consumption to investments. The rate of investment in the heavy any machine-building industries was slowed down only in the periods of social unrest (1956-57, 1968-69, after 1976, and 1980-81), when promises were made to keep this tendency constant. With the immediate social threat averted, however, investment in those branches accelerated again. The targets of the successive five-year plans were not achieved as far as agricultural production and the output of consumer industries were concerned; instead, the targets for the output of the producer goods industry were exceeded, which contributed to the disorganisation of the economy due to the unevenness of development, e.g. the deficit of materials and raw materials.

In spite of a serious increase in the level of industrialisation, its results did not turn out to be very fortunate. It is believed that its negative feature was the lack of a clear conception of the place of Polish industry in the world division of labour and indecision as to its specialisation (Landau 1985: 60). Attempts at a selective development of industry have thus far been unsuccessful and ended in excessive expansion of production. We simply produce a bit of everything. This has made significant advances in technology impossible and prolonged the time of production to obtain longer series, and in consequence has limited the possibilities of export owing to the ageing of goods.

The expansion of the machine-building industry did not lead to a profitable specialisation. It required huge investments in metallurgy, which in turn necessitated a massive import of ores, and ultimately turned out to be extremely material - and energy-intensive. There was also sharp competition on the world and CMEA markets. The excessive procurement imports accompanied by lack of export-oriented production resulted in a chronic deficit in the trade with the dollar-based trading area.

Another costly thing was the development of coal mines and the wasteful exploitation of coal. For instance, the input of energy necessary to extract 193 million tons of coal amounted to 45 million tons of coal in 1980 and 54 million in 1987. The coal industry devours more and more of its own production, as does the whole of the heavy industry.

2.1.2. The weakness of agriculture

Disproportions between the development of agriculture and industry have been growing ever since the war. While in the years 1950-1970 industrial production increased by nearly 650%, the net commodity production of agriculture grew by only 76%.

In the first years after the war the increase in agricultural production was fairly rapid, due to the utilisation of simple reserves, mostly arable land lying fallow. Although the agrarian reform of 1945 disposed of big landed property, as soon as 1948 the process of collectivisation was started following the Soviet model. The resistance of peasants, lack of means of production, and disorganisation made agricultural production dwindle, and the return of Gomułka to power in 1956 was followed by the return to family farming.

Hence, Polish agriculture differs from that of other East European countries in that it has a large share of private farming taking up 76% of land under agricultural use. Despite the acknowledgement of private farming by the authorities, their economic policy was inconsistent and favoured state-owned and co-operative farms, called the socialised sector, by giving them subsidies and ensuring the better procurement of agricultural machinery, fertilisers and pest control products. In 1987 outlays on productive investments per worker in the private sector amounted to 29% of those in the socialised sector, and per hectare of farmland - 61% (Kulikowski 1983: 31). Also, material consumption was much higher in socialised agriculture than in private farming.

As to effectiveness, however, private farming got much better results than socialised one: 1) land productiveness was much higher when measured as production per unit area of agricultural land (in 1987 - 137,000 zlotys/ha versus 128,000 zlotys/ha), and even higher when measured as net output; 2) the productivity of labour measured as production per full-time worker was also higher (by 80%) in private farming than in socialised one (Kulikowski 1983: 32).

Taken as a whole, agriculture had too small a share in investment outlays. In the years 1950-1955 agriculture got only 10% of investment outlays, with the figure rising to 17.4% in 1966-1970 and dropping finally to 15-16%. As a result, agriculture became seriously under-capitalised, and the deficit of agricultural produce kept increasing. The under-capitalisation led to the permanent dependence of the Polish economy on growing imports of grain and meat, and it did it in the conditions of a deficit of the balance of trade in industrial goods.

An important issue that will not be dealt with here is the internal structure of agricultural production, namely the relationship between vegetable and animal production.

2.2. Material and technological backwardness

A significant point in the economic programme of the Communists when they came to power after the Second World War was a material and technological modernisation of the technical infrastructure and industry, and it won strong social approval. "The acceptance of modernisation meant the acceptance at their face value of promises of changes for the better that urbanisation and industrialisation were supposed to bring to the masses" (Kochanowicz 1988: 105). This programme, however, was understood traditionally as the process of industrialisation patterned upon the Soviet model, and lagged behind the rapidly advancing technology of Western countries. While in the first post-war years, during the period of reconstruction, negative economic effects of the material and technological backwardness did not make themselves felt, by the end of Gomułka's rule, i.e. the late 1960s, these effects became conspicuous. They became even more aggravated in the late 1970s, when they clearly turned out to be a factor contributing to the economic collapse.

Technological backwardness affected both, material infrastructure and the technologies of manufacturing processes and products.

Practically all the components of material infrastructure are backward, but it i especially glaring in residential construction and the state of dwellings, the technical state of transport, especially the railway, and the telephone network. The technical state of the railway is much worse than it was before the Second World War.

There is a big technological gap between Polish manufacturing processes and products and those of the Western countries. The gap

manifests itself in: 1) an outdated and ineffective branch structure of industry, or in the lack of industries manufacturing and utilising high-tach products, e.g. integrated circuits, and in 2) a backward assortment of products within a branch, e.g. poor-quality steel, packing, etc.

Let us now turn to the major factors responsible for this material and technological backwardness:

1) low innovativeness,
2) low productivity and quality of labour, and
3) high consumption of energy and raw materials.

2.2.1. Low innovativeness

Low innovativeness, or strictly speaking, the incapacity for innovations, i.e. for an independent development of new, socially and economically useful technologies and products, is closely connected with the technological backwardness, although it is its cause rather than effect. The Polish economic system was unable not only to generate new technologies and products in required quantities, but also to import them, and when imported, to use them efficiently. The directive mechanism, guided solely by gross output figures and limits, discouraged socially effective innovations. State-run enterprises were not interested in innovations because, under the conditions of disequilibrium and associated demand barriers, lack of competition, high inflation, and easy subsidies and rebates, they were not compelled to seek novelties. The adaptation of enterprises to external economic conditions required only slight improvements of products and ways of manufacturing them. Engineers and managers could be sure of their positions without bothering about technological progress (Macieja and Mujżel 1988: 199).

As a result, few innovations were introduced that were socially and economically useful, especially that would save resources, and many innovations that were socially and economically ineffective (e.g. precast building units plants, the "Polonez" motor-car, etc.). Also, innovative projects took a much longer time to implement than in the Western countries, which made them obsolete and costly (Balcerowicz 1981: 164). The purchase of technological licences was not as profitable as expected, either; some of them have never been used because of lack of investment means.

2.2.2. Low productivity and quality of labour

The low productivity and quality of labour are one of major factors of low economic effectiveness in Poland, and hence of the economic crisis. They cannot be accounted for merely by a low ethos of work. They are first of all a sinister effect of the functioning of the economic system and enterprises. Their basic reasons are a poor motivation on the one hand, and a bad organisation of labour in industrial plants on the other.

The poor motivation follows from the mismatch between wages and effects of labour, and from a low level of wages which are insufficient to satisfy needs other than food and clothing. Many years' incomes from work are not enough to earn one independent living, the fundamental component of which is one's own dwelling.

Some economists emphasise the role of lack of unemployment. However, in the state-run sector there is a disguised unemployment in the workplace, to quote Kornai, analogous to the unemployment in agriculture before the war (Kochanowicz 1988: 106).

The principal reason, however, is the badly organised work in workplaces. Disturbance in the supply of raw materials and semi-finished products and the deficit of proper tools disorganise work and encourage workers to shrug off responsibility for it.

In the conditions of the economics of shortage all this results in a low quality of products. It is true of a lot of industrial goods (e.g. the defectiveness of cars is 100%), dwellings, and some agricultural produce, especially milk. Attempts to change this state of affairs under the directive economy, such as the obligation to exchange defective goods and free guarantee service, have been unsuccessful. A customer is reluctant to have e.g. his car serviced, even in the case of a minor repair, for fear that good parts might be replaced with bad ones.

2.2.3. High energy and material consumption and the creation of an energy and material barrier

The Polish economy consumes disproportionately large quantities of energy and raw materials. Energy consumption per unit is very high, starting with a bulb and ending witch a car. The heating of a flat requires 7.5 tons of coal annually. The most synthetic indicator of this fact is the energy intensity of national income, which is three times as high as in the

developed countries of Western Europe. No mechanisms forcing industry to reduce its energy and material consumption have developed in the Polish economy over the lost 20 years. The large share of fossil fuel (coal) in the fulfilment of the demand for energy (about 80%) and the low consumption of petroleum helped the Polish economy to avoid, at least at the beginning, the oil shock of the 1970s which forced tremendous progress in fighting energy intensity in the Western economy.

The persistence of high energy intensity was caused by a wrong investment policy and poor technological progress. The growing demand for fuels and energy, in turn, was stimulated by the increase in the production of particularly energy-intensive goods, such as rolled products, fertilisers, products of heavy chemistry, and cement. Over the last 20 years the demand of the economy for primary energy increased on the average by 4.5% per year, and its generation by 3.7%; the difference was covered by the import of liquid fuel and natural gas. Since 1979, when the output of hard coal reached 201 million tons, it has been declining, and amounted to 193 million tons in 1988. Coal is more and more expensive due to the rising costs of extraction and investments; it is ineffective in a number of technological applications and useless in motorisation, but there is little chance of increasing the import of oil and gas from the USSR.

Thus, the Polish economy is in a tight place between the growing costs of energy and material procurement and the increasing expenditures on new, energy-saving technologies and the restructuring of industry. This sets up a strong barrier to further development and is highly crisis-generative. Some people even anticipate a power catastrophe.

2.3. Civilisation-related factors

The slowing down of economic development followed by the crisis is also conditioned by civilisation-related factors, although there is a feedback here. There is such a diversity of them that it would be difficult to discuss them all. Hence, I shall limit myself to only two: 1) the adverse impact of accelerated urbanisation, and 2) the behaviour and situation of households.

2.3.1. The adverse impact of accelerated urbanisation

Urbanisation, beside industrialisation, was the principal element of the post-war modernisation programme. The development of industry of

industry in towns and so-called urban agglomerations as well as large labour reserves in the rural areas brought about migrations from the country to towns and from smaller to larger towns, rapidly gaining in population. While in 1946 34% of the total of 23.6 million people lived in towns, in 1988 the urban population amounted to 61.2% of 37.8 million. The inflow of people to towns was mostly motivated economically, but an important motive was also the possibility of gaining a dwelling and education.

Without going further into the matter, the point that requires emphasis is the tremendous economic cost of rapid urbanisation. This cost was borne by the state, which financed the whole of the development of the communal infrastructure and its maintenance, and most residential construction (through the construction of precast building units plants, the financing of communal construction, credits for co-operative and private construction at low interest rates, and huge housing subsidies - for repairs, heating, etc.).

Thus, accelerated urbanisation turned into a great burden involving considerable investment outlays on the communal economy and housing, and on their functioning. While in 1960 outlays on residential construction equalled 21.2% of total investments, in 1975 they amounted to 11.8%, and in 1980 to 17.4%. Nevertheless, since the mid-1970s housing and communal conditions have been deteriorating (sewage disposal, shortage of drinking water, etc.), which has aggravated public feelings.

2.3.2. The behaviour of households

The behaviour of households plays an important role in the shaping of the condition of the economy, including the creation and shaping of the economic crisis, mainly through their immediate responses to the market situation. Their function is usually discussed in term of aggregated demand. This issue was taken up by Szczepański (1989a:92), in whose opinion "households are very sensitive testers of the state of the economy and record both its improvement and deterioration; also, the first signals of social unrest induced by the state of the economy come out from here". Szczepański believes that a new light is shed on the economic functions of households in the process of consumption if it is divided into five different phenomena: the acquisition, possession, use or consumption, waste, and thoughtless destruction of goods (1989a:92).

Hence, the role of households cannot be accounted for in the framework of the traditional conception of demand. Starting with this assumption, attention should be paid to the following aspects of the behaviour of households in the shaping of the state of the Polish economy and the crisis:

1) In contrast to a mass-consumption market economy where the demand is the main factor of production, in a directive economy with a producer's market there is no such direct interaction, at least in short periods of time. This forces households to follow their own economic policy of storing and own production of some goods.

2) The "storing" function and the increase in the production functions of households requires a quick response (i.e. eager buying) to the production and market situation and a constant watching of this situation and its threats. Hence their interest in political and economic changes, not only at home but also abroad. All important political events have always swept the market clean.

3) This type of behaviour has a negative impact on the economic situation because it deepens the market disequilibrium and is a major factor shaping the economics of shortage. In the conditions of crisis, it strengthens social dissatisfaction and the negative image of the crisis in the social awareness.

4) There is a shift of focus on the satisfaction of needs of one's own household and its efficient operation, and a weakening of interest in the effects of external work, i.e. in a workplace, to improve one's situation.

2.4. Socio-political factors

Poland's economic crisis is closely connected with a socio-political crisis. These phenomena are always intertwined and mutually dependent, but usually it is the influence of the economic situation on the political one that is considered rather than the other way round. It is beyond doubt that the deterioration of the population's living conditions and a bad market situation played a significant role in the eruption of the social unrest of 1956, 1970, 1976, 1980/81, and 1988.

At the same time, however, the political wear and erosion of the power system kept increasing, both outside, i.e. in the social awareness, and inside, i.e. in the power **aparat** and its operation.

Fundamental changes have been taking place in the social awareness,

especially since the mid-1970s. The society was losing faith in the possibility of improvement of the economic and civilisation situation. The diminishing political and cultural isolation from the developed West European countries made known their high standards of living and political democracy. The civilisation and consumption models coming from there produced the effect of demonstration which, the chances to improve the standard of living blighted, made the society indisposed to accept new hardships and high accumulation. There were also ever higher aspirations of the growing middle class, embracing also industrial workers, miners and farmers. In these conditions the authorities demand it indispensable to contract more foreign loans which were partly allotted to consumption.

The society also lost confidence in the success of the attempts at partial economic reforms and blamed the authorities and the Party-government aparat for the poor condition of the economy. The deprivation of the society of an influence on the economic policy and the direction of changes in the political system greatly contributed to the emergence of Solidarity and to the explosion of social activity and strikes of 1980/81, with demands for radical changes well to the fore; and after the declaration of the state of martial law (13 December 1981) to a permanent and ever growing socio-political crisis. Without overestimating the losses brought about by strikes (they were insignificant), it should e stated that the growing socio-political crisis further disturbed the already upset balance, increased deficits, and helped ignore the importance of such factors as the productivity of labour.

Under these conditions, since the late 1970s the Communist power and the political system started to wear down, and inside power centres and the Party-government aparat the conviction was gaining ground that the methods and doctrinal assumptions pushed thus far were far from successful, although internal quarrels and the fear of the society undermined the will to introduce reforms.

The ideological and doctrinal foundations of the system based on Marxism-Leninism were totally discredited. This concerned the prophetic and primitive version of Marxism-Leninism with its claims about inexorable laws of history and progress, and about the special role and rights of a Communist party ensuring it a monopoly of tripartite power: political, economic and ideological (Kochanowicz 1988: 105; cf. also Nowak 1983).

In an attempt to save the system, the authorities introduced the state of martial law, which upset and depressed the economy, and then started to implement half-way economic reforms which turned out to be unsuccessful. These processes produced the following results:

1) the disintegration of the central authorities,

2) a diminished effectiveness of central control,, especially in forcing accumulation and the achievement of selected targets, and

3) the questioning of the legitimacy of those in power.

I shall only discuss the first issue. The disintegration of the central authorities took place as their power to confer privileges and resources on lower-ranking members of the **aparat** dwindled. It resulted in a pathological duality of authority lessening the efficiency of the centre through the sabotage of its orders at lower levels and through supplying it with false information. While it reduced the efficiency of the directive system, it did not bring any profits to the society, more and more convinced of the egoistic behaviour and aims of the people in power. At the same time, these very people stopped treating the official ideology seriously.

The socio-psychological effects of these processes turned out to be disastrous for the authorities and the system: they aggravated the discontent of the masses even further, led to the formation of a Solidarity-based, powerful opposition and the breakdown of political mechanisms, and in practice made it impossible for the old **aparat** to exercise authority and for the system to function.

3. SYMPTOMS OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS

The symptoms of the economic crisis are a set of phenomena and processes determining such a state of the malfunctioning of the economy which prevents the satisfaction of historically developed societal needs, the renewal of the economy, and economic and civilisation progress. These symptoms are:

1) regression in production and construction,

2) a change in the distribution of national income and investments,

3) export stagnation and growing pecuniary difficulties,

4) a crash on the market and increasing shortages,
5) run-away inflation,
6) environmental degradation,
7) a drop in the standard of living, and
8) an increase in emigration.

3.1. Regression in production and construction

The most conspicuous drop took place in the production of a number of industrial goods. Its volume was smaller in 1988 than 10-12 years ago. Accompanied by an increase in the population (by about 2.7 million in the years 1978-1988), this aggravated the economics of shortage.

The drop in the production of major articles looked as follows*:

1. fossil and liquid fuels:			
hard coal	from	201	million t in 1979
	to	193	million t in 1988
coke coal	from	20.2	million t in 1978
	to	17.1	million t in 1988
oil refining	from	17.0	million t in 1978
	to	15.0	million t in 1988
2. metallurgical goods:			
pig iron	from	17.7	million t in 1978
	to	10.3	million t in 1988
crude steel	from	19.3	million t in 1978
	to	16.9	million t in 1988
rolled products	from	13.6	million t in 1978
	to	12.4	million t in 1988
zinc	from	228	thousand t in 1978
	to	177	thousand t in 1988
3. machinery and transport equipment:			
metal working machines	from	57.6	thousand t in 1979
	to	39.7	thousand t in 1988

*All data come from *The 1986 Statistical Yearbook*, *The 1988 Statistical Yearbook* and *The 1988 Concise Statistical Yearbook*.

sea-going vessels	from	791	thousand DWT in 1978
	to	224	thousand DWT in 1988
lorries	from	61.3	thousand in 1978
	to	46.8	thousand in 1988
passenger cars	from	350	thousand in 1978
	to	293	thousand in 1988
4. building materials and timber:			
cement	from	21.7	million t in 1978
	to	17.0	million t in 1988
sawn wood	from	7,800	thousand m^3 in 1978
	to	5,800	thousand m^3 in 1988
5. textile and leather products:			
cotton fabrics	from	951	thousand km in 1977
	to	749	thousand km in 1988
woolen fabrics	from	124	thousand km in 1977
	to	101	thousand km in 1988
footwear	from	76	million pairs in 1977
	to	62	million pairs in 1988
6. food products:			
meat	from	2.559	thousand t in 1979
	to	2.246	thousand t in 1988
sea fish	from	803	thousand t in 1979
	to	590	thousand t in 1988

Although global data on the value of industrial production show an increase, they do not supply reliable information due to changes in the calculation of fixed prices. Hence volume data are more adequate.

The causes of production slump vary from industry to industry. Some, however, are fundamental: mismanagement of the existing resources of raw materials, including scrap materials, a drop in the import of raw materials and semi-finished products, the ageing of machinery, negligible technological progress, and ineffective stimulation of the productivity of labour.

A sharp decline in the production has taken place in construction, which is the weakest branch of the Polish economy. The air-space of buildings completed in 1987 (138.3 million m^3) was smaller than in 1970 (149.3 m^3). The crash took place in 1980, when an air-space of 146.2 million m^3 was completed, as against 200.3 million m^3 in 1979. Thus, there

is a set-back of almost 20 years. In residential construction the situation is similar: its 1987 output (75.2 million m^3) was smaller than the 1976 one (78.9 million m^3). It is especially distressing in view of the huge deficit of dwellings, particularly in big cities where the time of waiting for a flat in housing co-operatives is tens of years, sometimes even almost 40. Naturally, this evokes social dissatisfaction and frustration.

Construction is characterised by particularly low economic effectiveness, wastefulness, and technological backwardness. The slump in production results from the shortage of building materials, especially finishing materials and fittings, caused among other things by the limitation of exports. This, in turn, makes building cycles erratic and prolonged.

The production situation of agriculture is equally grim. The increment in agricultural production, which has been low anyway, halted already in 1974, mainly in vegetable production. In subsequent years production, especially animal, increased owing to the import of fodder and grain. The crash came in 1980, and despite periodical upward tendencies, in 1987 total agricultural production reached the 1974-1977 level, and total animal production - that of 1973. Here, too, there is a set-back of some 10 years. It is obvious how this situation affects the food market and societal attitudes.

Among major factors responsible for this state of affairs are insufficient investment outlays on agriculture and agriculture-oriented industries, especially of agricultural equipment and pest control products, the neglect of infrastructure (a water supply system), a low level of agricultural knowledge, the outflow of young people to towns, and the vacillating agrarian policy. The set of these factors has created a barrier in the development of agricultural production that will be difficult to surmount.

3.2. The change in the distribution of national income and the unfavourable situation of investments

The distribution of national income underwent serious changes at the beginning of the 1980s, when the share of accumulation dropped in 1981 to 20.7% at fixed prices. and to a dramatically low level of 9.9% at current prices. After a slight increase it slumped again in 1985 and in 1988 it oscillated around 19%. While this indicates the tendency to protect the standard of living, it also diminishes the chances to restructure production.

This is strictly connected with an unfavourable situation of investments, namely (Wyżnikiewicz 1988 144):

1) The decreasing rate of productive investments, as manifested by the diminishing share of investment outlays on material production in gross national income distributed: 18.1% in 1980 versus 15.1% in 1987.

2) The worsening of the defective sectoral structure of investments because of the continuation of investments from previous years. The share of investment outlays on machinery and equipment was 35.1% in 1987, while in 1980 it was still 43.9%. It is assumed that the more is invested in construction works at the cost of machinery, the lower the efficiency of investment.

3) The continuation of investment pathology consisting in: a) the scattering of investments as a result of new ones being started while the number of old ones does not diminish; b) the lengthening of the investment cycle, which soared up from 30.3 months in 1975 to 50.1 months in 1983; and c) scant deliveries of machinery which do not even guarantee the depreciation of the existing stock.

So, the investment process is disintegrated and full of contradictions. This follows not only from the bad investment structure, the monopolistic position of construction firms and designing offices, and practical irresponsibility of investors for costs and economic effects, but also from the general imbalance of investments, and a hug excess of investment demand over the supply of indispensable material and personal factors (Rakowski 1989: 120).

3.3. Export stagnation and growing pecuniary difficulties

The present situation of Poland in the domain of foreign relations is bad, and getting worse. A particular feature of the Polish economy is an excessive demand for imported goods accompanied by a very low exporting capacity. After a period of growth in the 1970s and decline in 1980-1981, export does not show any tendency to expand, and its share in world export keeps diminishing.

This state of export results primarily from the wrong structure of industrial production and a low technological level of products, but also from a bad export-promoting policy.

The policy of expanding export to dollar-based countries has not brought desired effects so far. The share of the export of electrical equipment has never even reached 25% (23.4% in 1988), and any increase in the export of products of the light and food industries (21.0% in 1988) is impossible at present due to the insufficient supply of the home market, i.e. a danger of making shortages and inflation more severe.

The tendency to export scarce goods is caused by the necessity of balancing foreign trade, and effectiveness is of secondary importance here.

The foreign trade surplus obtained does not even suffice to pay interest on the growing debts contracted in the West. The annual foreign trade surplus (the surplus of payments for goods) was about a milliard dollars in the years 1985-1988. Pecuniary difficulties in foreign relations become ever more serious. In this connection, four matters require attention:

1) the adverse impact of external factors on Poland's economic situation: a sharp increase in credit interest, refusal of short-term commercial credits, unfavourable terms of trade, and the protectionist policy of some Western states that is changing only now;

2) the growing passive debt amounting, in 1988, to 39.2 milliard US dollars plus 1.7 milliard of active debts and 6.5 milliard roubles;

3) the outflow from Poland of net 6 milliard US dollars as partial payment of interest on debts in the years 1982-1985;

4) obtaining a foreign trade surplus through a drastic reduction of exports rather than through boosting exports.

3.4. The crash on the consumer goods market and increasing shortages

The most spectacular and trying symptom of the crisis was the crash on the consumer goods market that took place in the years 1981-1982, and which persists till now in spite of attempts at its reconstruction.

The main factor responsible for the crash is the supply deficit, i.e. a deficit of goods and services as well as the import of goods, with relation to the population's paying capacity. This deficit varies over time with the variation in production and deliveries, which, in turn, leads to increased buying and the shortage of goods in households. Hence, a shortage causes a shortage, as Kornai put it in his excellent analysis of the economics of shortage, but finally it has attained a state which caused the consumer goods market to break.

The crash affected the supply of most products, though in varying degrees. For example, the supply of TV sets decreased by 53% in 1982 as compared with 1977, and coffee even by 93% in 1983 in relation to 1980. This was largely due to a decrease in the production of several goods which was not offset by imports; for instance, the production of several goods which was not offset by imports; for instance, the production of fabrics was smaller in 1988 than in 1970, and of footwear smaller than in 1980. Shortages occurred at a wide scale and in practically all groups of goods.

In these conditions, the demand stopped playing any role in the regulation of the supply of various goods, and the function of the distributor was taken over by the system of rationing and administrative distribution. Autarchic decisions of voivodeship and enterprise authorities to detain goods in short supply on their territories have created regional unevenness of distribution and aggravated market difficulties. It is impossible to buy a lot of articles without queues, a great deal of pull, or bribes. It is difficult to estimate both, the loss of time spent on searching for goods and queuing up (e.g. thousands of drivers waiting for petrol for several hours) and the increase in the cost of living brought about by the storage of goods and the lack of their cheaper sorts.

The crash on the consumer goods market has a direct influence on the public feeling and social awareness. To the present day the condition of the market is the touchstone of the success of the reformatory steps undertaken.

It is a fairly common opinion that in order to restore the market equilibrium it is necessary to curb the increase in personal incomes through wage discipline. The experiences of the years 1981-1988 have shown it to be an illusion, because thus far it has been impossible to halt the increase in wages (Wyżnikiewicz 1988: 151). This, of course, induces a further increase in inflation.

3.5. Run-away inflation

The sharp increase in inflation consisting always in a rapid upward price movement absorbing excess demand is that symptom of the crisis which is particularly disorganising to economic mechanisms and which is most keenly felt by the society.

The moderate inflation of the late 1970s got worse at the turn of the 1970s in the conditions of a growing strain in the market, to become rampant in the second half of the 1980s with a threat of hyperinflation in 1989. Thus, in 1988 the general index of retail prices of goods and services was 942% as compared with 1980, but e.g. the prices of fuel jumped 22 times. In comparison with 1987 it was 161%, and in July 1989 it amounted to 283% as compared with July 1988. In 1989 the monthly inflation was about 50% (Życie Gospodarcze 43: 15).

Inflation is a too complicated phenomenon for its causes and mechanisme to be presented very briefly. Also, neither of the leading theories of inflation (of demand-induced inflation and of wage-induced inflation) gives a satisfactory explanation of this phenomenon in the Polish economy (Topiński 1989: 45-57).

Simplifying, there are two overlapping processes responsible for inflation. One is market shortages and the associated price increase, and is determined by the low economic effectiveness and the wrong structure of production. The other process, the increase in the population's wages and incomes, was of minor importance until recently, because the share of wages in net production kept decreasing, with wages growing slower than effectiveness and pecuniary resources increasing at a rate similar to that of inflation. It was only in 1987 that a change in the price structure followed by a frantic pressure to raise wages started the prices-wages-prices chain, the flight from the currency, and the hyperinflation.

3.6. Environmental degradation

It would be a hard task to describe here in detail the scope and degree of the degradation of the natural environment that has taken place in Poland. In some parts of the country, the intensity and extent of the degradation qualify it as an ecological disaster. On all ecological maps of Europe there is a conspicuous area of a high concentration of environmental damage embracing the frontier region between Poland, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic. The pollution of water, soil and food over large areas of Poland is alarming and poses a very serious ecological threat, as evidenced by the results of tests and diagnoses (Kozłowski 1984). There are such phenomena as forest decline, a shortage of potable water, steppisation and soil erosion, excessive emission of sulphur brought about by coal-based power production, especially by the burning of brown coal, an incorrect use of chemicals in agriculture, the flushing of fertilisers into lakes and rivers, and the discharge of waste into rivers and the sea. The list of such threats is long, and indicates a constant deterioration of the environment.

This condition of the environment has its economic causes and effects (Kozłowski 1983). The economic programme implemented after the war, especially the direction of the industrialisation of the country, was conducive to environmental damage and improper use of natural resources. It was aided in this by the absence of an evaluation of natural resources and a proper economic calculus, as well as by negligence and carelessness in the construction and performance of industrial plants. At the same time, environmental pollution and damage incurs colossal economic losses.

The relation between environmental degradation and the crisis has the form of feedback. On the one hand, with the growing economic difficulties and the deepening of the economics of shortage, investment funds for ecological purposes are being reduced or hardly drawn on. The extent of environmental damage was long known, but no steps were taken to prevent it, especially to stop the emission of noxious gases and to build sewage-treatment plants. There was a fairly common opinion that whatever technology had destroyed, technology could mend, given appropriate means. At present the talk is only about stopping the danger from increasing, and even that might be difficult to achieve. In turn,

increasing ecological difficulties aggravate economic troubles and lower the population's standards of living and the quality of life.

3.7. The drop in the standard of living

The drop in the population's standards of living is a distinct symptom of the crisis. An objective approach to the process of diminishing satisfaction of people's material and non-material needs requires the presentation of changes in the magnitude of incomes, and goods and services consumed. Other factors influencing this process, besides shrinking incomes and consumption, are growing inflation, the deepening of the economics of shortage, and the deterioration of people's living conditions, especially of the quality of the environment (Chojnicki and Czyż 1987).

Granting the standard of living to be a complex and multi-dimensional phenomenon, let us focus solely on changes in the money incomes and consumption of the population. A drop in these magnitudes is the most important thing that social awareness associates with the crisis anyway.

Real money incomes of the population started to fall markedly in 1982. Per capita incomes in 1987 amounted to 92.4% of those in 1980, with the greatest slump in 1982 - nearly 20% as compared with 1981. In the years 1970-1980 they increased by 85%. The drop in real wages was even bigger: in 1987 they amounted to 80.8% of the 1980 ones.

There has also been a decrease in the private consumption of material goods since 1980. The sharpest slump took place in 1982 again - 15% as compared with 1981. While in 1980-1987 the nominal decrease was only 0.5%, in reality it was much bigger given the increase in the population of 2.1 million, i.e. 6%. This is evidenced by a drop in the per capita consumption of some goods in the years 1980-1988, namely: of grain products from 127 to 113 kg; rice from 3.2 to 2.0 kg; fruit from 37.7 to 32.2 kg; fish from 8.1 to 6.4 kg; animal fats from 8.1 to 7.8 kg; butter from 8.9 to 8.6 kg; eggs from 223 to 200; wine from 10.1 to 7.7 l; fabrics from 22.5 to 19.3 m (1987); footwear from 3.8 to 3.5 pairs (1987); and paper from 33.2 to 28.3 kg.

The distribution of the costs of the crisis over the population is not even. The opinion is gaining ground that the group of people most burdened with the costs is that employed in the so-called socialised

economy, that is, in the state-run sector. Their economic degradation took place in at least three relations: 1) in relation to their previous incomes, 2) in relation to the incomes of privately-employed people, and 3) in relations among various professional groups (Wiśniewski 1984).

As I have shown above, there is a marked drop in real incomes. What is difficult to establish, though, is the relationship between personal incomes in the socialised and non-socialised (private) economy. But can be stated generally is that the increase in nominal wages in the two types of economy jointly was 873% over the years 1980-1988, and was lower than the increase in incomes from private farming (931%) and from work in the private sector outside farming (a 20-fold increase). Also, differences between wages in various branches of the economy widened. Thus, while in 1985 average wages in education amounted to 72% of those in industry, in 1988 they dropped to only 62%. In health care the respective figures were 68% and 66%.

However, these relations keep changing due to the operation of the underground economic circulation. Studies have shown that whereas in the 1970s out of twenty 1-zloty coins of current incomes of the population, one changed its owner via the underground circulation (20 : 1), in 1982 this ratio was 8 : 1 (Wiśniewski 1985: 937).

3.8. Intensification of emigration

A psycho-social symptom of the crisis, and at the same time its effect, is the apathy and frustration of the society reinforced by the comparison with the economic situation and civilisation of West European countries. The dissatisfaction with the standards and conditions of living makes many young people see the chance of bettering their lives in a temporary or permanent migration to countries with higher standards of living and higher wages. A similar phenomenon can be observed in Turkey, Yugoslavia and north-African countries. According to Galbraith (1979), migration is the oldest way of preventing poverty.

According to official statistics, i.e. those of the Central Statistical Office, in the years 1981-1985 there were 120.000 persons emigrating from Poland, and in 1986-1988 this figure was 102,000. Unfortunately, these statistics are misleading, because they are based on records of departure of those leaving the country for good. However, a great deal of people go

abroad for a period of time only, mostly as tourists, and then decide to stay there. Hence serious difficulties with the estimation of the actual volume of migrations abroad.

According to the information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there are 753,000 Polish citizens to capitalist countries that have arrived there since 1980 and that are called the latest emigration (Latuch 1989: 54). According to other estimates, 58,500 people emigrated from Poland in the years 1983-1987, including 5,000 with higher education; 117,000 persons who left the country temporarily decided to stay abroad, including 16,500 with higher education; finally, 328,000 persons (38,000 with higher education) prolonged their visit abroad (Latuch 1989: 55). This amounts to a loss of hundreds of thousands of people of the working age, and to tremendous brain draining.

The influence of these migrations on the economic situation and the crisis is indisputable. On the one hand, it depresses the economy by depriving it of particularly valuable workers and citizens, mostly professional people with plenty of initiative, because it is primarily this category of persons that decide to emigrate. On the other hand, however, many of them send substantial sums of money to Poland, totalling several milliard dollars, and when they eventually come back, they contribute new skills and abilities.

CONCLUSION

In order to change Poland's economic situation, that is, too overcome the crisis and then to achieve significant economic growth, it is necessary to restructure the economic system radically enough to accommodate market mechanisms. This restructuring, however, must be an integral part of the transformation of the whole of Poland's socio-economic system and its institutions. Its basic element is the introduction of a democratic parliamentary system, and hence of a democratic mechanism of shaping and verifying the economic policy.

The attempts to reform the economy undertaken in the years 1982-1988 were not successful because they only replaced some tools of central control with others, without changing the directive system itself, its institutions, and the totalitarian system of Communist power. These

experiences show that this system is not fit for partial reforms because its performance clashes with the aspirations and preferences of people and with regularities defining modern civilisation.

According to Wilczyński (1989: 266), the reform should rim at the following targets: 1) profound changes in the economic relations conducive to the re-integration of the society disintegrated by the Stalinist system, 2) the construction of a totally new economic mechanism based on horizontal rather than vertical links and encouraging optimisation from below, and 3) opening the way for proper structural development as opposed to doctrinal planning conceptions.

To achieve these targets, a radical change is necessary in the position and function of the state in the economy, and in the market and financial relations. The state must give up its function of the manager of the national economy as one huge multiple-plant concern. Rather than manage production directly, it should make enterprises obey norms violated this far (e.g. in environmental protection, the space economy, the quality of goods, etc.) and fulfil properly its functions in establishing the policies of wages, prices and taxes.

It is also necessary to transform the market and financial relations, first of all prices and the market, if we want to develop a market economy and equilibrium mechanisms.

The taking over of power by Mazowiecki's government and Solidarity following the election in June 1989 made it possible to start the restructuring of the political and economic systems. Balcerowicz's programme of economic reform began the transformation of the economic system from measures to stabilise currency, cuts in subsidies, demonopolisation and making enterprises independent, changing state-owned businesses into privately-owned ones based on stock ownership, and in general from the limitation of state intervention in the country's economic life.

Thus, the principal goal of the reform is the disruption of the totalitarian system with its excessive government intervention in the whole of social life. The difficulties connected with this task are appalling (cf. Kukliński 1989: 31). First of all, there are no historical experiences to rely on. The example of Spain is not adequate, because it has a market economy to start with.

Among the limitations and obstacles that the reform will face the most important are, on the one hand, the burdening of the society with the

National income

	1946	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
National income generated (fixed prices) 1970 = 100	15.2	26.8	40.4	55.5	74.9	100.0	159.4	169.1	148.8	140.6	149.0	157.3	162.6	170.6	174.0	182.3
Share in national income generated (fixed prices) in %																
industry	22.0	24.3	28.6	34.5	38.9	44.0	47.5	50.2	48.7	49.2	49.1	49.0	48.6	48.4	49.1	49.1
construction	4.6	8.2	9.2	10.3	10.2	11.7	13.6	13.3	11.3	11.0	11.1	11.4	12.0	11.9	12.0	12.1
agriculture	70.0	60.3	42.3	34.5	29.7	22.7	15.4	12.9	14.9	16.5	16.4	16.3	14.4	14.6	13.0	12.5
Composition of national income distributed (fixed prices) in %																
consumption	85.1	79.9	78.6	76.1	73.7	72.9	64.3	74.4	79.3	78.4	78.6	78.1	81.0	80.9	81.7	80.5
accomulation	14.9	20.1	21.4	23.9	26.3	27.1	35.7	25.6	20.7	21.6	21.4	21.9	19.0	19.1	18.3	19.5

Source: *Rocznik Statystyczny 1988* (The 1988 Statistical Yearbook)
Mały Rocznik Statystyczny 1989 (The 1989 Concise Statistical Yearbook)

heavy costs of the restructuring, manifesting themselves in a fall in the standards of living of large social groups, and on the other, exaggerated expectations of a rapid improvement accompanied by the atrophy of the habit of conscientious work and good organisation (cf. Szczepański 1989b: 370). Thus, the success of the reforms depends first of all on the attitude of the society and its ability to adapt to and operate in the new conditions.

References

Balcerowicz L., 1981. *Od diagnozy systemu do projektu jego reformy* (From a diagnosis of the system to a draft of its reform). In: Libura-Grzelońska U. (ed.), *Ekonomiści o reformie gospodarczej*. T. 1: *Cele i zakres reformy gospodarczej* (Economists on the economic reform. Vol. 1: Targets and scope of the economic reform). Warszawa : PWE, 157-175.

Bożyk P., 1983. *Marzenia i rzeczywostość* (Dreams and reality). Warszawa: PIW.

Chojnicki Z., Czyż T., 1987. *Economic growth and the standard of living of Poland's population: a regional approach*. Geoforum 18/2, 203-212.

Davies N., 1986. *Heart of Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dymarski W., Juja T., 1988. *Źródła niepowodzeń planowania centralnego i kierunki jego przebudowy* (Sources of failures of central planning and directions of its reconstruction). Ekonomista 1, 47-74.

Galbraith J., 1979. *The nature of mass poverty*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Kochanowicz J., 1988. *Gdzie jesteśmy* (Where are we?). Res Publica 8, 102-108.

Kornai J., 1971. *Anti-Equilibrium*. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

Kornai J., 1980. *Economics of shortage*. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

Kozłowski S., 1983. *Przyrodnicze uwarunkowania gospodarki przestrzennej Polski* (Natural determinants of Poland's space economy). Warszawa-Wrocław: Ossolineum.

Kozłowski S. (ed.), 1984. *Gospodarka zasobami przyrody* (Management of natural resources). Studia KPZK PAN 85. Warszawa: PWE.

Koźmiński A.K., 1982. *Po wielkim szoku* (After the great shock). Warszawa: PWE.

Kukliński A., 1989. *Kto poprowadzi Polskę do XXI wieku* (Who will lead Poland to the 21st century?). In: Kukliński A. (ed.), Współczesne problemy gospodarki przestrzennej Polski (Contemporary problems in Poland's space economy). Rozwój regionalny - rozwój lokalny - samorząd terytorialny 18. Warszawa: Instytut Gospodarki Przestrzennej UW, 31-34.

Kulikowski R., 1983. *Ocena rozwoju organizacji przestrzennej gospodarki żywnościowej w Polsce* (An estimate of the development of the spatial organisation of food management in Poland). Diagnoza stanu gospodarki przestrzennej Polski (A diagnosis of the state of Poland's space economy). Biuletyn KPZK PAN 123, 28-47.

Landau Z., 1985. *Główne tendencje rozwoju gospodarczego Polski Ludowej* (Main tendencies in the economic development of People's Poland). In: Müller A., (ed.), U źródeł polskiego kryzysu (At the source of the Polish crisis). Warszawa: PWN, 17-97.

Latuch M., 1989. *Dylematy i problemy współczesnych migracji zagranicznych w Polsce* (Dilemmas and problems of contemporary international migrations in Poland). In: Współczesne migracje i metodyka ich badania (Contemporary migrations and methodology of studies on them). Warszawa: Instytut Statystyki i Demografii SGPiS, 53-59.

Lipowski A., 1988. *W poszukiwaniu tożsamości* (In search of identity). Res Publica 7, 10-17.

Lipowski A., 1989. *Rynek - własność - socjalizm* (Market - property - socialism). Res Publica 4, 111-114.

Macieja J., Mujżel J., 1988. *Przedsiębiorstwo w procesach restrukturyzacji* (The enterprise in the processes of restructuring). In: Pajestka J. (ed.), Analiza procesu reformy gospodarczej 1986-1987 (Analysis of the processes of the reform of the economy 1986-1987). Studia Ekonomiczne 19. Wrocław: Ossolineum , 198-251.

Nowak L., 1983. *Property and power. Towards a non-Marxian historical materialism.* Dordrecht: Reidel.

Rakowski M., 1989. *Kierunkowe propozycje dotyczące wyjścia z kryzysu* (Proposed directions of overcoming the crisis). In: Dąbrowski M. (ed.), Z problemów funkcjonowania gospodarki polskiej (The problems of the functioning of the Polish economy). Studia Ekonomiczne 20. Wrocław: Ossolineum, 87-139.

Szczepański J., 1989a. *Polska wobec wyzwań przyszłości* (Poland facing future challenges). Rozwój regionalny - rozwój lokalny - samorząd terytorialny 17. Warszawa: Instytut Gospodarki Przestrzennej UW.

Szczepański J., 1989b. *Epilog i otwarcie* (An epilogue and opening). In: Kukliński A. (ed.), Współczesne problemy gospodarki przestrzennej Polski (Contemporary problems in Poland's space economy). Rozwój regionalny - rozwój lokalny - samorząd terytorialny 18. Warszawa: Instytut Gospodarki Przestrzennej UW, 369-375.

Topiński A., 1989. *Aspekty teoretyczne i metodologiczne badań nad inflacją w Polsce* (Theoretical and methodological aspects of studies of inflation in Poland). In: Dąbrowski M. (ed.), Z problemów funkcjonowania gospodarki polskiej (The problems of the functioning of the Polish economy). Studia Ekonomiczne 20. Wrocław: Ossolineum, 45-57.

Wilczyński W., 1989. *Teoretyczne aspekty i problemy reformowania gospodarki polskiej* (Theoretical aspects and problems in reforming the Polish economy). In: Buczkowski P., Cichocki R. (eds), Podmiotowość: możliwość, rzeczywistość, konieczność (Subjectivity: possibility, reality, necessity). Poznań: NAKOM, 259-272.

Wiśniewski M., 1984. *Ile? Komu? Za co?* (How much? Whom? For what?). Życie Gospodarcze 38.

Wiśniewski M., 1985. *Źródła i rozmiary drugiego obiegu gospodarczego* (The sources and size of the underground economy in Poland). Ekonomista 6, 913-940.

Wyżnikiewicz B., 1988. *Przemiany strukturalne w gospodarce Polski w latach 1978-1986 i perspektywy dalszych przeobrażeń* (Structural changes in the Polish economy in the years 1978-1986 and the perspectives of further transformations). In: Pajestka J. (ed.), Analiza procesu reformy gospodarczej 1986-1987 (Analysis of the processes of the reform of the economy 1986-1987). Studia Ekonomiczne 19. Wrocław: Ossolineum, 142-160.

Bogdan Kacprzyński
Institute of Space Economy,
University of Warsaw

STATE INTERVENTIONISM VS. THE POLICY OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENTS IN A PERIOD OF TRANSITION RELATED TO RESTRUCTURING

1. INTRODUCTION

As historical experience shows, the relation between State's inter ventionism and the policy of lower levels in the hierarchy of power, including local self-governments, may change very rapidly and depends on many factors.

Our interest is focused on an analysis of prerequisites of the relation, that is on what facilitates the solution of main problems in a political, social and economic system, at a given time and place, possibly fast, efficiently and without conflicts.

We shall concentrate on the problem of restructuring which begins the process of transition from an excessively centralized system to a free market system.

The changes connected with restructuring may be accompanied by rapid secondary changes, resulting from modification or even dis ruption of relations existing in the previous system of interrelations [1].

There are well justified fears that in the initial process, resultant negative effects may be even larger than benefits stemming from the introduced changes, with one remark that the losses and benefits will affect different economic subjects. This does not imply, however, that the changes are to be given up. But it is necessary to prepare the environment

of the changing object to the changes as well as the object itself. The preparation of the environment to the changes should be performed – in suitable proportion – by local self-government and bodies of State administration. The participating proportion of State interventionism and policy of local self-government in each project like that **should depend on the impact of negative features of the transition period,** related to restructuring.

It is necessary to stress that in a classical selection process by an economic subject (company, economic agent [2] of a new type of activity and in a classical process of locating the facilities to carry out the activity, the reaction of the future environment to the anticipated change is of primary importance since the new type of activity and the new facilities are in principle to fill in a gap in the environment. Profitability of the facilities and activity will depend on the existence of the gap and its volume. As examples in developed countries prove, depending on local or global dimensions of the gap, the economic agent risks a new economic activity, considering both the policies of local self-governments and higher levels of State authorities as well as possibilities of gaining their support for the activity. The support is possible when the activity is in conformity with the policy goals of those bodies.

There are many examples like that, perhaps not on so large a scale as is anticipated in East European countries. Most valuable source of inspiration in this area (due to the scale) is experience from the 1970s oil crisis (e.g. [3]), end to mass production of mechanical watches in France and Switzerland (e.g. [4]) and Portugal's joining the Common Market.

2. RESTRUCTURING

It is well known that the system of centralized economy in its extreme form by principle was to be a system functioning without reserves [2]. Reality has outpaced theory and centralized economy has become synonymous to an economy of permanent shortages [5].

Suitable precise models and tools were to be used to describe the system for operational needs. In reality, it was never possible to break the circle of von Neuman and Leontief's ideals (mainly the table of interbranch interregional flows), supplying tools correctly designed for an ex post analysis. One may say even more – in reality, the system still makes use, in critical situations, of the principle of central intervention

without which the economy and the nation cannot bear any more severe shortages.

One should stress that in a centralized economy without reserves, even if there are no shortages, local changes are characterized by a general trend to propagate throughout the system and frequently they become a beginning of global changes [6]. The property may (but not necessarily) disappear along with accumulation of reserves. In big systems functioning in a natural way (e.g. live organisms), a main function of reserves – supported by in situ observations and detailed laboratory research – is to restrict the range of local perturbations and to check propagation of disturbances throughout the system, excepting a limited areas around the source of disturbances. This is possible due to the application of a suitably differentiated procedure at each level of the control system hierarchy [6].

One of the first necessary steps in the transformation from a centrally planned economy to a free market economy is to eliminate some economically inefficient, technologically obsolete objects or objects which are excessively harmful to the environment. The properties may have been less prominent in studying the system as a whole but they become prominent when examining each object separately. This does not mean that the objects are to be eliminated immediately after an autonomy of operation has been introduced since in a system without reserves this may produce disturbances with effects that may be more expensive than subsidies to much unprofitable objects in a period of transition, until their production has been substituted from other sources or respective technologies have been modernized.

In other words, in the process of turning a centralized economy into a market economy, a moment comes when the economic agent who begins to take independent decisions concerning the object (as owner, co-owner, manager), after he has ascertained economic inefficiency, he must make one of three possible decisions:

1/ **change production volume** (no more restrictions like plans) if this is sufficient to improve economic efficiency (that was a common move in Poland in 1989),

2/ **change profile or technology of production** (no superior restrictions in the form of assortment plan),

3/ **close the facility.**

A decision that a completely unprofitable object should continue to function for some time does not depend on the economic agent but on the

bodies of local self-government or higher levels of State authorities who may provide subsidies.

Due to a shortage of reserves in the entire system, each of the three possibilities at the economic agent's disposal must create a transition period to cover the system, spreading far beyond the source, and its effect may be positive or negative for the whole system.

One may assume a hypothesis that avoidance of negative effects of a transition period, resulting from a legal and right decision by the agent, is beyond the agent's behaviour and possibilities, and this should be one of main tasks of local authorities or higher levels of State authorities.

An altruistic attitude of the agent may not be excluded but this is highly improbable in the face of bankruptcy, and formation of altruistic attitudes is not an economic activity.

3. POSSIBILITIES TO WEAKEN SECONDARY EFFECTS OF THE RESTRUCTURING PROCESS

In connection with the above hypothesis, the following question should be answered: under what conditions and who should take steps which – without making the agent's situation more difficult – will make it possible to diminish the volume and range of negative effects of transition periods, caused by local changes in an isolated economic system without reserves, that is a system of centralized economy in an early period of turning it into a market economy.

The process of radical changes (restructuring) may be studied in economic space from various viewpoints. For our needs we shall mention three viewpoints:

1/ economic agent's who decides about a given object[1], who for various reasons must significantly change the operation,

2/ viewpoint of the immediate environment[2] in economic space,

3/ operation of the whole system (global viewpoint [9]).

In a free market system, the first viewpoint ex definitione is decisive, the second viewpoint is necessary to organize properly coordination and compensation measures to be done by local self-governments, and the third viewpoint – it is necessary to implement global policies [9] apart from coordination and compensation measures.

Let us assume that object A is unprofitable in the present situation, with the present price system. Let us also assume that no price changes are expected to make the object profitable. Object A is connected "downwards" with object B to which it supplies semi-products (raw materials), and "upwards" with object C for which it is a buyer of products (comp. Fig. 1).



Fig. 1.

This is an oversimplification since usually A produces many "goods", it has many B buyers and many C suppliers.

Let us assume that a changed intensity of A operation (e.g. its closing) will change economic effects of B and C objects since this will force B to lock for more distant sources of supplies, and C to seek more distant markets. Thus, with a shortage of available reserves in the system, changes in operational intensity of A will propagate "downwards" and "upwards" via B and C objects. This is typical for an economy of shortages and was the reason for a crisis of excessively centralized economies.

As already mentioned, the phenomenon of restructuring can be viewed from three points:

– from the viewpoint of A's interest,

– from the viewpoint of all objects that constitute A's environment and are considered separately, i.e. in our case B and C; the evaluation will be identified with an evaluation from the viewpoint of local self-government,

– from the viewpoint of A and A's environment jointly, that is C+A+B; the evaluation will be identified with an evaluation of higher levels of State administration.

The above approach is most primitive since A's operation may exert an influence on the activity of many Bs and many Cs, connected in a chain (comp. Fig. 2) and requires an arbitrary determination to which B1 and C1 objects inclusive spreads the authority of a locality geographically connected with A; there are A objects to which is attributed a locality not covering B (e.g. A is a power station in the State network) or not covering C (e.g. A uses imported raw materials).



range of locality connected with A in economic space

Fig. 2.

Let us assume that object A takes a decision to close down. This will worsen economic effects of B and C, particularly during the tradition period directly after closing down of A, until B and C adjust to the new situation.

When A has been closed, B and C objects can:

1/ get adjust possibly soon to a new situation of non-existence of A by substitute export and import from outside the locality,

2/ seek ways to prolong the operation of A at an expense of some compensation for A or ways to fill in soon the gap due to disappearance of A by a new object A', using new technologies, also at an expense of some compensation for A' (comp. Figs. 3 and 4).



Fig. 3.



Fig. 4.

The role of mediation in negotiations between B and C, and A (or A') – and perhaps even the role of supplier of the compensation – is expected to be performed by bodies of local self-government and higher levels of State administration, and not e.g. by banks or social organizations or political parties.

4. POWERS OF THE STATE AND SELF-GOVERNMENTS IN THE CASE OF RESTRUCTURING

One may assume that propagation of changes (innovations, disturbances) in each system is a normal phenomenon. In the case of innovations, changes are required to propagate rapidly; in the case of disturbances – slowly.[3]

Propagation of changes in a system without reserves is usually much faster than propagation of changes in a system with reserves, since reserves cause or facilitate delays (in the first approximation, delays can be directly proportional to the volume of reserves).

One may notice that the division of roles between local systems and higher levels of State administration may be that local systems allow (or not) for changes (innovations, disturbances) to from (appear) whereas higher systems allow (or not) for those changes to propagate beyond the local system, in the whole system.

The above viewpoint on a possible role of local and higher systems makes it possible to clearly define local and global systems, and relations among them:

– local systems allow (or not) for changes (innovations, disturbances) to be formed,

– global systems allow (or not) for changes (innovations, disturbances) to be propagated beyond the local system, in the whole system.

In the case of regional changes, it is recommended to distinguish intermediate systems apart from global systems, which in Poland may mean future unions of communes, that is present provinces or macroregions [9].

5. OUTLINE OF QUANTITATIVE APPROACH

Let us assume that economic efficiency of A, B and C with given prices and taxes is determined only on two levels: -, +; " - "means lack of profitability that will lead to bankruptcy and closing down of the given object in its existing form, and " + " means profitability justifying the sense of its further existence.

Let us assume that the situation of A, B and C objects is -, +, + respectively.

One may try to determine the situation of A, B and C in more detail. examining in the same scale the situation of aggregated objects A+B, C+A and C+A+B. All possible cases are grouped in the Table.

Table 1

case \ object	A	B	C	A+B	C+A	C+A+B
1	-	+	+	+	+	+
2	-	+	+	-	+	+
3	-	+	+	+	-	+
4	-	+	+	-	+	-
5	-	+	+	+	-	-
6	-	+	+	-	-	-

Comments to the Table:

- in situation 1 there is a potential in B and C to participate in assistance to A since A's losses are low in relation to B and C's profits,
- in situations 2 and 3 only some objects have enough potential to provide assistance to A,
- in situations 4 and 5 only some objects have enough potential to participate in assistance to A, however the assistance anyhow would be insufficient,
- in situation 6 there is no possibility to organize assistance to A at the local level and this could be sought only at a higher level, e.g. global.

After the closure of A object, economic efficiency of B and C will be changed. Possible situations, same scale, are grouped in Table 2.

Comments to Table 2:

- in situation a, the closure of A will not radically change the efficiency of B and C and thus B and C will probably accept the closure,
- in situations b and c, the profitability of some objects is changed whereas the profitability of B+C will remain at an acceptable level; thus B and C may assist each other at the local level,
- in situations d and e, the profitability of some objects is changed with a

radical change of overall profitability; thus, there will not be sufficient funds at the local level for mutual assistance and possibilities will have to be sought at higher levels of State authorities,

- in situation f, the change in profitability affects all objects and the entire locality, and resultant disturbances propagate "downwards" and "upwards", beyond the source and beyond the locality.

Table 2

case \ object	B	C	B+C
a	+	+	+
b	-	+	+
c	+	-	+
d	-	+	-
e	+	-	-
f	-	-	-

One may ponder on the correctness of a decision to close down A, analysing each combination in the situations 1-6 and a-f, from the viewpoints of:

1/ B and C objects separately,

2/ B and C objects together – in our understanding this corresponds to the viewpoint of the locality,

3/ the global system understood as superior to the local system; the global system is interested that the local system is not a source of disturbances that may be propagated throughout the system.

Evaluations from B's viewpoint in all 36 combination situations from Tables 1 and 2, are presented in Table 3.

Comments to Table 3: evaluations contained in the Table are all a transposition of evaluations from Tables 1 and 2.

Evaluations from C's viewpoint are presented in Table 4.

Comments to Table 4: evaluations contained in the Table are all a transposition of evaluations from Tables 1 and 2.

Evaluations from the locality's viewpoint (L for short) are presented in Table 5.

Table 3

	a	b	c	d	e	f
1	+	-	+	-	+	-
2	+	-	+	-	+	-
3	+	-	+	-	+	-
4	+	-	+	-	+	-
5	+	-	+	-	+	-
6	+	-	+	-	+	-

Table 4

	a	b	c	d	e	f
1	+	+	-	+	-	-
2	+	+	-	+	-	-
3	+	+	-	+	-	-
4	+	+	-	+	-	-
5	+	+	-	+	-	-
6	+	+	-	+	-	-

Table 5

	a	b	c	d	e	f
1	+	.	.	.	.	-
2	+	.	.	.	.	-
3	+	.	.	.	.	-
4	+	.	.	.	.	-
5	+	.	.	.	.	-
6	+	.	.	.	.	-

Comments to Table 5: evaluations contained in the Table are a conjunction of evaluations from Tables 3 and 4; with differing evaluations in Tables 3 and 4, the result is an evasive evaluation (marked with .) which means that there are no possibilities to draw conclusions with the application of our most primitive scale of evaluation and that it is necessary to refer to more detailed results of an economic analysis of profitability.

Evaluations from a higher (e.g. global) viewpoint (G for short) are presented in Table 6.

Table 6

	a	b	c	d	e	f
1	+	+	+	-	-	-
2	+	+	+	-	-	-
3	+	+	+	-	-	-
4	+	+	+	.	.	.
5	+	+	+	.	.	.
6	+	+	+	.	.	.

Comments to Table 6: the Table contains evaluations of the local system from the viewpoint of the G system. Evasive evaluations in the lower right-hand side quarter of Table 6 result from no possibility to obtain another evaluation with the applied scale, that is it is impossible to answer the question if after the closure of A, the new situation is more difficult to handle for G than a situation with existing A, or not.

A comparison of Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6 shows that some evaluations are the same, some not, which confirms that it is correct to apply various viewpoints in valuating the purposefulness of introduced changes and in evaluating the purposefulness of introducing an organized compensation of losses at the local level and at higher levels of State authorities.

Diverging evaluations obtained from different viewpoints (B, C, L, C) may be in a primitive way brought down to one joint evaluation, applying a summary function of usefulness, that is taking "1" as a positive evaluation, "O" as no evaluation and "-1" as a negative evaluation. Joint results are presented in Table 7.

Table 7

	a	b	c	d	e	f
1	1	1	1	-1	-1	-1
2	1	1	1	-1	-1	-1
3	1	1	1	-1	-1	-1
4	1	1	1	0	0	-3
5	1	1	1	0	0	-3
6	1	1	1	0	0	-3

Comments to Table 7: Wherever the total of points produces a lowest result, intervention by the State and local self-government is most justified and needed. It is worth noticing that the local level is very significant (comp. Fig. 5).



Fig. 5.

This is so because evasive evaluations are significant in overall scale of evaluations and in this case it is necessary to refer to more detailed economic analyses, which can be performed only at the local level. It seems that this remark corresponds to what is expected of local self-governments: a precise valuation, sufficiently objective and comprehensive, making it possible to organize mutual compensation of losses and distribution of external assistance so that source of disturbances do not appear; in case they do appear, there has to be an organized reference for assistance to higher levels of State administration that will be used to restrict the range of disturbances.

6. OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES ACCOMPANYING THE RESTRUCTURING PROCESS

Studies on secondary effects of the restructuring process should cover primarily production objects operating within the existing price system in a highly unprofitable way, producing unique products for the local and national market. As there are shortages of a majority of products, semi-products and raw materials – apart from labour – the closure of such plants will result in a more profound shortage, affecting B type objects and emergence of excess labour that can be recognized as a C type object [11].

Removal of effects after the closure of A objects is possible with substitute imports. In Poland this is real but may be quite expensive. There is also another aspect of such forced substitution of domestic products with imports.

It is well known that the average quality of products in the domestic market is much lower than the quality of internationally traded products. Imports may mean introduction of much higher quality components to production processes. This situation can be used for organized stimulation of quality improvement of other semiproducts and raw materials, and in effect – of the final product. The situation can also be wasted since depreciated machines and negligence by labour may produce poor quality products out of good raw materials. This statement can be easily substantiated.

One may optimistically assume that the chance will not be wasted. Thus we shall witness a process of forced **propagation of normality** in production technologies (in geographical space the process does not have to have attributes of a classical process of diffusion of innovations [10] since the vicinity of technological connections does not have to correspond to a geographical vicinity).

It is also possible to avoid the results of production stoppage by A objects by subsidizing the production and continuing it for some time. Poland's budget for 1990 provides for some funds for this purpose but they can only be used in extreme cases. From the locality's viewpoint and from the viewpoint of higher systems, a solution in the form of **reasonable management** of the restructuring process, that is a justified extension of the existence of unprofitable plants, seems to be a just and effective

solution, with most moderate negative effects; often this is the only solution. An additional positive circumstance is a possibility to combine the process with a process to stimulate earlier modernization of technologies since in this way it is possible to prevent a dispersal of highly trained labour.

Some other problems are related to propagation of disturbances "upwards". In this case there is a problem of excess semiproducts but in the face of existing shortages this is usually not very important, and the problem of excess labour which can be highly qualified and specialized, in a specific age profile (particularly in the countryside) but almost always it is immobile due to an overall shortage of housing.

A dispersal of labour can be a loss for the locality (most active people, with attractive education and qualifications will move away first) and for the State. Management of internal migrations is not effective [12] as was proven by Western experience. The biggest problem to be solved will be the elimination of small farms (now about 29% of professionally active population in Poland earn their living in agriculture whereas in France – 6.7%, in the USA – 3.0%). One should also remember the age structure in agriculture, objective difficulties in uniting farm land in order to introduce large scale production and about other limitations, e.g. universal shortage of water.[4]

7. CONCLUSIONS

As our dicussion has shown, the process of dividing powers between local self-governments and generally speaking State authorities depends on the intensity of disturbances at the local level, their number, the state of local economy, the powers of local self-governments and organizational efficiency of the social-economic system and system of power. **This means that in the process of transition from a centralized economy to a free market economy, simultaneously overcoming a deep economic crisis, the role of local self-governments should be variable and specific.**

In the early period of restructuring, the number of tasks to organize loss compensation and to force intervention by higher bodies of authorities will be large; later coordinating functions should start to prevail s it is observed in West European countries. This means that legal framework for the functioning of local self-governments should provide for a function to

overrule or prevent involuntary negative effects of otherwise justified decisions by individual economic agents. Quite extensive funds from the State budget should be assigned for that purpose for the period of transition. Such a proposal may seem surprising since it is contrary to the overall trend to decentralize power, but it seems unavoidable, at least in the period of transition. Practice is expected to confirm that thesis soon.

There is one important matter left: to what extent interventions aimed at avoiding negative effects of restructuring should come from local self-governments and from the State.

Our very simplified discussion shows that:

- in extreme situations 1a, 2a, 3a, 4a, 5a, 6a, intervention is not necessary,
- in situations 1f, 2f, 3f, the necessary intervention must be financed from sources outside the local system,
- in all the other cases a more detailed economic analysis is necessary and the division of powers between local self-governments and higher levels of State authorities should be subject to an arbitrarily agreed cooperation.

From a theoretical viewpoint, no universal recipe can be proposed. It seems reasonable to propose that local self-governments begin to liquidate the negative effects of restructuring from the most troubling ones (in a determined order, e.g. economic, social, ecological) with respect to situations listed in Table 8 and those that can be liquidated or moderated with the possibilities local self-governments may have (legal, financial, organizational, technical, personal, etc.).

Table 8



Our discussion, despite an extreme simplification, helps to call attention to:

1/ purposefulness to apply a few viewpoints in evaluating radical decisions made by the economic agent:
   a/ the interested plant itself,
   b/ other agents constituting its environment (in economic space and in other spaces),
   c/ a group of agents constituting its environment and belonging to one locality,
   d/ a higher (global) system observing the given locality and interested only in disturbances exceeding the locality,
2/ purposefulness of making a detailed economic analysis at the local level (often disregarded in a centrally planned and controlled economy) since it is only this analysis that may reveal the sources of disturbances (including turning points) for the whole system [13],
3/ purposefulness of analysing situations that may become sources of disturbances propagating throughout the system; if there is no poss sibility to locate the disturbances with means existing at the local lev vel, purposefulness of warning higher level of State administration about that,
4/ purposefulness to coordinate the process of restructuring with part ticipation of local self-governments and bodies of State authorities.

It seems that points 2/ and 3/ quite clearly define ways to relate State interventionism to policies of local self-governments. The relation is specially well visible and important in the process of restructuring if it is to improve the efficiency of functioning of all objects and the entire economy.

Points 2/ and 3/ also describe relations between the global system and local systems, managed by real local self-governments. It is necessary to remember that with hardly any power by local self-governments, the function under point 2/ may not be realized as there is no interest in its results at the local level.

---

[1] The object is described in [2].

[2] Frequently the environment may be identified with the local level in the system of social, economic and ecological phenomena [8].

[3] Propagation of changes in geographical space is well studied empirically, e.g. within research on diffusion of innovations [10]. So far no studies have been performed on propagation of changes one by one or parallel in various types of space, e.g. geographical, economic, social space..

*In some countries (northern Italy, Switzerland, southern FRG) there are proposals to maintain the existing structure of agriculture with only slight changes to produce health food for incoming tourists (simultaneous development of various forms of tourism and recreation). This may guarantee a profitability of production (e.g. in northern Italy the cost of agricultural production is now twice higher than in the Povalleys). Such a solution is very interesting from the viewpoint of local systems, it can also be interesting from the viewpoint of higher systems. It is a solution that is based on a controlled extension of operation of type A objects.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Kacprzyński B.: *What, how, for whom and for how much should be examined in space development.* (Co, jak, dla kogo i za ile badać w dziedzinie gospodarki przestrzennej). Pronouncement at seminar of the Institute of Space Development of University of Warsaw on October 26, 1989 (typescript).
2. Kacprzyński B.: *Agent économique – espace concret – temps.* Colloque à Nieborów: Three Prespectives of Time and Space: Lösch, Perroux, Prebisch, May 4, 1986.
3. Camagni R.: *Les modèles de restructuration économique des régions européennes pendant les années 70.* (In:) Aydalot Ph. (ed.): Crise et Espace. Economica 1984.
4. Maillat D.: *La région horlogère: transformation de l'appareil de production et capacité d'adaptation.* (In:) Aydalot Ph. (ed.): Crise et Espace. Economica 1984.
5. Kornai J.: *Economy of Shortages.* North Holland 1980.
6. Kacprzyński B.: *Critical state, transition state, transition process.* (Stan krytyczny, stan przejściowy, proces przejścia). Warszawa 1990 (typescript).
7. Ackoff R.L.: *Optimum decisions in applied studies* (Decyzje optymalne w badaniach stosowanych). PWN, Warszawa 1969.
8. Kacprzyński B.: *Economie locale en Pologne.* (In:) Colloque européen sur "La dynamique locale et sa gestion Lausanne, 10-11 Oct. 1988. Commission Nationale Suisse pour L'UNESCO, Berne 1989.
9. Kacprzyński B.: *On Studies of Global vs. Local Relation.* Polish-Soviet Seminar on "Globality vs. Locality", Radziejowice, December 13-16, 1989.
10. Bernard-Bechariers J.F: *La consomation comme production.* Consommation, No. 3, 1977.
11. Kacprzyński B.: *Attempts at controlling internal migrations in Western Europe* (Próby sterowania migracjami wewnętrznymi w Europie Zachodniej). (In:) Kukliński A. (ed.): Planning of regional development in European countries (Planowanie rozwoju regionalnego w krajach europejskich). PWN, Warszawa 1976.
12. Kacprzyński B.: *Analysis by Study of Turning Points.* "Globality vs. Locality – the Experience of 20th and Prospects of 21st Century". International Seminar, Nieborów, June 5-9, 1988.

Jean-Philippe Leresche et Martin Schuler
Institut de Recherche sur l'Environnement Construit
Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne

LE RENOUVEAU DU "LOCAL" ET SES LIENS AVEC LA "QUESTION REGIONALE": QUELQUES REFLEXIONS

1. INTRODUCTION

Si, à l'heure actuelle, le "local" opère un "come-back" remarqué dans le champ des sciences sociales ainsi que dans les discours et pratiques politiques, économiques et sociaux, son extension et son contenu varient par rapport à sa vogue des années 60-70. Mais le concept n'en demeure pas moins ambigu et polyvalent qu'à l'époque.

Ce renouveau du "local" se manifeste notamment à travers la récente prospérité du concept de développement local, présenté comme nouvel enjeu des sciences sociales. Phénomène qui s'observe au moment où, paradoxalement, les systèmes politiques et économiques dévoilent des tendances intégratrices de plus en plus poussées au niveau mondial. Dans ces conditions, il apparaît judicieux de s'interroger sur le sens de cette notion et sur les causes de ce phénomène, général en Europe, de résurgence du local.[1]

Notre seconde préoccupation concerne la position suisse dans le discours sur le local. On notera d'emblée que, dans ce pays, la dénomination de local s'avère fort peu répandue. On lui préfère traditionnellement les termes de quartier, commune ou région.

Une troisième question fondamentale touche à l'orientation politique du local: l'opposition entre les mouvements "d'en bas" et les actions "d'en haut" et leurs interrelations. Sur le niveau régional, cette opposition se retrouve partiellement dans les termes de "régionalisme" et de "régionalisation". Mais cette opposition dépend bien sûr très fortement de l'organisa-

tion spatiale du système politique: le local, comme il est conçu en Suisse, concerne avant tout la commune, unité politique et administrative. Les régions suisses, par contre, se distinguent par l'absence d'une structure institutionnelle.

La confrontation des cas suisse et français est destinée à démontrer les difficultés d'adaptation de concepts liés au "local" à des contextes territoriaux différents.

2. LE DEVELOPPEMENT LOCAL

En tant que nouvel enjeu des sciences sociales, la notion de développement local soulève au moins deux grands problèmes:

1. sémantique;
2. d'échelle.

Dans un premier temps, il s'agit de ne pas confondre cette notion avec celles de dynamique locale, de politique locale, de pouvoir local ou de développement régional. Ces dernières ont déjà acquis leurs lettres de noblesse sociologique. La notion de développement local, quant à elle, ne peut pas encore se prévaloir d'un tel titre. Sur la base d'une simple analogie conceptuelle, on pourrait toutefois la rattacher à la notion de développement socio-économique - appliquée ici au niveau local - très répandue dans les sciences humaines américaines des années 60. En réalité, rien de plus hasardeux que d'établir une telle filiation, tant les conditions économiques, sociales et politiques de production des concepts se sont modifiées depuis cette époque. N'excluons toutefois pas une tentation développementaliste de la part des tenants d'une vision exclusivement "économiciste" ou "normativiste" du développement local.

A ce stade liminaire de clarification de la notion de développement local, l'objectif consiste avant tout à lui conférer une sorte d'opérationnalité conceptuelle, plutôt que de lui attribuer un sens unique; ne serait-ce que pour l'introduire dans le champ de la comparaison. Dans tous les cas, l'erreur résiderait dans une volonté de dégager immédiatement un seul facteur explicatif du développement local. Trop de faits locaux ou régionaux distincts coexistent dans nos sociétés pour autoriser, dans un premier temps, la formulation d'une définition unique. La localisation essentiellement française de la notion de développement local rend encore plus hypothétique l'identification de facteurs a priori valables dans

l'ensemble des pays européens. Cette observation ne saurait toutefois décourager tout procès en comparaison.

A l'évidence, une série de précautions sémantiques et méthodologiques s'imposent, relatives à l'usage de la notion de développement local. Le discous sur le développement local ne peut en effet coiffer la même réalité dans des Etats fédéraux ou unitaires, dans des régions centrales ou périphériques, urbaines ou rurales, riches ou défavorisées, appartenant à la majorité ou à la minorité culturelle (langue, religion, ethnie).

En outre, selon la forme des Etats, les collectivités locales une disposent pas des mêmes ressources financières, administratives et politiques pour maîtriser leur propre développement. Dans un Etat fédéral, les acteurs communaux du développement local possèdent l'essentiel des ressources nécessaires tandis que, dans un Etat unitaire, le pouvoir central détient des moyens supérieurs.

Dans le même ordre d'idée, on doit constater que tous les pays ne jouissent pas du même nombre de niveaux territoriaux institutionneles. A part les communes et les cantons, le dispositif helvétique ne comprend pas d'autre niveau pourvu d'un pouvoir politique. Sous la forme de régions, la France a par contre créé un troisième niveau territorial à côté des communes et des départements. De tells observations soulignent que le contexte et les acteurs du développement local sont susceptibles de varier d'un pays à l'autre. Précisons aussi que la crise économique des années 70 n'a pas frappé tous les pays avec la même intensité, façon d'introduire une variable corrective supplémentaire.

Fort de ces différences de taille, de forme, de structure et de développement socio-économique, chaque pays affirme une conception propre du développement local. A charge du chercheur de trouver les dénominateurs communs ou les facteurs unificateurs, sans perdre de vue les spécificités locales.

La confusion déjà mentionnée entre développement local et développement régional demeure toutefois un sérieux obstacle sémantique à une harmonisation des concepts.

En Suisse par exemple, la notion de développement régional recoupe le niveau territorial dans lequel, en France notamment, prend place le développement local. Il s'agit donc de s'entendre d'abord sur une terminologie unique, sous peine que deux notions différentes embrassent une réalité territoriale semblable. A contrario, il n'est pas de sort plus déplorable pour un concept que de renvoyer à des réalités fondamentalement

distinctes. L'employer dans plusieurs acceptions représente assurément le meilleur procédé pour le vider de tout son sens. Une fois le contenant spatial harmonisé, il restera alors à s'interroger sur le contenu des politiques de développement local ou régional. Dans les deux cas, on sera confronté à la question de svoir si tel nouveau concept se contente de recouvrir une vieille problématique ou si un ancien concept peut encore servir à l'analyse de nouvelles problématiques. Une troisième hypothèse suggère que le développement local, en tant que concept récent, salue une réalité nouvelle.

A travers une périodisation sommaire de la question du développement local se profile une première réponse relative au caractère novateur du concept et de la problèmatique locale qui lui est attachée.

Nul doute que dans l'évolution du local durant ces vingt ou trente dernières années, la crise a joué un rôle décisif, autant par ses répercussions économiques et financières que sociales et culturelles. Aussi, pouvons-nous découper cette période en trois phases, dont la crise figure la référence principale: 1) l'avant-crise, 2) la crise, 3) l'après-crise.

Selon la phase considérée, le discours sur le local ne valorise pas les mêmes facteurs (politiques, économiques, sociaux, culturels). Certes, aucun d'entre eux ne disparaît avec le passage d'une phase à l'autre, mais leur hiérarchie se modifie au même rythme que les glissements sémantiques et territoriaux.

Si la revendication régionaliste a dominé les années 60 et la première moitié des années 70, par la suite, la crise, le déclin des grandes idéologies et les réformes territoriales ramènent les mouvements régionalistes sur le terrain de revendications économiques et sociales plus modestes ou d'expérimentations locales alternatives.

Pour sa part, A. Kuklinski[2] prétend que les années 70 et 80 ont vu naître de nouveaux mouvements "de gouvernement, d'économie, de société, d'écologie et de culture" locaux issus de crises idéologiques relatives à l'évolution des premières décennies d'après-guerre.[31] Ces crises se sont manifestées dans quatre courants idéologiques:

- l'idéologie de la "petite échelle"
- l'idéologie de l'auto-développement
- l'idéologie du développement écologique et
- l'idéologie de l'identité culturelle.

Ces mouvements visent tous des territorialités restreintes: le type de production économique, l'organisation sociale et politique, ou la vie et la survie écologique et culturelle. Ces enjeux apparaîtraient donc liés à une

nouvelle organistion de l'espace. Aux yeux de ces mouvements, le village, la commune ou le quarter se seraient transformés, devenant des espaces de référence d'un type nouveau, bouleversant ainsi une tendance de longue date qui allait vers une concentration toujours plus poussée de tous les secteurs de l'activité humaine.

L'hypothèse suscite une certaine fascination, mais elle évoque quelques questions:

D'abord, quelle est véritablement la portée de ces mouvements "alternatifs". Bien qu'il soient incontestablement porteurs de débats essentiels et touchent une minorité importante de la population, leur influence dans la pratique politique et économique n'en reste pas moins limitée. Il devrait donc en être de même concernant leur impact local, sauf...

... si ces mouvements devaient rester minoritaires, ils devraient alors mener une stratégie de concentration des forces en vue de gagner de l'influence et de réaliser leurs projets pour lesquels l'espace local semble particulièrement propice.

... si ces mouvements devaient gagner en importance, ils représenteraient alors, par la force des choses, un certain danger pour les intérêts des acteurs qui détiennent le pouvoir. Une stratégie visant à affaiblir les impacts de ces nouveaux mouvements pourrait donc consister à diriger ceux-ci vers des enjeux moins menaçants pour le pouvoir – spatialement, c'est le niveaux local.

On peut se demander de même si le discours sur ces thèmes n'est pas révélateur en soi d'une stratégie de détournement: le local et la "Gemeinschaft" sont conçus comme ensembles de groupes d'individus défendant les mêmes idées. Dès lors ne voit-on pas surgir le danger d'un corporatisme spatial, conception éminemment conservatrice du local puisqu'elle contribue à maintenir en place les forces qui détiennent le pouvoir?

Par rapport au niveau spatial visé par A. Kuklinski, formulons une dernière remarque: les idéologies de l'auto-développement, du développement écologique et de l'identité culturelle et même celle de la petite échelle se réfèrent davantage au niveau régional que local. L'émergence du local n'a peut-être même pas de fondement théorique vraiment nouveau; son interrelation avec le "régional" reste en effet très fort.

Actuellement, le "local" a quelque peu relégué au second plan sa connotation de "lutte minoritaire" ou de "périphérie opprimée". Le réalisme de la crise a brisé les discours autogestionnaire ou nationalitaire, fondés, pour le premier, sur une sorte d'utopie communautaire et, pour le

second, sur la transposition du modèle de l'Etat-National au niveau régional. Les réformes territoriales qui se sont multipliées en Europe dans les années 70 et 80 – phénomène qui contraste avec la stabilité des structures spatiales de la Suisse fédéraliste – ont également contribué à désamorcer ces discours radicaux. Puis, d'un Etat se défaussant sur le local des responsabilités qu'il ne veut ou ne peut plus assumer en matière de création d'emplois, version pessimiste, on est passé à l'image d'un Etat qui les redéploie par la décentralisation, version optimiste.

3. LE CAS DE LA FRANCE

L'examen du cas français révèle que, dans les seconde et troisième phases, la crise n'est pas seulement en cause dans les mutations du local et dans l'émergence du développement local. Une fois engagée la sortie de la crise, le redémarrage de la croissance réclame en effet toujours des initiatives de développement, parallèles à un aménagement correcteur.[4]

En France, la réforme décentralisatrice de 1982 a, pour le moins, joué un rôle d'accélérateur dans ce retour du local. Les mutations technologiques sont aussi à l'origine d'une prise de conscience des collectivités locales. En dépit d'une mondialisation des échanges, leur destin n'est pas voué à leur échapper complètement dès lors que ces technologies sont susceptibles d'être localisées en n'importe quel lieu du territoire et de relier toutes les collectivités à cette problématique mondiale.

Dans ce nouvel ordre international, national et régional, les conceptions autarciques du développement local laissent donc leur place à un developpement concerté et négocié, "localement conçu et appliqué".[5] En France, d'une planification nationale, on passe à une planification décentralisée. La région devient le niveau territorial de référence en matière de planification décentralisée.

Simultanément, la réforme décentralisatrice prévoit de nouveaux outils de concertation locale. La crise avait délimité les frontières des zones industrielles et rurales défavorisées. Ces dernières traversent évidemment les découpages administratifs traditionnels du territoire. Durant les années 70, soutenus essentiellement par des subventions de l'Etat, les plans d'aménagement rural (PAR), les contrats de pays ou les contrats de villes petites et moyennes devaient aider ces zones défavorisées. La décentralisation a ensuite mis entre les mains des autorités locales et moyens de prendre elles-mêmes des initiatives de développement local. Les chartes

intercommunales de développement et d'aménagement (CIDA) ainsi que les contrats de bassin d'emploi symbolisent cette nouvelle politique.

Héritières des procédures des années 70, les CIDA et les contrats de bassin diffèrent toutefois de leurs devancières par leur souplesse et la liberté de décision qu'elles accordent aux acteurs locaux. Elles impliquent aussi une plus forte mobilisation du local. L'élaboration de ces chartes incombe à un regroupement de communes qui se tourne alors vers le plus grand nombre de partenaires (Etat, région, département, syndicat intercommunal, etc.) en vue d'obtenir, après signature d'une convention, des aides financières soutenant le projet local de développement économique, social et culturel.

Ces chartes et autres contrats se placent donc sous les auspices de mécanismes de coopération. Ces nouveaux territoires transcommunaux, transdépartementaux et, éventuellement transrégionaux, contraignent en effet les collectivités au dialogue et, si possible, à l'entente.[6] A une attitude purement défensive, les conceptions du développement local contemporaines de la phase d'après-crise apportent ainsi une ouverture sur l'extérieur, absente des modèles antérieurs. Elles prennent acte de la division internationale du travail. Mieux, les initiatives de développement local tentent de se relier à une problématique mondiale par la valorisation des ressources locales. Certains auteurs évoquent à cet égard la naissance "de nouveaux systèmes productifs locaux". En tout état de cause, les milieux locaux admettent désormais que leur développement est inséparable du développement régional et national.

Cette nouvelle dynamique du développement local, par les mécanismes de solidarité qu'elle enclenche, ne déstructure pas les identités culturelles cultivées dans les phases précédentes. Elle participe au contraire à leur renforcement.

Sur la base du cas français, on est donc habilité à définir le développement local avec J.L. Guigou comme "l'expression de la solidarité locale créatrice de nouvelles relations sociales et (...) la volonté des habitants d'une micro-région de valoriser les richesses locales, ce qui est créateur du développement économique".[7] Le développement local suscite ainsi un nouveau partenariat mêlant des acteurs venus de différents horizons, publics et privés, nationaux, régionaux et locaux, au motif d'élaborer et de mettre en oeuvre un projet global de développement économique, social et culturel.

4. LE CAS DE LA SUISSE

Par opposition à la France, la politique régionale connaît en Suisse une phase de déclin. Faute d'avoir été institutionnalisé, le niveau régional n'a pas pu s'imposer dans ce dernier pays. Par contre, le "communal", comme niveau institutionnel fort du "local" dans son acception helvétique, conserve l'essentiel de ses privilèges politiques et suscite de nouvelles recherches.

4.1. Le régional et le local: une question d'échelle

Ces deux termes désignent ordinairement deux niveaux géographiques différents. L'hypothèse centrale de notre contribution, et il vaut la peine d'insister sur cette idée, postule toutefois que le phénomène régional en Suisse correspond sur bien des plans à l'actuel discours européen sur le local. Pour se comprendre, il s'agit donc au choix, on l'a vu, de trouver un vocabulaire commun ou d'identifier les équivalences spatiales, tout en expliquant les glissements opérés sur l'échelle spatiale.

Le "local" s'apparente à l'unité spatio-sociale la plus petite. La régional forme par contre spatialement un ensemble de ces unités qui sont interreliées entre elles.

Descendre sur l'échelle spatiale peut donc impliquer une simplification des problèmes ou bien une prise en considération d'autres types de problèmes. Dans ce sens, une telle évolution du "régional" ou "local" présenterait une certaine logique à plusieurs titres:

Suite à l'effet temporel dans la discussion des deux phénomènes: les points de vue conceptuels, les approches scientifiques ainsi que les méthodes de recherche et les intérêts et pressions politiques varient en fonction de la période observée, et pas seulement du niveau spatial de référence. Dans ce contexte, les années 70, nettement plus favorables aux interventions de l'Etat, ont vu se développer des conceptions globales de l'organisation spatiale ainsi que le soutien de mesures d'en haut en faveur des territoires moins développés. Les années 80 ont par contre laissé plus de liberté aux manifestations locales tant qu'elles ne s'opposaient pas au pouvoir central; le credo dominant était la libre concurrence des acteurs locaux.

Parallèlement, le retour du "local" est lié au nouveau concept de différenciation, qui analyse les relations, les dépendances, les actions du pouvoir. Ces phénomènes ne sont plus quantifiables (ils dépassent la structuration); ils concernent le fonctionnement stratégique d'une entité politique en tant qu'ensemble institutionnel existant: c'est-à-dire une commune plutôt qu'une région, puisque la première dispose de structures politiques et qu'elle est plus petite.

Non seulement les méthodes et les objets scientifiques sont en train d'évoluer, mais également les démarches et les types de recherche.

Le discours régionaliste se révélait profondément dialectique; bien des chercheurs s'étaient engagés en faveur de régions périphériques ou culturellement menacées. Les idéologies qui les guidaient étaient ostensiblement affichées et mises au service de l'objectif "scientifique" recherché.

En Suisse, la région comme unité non-institutionnelle fasait office d'une certaine manière d'espace social à remplir avec une "autre" politique, voire, selon certains, avec une meilleure politique!

Le renouveau du "local" pourrait donc également signifier une sorte de désillusion par rapport à cette idée ou ces projets. Ce sentiment engage dès lors la formulation d'une autre approche.

4.2 Caractéristiques de la politique régionale en Suisse

Les débuts de la politique régionale "moderne" en Suisse ont été l'affaire des cantons: la formation d'unités d'aménagement du territoire et des associations de communes pour la construction et le maintien de différentes infrastructures. Ces "régions" se référaient parfois à des unités spatiales historiques (districts, vallées), mais le plus souvent leur création dans les années '50 et '60 était issue d'approches pragmatiques (un mélange entre des exigences technocratiques de l'administration cantonale et les préférences des autorités locales); l'idée de lancer une vie politico-culturelle régionale ne figurait guère parmi les préoccupations majeures des acteurs.

A partir des années '70, la Confédération commençait à mettre en oeuvre sa politique régionale. Elle visait en premier lieu à l'amélioration de la situation économique et des conditions de vie des territoires périphériques en Suisse, sous la forme d'une aide en faveur des régions de montagne (loi LIM de 1974) et des régions économiquement menacées par

la récession économique de 1975 (arrêté "Bonny" de 1987). La LIM établissait des conditions pour l'obtention d'une aide financière fédérale aboutissant à la formation de régions, notamment l'élaboration d'un concept de développement économique et socio-démographique. La loi "Bonny" par contre définissait "d'en haut" les territoires de monostructure industrielle, auxquels l'aide de la Confédération et celle des cantons concernés devraient être assurées.

Les régions ainsi créées correspondent à des degrés divers à des unités conçues tantôt d'"en haut", tantôt d'"en bas" (là où le recours à des régions traditionnelles semblait plus aisé). Au cours des années, ces régions se sont dotées de certaines fonctions (conseil régional, secrétariat régional, gestion d'infrastructures), mais à aucun moment cette évolution n'a remis en question les autres niveaux institutionnels, c'est-à-dire les cantons et les communes. Le rôle principal des régions reste celui d'une coordination technique. Malgré tout, une dynamique régionale et la création d'une identité régionale se sont produites dans la plupart de ces unités, reposant essentiellement sur les effets des infrastructures nouvelles dans les domaines scolaires, de loisir, de culture et de santé, ainsi que sur les répercussions d'une évolution économique souvent difficile.

Cette évolution était favorable en premier lieu aux centres régionaux et aux élites. Dans les communes les plus périphériques, par contre, l'identité locale s'est souvent affaissée sans que le niveau régional ait pu offrir une compensation suffisante.

La politique régionale esquissée jusqu'ici était - comme indiqué - essentiellement conçue comme aide aux régions défavorisées. Si elle possédait une vision concrète d'une problématique qui touchait une partie importante du pays, elle ne défendait que d'un manière embryonnaire une optique globale de l'organisation spatiale, puisqu'elle laissait de côté les centres. Il ne s'agit donc pas d'une redistribution spatiale du tissu économique, mais, en premier lieu, de répartir quelques subventions supplémentaires (si possible bien dirigées). L'échec de CK-73[1], qui visait à une conception globale de l'évolution spatiale de la Suisse en proposant quelques mesures de redistribution, représente à cet égard un indice parlant.

En Suisse, la politique regionale traverse aujourd'hui une crise: les problèmes les plus graves semblent partiellement résolus (grâce à la bonne conjoncture ou grâce aux efforts de la politique régionale?) et le retard dans la construction des infrastructures apparait plus ou moins comblé.

Les antagonismes interrégionaux, cachés temporairement par les subsides fédéraux, resurgissent cependant tandis que les buts de la politique régionale deviennent plus flous. S'ajoutent enfin les effets d'une dynamique structurelle: la première génération des acteurs de la politique régionale (dans les régions, dans l'administration et les universités) commence à se retirer.

4.3. En guise de conclusion: le "local" dans le contexte suisse actuel

Actuellement, le "local", bien qu'il ne figure pas (encore) sous cette appellation dans notre pays connaît malgré tout une forme de renouveau, et cela dans plusieurs domaines, scientifiques et politiques.

D'abord, il semble que les historiens recommencent à s'intéresser aux origines des processus du "communalisme" ou de la "Verdorfung" du Moyen-Age - compte tenu du succès particulier que ce mouvement local a rencontré en Suisse ou dans un cadre spatial plus large (l'Europe centrale et tout l'arc alpin).[9] Sur cette question, les derniers travaux historiques approfondis datent des années 30.[10]

Les recherches sur le développement de la commune aux 19e et 20e siècles et le rôle qu'elle joue aujourd'hui dans le fédéralisme helvétique sont très nombreuses, mais elles ne traitent que rarement le sujet dans l'optique française. Soit qu'en Suisse le phénomène s'avère trop évident et l'autonomie communale si bien ancrée qu'elle ne souffre aucune remise en question, soit le contenu du "local" est traité sous d'autres dénominations spatiales - le quartier, la commune, la région, le canton. Peut-être que, et nous l'évoquons comme troisième hypothèse, la tradition très ancienne et de plus en plus professionnelle de production de chroniques et de monographies communales, occupe trop largement le terrain pour autoriser d'autres approches scientifiques.

Ces dernières se sont pourtant également développées. Durant les années '60 et '70, le quartier a éveillé un certain intérêt au sein de la communauté des chercheurs. A l'époque on le prétendait cependant voué à la disparition. Sous l'effet des mouvements alternatifs de la décennie suivante il a pourtant connu un regain d'attention de la part des milieux scientifiques. Aujourd'hui, les quartiers des grandes villes sont effectivement les espaces qui posent le plus de problèmes sociaux et écologiques.

En dehors des sous-unités des grands centres, la situation économique et politique de la plupart des communes urbaines et même périphériques s'est améliorée au cours des années 80 sous le coup de plusieurs faits: une conjoncture économique favorable, des mesures de péréquation financière entre les communes du même canton, une certaine tendance à la délégation du pouvoir sur le niveau inférieur (qui va à l'encontre des politiques de fusions de communes) et une vie culturelle probablement plus active.

S'il apparaît que la commune suisse (ou la plupart des communes) se porte assez bien, c'est peut-être justement au détriment de l'ensemble, c'est-à-dire de la région. En effet, les régions urbaines sont toujours privées de tout pouvoir exécutif et plusieurs d'entre elles sont en train d'être démantelées. Dans les régions périphériques, ce processus se manifeste un peu moins, au vu des avantages procurés par les subsides distribués.

Par rapport à son usage fréquent en France, l'absence sémantique du "local" en Suisse dissimule mal une certaine activité scientifique et politique à ce niveau, même si ce courant ne constitue pas encore une vague de fond. Ce constat en demi-teinte et la perte de vitesse du mouvement régional en Suisse suggèrent toutefois que la nature des problèmes sociaux et écologiques dans ce pays a perdu une part de sa dimension spatiale.

Mais, si la conjoncture spatiale devait changer, il n'est pas dit pour autant que le local constituerait l'espace de référence. C'est plutôt la cohésion de la Suisse entière qui pourrait représenter l'enjeu spatial dominant.

---

[1] Cf. notamment Bassand M., Moeckli J.-M., Villages: quels espoirs?

[2] Kukliński A., "Local dynamics and environment: some comments and proposals", in Bassand M., Bridel L., (sous la direction de), La dynamique locale et sa gestion, pp. 223-224.

[3] Pour l'avenir, A. Kuklinski a d'ailleurs prévu, apres les turbulentes années 70 et 80, le tournant (the turn) des années 90 dans la réalité locale. Les évènements survenus dans les pays de l'Est ont contribué à lui donner raison plus rapidement qu'annoncé.

[4] X. Greffe défend cette thèse.

[5] Perrin B., "Plaidoyer pour le développement local", Regards sur l'actualité, no 132, juin 1987, p. 57.

[6] Jegouzo, Y., "La coopération entre les collectivités locales", IFSA, Séminaire franco-suisse, Centres et périphéries en France et en Suisse, Paris, Conseil d'Etat, 27 et 28 mars 1987.

[7] Guigou J.L., "Le développement local: espoirs et freins", in Guesnier B., (sous la direction de). Développement local et décentralisation, p. 47.

[8] CK-73 = Chefbeamtenkonferenz 1973 (conférence fédérale des hauts-fonctionnaires en vue d'une nouvelle loi sur l'amenagement du territoire).

[9] cf. Blickle (1986) ou Sablonnier (1984).

[10] cf. Gasser (1947) ou Meyer (1952).

BIBLIOGRAPHIE INDICATIVE

Arocena J., *Le développement par l'initiative locale*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 1986.

Autrement, "Le local dans tous ses états", no 47, février 1983. 249 p.

Bassand M., *Villes, régions et sociétés*, Lausanne, Presses polytechniques romandes, 1982.

Bassand M., Rossel P. et ss., *L'autogestion disait-on*, Cahiers de l'IUED, Paris, PUF, 1988, 181 p.

Bassand M., Joye D., Schuler M. (eds.), *Les enjeux de l'urbanisation : Agglomerationsprobleme in der Schweiz*, Berne, Lang, 1988, 379 p.

Bassand M., Moeckli J.-M. (éds.), *Villages : quels espoirs?*, Berne, Lang, 1989, 246 p.

Blickle P., *Kommunalismus, Parlamentarismus, Republikanismus*, in: Historische Zeitschrift 242, 1986, p. 529-556.

Brugger E.A., Frey R.F., *Regionalpolitik Schweiz, Ziele, Reformen, Erfahrungen, Reformen*, Haupt, Berne, 1985, 142 p.

Brunet R., Sallois J. (sous la direction de), *France, les dynamiques du territoire*, DATAR, GIP-RECLUS, Montpellier, 1986, 251 p.

DATAR, *Guide du développement local*, Paris, Syros, 1986, 479 p.

Fahrenkrug K. et al., *Entwicklungschancen abgelegener Dörfer*, in: Zukunftschancen für das Dorf, Schriftenreihe "Forschung" des Bundesministers für Raumordnung, Bauwesen und Städtebau, Heft 466, 1988.

Forschungskolloquium im Rahmen der europäischen Kampagne für den ländlichen Raum (EKL), *Stand und Perspektiven der Forschungen für den landlichen Raum*, Schriftenreihe "Forschung" des Bundesministers für Raumplanung, Bauwesen und Städtebau, Heft 464, 1987.

Gasser A., *Gemeindefreiheit als Rettung Europas*, Bookfriends, Basel, 1947.

Greffe X., *Territoires en France*, Les enjeux économiques de la décentralisation, Paris, Economica, 1984, 304 p.

Greffe X. *Décentraliser pour l'emploi*, Les initiatives locales de développement, Paris, Economica, 1989, 296 p.

Greffe X., *"Décentralisation économique, développement local et agents publics"* Economie et humanisme, no 283, mai-juin 1985, pp. 15-21.

Guesnier B. (sous la direction de), *Développement local et décentralisation*, Paris, Ed. régionales européennes, 1986, 278 p.

Güller P., *Un avenir pour la campagne, une contribution de la Suisse à la Campagne du Conseil de l'Europe pour le monde rural*, Burga, Berne, 1989.

Guindani S., Bassand M., *Maldéveloppement régional et identité*, Lausanne, Presses polytechniques romandes, 1982, 200 p.

Département fédéral de l'économie publique, *Nouvelles directives concernant le développement des régions de montagne du 18 mai 1989*.

Kuenstler P., *"Initiatives locales de création d'emplois en Europe occidentale"*, Futuribles, no 83, décembre 1984, pp. 473-480.

Lendi, M., Reith W.J., *Regionalentwicklung im Berggebiet Schweiz-Oesterreich : Strategien im Vergleich*, IRUB, Wien, 1984, 295 p.

OFIAMT, *Ordonnance sur l'aide financière en faveur des régions dont l'économie est menacée du 21 février 1979*.

Office fédéral de l'aménagement du territoire, *Etat de la régionalisation en Suisse début 1981*, Berne, mai 1981, 32 p.

Perrin B., *"Plaidoyer pour le développement local"*, Regards sur l'actualité, no 132, juin 1987, pp.43-57.

Planque B. (sous la direction de), *Le développement décentralisé : dynamique spatiale de l'économie et planification régionale*, Paris, Litec, 1983, 297 p.

Popp H. W., Senn E. W., *Lebens- und Wirtschaftsraum Berggebiet Schweiz*, Bundesamt für Landwirtschaft, Bern, 1989, 67 p.

Pour, *"Les chantiers du développement local"*, no 106, mars-avril-mai 1986.

Rapport de la Commission consultative pour le développement économique régional à l'attention du Conseil fédéral, *La politique régionale de demain*, La Région, 4/88, 56 p.

Rotach M.C., *Erfahrungen mit dem Leitbild CK-73 auf eidgenössischer Ebene*, in "La Suisse et le pari régional", ROREP, Ed. Trelingue, Porza, 1981, pp. 100-107.

Sablonnier R., *Das Dorf im Uebergang vom Hoch- zum Spätmittelalter*, in: Lutz E, Rösener W., Zotz Th. (éd.), Institutionen, Kultur und Gesellschaft im Mittelalter, Sigmaringen, 1984, pp. 727-745.

Schweizerischer Bundesrat, *Raumplanungsbericht 1987*, Berne, 1987, 160 p.

Wachter S., *"Développement local et régulation par la base: quelques réflexions critiques"* Correspondance municipale, no 250,septembre 1984, pp. 39-44.

Wehling H.-G. (Hrsg.), *Regionen und Reginalismus in Westeuropa*, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 1987, 163 p.

Zdravko Mlinar
Université de Ljubljana

AUTONOMIE ET SOCIALISATION DANS L'ESPACE: QU'AVONS-NOUS APPRIS?
Expériences yougoslaves

1. POURQUOI ET COMMENT PARLER DE CE THEME?

Dans cet exposé j'essaierai d'interpréter sociologiquement les expériences caractéristiques et les problèmes touchant avant tout à l'organisation spatiale de la vie sociale et à sa restructuration spatio-sociale, dans le contexte des grands changements survenus dans le système politique du temps d'après-guerre en Yougoslavie. En connexion avec cela, dès le point de départ deux questions se posent: 1. Pourquoi consacrer aujourd'hui une attention particulière à l'organisation spatio-sociale et aux changements dans les Etats "socialistes" qui ont existé jusqu'ici, et 2. Comment traiter ce sujet pour qu'il soit le plus valable aussi pour d'autres et pour tenir compte dans la plus grande mesure possible du besoin des connaissances cumulatives?

La première question est particulièrement un défi précisément aujourd'hui, où dans les pays du "socialisme réaliste" on renonce justement à ce qui devrait être leur spécificité. Il faut cependant tenir compte du fait que du point de vue sociologique nous disposons d'une expérience historique exceptionnellement précieuse que nous pouvons tirer d'une situation quasi-expérimentale. Et précisément la Yougoslavie, plus que n'importe quel autre Etat, représentait une sphère d'expérimentation continuelle, qui directement ou indirectement touchait aussi au micro- et macro-niveau de l'organisation spatio-sociale. En ce qui concerne une série de changements qui entrent aujourd'hui au premier plan dans les Etats de l'Europe de l'Est, la Yougoslavie a déjà quatre décennies d'expériences, sur

la base de la recherche très dynamique et à certains points de vue aussi innovatrice de sa propre voie du développement ultérieur, qui s'est renforcé après le conflit avec le stalinisme en 1948. Ici, je pense avant tout au processus de la décentralisation de la prise des décisions, qui l'a menée vers une autonomie renforcée des républiques, des communes et des organisations économiques, puis, en liaison avec cela, au processus de la désétatisation, c.-à-d. du "dépérissement" de l'intervention de l'Etat sur la base de la contrainte, et à la fois à l'établissement du système de l'autogeston aussi bien dans les entreprises que dans les collectivités locales (territoriales). Le système politique avec une telle orientation de développement indiquait donc qu'il ne s'agissait pas (seulement) du retour de l'ancien, mettons à l'économie de marché, mais de l'affirmation – dans les conditions très défavorables du pays à un degré bas du dévelopement économique – de quelque chose de nouveau et de potentiellement valable aussi pour les autres Etats. Nous désirons, en outre, exposer quelques connaissances portant sur les implications spatio-sociales du programme de développement, qui affirmait la collectivisation et la socialisation dans les cadres territoriaux plus ou moins larges.

Bien qu'il se soit avéré qu'il s'agissait dans tout cela d'une grande prétention et qu'aujourd'hui la société yougoslave se trouve dans une grande crise économique et sociale, nous avons derrière nous près d'un demi-siècle d'expérimentation avec des millions de personnes, de vérification de différents modèles d'organisation territorio-sociale et de différents modes d'orientation des processus spatio-sociaux dans le contexte structural de l'Etat le plus hétérogène de l'Europe. Et cela nous amène à la question: qu'est-ce que cela nous a appris?

Dans les décennies passées, nous avions au premier plan la prétention qu'il s'agissait de l'édification d'un ordre social entièrement nouveau et dans ce complexe nous evions, sur le plan local, créer un type tout à fait nouveau de communauté – "la commune yougoslave". Celle-ci aurait dû être quelque chose de qualitativement différent des collectivités locales et de l'autogestion locale à l'Ouest.[1] Bien que cette **prétention à une différence qualitative** se fût avérée plus tard comme illusoire et écroulée comme un château de cartes, nous ne devrions cependant pas tomber dans des simplifications et nous précipiter en zigzag d'un extrême à l'autre. Il s'agit plutôt d'étudier à fond non seulement les changements normatifs et institutionnels, mais encore le contexte structural et de développement, à l'intérieur duquel, par exemple, certaines conceptions

innovatrices ne se sont pas réalisées. Evidemment, cela implique que dans des circonstances différentes on aurait pu atteindre aussi des résultats différents. Cela nous ouvre le vaste domaine de l'étude des conséquences inattendues, imprévues et non souhaitées de l'intervention consciente, "planifiée" dans les processus spatio-sociaux. Plus la sphère d'"expérimentation" était vaste, plus riches peuvent être les connaissances potentielles que nous pouvons atteindre par l'analyse sociologique de ces activités dans les décennies passées. En ce sens, nous sommes défiés par une série de questions et de paradoxes, comme par exemple:

- Comment expliquer le fait que nous avions en même temps **beaucoup de contrôle** (conduite, planifications), qui aurait dû assurer la formation d'un ordre spatial bien défini, et **beaucoup d'anarchie** dans l'espace (par ex. lesdites "constructions noires" (sans autorisation), où nous pensons surtout au phénomène de masse de la construction familiale sur des emplacements non permis)?
- Comment l'orientation vers la collectivisation et la socialisation s'est-elle exprimée dans le mode de colonisation et d'organisation des gens dans l'espace?
- Comment se fait-il qu'en Yougoslavie les différences entre les régions le plus et le moins développées augmentent, alors que, par exemple, les différences régionales concernant le développement économique aux USA diminuent déjà depuis quelques décennies?
- Comment expliquer le fait que, malgré la glorificaton de "la fraternité et de l'unité" et de la perspective du rapprochement entre les nations, même à l'intérieur de la Yougoslavie apparaissent certains signes de leur éloignement (par ex. l'accroissement des différences linguistiques entre les Serbes et les Croates)?
- Pourquoi, contrairement l'attente, se renforce la signification du "principe territorial" et de l'appartenance territoriale, ainsi que l'exclusivité réciproque et même la menace?
- Comment se fait-il que dans l'Europe de l'Ouest se trouvent au premier plan ls processus de l'intégration (supranationale), alors que dans l'Europe du Sud-Est ressort de plus en plus la "balkanisation" (dans le sens d'une fragmentation de plus en plus grande)?
- Est-ce qu'à l'avenir nous pouvons nous attendre à une tolérance de plus en plus grande envers la différence et au renforcement du multiculturalisme, ou bien est-ce que prédominera la tendance à une homogénéisation territoriale, qui traite la différence comme hostilité?

- Est-ce que le renforcement de l'autonomie régionale (nationale) et de l'identité est compatible avec les processus de l'intégration (européenne) dans un espace plus large et avec la création d'une "Europe sans frontières", ou bien l'un s'affirme-t-il sur le compte de l'autre?
- Quand et dans quels cadres la consolidation de l'identité territoriale est-elle en accord et en faveur de l'affirmation de l'autonomie du particulier, et quand entrent-elles en collision?

Ces questions et d'autres semblables représentent donc à la fois à leur manière aussi la réponse, à savoir que cette problématique mérite et exige une étude sociologique plus détaillée.

Après avoir indiqué dans les grandes lignes pourquoi consacrer notre attention à ce thème, il y a encore une autre question qui se pose: **comment** le traiter? Dans les traités antérieurs sur "la ville socialiste et sur "l'urbanisation dans les Etats socialistes" était au premier plan "l'analyse démographique" de l'établissement de la population dans l'espace et le temps. Mais cette analyse conventionnelle, descriptive des variables démographiques caractéristiques ne nous semble pas le point de départ le plus convenable pour une analyse, qui devrait englober en entier le contenu spécifique des changements spatio-sociaux dans les Etats "socialistes". De telles analyses, en effet, – que les auteurs en aient conscience ou non – n'aboutissent qu'à des questions de croissance, et on égalisons la notion de croissance avec celle de développement. Une autre approche caractéristique expose les questions qui se posaient, dans la période postrévolutionnaire, aux architectes et aux urbanistes, qui cherchaient **l'expression spatiale** appropriée **des valeurs socialistes** au niveau de la ville et du milieu de travail et d'habitation (Lissitzky, 1984; Fisher, 1962; French, Hmilton, 1979). Ici, il s'agit aujourd'hui le plus souvent de la présentation des idées plus ou moins ingénieuses des projeteurs particuliers qui, après la révolution, essayaient d'affirmer le collectivisme, et de la présentation exemplificative des projets caractéristiques, réalisés ou non. Ce faisant, il s'agissait dans une grande mesure du subjectivisme et des jugements intuitifs, aussi bien de la part des architectes et des urbanistes, qui construisaient différents modèles, que de la part des sociologues, qui aujourd'hui évaluent cela rétrospectivement.

Pour dépasser un traité détaché, fragmentaire-descriptif et un choix arbitraire des segments particuliers de l'organisation spatio-sociale (Morton and Stuart, 1984), nous avons besoin d'un cadre théorique plus large, qui inclut les processus de base et les contradictions du

développement social. Comme cadre de ce genre j'indiquerai très brièvement le paradigme du développement social (Mlinar 1986), sur la base duquel nous pouvons traiter d'une manière unifiée le contenu des changements spatio-sociaux au micro- et au macro-niveau sociologique.

2. POINT DE DEPART THEORIQUE

Comme noyau de ce paradigme nous exposons qu'il s'agit de la contradiction de deux processus de base à long terme: de l'individuation, par laquelle nous désignons l'autonomie (le renforcement de celle-ci) des parties à l'intérieur d'un tout plus large, et de l'association, qui apparaît comme collectivisation et socialisation dans des cadres spatiaux de plus en plus larges. L'individuation s'affirme par le renforcement de l'autonomie des groupes sociaux et de l'autonomie de l'homme comme particulier. D'autre part, la socialisation reçoit, au cours du temps, des connotations ou accents de contenu différents. Dans la période d'après-guerre, la nationalisation était au premier plan, maintenant nous entrons dans la période de l'internationalisation et de la globalisation.

Si nous disons qu'il s'agit de deux processus contradictoires, nous pensons que, d'un côté, ils dépendent l'un de l'autre, de sorte que l'un ne peut progresser sans l'autre, et d'un autre côté, qu'en même temps ils s'excluent l'un autre. C'est la caractéristique de toute contradiction. Et à la fois, comme on le sait, la contradiction dans le marxisme s'interprète comme la force motrice du développement social. De l'aspect de notre thème, ce qui nous intéresse particulièrement, c'est comment appliquer ces idées générales à l'espace et aux conditions concrètes en Yougoslavie. Du point de vue spatial, nous verrons comment l'individuation et la socialisation s'expriment dans les formes concrètes de la restructuration spatio-sociale et quels sont les conflits caractéristiques qui surviennent à ce sujet. En ce qui concerne la prise en considération ou non du paradigme indiqué en général dans la pratique yougoslave, nous pouvons exposer d'une manière critique trois écarts caractéristiques.

1. La tendance à la marginalisation de la contradiction du développement dans le contexte de la société socialiste. Même si la pratique politique se réclamait du marxisme, en fait elle tendait tout le temps à la marginalisation de la contradiction dans le développement (spatio-)social. Cette tendance s'appuyait sur quatre explications caractéristiques: a) il s'agit de la discontinuité révolutionnaire par rapport à la société préalable,

capitaliste, ce qui signifierait que déjà avec cet acte, c.-à-d. avant tout avec la suppression de la propriété privée, les contradictions de développement de base étaient aussi supprimées une fois pour toutes; b) d'après la deuxième explication, il s'agit d'une transformation de la structure sociale de la société socialiste, où s'affirme une homogénéisation intérieure de plus en plus grande, ce qui signifierait qu'il n'existe plus que des "contradictions non-antagonistes", par ex. entre la ville et la campagne et sembl.; c) la troisième innerprétation expose que les contradictions, si elles se manifestent encore, ne sont que "des restes du passé", des restes du "capitalisme", et ne sont pas l'expression authentique du nouveau système social; et d) le quatrième mode de marginalisation de la contradiction montre que la contradiction se limite seulement aux relations extérieures, aux conflits extérieurs et aux rapports envers les "ennemis extérieurs".

A la différence d'une telle orientation idéologique générale (d'où provenait une série d'activités concrètes des organes de l'Etat), la recherche empirique a dévoilé, dès les années soixante-dix — cequi est assez surprenant pour ce moment-là —, la présence latente d'un large répertoire de contradictions du développement social territorial, que nous connaissons déjà dans la période classique du capitalisme. Ainsi, par ex. dans le développement inégal au niveau local et régional, nous avons commencé à découvrir qu'il s'agissait, d'un côté, d'une concentration de la pouvoir politique, des connaissances (des cadres professionnels et des institutions), du capital (sièges des banques), des informations et des degrés supérieurs du traitement (industriel) etc., et, d'un autre côté, d'une sphère en prépondérance paysanne de province, avec une populaton paysanne atomisée sans organisations autonomes et sans puissance politique, de sphères qui sont avant tout les fournisseurs de matières premières, sans industrie ou avec des exploitations industrielles disséminées avec une main-d'oeuvre peu qualifiée, subordonnées à des "centrales" extérieures, avec une technologie obtenue comme aide de la part des développés, parce qu'elle était soit déjà surannée, soit écologiquement menaçante et semblable. L'analyse sociologique a donc dévoilé toute l'acuité de la contradiction du développement social territorial en accord avec le modèle déjà connu des relations entre le centre et la périphérie.

Eu égard aux grandes prétentions d'une transformation révolutionnaire et de la discontinuité par rapport au passé, dans les Etats "socialistes" prédomina "la logique de l'autruche". Les représentations visionnaires de l'avenir recouvraient simplement l'état existant, conditionnant par là une

spèce de cimentation et le prolongement de cet état; auprès des grandes objctifs clairs, la réalité concrète était simplement masquée. Il s'ensuivait des implications d'action, ce que nous pouvons illustrer par le fait qu'aussi les aphères moins développées, avec leurs impulsions dans les organes particuliers de la prise de décision politique, assez longtemps ne purent pas pénétrer et faire valoir la légitimité de leur position spécifique, car on estimait que le socialisme résolvait tout cela déjà en principe.

2. Le deuxième écart du paradigme général indiqué du développement social peut être désigné comme unilatéral, et cela en ce sens que toute l'attention n'était concentrée que sur le processus de la socialisation (collectivisation, nationalisation), sans égard à la question de l'autonomie des sujets concernés ou même avec une opposition consciente à une telle autonomie. La socialisation était devenue le synonyme du développement socialiste ou du socialisme en général.[2]

En liaison avec cela, je constate encore ce qui suit:

a) Comme orientation prioritaire du développement ressort le renforcement de l'ensemble et de son unité, que l'on fortifierait par l'élimination ou le refoulement des différences des parties composantes.

b) La société (le système, le collectif) est ce qui – non seulement complète et enrichit, mais – remplace l'activité autonome des groupes et des particuliers. La société donnera l'appartement, assurera l'emploi, la protection de l'enfant, etc.

c) Il est possible d'atteindre un degré supérieur de collectivisation ou de socialisation par le rapprochement, donc par la concentration des hommes dans un espace physique; par contre, une plus grande dispersion conditionnerait un degré inférieur de socialisation (par ex. à la campagne, le séjour dans des maisons pour une famille, etc.).

d) L'agrégation des hommes dans l'espace est devenu le synonyme, et par là aussi la compensation de la collectivisation, bien qu'il ne s'agisse là ni de l'association, ni de l'autonomie des particuliers inclus. La forme phénoménale d'une telle collectivisation apparente ou déformée apparaît dans le concept des "masses populaires", qui se rassemblent souvent en des lieux publics pour manifester leur appartenance et leur loyauté au système (c.-à-d. avant tout à ses représentants, à l'avant-garde) et leur préparation à la lutte contre l'ennemi intérieur ou extérieur. L'habitation dans de grands immeubles devrait aussi exprimer un degré plus élevé de collectivisation (on parle simplement d'"appartements collectifs"), bien qu'il s'agisse en fait encore d'un moindre degré de liaison entre les habitants.[3]

e) La propriété sociale obtint la priorité absolue, ce qui signifie que les autres formes de propriété (privée, coopérative et autre) étaient soit entièrement exclues, soit tolérées dans une étendue limitée, comme quelque chose de temporaire dans la voie de la prédominance complète du social. Sous cet angle visuel on forçait même le processus de la désagrarisation; la plus grande part de la population paysanne devrait s'inclure dans le secteur social de l'économie dans les centres urbains et industriels. Ce faisant, on essayait d'atteindre l'interruption la plus rapide et complète possible de l'attachement à la terre (lesdits "semi-prolétaires" ou paysans-ouvriers ne recevaient pas, par exemple, d'allocations familiales, etc.). Même la construction de logements coopérative n'était pas assez "sociale" et, pour cela, elle ne recevait pas le soutien politique convenable.

f) L'orientation prioritaire de développement vers la socialisation, dans laquelle il n'y avait pas de place pour la variété et autonomie individuelle, pouvait s'affirmer seulement avec l'institutionnalisation de plus en plus grande de la vie sociale à tous les niveaux de l'organisation sociale territoriale. A la différence de ce que Manuel Castells et d'autres sociologues à l'Ouest découvraient comme les "luttes urbaines" (Castells, 1975). Les sociologues en Yougoslavie, surtout dans les années soixante-dix, traitaient d'une manière critique avant tout comme un problème d'**hyperinstitutionnalisation**, comme une espèce de succédané de la socialisation de fait.

3. Nous voyons le troisième écart caractéristique du paradigme général du développement social, avec l'aide duquel nous pouvons expliquer l'actuelle situation de crise et les nombreux problèmes du point de vue de l'organisation spatiale de la vie sociale, comme suit: Tandis que le concept de la contradiction inclut en général aussi bien le choc, la lutte et l'exclusion que l'interdépendance, l'association et le complément, la pratique politique concrète, sur la base de l'explication du sens de la lutte de classe dans le développement social, **n'a absolutisé que le premier côté.** En liaison avec cela, ressortait tout le temps le "danger" provenant de l'activité des "ennemis" extérieurs et intérieurs, d'où s'ensuivent aussi des implications importantes du point de vue de l'organisation spatiale de la vie sociale. Le danger réel ou seulement imaginaire, construit, menaçant le programme de l'émancipation sociale et nationale, a longtemps fourni la légitimité pour la mobilisation, sur la base de l'homogénéisation territoriale ou de classe. Eu égard à cela, le processus de

la socialisation ne s'est pas développé non plus comme l'intégration de la variété, mais – plutôt dans le sens des communautés traditionnelles, primitives – il était réduit à **l'agrégation des similarities**. Par là, on comprend aussi le retour au renforcement du principe de la territorialité, ce qui implique aussi l'exclusivité réciproque entre les unités territoriales dans le sens de la logique **"zero sum game"** (Thurow, 1981).

Tout comme la tension idéologique exposait une telle logique de l'exclusivité du point de vue de la lutte des classes (ce qui est au profit d'une classe est à la fois au dommage d'une autre), dans une période postérieure a commencé à entrer au premier plan une telle exclusivité dans les rapports entre les régions (républiques) particulières. Tout profit pour l'une se comprend déjà de règle et a priori comme un dommage (très probable) de l'autre. Du point de vue des uns, les républiques développées exploitent les moins développées, et du point de vue es autres inversement. Tout ne font que perdre. Pour les Serbes il va de soi qu'une "forte Serbie" signifie aussi une "forte Yougoslavie"; cependant, pour les nations voisines et plus petites, la "forte Serbie", et particulièrement la "grande Serbie" signifie l'affirmation de l'aspiration à la domination et l'augmentation du danger qu'elles se retrouvent dans un rôle subordonné, dans le cadre de la Yougoslavie comme un tout.

3. LA SOCIALISATION AU COMPTE DE L'AUTONOMIE: ASPECTS SPATIAUX

Dans le cadre du mouvement socialiste et communiste, il y avait de grandes différences aussi bien en théorie qu'en pratique, cependant une espèce de dénominateur commun est **le refus de limitation du secteur privé, de l'atomisation et du caractère périphérique** de la vie hors de la dynamique centrale du développement social global. Dans "La position de la classe ouvrière en Angleterre", Engels a présenté d'une manière très frappante cette limitation encore au temps avant la prédominance de la production industrielle dans les villes, en décrivant la vie des artisans, des ouvriers du textile, qui travaillaient à la maison, dans leurs maisons à la campagne. Pour eux il dit qu'"ils vivaient et pensaient... séparés du monde, dans la solitude, sans activité spirituelle et sans commotions violentes... ils allaient à l'église, ne faisaient pas de politique,

peu d'entre eux savaient lire, encore moins écrire... dans une modeste soumission ils s'entendaient parfaitement avec les classes plus distinguées de la société. Mais pour cela ils étaient morts spirituellement, ils ne vivaient que pour leurs bénéfices privés mesquins, pour leur métier à tisser et leur jardinet et ils ne savaient rien du puissant mouvement qui se déroulait au dehors à travers l'humanité. Ils se sentaient bien dans leur silencieuse vie végétale et s'il n'y avait pas eu de révolution industrielle, ils n'auraient jamais cessé cette existence romantique et douce, cependant pas digne de l'homme. Ce n'étaient pas des hommes, mais seulement des machines qui effectuent leur travail..." (Engels, 1989, 561-163).

A la différence d'une telle dissémination et marginalité, on en arrive plus tard à la concentration de la classe ouvrière précisément dans les foyers des événements sociaux, ce qui augmente sa force aussi jusqu'à la mesure qu'il a affirmée en 1918 à St. Pétersbourg. La concentration et l'association sur les points décisifs dans l'espace ont permis que maintenant même une catégorie minoritaire de la population (dans un Etat principalement agraire) a mis en valeur des changements sociaux radicaux.

L'urbanisation a ainsi, dans le cadre du mouvement socialiste, obtenu un signe précurseur expressément positif, à savoir:

a) du point de vue des possibilités de l'affirmation des "forces progressives" et de la transformation structurale radicale au macro-niveau social et

b) du point de vue de l'affirmation d'un nouveau mode de vie, pour lequel est caractéristique un degré supérieur de collectivisation dans le milieu de travail et de séjour.

D'un point de vue ou de l'autre, nous pourrions reprendre les idées plus ou moins radicales et les expériences en liaison avec leur (non-)réalisation par ex. en Union Soviétique, en Chine, au Cambodge, en Roumanie et ailleurs. A l'Ouest, on a déjà jusqu'ici consacré une plus grande attention aux projets extrêmes, qui ressortent, et aux interventions des politiciens, des urbanistes et des architectes, particulièrement ceux de la période après la Révolution d'Octobre. Du point de vue sociologique, de tels exemples peuvent être valables, surtout parce qu'avec leur radicalisme ils découvrent très distinctement les intentions et l'orientation de leurs porteurs et de leur temps.

Avec la critique de "l'individualisme bourgeois", on mettait maintenant en première place le collectif, qui devait avoir l'avantage moral et historique sur le particulier. De cet angle visuel, on avait de grandes

espérences que les valeurs socialistes obtiennent aussi leur expression matérialisée spécifique dans la structure du milieu construit. Mais les débats déjà plusieurs fois entamés sur "la ville socialiste" ont constaté avec déception ou au moins avec résignation (en Yougoslavie, par exemple, le débat organisé déjà en 1964 par la revue "Nos thèmes") que s'affirme "un urbanisme à côté du socialisme". Bien que les "Etats socialistes" dans les années passées eussent de plus grandes possibilités de contrôle et de conduite vu les buts posés, en comparaison avec les Etats capitalistes, ils n'ont pas réussi à affirmer un échantillon clairement profilé de l'organisation spatiale de la réalisation des valeurs socialistes (Caldarovic, 1989; Seferagic, 1988).

Sans égard aux grands changements entre les Etats et les mouvements particuliers (en ce qui concerne les expériences avec l'introduction de modes plus collectifs de séjour, la Yougoslavie ne fait pas précisément partie des cas extrêmes), nous pouvons cependant leur trouver un dénominateur commun. Je vois celui-ci dans l'aspiration à supprimer toutes les **lignes de séparation** sociales et spatio-physiques, qui permettraient la séparation des identités particulières, qu'il s'agisse du particulier, de la famille et parfois aussi du groupe ethnique, etc. Dans ce contexte, il est possible de comprendre que la critique du caractère privé, comme un reste de la société bourgeoise, a amené même aux exigences qu'il faut, par exemple, assurer aux gens des logis communs, de façon qu'ils n'habitent pas séparément dans des chambres particulières; uniquement pour l'acte sexuel le couple se retirerait dans un espace particulier (Kamenka, 1983). En ce qui concerne la famille, nous connaissons des "solutions" radicales, comme celle qu'on pratiquait dans les communes chinoises avec la séparation forcée des sexes dans des dortoirs séparés pour une foule de gens au moins six jours par semaine. Plus répandue était la pratique, qui prédomina aussi en Yougoslavie, où il ne s'agissait que du processus forcé de "la socialisation des fonctions de la famille". Ici, il s'agissait de la prétention qu'avec l'organisation de services sur le plan local on remplacerait dans plus grande mesure les fonctions classiques du ménage; avec l'organisation des services ménagers dans le lieu, de "l'alimentation sociale" dans les entreprises; la famille cèderait la fonction de protection et d'éducation (qui échappe au contrôle, tel qu'il est assuré dans les formes sévèrement institutionnalisées); récemment encore, politiquement; on forçait l'action (et à cela il y avait aussi des oppositions, surtout en Slovénie) pour l'introduction de "l'école de la journée entière" etc.

Tout cela devait être la contribution au processus accéléré de la socialisation – de conception unilatérale – qui était, d'un côté, égalisé avec l'institutionnalisation et, de l'autre, traité comme synonyme du développement socialiste. Mais comme on essayait de mettre en valeur un tel programme dans une grande mesure en ce sens que la société (le système **supplante et remplace** des sujets concrets, il s'est avéré d'un cas à l'autre, et partout dans l'actuelle crise économique, que ce système n'a pas de fondement réel, matériel pour la réalisation de tels programmes).

En accord avec la conception indiquée de la socialisation, il est possible de comprendre aussi le rôle et le mode de traitement des **identités territoriales** dans l'espace plus large. L'orientation globale de "l'édification socialiste", surtout dans la première période après la guerre en Yougoslavie, a entièrement recouvert l'hétérogénéité réelle et la fragmentation de cette partie de l'espace balkanique, qui à l'Ouest a déjà obtenu une désignation spéciale par l'expression de "balkanisation", ce qui devrait ésigner une fragmentation exceptionnelle. La priorité de l'orientation visionnaire vers l'unification au niveau global a tout d'abord entièrement bloqué l'expression des intérêts et besoins régionaux réels, malgré l'établissement de la structure institutionnelle du système politique, qui permettrait cela. Lorsque quelques membres de ces structures représentatives et des organes exécutifs de l'appareil d'Etat ont pris ces droits "au sérieux", cela fut une surprise, suivie par la répression politique d'en haut, qui fondait sa légitimité sur le mot d'ordre de "fraternité et unité". En Slovénie se déroula "l'action (spontanée) de 25 députés" qui, à cause de cette autoinitative et autoorganisation, provoquèrent de sévères réactions du plus haut sommet politique. Tout comme la forte tendance à l'autonomie régionale fut confirmée par l'identité nationale des républiques particulières, ainsi devint critique aussi l'offensive idéologique contre le nationalisme et le particularisme, qui, surtout dans les années 70, rétablit l'unité, mais non l'unité de la variété, mais l'unité dans le cadre de laquelle il s'agissait avant tout de rendre impossible l'expression autonome de la diversité (et en fin de compte pour que la diversité devienne synonyme de l'hostilité).

Ici, nous pouvons attirer l'attention encore sur l'exemple bien plus frappant de l'essai d'obtention, par une intervention politique, de l'unification de l'espace entier de l'Etat, ce qui supprimerait les gênantes identités culturelles et territoriales héritées. Ici, nous pensons au projet de Ceausescu, dans le cadre duquel on prévoyait de démolir au moins la moitié des

13.000 localités à la campagne. De cette manière on unifierait la population hétérogène qui, à côté des Roumains d'origine romane, comprend aussi des communautés nationales allemandes, hongroises et serbes. Les paysans étaient délogés de force dans de "nouveaux villages agraro-industriels", sans liaison avec leurs traditions linguistiques, ethniques, historiques et artistiques, pour empêcher tout essai d'autoconfirmation ethnique des minorités. (Cesare de Seta, 1990).

Bien que l'on puisse objecter que cet exemple sort des cadres du programme socialiste de la socialisation (il ne s'écarte pas des actions analogues en Asie), il découvre cependant très clairement à sa manière le contenu de la prise de position pour l'unité, qui n'inclut pas la diversité et l'autonomie des parties particulières.

La conception de la socialistation, qui égalise celle-ci avant tout avec **l'homogénéisation** de la société dans des cadres territoriaux plus ou moins larges déterminés, représentait aussi un point de départ idéologique pour l'intervention de l'Etat dans **l'agriculture et la campagne.** Leur incorporation dans la société plus large était conçue plutôt dans le sens de la suppression de leurs particularités et de la soumission des paysans aux "forces progressives" de la société[4] que dans le sens d'une augmentation des possibilités de leur participation. (Mlinar, 1972).

En général prédominait la tendance visant à ce que les différences et les contrastes entre la ville et la campagne, auxquels les classiques du marxisme attribuaient une grande signification, soient surpassées sous forme de la domination complète de la vie et de la subordination de la campagne plutôt que dans le sens de l'association et du complément des particularités de l'une et de l'autre. Ainsi, par exemple, de l'enseignement dans les écoles primaires à la campagne dans le temps d'après-guerre on élimina toutes les particularités de contenu, valables pour le travail et la vie dans les conditions spécifiques du milieu concret. Pour les enfants des paysans, qui après la fin de la scolarité restaient à la ferme, le même programme d'études était obligatoire que pour les enfants d'une grande ville. Tandis que pour l'instruction complémentaire dans tous les lieux plus importants on organisait les "universités ouvrières", nous n'avions pas d'une manière analogue d'institutions ou de programmes semblables spécifiquement pour les paysans et la campagne. Les ressources d'information de masse (avec des différences déterminées entre elles), durant près de trois décennies, furent écartées en ce qui concerne le contenu de la problématique spécifique et des innérêts authentiques et des besoins de la population paysanne.

Il nous semble donc compréhensible que l'analyse sociologique (Mlinar, 1974)) nous a découvert une situation paradoxale: les mesures et les activités, avec lesquelles on aurait dû promouvoir la socialisation (au sens le plus large du terme) de l'agriculture et de la campagne les ont en fait encore plus marginalisées et elles ont conservé l'atomisation reprise du passé et le traditionnalisme.[5]

Pour autant qu'il est arrivé, en Yougoslavie jusqu'à nos jours, à un rapprochement entre la ville et la campagne, c'est plutôt le résultat du développement technologique (avant tout du trafic élargi et des communications) que de la politique de développement. Par ailleurs, cette politique peut nous servir d'explication, à savoir pourquoi, aujourd'hui en Yougoslavie, la propriété foncière est plus fragmentée que dans la plupart des pays européens, soit à l'Est, soit à l'Ouest. Dans sa tendance à la socialisation, cependant, la politique a évité (à l'exception de l'essai primitif de collectivisation à la fin des années 40) l'emploi des formes grossières de la violence. Et à la fois a priori et jusqu'à nos jours mêmes elle a refusé la possibilité du renforcement du secteur privé (jusqu'à 1989 le maximum agraire admis était de 10 ha de terre cultivable, lequel fut porté à 30 ha par un amendement constitutionnel), même s'il s'agissait du propre travail des membres de la famille.[6]

4. L'AUTONOMIE PAR L'ASSOCIATION ET L'AUTONOMIE PAR L'EXCLUSION

Comme nous l'avons indiqué dans notre point de départ théorique, nous essayons d'expliquer les événements dans l'espace en tant qu'expression de la dialectique de la contradiction des tendances à l'autonomie des parties et à l'association (de plus en plus large) de l'ensemble. Dans le chapitre précédent, nous avons vu comment la politique de développement, sur la base de l'orientation idéologique vers la socialisation et la transformation globale du système entier, au moins dans la première période après la révolution, s'est concentrée seulement sur l'un de ces deux processus. Il s'agirait là de la consolidation de l'ensemble, même si cela implique l'exclusion de l'autonomie et des particularités de ses parties. Evidemment, le résultat n'était pas l'intégration des diversités, mais une unité apparente, comme expression des mesures restrictivement répressives et de l'homogénéisation forcée. Plus grandes ont les

conséquences négatives d'un tel caractère unilatéral, plus grande est l'hétérogénéité réelle de la société.[7]

En liaison avec cela, il s'agissait aussi des circonstances extérieures, où je pense avant tout au conflit avec le stalinisme. Etat donné le puissant mouvement de libération nationale autochtone et victorieux, il est intéressant de noter que dans la période d'après-guerre la Yougoslavie montrait trop d'indépendance, ce pour quoi elle fut punie par l'exclusion du bloc des Etats socialistes. Tout comme à l'intérieur de l'Etat, dans les relations internationales aussi se manifeste la même opposition de base, c.-à-d. l'opposition entre l'autonomie et l'association.

Tandis que la première période fut suivie par la critique du centralisme, de l'étatisme et de l'uniformité, avec la réalisation du programme de la décentralisation et de la désétatisation on en arriva aussi à des conséquences imprévues et – au moins pour certains – non désirées. Au moins à certains points de vue, la **décentralisation** commença à se montrer comme une **désintégration**. Des reproches commencèrent à se manifester, à savoir que la décentralisation ne signifie pas encore la démocratisation, puisqu'il s'agissait en essence seulement du transfert du pouvoir politique aux élites politiques des unités territoriales plus restreintes. Tadic (1986) a, par exemple, exposé d'une manière critique la tendance que la démocratie se subordonnait à la "natiocratie". Mostov (1988) constate que le régionalisme renforcé limite les processus de la démocratisation en Yougoslavie. "La décentralisation des décisions économiques de l'administration fédérale aux républiques, régions, administrations locales et entreprises n'allait pas de pair avec la démocratisation des relations politiques et économiques, mais avec l'autarcie dans l'économie et le transfert du pouvoir aux centres locaux, qui sont hors de l'atteinte des travailleurs et des citoyens".

Pour protéger l'identité et l'autonomie des nations (républiques) particulières, dans des cadres déterminés de la prise des décisions au niveau fédéral on introduisit **le principe de l'accord, du consensus**. Cela fut suivi, cependant, par la critique qu'il s'agit à vrai dire du droit de veto, avec lequel une région peut bloquer la solution de certaines affaires sur le territoire de l'Etat entier et, par conséquent, cela représente de fait la domination de la minorité sur la majorité. En liaison avec cela, surtout les discutants de la Serbie exigent l'affirmation plus conséquente du principe "un votant une voix" et s'engagent d'une manière critique contre l'autonomie des unités territoriales.[8]

De l'angle visuel opposé, avant tout de la Slovénie et de la Croatie proviennent **les critiques des tendances à la majorisation.** Si au niveau fédéral prédominait le principe majoritaire au sens d'un votant une voix, cela signifierait eo ipso une position à droits inégaux des nations particulières. Pour une nation plus petite, comme par exemple la nation slovène, cela signifierait a priori la condamnation par avance à la position permanente de minorité à l'intérieur d'un Etat très hétérogène. Ce serait la condamnation à la subordination de cette république particulière relativement la plus développée et cultivée, par rapport à la majorité, qui est à un degré inférieur de développement, mais qui prédominerait politiquement et militairement.[9]

Dans une telle situation, précisément aujourd'hui s'aggrave le dilemme décisif entre

a) la recherche ou l'affirmation d'une plus grande autonomie, avant tout des républiques plus développées à l'intérieur du système donné et

b) la tendance à l'autonomie avec l'exclusion, c'est-à-dire la recherche d'une plus grande indépendance avec la séparation.

Comme nous le constations dès le début des années 70 dans les recherches de l'opinion publique, il est valable encore aujourd'hui que la Yougoslavie, à ce point de vue, est encore fortement divisée en deux parties – nord-ouest et sud-est – de l'Etat. Dans le cadre de la première, formée avant tout par les républiques plus développées de Slovénie et de Croatie,[10] ressort l'exigence expresse d'une plus grande autonomie, tandis que dans le cadre de la seconde, est présent un soutien relativement bien plus fort du rôle de l'Etat au niveau fédéral. Evidemment, le rôle renforcé du centre est lié, dans les régions moins développées, à des prestations plus grandes. Mais le nationalisme accru change de telles proportions, si les tendances expansives d'une nationale plus grande se manifestent en tant que menace de l'autonomie ou même de l'identité d'une nation plus petite.[11]

5. L'HOMME ET LE SYSTEME DANS LE MILIEU DE SEJOUR: DE L'ECCLUSIVITE A LA COMPLEMENTARITE

Aussi au niveau du milieu de vie quotidien, nous pouvons expliquer les formes de l'actuelle situation de crise à l'aide du paradigme de développement indiqué. Au lieu d'encourager le renforcement des deux côtés de la contradiction de développement de base et à la fois le rapprochement et la pénétration de l'homme et du système, la politique de développement a encore intensifié leur exclusivité et les conflits réciproques. Dans leur milieu de vie concret, les gens n'ont pas ressenti le processus de la collectivisation et de la socialisation en tant qu'incorporation dans la richesse de la diversité, mais comme synonyme de la limitation, du contrôle, de la vérification et de la domination.

Mais, comme nous pouvons le voir dans le domaine de la construction des logements, il s'est avéré que pas même l'intensification du contrôle n'a pu assurer la conformité attendue et la discipline dans l'affirmation d'un ordre spatial déterminé. Ce fut plutôt le contraire. Plus de contrôle – au moins au-delà d'un point déterminé – renforça même les "effets-boomerang". Quand le poids de la prise en considération des exigences du système devient trop grand, le sujet concret

- soit abandonne le but posé (par ex. la construction de la maison d'habitation),
- soit sort des cadres, définis par le système, du comportement permis (par ex. il commence à construire sa maison sans permis d'emplacement et/ou de construction).

De cette manière, comme nous l'avons déjà mentionné, se découvre la situation la plus paradoxale: nous avons **beaucoup de conrôle**[12] **et beaucoup d'anarchie dans l'espace.** Le système devient si limitatif et à la fois, dans le sens affirmatif, au niveau sellectif il offre si peu que par là il encourage l'anarchisme et la violation du propre ordre normatif. Les expériences négatives que les gens obtiennent en essayant d'agir à l'intérieur de l'ordre normatif embrouillé, en fin de compte ne font que les détourner du système, de façon qu'ils ne peuvent compter que sur eux-mêmes. Et cela signifie que, impuissants, ils se retirent et deviennent

indifférents, ou bien "ils prennent le droit en leurs mains" et, comme contrevenants de l'ordre public, ils entrent en lutte contre la société.

L'analyse critique rétrospective des expériences yougoslaves nous découvre donc, déjà par l'exemple de la crise de la question du logement, qu'il y a à l'arrière-plan une certaine **conception de la socialisation,** qui devrait renforcer **le système comme alternative et compensation** des sujets autonomes. En ce sens seulement nous pouvons expliquer la structure institutionnelle extrêmement exubérante, qui assume avant tout la fonction de contrôle (Misztal, 1986-87) et qui est à la fois rigide, renfermée et excluante et insensible aux divers besoins et potentiels spécifiques humains et matériels, pour leur satisfaction dans le contexte local concret.

D'une manière un peu simplifiée on pourrait dire qu'on ne reconnaît que ce qui est institutionnalisé et, bien sûr, contrôlé. Toute l'attention est consacrée à "la construction sociale des logements", alors que la construction individuelle (bien que par sa part toujours prépondérante) a le caractère d'une catégorie résiduelle. Malgré la grande crise du logement, à travers les décennies la politique donnait quand même la priorité à l'orientation (illussoire) visant à ce que "la société donnera le logement", plutôt que de libérer et soutenir les possibilités disponsibles pour un plus grand engagement individuel.

Nous voyons la caractéristique générale pour tous les domaines d'activité au niveau local (ici nous pensons aussi à la protection de l'enfant, à l'instruction, aux besoins sanitaires, à l'aide aux personnes âgées, à l'activité communale, etc.) dans le fait que l'institutionnalisation des activités s'est renfocée comme mode exclusif, et non pas complémentaire de la satisfaction des besoins des habitants. En ce sens il est compréhensible que nous avions affaire avant tout à des institutions fermées, sans égard à la part des besoins qu'elles parvenaient à satisfaire. Même si le jardin d'enfants dans une commune concrète n'englobait qu'une moindre part des enfants de toutes les familles qui avaient besoin de la garde des enfants, il était cependant politiquement "inacceptable" de permettre ou même d'encourager des formes non-formelles de protection de l'enfant. Les enfants ne devaient pas passer sous une influence indésirable (par ex. de femmes religieuses), et cela même si cela signifiait plusieurs années d'attente pour la réception au jardin d'enfants.

Mais la crise économique a apporté de force aussi à ce point de vue des solutions plus vitales. Pour la première fois dans le temps d'après-

guerre, il s'est avéré que les familles aux revenus inférieurs n'étaient pas en état de couvrir les frais de la protection enfantine institutionnalisée. Les institutions éducatives de protection commencèrent à fermer leurs sections et en même temps, d'un autre côté, s'élargissaient différentes formes de garde d'enfants non-formelle, soit contre paiement, soit sous forme d'entraide entre voisins et parents, etc.

Seuls des changements ainsi forcés furent suivis par une réaction officielle tardive, de sorte que les institutions jusque là entièrement fermées et excluantes commencèrent à s'ouvrir et à consentir à un rôle complémentaire par rapport à différentes formes spontanées d'entraide.[13]

En général nous pourrions dire que là où le degré d'institutionnalisation était le plus élevé et par là l'autonomie des sujets concernés la plus limitée, l'expérience de la crise économique et sociale est aussi evenue la plus difficile. Ainsi, nous sommes arrivés à une situaton entièrement renversée en comparaison avec ce qu'Engels condamnait comme une limitation de la vie à la périphérie de la société. Maintenant, vraiment dominante est devenue la structure institutionnelle de la société, qui subordonnait, bloquait et rendait passif l'homme. Comme représentant du système, les institutions remplaçaient et libéraient l'homme, en le rendant passif tant au point de vue matériel que moral.[14]

Au lieu que la socialisation signifierait l'entrée de la périphérie dans les courants globaux de la transformation sociale, la convergence du local et du global, les îles résiduelles de l'indépendance marginale restaient une alternative de plus en plus importante dans les différentes stratégies de la survie. En ce sens, déjà Gyorgy Konrad, sur la base des expériences hongroises, faisait observer comment les gens cherchent leur place là où ils sont libres, et cela non en leur lieu de travail, où l'on est "dans une zone de contrainte", mais dans le temps libre, où "l'on est seul son maître", où "est notre vie véritable". "Le bon sens des Hongrois est peut-être dans le fait qu'ils progressent là où c'est possible sans difficultés majeures: dans l'économie "grise" et la culture "grise", c'est-à-dire dans la sphère du temps libre. Dans les appartements privés sont organisés de petites entreprises et des séminaires indépendants, des associations économiques et des éditions aux frais de l'auteur. Les bureaux appartiennent à l'Etat, les appartements à "la société". L'appartement et le temps libre sont la dimension spatiale et temporelle de l'indérpendance du citoyen". (Konrad, 1988, p. 135).

Ces derniers temps surviennent de grands changements que nous pouvons indiquer ici au moins dans les grandes lignes. Ce sont:

1. la restructuration à l'intérieur du milieu de vie quotidien au niveau local et

2. les changements dans le rôle de l'activité local par rapport à sa signification pour la prise des décisions au niveau macro-sociologique.

En connexion avec le premier point ressortent:

a) **La désinstitutionnalisaton**: ici nous pensons à la diminution du rôle des institutions et à leur ouverture dans le contexte de la communauté locale, mais pas à leur suppression. Svetlik et ses collaborateurs ont, par exemple le domaine des services sociaux, découvert qu'il s'agit de changements dans le sens de la **rationalisation** de l'activité institutionnalisée, de changements qui indiquent une plus ou moins grande ampleur de la **commercialisation**, et de **l'externalisation**, lorsqu'elles reportent une partie de leurs prestations sur d'autres sujets (Svetlik, 1988).

b) **La démocratisation**: ici il s'agit de la libération et du déblocage, qui permet l'activation et élargit la légitimité de l'action pour un cercle de plus en plus large de sujets relativement autonomes dans un contexte local donné. Ainsi augmente le nombre de ceux qui sont capables d'agir, soit comme alternative, soit comme partenaires des institutions existantes.

c) **La réintégration**: Sur la base de la première et de la seconde naissent les conditions permettant de dépasser la pratique antérieure, où l'on n'essayait de résoudre les problèmes particuliers avant tout en séparant les personnes concernées du milieu de vie quotidien. C'était la pratique de **la ségrégation institutionnelle** (par ex. des enfants, des vieux, des travailleurs célibataires, etc.). La réintégration est donc indiquée comme l'orientation, dont devraient tenir compte aussi bien la politique sociale que le planning urbanistique.

Enfin, indiquons encore les changements qui touchent au rapport entre les niveaux local et global (national) de l'engagement ou de la prise des décisions. Les expériences de la période demi-passée montrent que la décentralisation de la prise des décisions et le renforcement de l'autogestion dans le sens de la démocratie directe au niveau local par elle-même ne représente pas encore une solution satisfaisante. Ici, il s'agissait certes d'une plus grande autonomie de la commune yougoslave que celle des unités locales de n'importe quel Etat de l'Europe de l'Est. Cependant, il s'agissait là de l'autonomie et du caractère direct dans la limitation, plutôt de l'autonomie par la séparation que de l'autonomie dans l'association. En ce sens, donc, la décenralisation aussi signifiait une certaine marginalisation des citoyens, qui s'engageaient dans la solution des questions banales

de leur milieu immédait. Nous pourrions désigner cela aussi comme la **stratégie de la pacification**, puisque, dans les conditions d'une basse intégration sociale (comme elle est caractéristique pour la Yougoslavie), un plus grand engagement au niveau local peut impliquer un moindre engagement au niveau global. Les essais d'influence sur les décisions globales par la structure institutionnelle embrouillée n'avaient pas de possibilités réelles; tous les essais de réduction de la voie de présentation directe dans le plus large public (les "lettres ouvertes" aux plus hauts fonctionnaires, etc.) étaient officiellement condamnés comme inadmissibles.

Vu tout cela, il va de soi qu'avec la libération du pluralisme politique, s'est manifestée parmi les premières l'exigence d'élections **directes**, même des organes les plus élevés de l'Etat. Ainsi, au moins au niveau local on en arrive à la différentiation interne aussi en ce qui concerne les questions globalo-sociales de base. Et cela indique que les possibilités de l'individuation augmentent, car nous ne pourrons plus expliquer le particulier déjà par son appartenance à une unité locale déterminée.

6. QU'AVONS-NOUS APPRIS?

Sans essayer de résumer plus en détail les questions traitées, exposons pourtant, en conclusion, quelques connaissances et points centraux de ce texte.

Les changements survenus dans l'organisation spatio-sociale dans les Etats socialistes ne sont pas seulement l'expression des interventions ad hoc dans l'espace, mais ils ont dans une grande mesure leur base idéologique commune. Et celle-ci à son tour provient de la compréhension plus ou moins authentique (ou déformée) de la théorie marxiste du développement social. Donc, si nous voulons comprendre les problèmes actuels de l'organisation spatiale des pays "socialistes", nous ne pouvons pas les expliquer chacun pour soi ou dans les cadres conventionnels de l'analyse des changements démographiques. C'est pourquoi il faut dévoiler ces lignes de conduite théoriques et idéologiques de départ, sur la base desquelles aussi dans la pratique a commencé à s'affirmer le plus grand projet du changement intégral du mode de vie des gens dans le monde contemporain.

Du point de vue théorique, comme "péché originel" de l'actuelle crise, j'ai fait ressortir l'écart de la compréhension dialectique de la contradiction du développement social, qui inclut l'unité des oppositions

des processus de la socialisation et de l'individualisation. Et pour autant que dans le mouvement socialiste et communiste prédominait la conception, qui limitait le développement en l'identifiant seulement avec le processus de la socialisation, il est arrivé à de nombreuses déformations et à la stagnation aussi du point de vue des changements spatio-sociaux.

Après le conflit avec le Kominform et avec l'introduction de l'autogestion, la Yougoslavie a dans une certaine mesure corrigé une telle unilatéralité, cependant nous pouvons aussi expliquer sa crise actuelle par le fait que, dans l'affirmation des deux processus, elle n'est restée qu'à mi-chemin. Le processus de la socialisation fut conçu et en fait il s'arrêtait avant tout dans les cadres territoriaux à l'intérieur des frontières étatiques; mais le renforcement de l'autonomie des parties plus restreintes du système s'est de nouveau arrêté au niveau des unités collectives (de l'entreprise, de la communauté locale), en sorte qu'il n'incluait pas aussi l'autonomie de l'homme comme particulier. Déjà ici nous pouvons constater que le paradigme théorique utilisé nous aide à comprendre aussi les questions tout à fait spécifiques de la territorialité et du (dés)ordre spatial. Si nous constatons que – contrairement à l'attente et aux "megatrends" à l'Ouest – la signification de la territorialité en Yougoslavie s'est même accrue, cela est de toute façon en laison avec le fait que l'Etat est resté relativement fermé à l'extérieur et à la fois non-différentié jusqu'aux niveaux de base de la vie quotidienne à l'intérieur. Ainsi, au lieu de l'association ramifiée, réticulée de la grande diversité des sujets autonomes, venait au premier plan le conflit frontal des unités territoriales. Cela signifiait la régression en direction des communautés primitives, pour lesquelles il est caractéristique qu'elles fortifient leur homogénéité interne (la participation symbolique et l'intégration) et à la fois avec cela s'intensifient les différences et les oppositions vers l'extérieur.

L'effet cumulatif des orientations idéologiques du mouvement communiste et l'inertie du traditionnalisme apparaît dans la régression, dans laquelle prédominaient la théorie et la pratique de la communauté territoriale primitive. Au lieu de l'orientation de développement qui tendrait à l'intégration de la diversité, en fait prédomina l'orientation opposé est d'autant plus ferme que la diversité et l'autonomie de ses parties composantes sont plus faibles. La diversité, qui était soit héritée du passé, soit le résultat de l'activité autonome, est ainsi devenue le trouble, et on l'a facilement requalifiée comme hostile. Pour cela, comme conséquence logique, ressortait une uniformité de plus en plus grande, aussi bien du

point de vue de la structure physique du milieu construit, du point de vue de la structure institutionnelle de l'activité politique administrative (ladite organisation monotype des communes, sans égard au degré du développement économique) que du point de vue de la sphère entière contrôlée de la vie des gens dans leur milieu quotidien. Par ailleurs, une telle orientation idéologique bloqua, marginalisa et repoussa hors du "système" une part de plus en plus grande des potentiels de développement humains et matériels (par ex. en connexion avec la construction des logements) et elle commença à prodire elle-même de plus en plus d'effets non-intentionnés, imprévus et non-désirés. Le forcement de l'unité, d'un côté, sans l'autonomie permise des parties, se transformait dans l'uniformité et, de l'autre, avec un conrôle de plus en plus grand, en fait s'élargissait encore la sphère de l'activité hors du système et contre le système. Dans ce sens, l'activité pour la consolidation de **l'ordre spatial** se transforme en une activité qui ne fait qu'augmenter l'anarchie dans l'espace.

L'orientation idéologique unilatérale vers la collectivisation et la socialisation considérait aussi l'espace physique et la distance physique seulement comme une barrière dans la réalisation des orientations posées. Sous cet angle visuel, chaque séparation spatio-physique était évaluée négativement. Ici, il est caractéristique que, avec la domination générale du collectif (de l'institution, du système) en tant qu'état de choses qui s'entend de soi-même, on ne tenait pas compte d'une autre fonction, **la fonction de protection** de l'espace. Ici, je pense au rôle positif, de protection de la distance spatiale dans la conservation et l'affirmation de l'identité spécifique du particulier et du groupe. Si une telle identité particulière dans le cadre du système politique n'a pas de "prix", il est évidemment superflu de songer à sa protection. Au contraire, il s'agit avant tout du fait qu'il faut rapprocher les gens dans l'espace; au lieu de leur dissémination, atteindre leur concentration; au lieu du petit, créer le grand; et noyer la diversité dans le processus de l'homogénéisation.

Il n'est possible d'expliquer l'exemple yougoslave sans reste avec aucun modèle théorique. Les expériences des décennies passées nous découvrent les conséquences de la situation la plus paradoxale, lorsqu'avec les orientations prétentieuses vers des buts de développement à long terme on est parvenu à des effets renversés, pervers, qui nous font revenir en fait au passé et font revivre (ou renforcent) les éléments de l'organisation territoriale de la société préindustrielle. Seule la différentiation interne ultérieure, ensemble avec l'incorporation dans les processus d'intégration

en Europe, ouvre les perspectives pour le dépassement des confrontations territoriales actuelles, qui menacent déjà sérieusement l'intégrité et l'existence de la Yougoslavie en tant que communauté sociale territoriale.

---

[1] A titre d'illustration nous pouvons indiquer que la recherche comparative du rôle des dirigeants locaux dans le développement des communautés locales en Inde, en Pologne, aux USA et en Yougoslavie (Jacob et al., 1971) est tombée sur des estimations critiques et des doutes, exprimés par certains politiciens, affirmant que la commune yougoslave est quelque chose d'unique et d'incomparable avec les communautés locales dans les autres Etats. De même, à l'Université de Ljubljana, où l'auteur enseigne "la sociologie des communautés locales", on a fait observer qu'une telle désignation n'exprime pas la réalité spécifique yougoslave.

[2] Du point de vue théorique, déjà Karl Korsch défendait une telle conception (Voir par ex. la traduction anglaise du livre, 1977); Jovan Miric, parmi les auteurs yougoslaves, représente une compréhension analogue du développement (1984, p. 55), lorsqu'il écrit par ex.: "Le socialisme est réalisé pour autant que se réalise le processus de la socialisation".

[3] Dans notre recherche de 1965 dans la nouvelle ville de Velenje, en Slovénie, nous avons constaté que les habitants (voisins) étaient relativement le plus liés dans les immeubles d'habitations plus petits (jusqu'à 10 appartements), et moins dans les grands immeubles et dans les domaines de maisons pour une famille.

[4] Même dans les coopératives agricoles, les paysans n'avaient pas de rôle décisif dans la prise des décisions, où prédominaient les employés, auxquels on adjoignait encore quelque ouvrier et, au besoin, encore un agent de police ou un instituteur, qui assuraient que dans la prise des décisions l'intérêt des paysans ne serait pas prédominant.

[5] Comme, par la structure institutionnelle des centres, les nouvelles informations nécessaires et les connaissances professionnelles ne parvenaient pas jusqu'aux paysans, ceux-ci se sont appuyés dans une mesure d'autant plus grande sur les expériences transmises nonformellement par les générations plus anciennes (même si elles sont déjà tout à fait surannées) à la campagne même.

[6] Le rôle primitif de la limitation de la grandeur admise du terrain en propriété privée fut déterminé dans des conditions tout à fait différentes aussitôt après la guerre et sous impression d'un trop grand surpeuplement et de l'exploitation des couches plus pauvres de la population paysanne. Mais aujourd'hui, il n'y a pratiquement plus à la campagne de prolétariat paysan que les propriétaires fonciers pourraient exploiter. Malgré tout, il reste une espèce de "peur primitive" devant un éventuel enrichissement des paysans, même si celui-ci provenait du propre travail des membres de la famille sur leur propriété. L'actuel morcellement et la basse productivité de l'agriculture en Yougoslavie, qui dans une grande mesure conditionne le bas niveau de vie de la population des campagnes et aussi celle des villes est en grande partie et avant tout la conséquence d'une politique de développement déterminée, et celle-ci à son tour résultait d'une interprétation idéologique erronée du "développement socialiste" qui, comme nous l'avons vu, égalise celui-ci avec la socialisation, sans égard à l'autonomie des sujets, inclus dans ce processus.

[7] Et justement la Yougoslavie (si nous laissons de côté l'Union Soviétique) – comme nous l'avons déjà constaté – est l'Etat le plus hétérogène de l'Europe, d'après une série de critères (le développement économique, la composition nationale, l'appartenance religieuse, les

différences culturelles, etc.), où le problème devient critique avant tout à cause de leur effet cumulatif dans les unités territoriales particulières. Ainsi donc, comme nous avions, d'une part, une uniformité dans la politique et la structure établie de l'organisation politique territoriale (ladite "organisation monotype" des communes), nous avions, d'autre part, une grande variabilité régionale et un écart de la moyenne, qui ne pouvaient pas s'exprimer et faire valoir les solutions spécifiques convenables dans le cadre du système donnés. Au lieu de faire valoir une perspective de développement à long terme dans le sens du rapprochement et de la pénétration entre les parties et le tout, on en arrivait plutôt au contraire, c'est-à-dire à l'aggravation de l'exclusivité alternative de l'une et l'autre partie. On comprend donc plus facilement pourquoi, justement en Yougoslavie plutôt que dans n'importe quel autre Etat "socialiste", on en est arrivé à la décentralisation de la prise des décisions et, en conséquence, au renforcement de l'autonomie des républiques et des communes, et aussi des organisations économiques et autres.

[8] L'année passée, il est arrivé en fait à des changements constitutionnels, sur la base desquels l'autonomie des provinces de Voïvodine et du Kosovo a été réduite, renforçant par là la Serbie unifiée.

[9] En connexion avec cela, évidemment il n'est pas surprenant qu'un tel état éveille souvent des asociations et des comparaisons avec la position de la Lituanie, de la Lettonie et de l'Estonie dans le cadre de l'Union Soviétique.

[10] La Serbie, en ce qui concerne le degré de développement économique, occupe certes une position intermédiaire, mais ici il faut tenir compte additionnellement aussi de sa localisation géographique centrale et du fait que le siège de la république est aussi la capitale de l'Etat.

[11] Ici, nous pensons surtout à la Macédoine, dont la politique et certaines oscillations peuvent être expliquées par la liaison des deux critères (le non-développement et le sentiment de la menace nationale).

[12] Il faut de nombreuses autorisations de différents services professionnels organisés par secteurs, dont chacun pour soi fait valoir différents procédés et exigences; les personnes intérssées ne parviennent qu'avec difficulté aux informations de base sur ce qui est permis et ce qui ne l'est pas,, de sorte que déjà en règle générale on compte sur le principe: "tout est interdit, sauf...". Ce qui est permis est donc plutôt l'exception que la règle. Et en même temps l'information sur ce qui est permis est aussi d'abord accessible à ceux qui agissent à l'intérieur de la structure politique administrative de la commune. Il faut donc plusieurs années de recherche de l'emplacement, puis pour l'obtention du permis de construire, etc. De ce fait, Branko Horvat est parvenu à la conclusion: "Tout est organisé de façon à empêcher la construction individuelle. Si pourtant quelqu'un s'y attaque, il doit compter qu'il emploiera pour cela un tiers de sa période de travail!" (Horvat, 1982)

[13] Dans le cas de la garde des enfants, de notre angle visuel il y a deux détails caractéristiques: officiellement on toléra tout d'abord les cas, où il s'agissait plutôt de la garde des plus jeunes enfants que de l'éducation, où l'on estimait que des influences incontrôlées seraient plus nuisibles. Ici, les institutions éducatives de garde avaient aussi un rôle de contrôle, mais seulement du point de vue de l'affirmation des standards professionnels minimaux.

[14] De notre recherche dans la ville neuve, autrefois principalement minière, de Titovo Velenje, je puis résumer l'exemple illustratif suivant. Tandis que la solidarité parmi les mineurs était déjà traditionnellement fort développée, dans le contexte de l'institutionnalisation générale de la vie quotidienne il devient compréhensible que, dans l'action de collecte des contributions pour la couronne destinée au camarade mort, il y eut

aussi des réponses comme celle-ci: "Adressez-vous à la communauté locale" (où l'on pensait aux organes de cette communauté).

LITTERATURE:

Burg Steven L. (1989) *Community, Integration, and Stability in Multinational Yugoslavia*, American Political Science Review, vol. 83, No. 2, juin 1989.

Canapa Marie-Paule (1973) *Le conflit entre le Cominform et la Yougoslavie*, Revue de l'Est, Vol. 4, No. 2.

Castells Manuel (1975) *Luttes urbaines et pouvoir politique*, Paris, François Maspero.

Cohen Leonard and Paul Warwick (1983) *Political Cohesion in a Fragile Mosaic*, The Yugoslav Experience, Boulder, Westview Press.

Caldarovic Ognjen (1989) *Drustvena dioba prostora* (La division sociale de l'espace), Zagreb, Societe sociologique de Croatie

Engels Friedrich (1959) *Polozaj delevskega razreda v Angliji* (Position de la classe ouvriere en Engleterre), Ljubljana, CZ

Fisher C. Jack (1962) *Planning the City of Socialist Man*, JAIP, Vol. 28, No. 4

French R.A. and Hamilton Ian (1979) *The Socialist City*, New York, John Wiley and Sons

Ganassi Agger Simona (1979) *Urban Self-Management, Planning for a New Society*, International Journal of Sociology, Spring-Summer, New York

Himmelstrand Ulf (ed.) (1981) *Spontaneity and Planning in Social Development*, Sage Publications

Horvat Branko (1982) *Drustveno-ekonomske karakteristike stambenih potreba* (Socio-economic charakteristics of housing needs), Gledista, No. 1-4, Beograd

Jacob Philip et al. (1971) *Active Community*, New York, Free Press

Kamenka Eugene (1983) *Public/Private in marxist Theory and Marxist Practice*, S.I. Benn and G. F. Gaus (eds.) Public and Private in Social Life, London, Croom Helm

Konrad Gyorgy (1988) *Antipolitika*, Ljubljana: Krt

Lissitzky El (1984) Russia: *An Architecture for World Revolution*, Cambridge, Mass, The M.I.T. Press

Mao Tse-Tung (1965) *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, Peking, Vol. II.

Merton Robert (1936) *The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action*, American Sociological Review, No. 6

Miric Jovan (1984) *Sistem i kriza* (sistem et la crise) Zagreb, Cekade

Misztal, Barbara and Bronislaw (1986-87) *Uncontrolled Processes in the Socialist City*: A Polish Case Study, Politics and Society, 15, no. 2, 145-56

Mlinar Zdravko (1972) *Integration of Rural Areas into Broader Socio-Economic System: The Yugoslav Village*, Department of Rural Sociology, Zagreb

Mlinar Zdravko (1988) *Phenomoneology of the Local Response to the Economic Crisis*, Revija za sociologiju, 4, Zagreb

Mlinar Zdravko (1986) *Protislovja druzbenega razvoja* (Contradictions du developpement social), Ljubljana, Delavska enotnost

Mlinar Zdravko (1974) *Socjologija lokalnih skupnosti* (Sociologie des communautes), Ljubljana, FSPN

Morton W. Henry and Robert C. Stuart (1984) *The Contemporary Soviet City*, Armonk, M.E. Sharpe

Mostov Julie (1988) *Regionalizam i granice jugoslovenske demokratije* (Regionalisme et frontieres de la democratie Yougoslave), Sociologija, XXX, No. 4

Ryan Alan (1983) *Public and Private Property*, v.: S.I. Benn and G.F Gaus (eds.) Public and Private in Social Life, London: Croom Helm

Seferagic Dusica (1988) *Kvaliteta zivota i nova tambena naselja* (Quality of Life and New Housing Settlements), Zagreb, Sociolosko drustvo Hrvatske

de Seta Cesare (1990) *Podoba mesta, Ohraniti zgodovinsko identiteto evropske mestne civilizacije* (L'image de la ville, Conserver l'identite historique de la civilisation urbaine europeenne), Nasi razgledi, 49, no. 7, 6, april 1990

Szul Roman (1988) *Space as an Economic and Political Factor: The Case of Poland and Yugoslavia*, Grzegorz Gorzelak (ed.) Regional Dynamics of Socio-Economic Change, Warszawa: Institute of Space Economy

Tadic Ljubomir (1986) *Postoji li kriza jugoslovenske federativne zajednice?* (La crise de la communaute federative yougoslave existe-t-elle?) Belgrade, SANU.

Bogdan Kacprzyński
Institute of Space Economy
University of Warsaw

GLOBALITY-LOCALITY RELATION IN THE CASE OF WIELKOPOLSKA (GREATER POLAND)

1. GLOBALITY-LOCALITY RELATION AND GROWTH

In the 1970s and 1980s in many parts of the world many new phenomena occurred that were so untypical that they require a renewed analysis of viewpoints, systems of reference, methods of analysis and impact on space development. The new non-typical phenomena may be expected to find more responsive environment in the 1990s. This is indicated by a Europe without customs borders within the EEC, opening up of borders in Central and Eastern Europe in effect of economic and political changes in those countries, preparations for a re-unification of both German states. New rules of operation of modern enterprises produce most success when use is made of the synergy of internal factors – local factors and external factors – global factors. This is proven by capital concentration in the Pacific Basin, and on the other hand – intensified crisis in Third World countries.

From the viewpoint of studies on development, particularly in the spatial aspect, it is important to clarify why certain rules are applied to organization of the economy. There is no doubt that studies on the relation globality-locality should be used for that purpose. Such a study can be simplified much by selecting a suitable viewpoint (already Copernicus noticed that), dividing the studied problem into suitably selected parts and selecting a suitable time scale.

In this paper two viewpoints will be applied: global representing globality, and local representing locality, understood in four ways [1], [2].

Studies on growth (changes, evolution) of socio-economic phenomena in a given area can be divided into two parts:

1) studies of changes caused by local factors, 2) studies of changes caused by external factors (comp. Figure 1).

The two types of factors usually have different nature:

1) local factors are results of history, experience, tradition, local potential (financial resources, personnel, capacity of natural environment),

2) external factors as such originate in a larger area and result from experience of a larger population [3, 4], are produced by more varying experience and therefore with a higher probability may be a model of growth.



○ – states of phenomenon in subsequent moments of time

——— – local factors

—·—·— – external factors

1 means a change (evolution) of local system in time (t_i, t_{i+1}) under the impact of local factors

2 means a change (evolution) of the local system in time (t_i, t_{i+1}) under the influence of external factors.

Figure 1.

The impact of external factors on a given local system, that is a relationship between a global and local system, depends on properties of intermediary systems, e.g. state administration at supralocal level [5]. They may either facilitate or hinder contacts, or control them. This way we reach a conclusion that studies on relationship between global and local systems mean studies on locality, globality and primarily intermediary

systems in the communication process between local and global systems, which are the source of external factors, or the opposite, between global and local systems, which are the source of information on local factors (comp. Figure 2). The history of growth (changes, evolution) of localities shows that certain characteristic states and situations [6] can be distinguished in a time scale:

– "calm" evolution (CE) with a table growth over time,

– critical states (CS) which cannot be continued and have to be followed by significant changes; critical states are temporary states,

– transitional states (TS) related to changes that are introduced; transitional periods last some time,

– processes of transition (PT) understood as a total of a few transitional states connected with a few changes introduced one by one; usually the process begins with a critical state and is shaped with a purpose of achieving a specific aim.



1 means a change (evolution) of local system in time (t_i, t_{i+1}) under the impact of local factors

2 means a change (evolution) of the local system in time (t_i, t_{i+1}) under the influence of external factors

3 means a change (evolution) of the global system in time (t_i, t_{i+1})

4 means an intermediary system

Figure 2.


building
3000
2000
1000
0
POZNAŃ
WROCŁAW
1961
65
70
75
80
1985

Figure 3

A sequence: CE, CS, TS followed by CE, that is a process of transition from one CE to a next CE phase, makes it possible to give a time dimension to the globality-locality relation. The relation is usually rapidly changing in time since it depends on the functioning of the global, local and intermediary systems and each of them may change in a different direction.

A calm evolution and sequences CE-CS-TS-CE or CE-PT-CE may occur in various parts of a given area or in various parts of a given economy at the same time or they can be shifted in time (comp. Figure 3). That depends on the occurrence of reasons causing those states, and those can be both local or external and be related to a mechanism of change propagation (reasons in this case) in space (comp. diffusion of innovation, e.g. [7]). The states overall – a total for a given moment in time – determine changes (evolution) in a given area or a given system: therefore from a scientific point of view it is interesting to study the globality-locality relation and treat it as a key to understanding the process of previous changes (evolution).

The issue will be analysed on the example of Greater Poland (Wielkopolska region in Poland).

2. GREATER POLAND AS A LOCAL SYSTEM

Selection of an area for which the globality-locality relation is studied, similarly to delimitation of any region, is always a controversial issue. Decision was made to select such an area which would meet the requirements of a local system as:

1) a small geometrically area in relation to another, e.g. a country or continent [1],

2) dependent on another system [8],

3) with specific dynamic properties [1, 5].

In paper [2] we stressed the usefulness of a fourth possibility to determine a local system as:

4) not permitting perturbations that later can propagate within the entire system (global) or initiating changes (innovations) whose propagating within the system would be useful.

Greater Poland is an area that meets the requirements.

The historical part of Poland, covering the middle part of the Warta

basin, practically includes the area of four voivodships: Poznań, Leszno, Kalisz and Konin. Historically the area was the place where Polish statehood emerged. During the partitions of Poland (1772 and 1793) Greater Poland (Wielkopolska) was completely included in Prussia. In the period of 1807-1815 it was part of the Warsaw Duchy. From 1815 the north-western part belonged to Prussia and the south-eastern part (with Kalisz) to Russia. After World War I Greater Poland regained independence along with the whole country. In the period 1939-1945 it was incorporated in the Third Reich and sine 1945 it has been again a part of Poland and now it is no longer a border area.

The area of Greater Poland is 52.260 km2 (16.71% of the country's area) and it is inhabited by 5,899 thousand people (15.61% of the country's population). Administratively each of its 8 component voivodships is divided into communes. Overall there are 327 communes (15.42% of all communes in the country.) (comp. Figure 4).

In 1986 gross national product generated in Greater Poland was 1.393.528 million zlotys which was 12.17% of Poland's gross national product [9]. The 1985 estimates of fixed assets in current prices were 6.102.000 million zlotys or about 14.6% of national fixed assets [10].

Arable land in 1985 was 18% of Poland's arable land. The land is used to breed 18% of the nation's cattle and as much as 24% of pigs. About 20% of grains are produced here. Thus this is an area whose share in the nation's potential is within the limits of 12 —·20%.

The present share is an effect of two hundred years of policy and economy. Until World War I a large part of Greater Poland was treated on purpose as an agricultural backyard of Prussia, and the other part, belonging to Russia was just another periphery of that empire (comp. Figure 4). After independence had been regained, no significant changes were made in Greater Poland until 1935. The period of German occupation left traces of a war economy. When the Soviet Army entered the area, some industrial equipment, considered as abandoned German property, was taken away in 1945. Until the beginning of the 1970s the economic structure in Great Poland was changing from agricultural to agro-industrial. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the structure was maintained and modernized. However, errors typical for a centralized planned and directive economy were not avoided. Nevertheless, the population of Greater Poland have maintained their traditional features, diligence, thriftiness, habits of order, openness to innovations.



Fig. 4

..... – border between Prussia and Russia

——— – border after World War I

– voivodship towns

– towns

——— – border of voivodship

WILNO
the border
between Prussia and Russia
POZNAŃ
WARSZAWA
52°
LUBLIN
WROCŁAW
KRAKÓW
LWÓW
16°
20°
24°
28°

Fig. 5

POŁOCK
WILNO
GDAŃSK
MIŃSK
GRODNO
SZCZECIN
POLAND
POZNAŃ
WARSZAWA
BRZEŚĆ
52°
LUBLIN
WROCŁAW
RÓWNE
the border after
World War I
KRAKÓW
LWÓW
TARNOPOL
KAMIENIEC
16°
20°
24°
28°

Fig. 6



Fig. 7

---------- the border between the Reich and the General Gouyernment

———— the border Ribbentrop–Molotoy Pact


WILNO
SZCZECIN
OLSZTYN
GRODNO
POZNAŃ
WARSZAWA
52°
SOVIET UNION
WROCŁAW
POLAND
LUBLIN
KRAKÓW
LWÓW
16°
20°
24°
28°

Fig. 8


WILNO
SZCZECIN
OLSZTYN
GRODNO
POZNAŃ
WARSZAWA
SOVIET UNION
52°
WROCŁAW
POLAND
KRAKÓW
LWÓW
16°
20°
24°
28°

Fig. 9

It should be stressed that within the last 200 years Greater Poland has been clearly subject to external (global) influence:

– until World War I it was the influence of Prussia (strong) and Russia (weak) with a clear political and economic border between the two states (two local systems and two global systems) (comp. Figure 5);

– until World War II there was a weak influence of the Polish state under reconstruction and a tight political and economic border (one global system and one local system) (Figure 6);

– during World War II a complete economic subordination to Germany (Figure 7);

– after 1945 there was a planned strongly centralized economy, implementing a principle of uniform industrialization and collectivization of agriculture (Figure 8),

– the 1970s and 1980s were a continuation of previous policies in a modernized way, without overall collectivization of agriculture but without small industry (Figure 9).

In 1975, in effect of an administrative transformation of the country, Greater Poland began to be composed of eight voivodships instead of two, which dramatically changed the intermediary systems. The aforementioned circumstances allow e.g. to study relatively easy the effectiveness of global models depending on what mechanisms are used to adapt them in a local scale.

3. GREATER POLAND, PRESENT STATE

An idea of conditions in Greater Poland and the functioning of the economy can be obtained through an analysis of spatial distribution of a few elements of the present stage of development and activity (Table 1).

Greater Poland is characterized by a higher that average share of arable land and lower afforestation. This clearly shows a big role of agriculture in the area and a small natural water retention. If this is complemented with a fact that in central part of Great Poland (about 2/3 of the area) there is Poland's lowest precipitation (540 mm annually, and even 450 mm in Kujawy) and natural retention keeps only 3% of precipitation, it is clearly seen that shortage of water is a fundamental restriction to Great Poland's development [11]. The shortage of water for agriculture is intensified by a catastrophic impurity of surface waters [11, 12, 13].

Greater Poland is characterized by a high density of towns (170 towns

which is 21% of all towns in Poland). However, the percentage share of town inhabitants in the total population (57.9% in 1988) is lower than the nation's average (61.2% in 1988). This is due to a large number of small towns, below 5.000 inhabitants. There are almost 50% of such towns in Greater Poland whereas in the whole country it is about 33%.

The reasons for such size and distribution of towns were external influence, specific processes influencing the network of settlement in Prussia. In the period of planned socialist economy the factors facilitating town development were intensified. In effect some towns developed in connection with liquidation of small trade, handicraft, processing industries and even small manufacturing industries, and locating substitute larger trading, servicing and industrial organizations in towns that were seats of county authorities (56 towns). There was also external influence from the country's central authorities.

In Greater Poland that highest level of urbanization is in voivodships that have city agglomerations, i.e. in the voivodships of Poznań, Bydgoszcz and Toruń.

Due to relatively large differences in area of individual voivodships, the structure of fixed assets in Greater Poland will be presented by sectors of national economy per 1 km^2 (Tables 2 and 3).

In order to facilitate conclusions on the basis of analysis of the structure of fixed assets, the values in Table 3 were divided by respective values corresponding to national average values (system of reference) (Table 4).

Basing on quotations presenting relative values of fixed assets, sectors of national economy were elected which have fixed assets of value above and below national average. Table 5 presents the values with numbers and the line represents national average.

The Table shows that in Greater Poland the highest value of fixed assets per 1 km^2 of area is in agriculture, transport and telecommunication and trade, and the lowest in sciene and technology development, industry, culture and art. It should be stressed that the depreciation index of fixed assets in socialized economy enterprises exceeded 1/3 in mid-1980s and was rapidly growing (in particular that referred to production machinery and equipment and means of transportation in industry and construction). The growth rate of fixed assets dropped from about 9% in the period 1976-1980 to 2.5-3.5% in the period 1981-1987.

The functioning of Greater Poland's economy can be presented

through an analysis of the structure of gross national product generated in 1986 per 1 km² and per head [9]. Table 6 presents relative values of gross national product generated in 7 sectors of the economy per 1 km² (only such data were in the source publication).

When the data have been arranged by decreasing value for each province and for Greater Poland overall, one can find that the highest economic activity in Greater Poland (per 1 km²) was manifested by agriculture, forestry, transportation and telecommunication, and the lowest by trade and industry (Table 7).

Table 8 presents relative values of gross national product generated in 7 sectors of economy per capita.

Arrangement of the values by decreasing value for individual voivodships and for Greater Poland overall is almost identical to calculating national product per 1 km² (comp. Table 9).

Arrangement of voivodships by gross national product generated in them overall and converted per 1 km² and per capita gives the following order:

1. Poznań
2. Toruń, Bydgoszcz
3. Kalisz
4. Kalisz, Włocławek
5. Leszno, Piła.

It is worth mentioning that the order with respect to the first four voivodships is in this case the same as the order by decreasing fixed assets overall which produces a conclusion that total gross national product can be considered as being directly proportional to the value of total fixed assets. An analysis of other features, like the volume of freight traffic, discharge of pollution of surface waters and to the atmosphere, housing construction, level of services, health care, quality of living, produces a conclusion that Greater Poland is a rather typical Polish region. The values of the discussed features are closely correlated to the density of population, value of fixed assets and gross national product. A high quality of agriculture in Great Poland is worth stressing (average crops of grains, potatoes and sugar beets from 1 ha, converted into grain, were 30.73 q in 1988, i.e. 107.5% of national average).

4. LOCAL FACTORS FACILITATING GROWTH

An analysis of Greater Poland's economy makes it possible to suppose that local factors facilitating growth will influence the future growth so that it is heading towards:

1) intensification of vegetable and animal production; this is a natural consequence of the natural conditions, structure of fixed assets and experimental staff (comp. Table 5);

2) production of health food; this is possible due to a high culture of crops and animal husbandry, but made difficult due to intensive pollution of air (fluorine) and high mineralization of surface waters (salt from mine water and salts from ash dumps);

3) intensive development of various branches of industry; this is a consequence of exploited or discovered deposits of raw materials, e.g. natural gas with high helium content (however, requiring denitriding), brown coal, rock salt and potassium salt, ceramic sands and clays, as well as agricultural and forest raw materials, fixed assets, experienced staff, scientific and research centres, modern structure of existing industry manufacturing modern products in cooperating factories;

4) using the landscape and historic monuments for tourism and recreation.

Local factors facilitating growth are:

a) possibilities to use the excess labour force from socialized industry and from small farms (this refers in particular to the eastern part of Greater Poland, the former Russian part);

b) possibilities to use a well developed network of universities (12 university-level schools in Poznań, Bydgoszcz and Toruń);

c) possibilities to use large fixed assets in the infrastructure of transportation and telecommunication (comp. Tables 3 and 4);

d) possibilities to make use of Greater Poland's central location in transsortation routes north-south and east-west, close distance to Germany and Baltic ports;

e) possibilities to make use of exceptional diligence, discipline and thoroughness of the local population.

The above factors have been used in the past twenty years but to an insufficient extent. Their role was well seen already in the second half of

1989 which produced e.g. much lower food prices, more efficient adjustment of the economy to new conditions, more rapid development of contacts with abroad than in other regions in Poland. Let us hope that the characteristics will also play a significant role in the future.

5. LOCAL FACTORS RESTRAINING GROWTH

The previous development of Greater Poland has produced some barriers restricting or restraining further growth.

Some of the restrictions and barriers result from the local implementation in the recent period of an erroneous economic, ecological and social policies and the effects should also be removed by local efforts. Some, however, are a natural consequence of the previous growth and physical conditions, and they cannot be removed, or they result from global actions and may be removed only with efforts of a global character. One of conclusions of an analysis of the globality-locality relation is to produce an economically effective method to remove the existing restraints and barriers, that have been tested under different but similar circumstances (making use of leader's way [5]). Another conclusion may be a proposal to adapt growth in a given locality to unremovable restraints and barriers, without producing excessive limitations and difficulties (e.g. by restructuring [2]).

Herebelow we shall list the factors restraining to growth without estimating quantitatively their restraining impact.

They are:

a) pollution of surface waters in the rivers: Warta (supply of water to Konin and Poznań), Vistula (due to high pollution and salinity the water can be used mainly for cooling applications), Noteć (supply of water to grassland in the catchment area), Drwęca (supply of water to Toruń and Inowrocław), Prosna (supply of water to Kalisz and Ostrów), Wełna (supply of water to the Poznań agglomeration), Gwda (supply of water or Piła);

b) excessive, not regulated exploitation of underground waters (e.g. around Konin);

c) unsolved problem of flood control in the valleys of Warta and Vistula which – with very low natural retention (only 3%) – produces large losses (continuation of development of the Vistula valley following the

Rhone model – the Vistula Program – is at present highly improbable and probably not necessary);

d) unsolved problem of complex water economy in the entire Greater Poland. The area is characterized by low precipitation, small natural retention which with incorrect land irrigation and very intensive agriculture produced permanent water deficit and conversion of land into steppe (in Kujawy); about 90% of arable land need irrigation and this requires transfers of water);

e) unsolved problem of air protection (in particular it is necessary to stop pollution from power stations in Konin and Bydgoszcz, aluminium smelter in Konin, chemical industry in Janików, Inowrocław, Toruń and Włocławek, cement plant in Barcin, phosphatic fertilizer plant in Luboń);

f) disproportion between the volume of agricultural production and processing potential of agro-industry resulting in big freight traffic on large distances (e.g. potential to process potatoes exceeds 2.5 times local production, but substantial quantities of milk, meat, sugar beets have to be taken out of Greater Poland for processing);

g) structure of personnel that does not fit the requirement;

h) low standard of living in the countryside, still there is a difference in standard of living between the former Prussian and Russian parts;

i) potential ecological emergency (on the list of most onerous plants, published in January 1990, out of 5 plants considered to be potential sources of exceptionally dangerous pollution of the environment, two are located in Greater Poland – Chemical Plant "Organika-Zachem" in Bydgoszcz and Chemical Plant in Włocławek, and two others in a distance less than 25 km from its "borders" "Organika-Rokita" in Brzeg Dolny and "Petrochemia" in Płock).

6. EXTERNAL FACTORS AFFECTING GROWTH

As already mentioned, the history of development of Greater Poland in 19th and 20th centuries makes it possible to point to factors from the outside that have influenced the evolution. It is possible to assume that at the end of 18th century there were no significant differences between those parts of Greater Poland which later, after the Congress of Vienna,

belonged to Prussia and Russia. External factors operating throughout 19th century produced large differences in the level of economic development of those parts which is clearly seen in the density of railways (comp. Figure 10). In that period, in the part belonging to Prussia, modern agriculture was developing, stimulated largely by the activity of Poles defending themselves against germanization who were aiming at maintaining at least a high material level (an example of synergy of local and external factors). Development of agriculture was facilitated by the close distance to Berlin and good waterway connections – the existing network of navigable rivers and canals, not to mention railway connections.

Since Poland regained independence after World War II, the previous connections were interrupted (there was even a period of economic blockade of Poland) and had to be substituted with new external factors from the reborn Poland. However, the process requires large efforts due to the necessity to set in order and change everything, starting from restoring transportation and communication between areas previously belonging to three states, uniforming the law, regulations, units of measure and weight, and even time. The process was also restrained by world economic crisis and the necessity to develop defense industries. Nevertheless, the change in spatial structure of industry and the rate of growth were at that time higher than in the neighbouring areas belonging to Germany [15].

In the post-war period, external factors were controlled by the policy of economic plans and centrally managed. Poznań Fair, restored at the end of the 1950s, was a source of innovation, though for many years the Fair was treated just as an exhibition. The policy of importing licences for new products and technologies was subject to other aims than economic. Some licences gave positive results (e.g. Sulzer engines in the Cegielski Plant in Poznań, loudspekaers in Września, furniture in Swarzędz), others were not so successful (e.g. a licence purchased in 1972 from CIT ALCATEL for the production of modern electronic telephone exchanges E-10 was introduced in time and correctly – which was not often the case among numerous licences – by the Greater Poland Tele-electronic Plant TELKOM – TELETRA in Poznań: due to centrally imposed limits, the full capacity planned for 1982 was reached only in 1987). Minimal effects of the innovation introducing processes (compare studies made by the Economic Academy in Poznan) show an incapacitating influence of the central planning and control, used until the end of 1980s, and simultaneously an

exceptional effectiveness of intermediary systems in filtering and channelling external factors (central trading organizations, associations of industry, ministries, etc.).

7. NEW LOCAL AND GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT OF GREATER POLAND AND PROSPECTS FOR GROWTH

In the social, economic, political and ecological system that Greater Poland functioned, a crisis characteristic for all countries with centralized economy occurred in mid-1970s. One may say that in many parts of the system – both in sections and in areas – synchronically critical states occurred with jointly produced a state of crisis. With application of directive method, the state was artificially kept for over 10 years which produced new critical states in other sectors of the economy and in other areas as well as intensification of the crisis.

An evolution process was initially released in the second half of 1989 and one can say that since that time a new local and global environment of Greater Poland has emerged.

The speed of transitional processes in individual sectors of the economy and parts of Greater Poland will depend – judging by the first two months of a new situation – on many factors: existing resources, available staff, structure of power, springing up of local self-governments, occurrence of new external influence. This does not necessarily mean that changes will occur at the same time in all places they should occur. Already it can be seen that this is not necessarily favourable, since e.g. the emergence of unemployment slowed down the process of exchange worthtless managers on whom lay offs depend.

Thus it is necessary to study how a transitional process is to be organized when overcoming a crisis so that to avoid negative secondary effects. The process largely depends on external factors and is organized at a local level. Some suggestions to that effect, concerning the problems of restructuring, ar included in [12].

The speed and intensity of occurrene of traditional processes in individual sectors of the economy and parts of Greater Poland depend also

on the interrelation of internal, local and external actors. Already it can be seen that this is not necessarily favourable that the external factors operate at the same time or that the operation of external factors outpace the operation of internal factors. The introduction at the beginning of 1990 of an external factor, that is world prices for almost all products except labour which is paid more than a dozen times less, produced perturbations in industry and agriculture that are difficult to assess.

Therefore there is a need to study the organization of transitional process in overcoming a crisis with respect to coordination of local and external factors and intermediary systems (which are still in the hands of the former "nomenklatura"), modelling the impact of global systems. There are no signs that the process is controlled in any way. It seems to be left to its own fate and is subject to an absolute impact of tax system and customs duties. The speed and intensity of occurrence of some processes of transition in individual sectors of the economy and parts of Greater Poland may depend only on external factors. Already at present there are phenomena that can be felt locally and that are fully subject to external factors. For instance: pollution of the Vistula, decision on starting exploitation of new brown coal deposits, economic efficiency of factories manufacturing unique products in the country.

It is necessary to study how the influence of external factors should be organized on a supralocal level under such circumstances. The problem was touched upon during the conference in Radziejowice in December 1989 by N. Głazowski in connection with the utilization of the Amu-Daria water and By L. Mazzo in connection with the role of so-called production towns [16]. So far legal framework for the operation of many intermediary systems has not been determined, e.g. environment protection inspection which is to have large possibilities to interfere in the operation of localities, including closing down of improperly functioning plants.

Prospects for a further evolution in Greater Poland depend on the transitional process, started in mid-1989. A correct arrangement of external and local impact should produce models of procedure – selection of a leader and strategy of following – which will allow to:

– restructure the industry efficiently,

– conduct a suitable municipal economy,

– give a suitable rank to local self-governments,

– restore ecological equilibrium to five areas of ecological hazard (area of Poznań, Bydgoszcz – Toruń, Inowrocław, Włocławek and Konin); at

present they cover as much as 1/10 of the area and 1/3 of the population in Greater Poland,

– avoid a sixth area of ecological hazard caused by the operation of the Legnica

– Głogów copper mining district,

– limit large discharges of municipal and industrial wastes to open waters (140 million m3/year of untreated liquid wastes which account for 3/4 of all waters),

– limit large emission of gas and dust pollution,

– make proper utilization and safe storing of solid wastes from municipalities and industry, recultivation of excavations, dumping sites and areas destroyed by brown coal mining,

– reconstruct biological life in rivers,

– reconstruct destroyed forests,

– restrict tourism in the areas where the absorbing capacity of the environment has been surpassed,

– shift excess of labour from agriculture,

– use the specific system of settlements in Greater Poland

– a large number of small towns.

CLOSING

The development of Greater Poland in 19th and 20th centuries shows the different effects that can be achieved with different relations between the local and global systems. The example is specifically interesting since the moving borders also produced changes in "globality", and changes in political situation and system produced significant changes in the operation of intermediary systems.

The experience of the best developed areas in the world shows that there is a narrow range of tolerance of deviations between local and global systems, a narrow area of occurrence of a synergy effect of local and external factors.

Greater Poland is an area which in the past had periods of rapid growth; it is also an area with proper conditions for such situations to occur again, particularly so that the present systemic changes provide for much freedom in shaping the form of intermediary systems, determining the globality-locality relation, that would be conducive to the development. In traditionally democratic countries (Switzerland, Sweden, the

Netherlands) that was taking place within the existing economic institutions, local self-governments and informal relations (often social connections) of local leaders. In Greater Poland's conditions this will have to be done in an artificial way, by adapting others' experience (just like this is done in the process of fighting the inflation) until institutions and connection similar to the aforementioned are developed.

Literature

1. Kacprzyński B., 1989, *Economie locale en Pologne*, [in:] *Colloque europeen sur "La dynamique et sa gestion", Lausanne, 10-11 oct. 1988.* Commission nationale suisse pour l'UNESCO, Berne.
2. Kacprzyński B., 1990, *Polityka interwencyjna państwa a polityka samorządów lokalnych w stanie przejściowym związanym z restrukturalizacją (State intervention policy vs. policies of local self-government in a transitional state connected with restructuring)*, paper presented at University of Warsaw on February 20, 1990.
3. Kacprzyński B., 1988, *Locality as an experimental ground for global studies?* Presented at the International Seminar "Globality versus Locality – The Experiences of the XXth and XXIst Century", Nieborów, June 5-9, 1988.
4. Dijking G., Van der Wusten H., 1989, *Global competition as an argument in local development policy ; The case of Ranstad*, Presented at the Polish-Soviet Seminar on "Global versus Locality", Radziejowice, Dec. 13-16.
5. Kacprzyński B., 1989, *On studies of global versus local relation*, Presented at the Polish-Soviet Seminar on "Globality versus Locality", Radziejowice, Dec. 13-16.
6. Kacprzyński B., 1990, *Stan krytyczny, stan przejściowy, proces przejścia (Critical state, transitional state, process of transition)*, Warszawa (typescript).
7. Brown L.A., 1981, *Innovation difussion. A new perspective*, Methnen, London, N.Y.
8. Kacprzyński B., 1988, *"Localness" as a distinctive feature*, Presented at the International Seminar "Globality versus Locality – The Experiences of the XXth and XXIst Century", Nieborów, June 5-9.

9. *Poland's national income by provinces in 1986*, Main Statistical Office. Polish Academy of Sciences. CPBP 09.8, Warszawa 1989.
10. *Statistical Yearbook of Provinces 1986*, GUS Warszawa 1986.
11. *Statistical Yearbook of Provinces 1976*, GUS Warszawa 1976.
12. Leszczycki S., 1980, *Nad mapą Polski. Geograficzne studium ekologiczno-planistyczne (Over a map of Poland. Economic and planning geographical study)*, KiW, Warszawa.
13. *Statistical Yearbook 1989*, GUS Warszawa 1989.
14. Lijewski T., 1977, *Geografia transportu Polski (Transport geography in Poland)*, PWE Warszawa.
15. Misztal S., 1970, *Przemiany w strukturze przemysłowej przemysłu na ziemiach polskich w latach 1860-1965 (Changes in the spatial structure of industry on the Poland's territory during 1860-1965)*, Studia KPZK PAN tom XXXI, Warszawa.

Table 1

Land use [10], [11]

voivodships	total area	of which cropland			
		total	arable land and orchands	meadows and postures	forests
Poznań	100%	67%	59%	8%	21%
Leszno	100%	71%	58%	13%	19%
Kalisz	100%	69%	58%	11%	23%
Konin	100%	76%	62%	13%	14%
Włocławek	100%	73%	65%	8%	16%
Toruń	100%	69%	61%	8%	18%
Bydgoszcz	100%	59%	50%	9%	29.6%
Piła	100%	50%	39%	11%	39%
Greater Poland	100%	67%	56%	11%	22.45%
Poland	100%	61%	48%	13%	27.5%

Table 2

voivodships	area	population (thou)	population density (persons/km²)
Poznań	8151	1316.8	161.5
Leszno	4154	381.2	91.8
Kalisz	6512	703.7	108.1
Konin	5139	464.6	90.4
Włocławek	4402	427.0	97
Toruń	5348	653.2	122
Bydgoszcz	10349	1098.4	106
Piła	8205	472.9	57.6
Greater Poland	52260	5899	112.9
Poland	312683	37775.1	120.8

[13] as of June 30.1988

Table 5

Sectors of national economy arranged by decreasing relative gross value of fixed assets in Greater Poland (basing on Table 4)

Poznań	Leszno	Kalisz	Konin	Włocławek	Toruń	Bydgoszcz	Piła	Greater Poland
10	3	3	3	7	10	5	4	3
14	5	4	1	13	15	7	5	5
12	6	5	7	3	11	3	3	6
2	12	6	5	5	8	4	15	15
.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
7	2	12	14	14	13	14	13	12
1	1	7	4	4	14	12	1	1
4	10	10	10	10	12	10	10	10

Numbers in this table refer to numbers of the sectors in the Table 3.

Table 7

Sectors of national economy arranged by decreasing relative value of gross domestic income per 1 km² in Greater Poland.

Poznań	Leszno	Kalisz	Konin	Włocławek	Toruń	Bydgoszcz	Piła	Greater Poland
1	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	3
2	4	4	5	2	7	3	3	4
3	5	5	2	7	5	5	5	5
.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
6	2	2	4	6	1	1	6	1
4	1	6	6	1	6	6	1	6

Table 9

Sectors of national economy arranged by decreasing relative value of gross national income per 1 inhabitant of Greater Poland

Poznań	Leszno	Kalisz	Konin	Włocławek	Toruń	Bydgoszcz	Piła	Greater Poland
1	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	3
2	4	4	5	2	7	3	3	4
3	5	5	2	7	5	5	5	5
.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
6	2	1[a]	4	6	1	1	6	1
4	1	6	6	1	6	6	1	6

Remark: [a] sector 2 was in this position on Table 7.

Table 6

Relative values of gross domestic income in seven sectors of national economy per 1 km²

	Poznań	Leszno	Kalisz	Konin	Włocławek	Toruń	Bydgoszcz	Piła	Greater Poland	Poland
Total	1.392	0.492	0.673	0.528	0.554	0.858	0.766	0.32	0.697	1
1. Industry	1.527	0.227	0.614	0.424	0.324	0.781	0.783	0.29	0.602	1
2. Construction	1.449	0.377	0.493	0.46	0.633	0.82	0.844	0.312	0.673	1
3. Agriculture	1.42	1.497	1.224	1.135	1.443	1.453	0.97	0.65	1.221	1
4. Forestry	0.956	0.823	1.038	0.41	0.538	0.83	1.306	1.723	0.958	1
5. Transport and telecommunication	1.255	0.62	0.781	0.544	0.525	0.856	0.855	0.443	0.734	1
6. Trade	1.001	0.39	0.40	0.334	0.353	0.545	0.544	0.221	0.473	1
7. Other	1.327	0.381	0.614	0.434	0.596	0.917	0.842	0.261	0.671	1

(Source: [9])

Table 8

Relative values of gross national income in seven sectors of national economy per 1 inhabitant of Greater Poland

	Poznań	Leszno	Kalisz	Konin	Włocławek	Toruń	Bydgoszcz	Piła	Greater Poland	Poland
Total	1.043	0.65	0.752	0.706	0.685	0.854	0.874	0.674	0.779	1
1. Industry	1.144	0.30	0.686	0.567	0.40	0.778	0.825	0.422	0.640	1
2. Construction	1.085	0.497	0.55	0.615	0.782	0.816	0.962	0.655	0.745	1
3. Agriculture	1.064	1.952	1.368	1.519	1.784	1.447	1.106	1.367	1.450	1
4. Forestry	0.716	1.087	1.160	0.548	0.665	0.827	1.489	3.621	1.362	1
5. Transport and telecommunication	0.94	0.819	0.872	0.727	0.649	0.853	0.975	0.932	0.845	1
6. Trade	0.75	0.515	0.447	0.447	0.437	0.543	0.621	0.464	0.528	1
7. Other	0.994	0.503	0.686	0.58	0.737	0.913	0.96	0.548	0.740	1

(Source: [10])

Table 3

Cross value of fixed assets in Greater Poland by sectors of national economy (current prices in mlo zl per 1 km², as of December 31, 1985)

	Poznań	Leszno	Kalisz	Konin	Włocławek	Toruń	Bydgoszcz	Piła	Greater Poland	Poland
Fixed assets total	174.8	105.6	112.8	103.5	109.2	136.1	117.6	66.30	116.7	133.6
1. Industry	34.22	7.703	17.65	30.55	25.21	29.35	27.53	6.459	22.75	33.41
2. Construction	5.275	0.722	1.382	0.972	1.817	2.430	2.415	1.462	2.257	2.923
3. Agriculture	40.48	47.42	41.76	35.41	36.34	36.46	28.11	21.08	34.44	30.71
4. Forestry	0.6134	0.240	0.7678	0.194	0.227	0.560	0.579	0.853	0.554	0.630
5. Transport and telecommunication	30.30	25.51	24.41	19.06	21.35	28.23	27.15	19.74	24.83	27.31
6. Trade	4.048	2.166	1.996	1.556	1.817	2.430	2.415	1.096	2.257	2.494
7. Other branches of national production	0.8587	0.481	0.153	0.583	1.363	0.934	0.773	0.487	0.688	0.780
8. Municipal economy	7.606	3.851	2.610	2.529	2.953	7.105	4.638	2.559	4.362	5.910
9. Housing and intangible municipal services	37.05	13.48	16.43	8.951	13.40	17.76	17.48	8.409	17.50	20.81
10. Science and technology	1.104	-	-	-	-	0.934	0.096	-	0.287	0.460
11. Education	4.416	1.444	1.842	1.167	1.817	3.178	1.932	1.096	2.181	2.571
12. Culture and art	0.7311	0.240	0.153	0.194	0.227	0.186	0.193	0.121	0.267	0.367
13. Health care and welfare	1.594	0.722	0.767	0.583	1.590	0.747	0.966	0.365	0.918	1.154
14. Tourism	1.349	0.24	0.307	0.194	0.227	0.373	0.386	0.243	0.459	0.617
15. Other	5.152	1.44	2.45	1.556	1.363	6.170	2.995	2.315	3.08	3.434

(Source: [10] and author's calculations)

PIŁA
BYDGOSZCZ
TORUŃ
WŁOCŁAWEK
POZNAŃ
KONIN
LESZNO
KALISZ

Fig. 10

Dominique Joye et Martin Schuler[1]

LE LOCAL, UNE GRILLE D'ANALYSE?

1. INTRODUCTION

Cette communication vise à éclaircir le vocabulaire utilisée dans l'analyse du local à partir de deux approches: le développement local, tel qu'on peut le suivre à partir d'une école particulière, et la politique locale. La thèse que nous allons défendre ici est que la manière dont le local est consideré n'est pas sans conséquence sur les présupposés de l'analyse. En d'autres termes, il importe de reposer le statut du local dans l'analyse à partir d'une conceptualisation plus systématique.

Plus particulièrement, il nous semble que le modèle du développement local insiste d'une manière programmatique sur l'innovation et le dynamisme local alors même que ce postulat interdit toute remise en cause du modèle et lui enlève donc une bonne partie de sa valeur analytique. A l'inverse, la manière dont les acteurs de la politique locale mobilisent leurs ressouces peut tendre à geler les rapports de force au niveau local et donc à empêcher tout rééquilibrage fondamental. Dans ce sens, développement et politique sont dans un rapport de complémentarité qui doit déboucher sur l'analyse des acteurs et de leur rapport au local.

Si la problématique que nous développons n'est pas limitée à un pays particulier, il est cependant clair que ce papier a été écrit avec l'exemple suisse en tête.

2. LE DEVELOPPEMENT LOCAL

Le développement local peut être compris comme la tentative de mobiliser la solidarité interne à une unité spatiale pour en promouvoir le développement.

D'un point de vue économique, il s'agit de la reconquête de l'outil de travail (Guigou, 1986, p. 45), ou, plus généralement, de l'utilisation de

ressources locales qui seraient autrement totalement éparpillées (Greffe, 1989, p. 274).

Généralement, les auteurs que nous venons de citer parlent du développement local comme d'un domaine particulièrement adapté aux régions périphériques. Ainsi pour Gattel et Passaris, "le développement local trouve sa tradition dans le monde rural, dans les zones dites défavorisées".[2] Guigou élargit cette définition en posant le caractère périphérique non pas dans des termes géographiques mais plutôt par rapport au pouvoir lui-même. Et c'est ce qui explique que l'on peut aujourd'hui parler de développement local à propos des quartiers des grandes métropoles aussi bien que par rapport aux régions les plus défavorisées.[3]

Cet aspect de réponse d'une périphérie aux actions du centre se retrouve quand est évoqué l'importance de la solidarité entendue comme réponse à une agression extérieure (Guigou, p. 45). Mais orienter la discussion dans ce sens n'est pourtant pas sans poser des problèmes. Certains parleront, en reprenant le concept marcusien, de glissement vers une société uni-dimensionnelle (Lopreno, 1989) dans la mesure où le développement assigné est unique et d'abord économique. Dans ce sens, l'animation socio-culturelle ne ferait que permettre de gérer les inégalités. Sans nécessairement adopter ce point de vue, il n'en reste pas moins qu'une démarche posée dans ces termes implique l'homogénéité de tous les acteurs locaux, y compris les acteurs politiques.[4]

Or quelles ont les conditions qui permette homogénéité et cohérence? Les éléments suivants ont été avancés (Kuklinski, 1989, p. 223-224), qu'ils soient considérés isolément ou en combinaison.

1. La petite taille serait une condition nécessaire et suffisante pour défendre une homogénéité.

   L'analyse des communautés locales montre que les petites unités sont aussi conflictuelles, parfois encore plus que les grandes dans la mesure où un nombre inférieur de groupes peut rendre l'établissement du consensus plus difficile.

2. Il faudrait qu'il y ait unité de l'espace de référence des acteurs locaux. En d'autres termes, il faudra probablement que leurs espaces de résidence et de travail coïncident pour qu'un tel type de développement puisse être envisagé.

   L'analyse de la société actuelle montre que cette condition est de plus en plus théorique. Nous reviendrons plus loin sur ce problème de localisation.

3. Il faudrait le développement d'une identité socio-culturelle.
4. Il faudrait une unité de contenu dans le projet proposé. Actuellement, l'idée de développement "écologique" ou d'un fort contenu "innovatif" est souvent envisagé (Greffe, 1989).

Cette manière de poser le problème est intéressante à comparer avec les travaux sur le développement régional. En effet, au niveau régional, la correspondance est plus facile entre les différents espaces: résidence, travail, etc. A l'inverse, dans la plupart des pays, le régional n'est pas institutionnalisé, ce qui pose des problèmes de mise en oeuvre.

Plus généralement cette conceptualisation nous paraît largement insatisfaisante dans la mesure où elle ignore deux problèmes importants.

1. Tous les habitants d'une région donnée ont-ils intérêt à un même type de développement? Y-a-t-il un intérêt économique commun, y a-t-il accord sur la répartition d'éventuels surplus? Cet intérêt commun est-il pertinent à un moment donné ou valable à long terme? Suivant les catégories sociales, faut-il envisager des modèles spécifiques?
   Ces questions doivent être abordées explicitement pour déterminer à quelles conditions l'unité peut être réalisée; comment une unité d'analyse peut devenir une unité d'action.
2. Quelles ressources les individus du lieu doivent-ils mettre en oeuvre pour réaliser le développement envisagé? Pour quelles raison le gouvernement central va-t-il éventuellement permettre la réalisation des demandes de la périphérie?

Pour répondre à ces questions, pour comprendre les chances de réaliser un modèle de développement local, et cela sans s'arrêter à une démarche volontariste et normative,[5] dont le succès éventuel ne pourrait être analysé, on est obligé de recourir aux travaux sur le pouvoir local.

3. LA POLITIQUE LOCALE

Les travaux sur la politique locale représentent une somme impressionnante de contributions. Un peu toutes les facettes de la science politique s'y retrouvent: mode d'organisation du pouvoir, représentation des intérêts, etc. La définition stricte de ce champ de recherche est difficile précisément à cause de cette pluralité d'approche. Finalement, l'unité réside dans l'objet: on peut parler de telles analyses dès que la recherche politologique s'applique à un objet local.

Cet élément de définition montre cependant que ce type d'approche

n'est pas caractérisé par des attributs spatiaux. Par exemple, Mabileau parle du local comme lieu de la vie quotidienne (p. 11), sans préciser davantage; de la participation locale comme simplement circonscrite à une "localité" (p. 19), sans qu'elle ait d'autre spécificité. On a alors un peu l'impression que le local en tant que tel n'existe plus: le pays est simplement maillé d'un certain nombre d'unités qui gèrent la distribution spatiale des ressources et participent à l'agrégation des demandes sans que l'échelle importe. De telles hypothèses demandent à être précisées. Bassand et Perrinjaquet (1989) posent trois modèles des rapports entre recherche scientifique et local qui permettent de clarifier les approches.

3.1. Le local comme laboratoire

Une grande série de recherches, dont celles de bon nombre de pionniers de la science politique et de la sociologie, ont considéré le local comme un laboratoire du social.

L'idée principale était en effet qu'au lieu de s'attaquer à des systèmes complexes que de toute manière un chercheur ne peut maîtriser à lui seul, il était plus pertinent de se restreindre à une scène bien délimitée. Typiquement, les différentes approches du pouvoir ont relevé de ce genre d'approche.

Si les acquis de telles démarches ont été nombreux, certains résultats posent problème. D'abord, comme on l'a vu, le local n'est pas simple du seul fait des tailles en jeu. Surtout ce type de découpage extrait le local de son contexte national, ferme le système d'analyse. Ce type de recherche postule donc de manière implicite que les variables pertinentes pour expliquer la structure locale du pouvoir sont intrinsèques à l'unité étudiée.

Dans ce sens là, ce que signifie le local, l'échelle du phénomène, n'est pas pris en compte par l'analyse. C'est un peu le cas de figure opposé à l'approche du développement local où les caractéristiques du lieu étaient constitutive de l'objet: ici, elles sont simplement ignorées.

3.2. Le local comme mise en oeuvre

Une autre manière de considérer le local est de le poser comme niveau de mise en oeuvre de la politique nationale, en d'autres termes de le considérer comme élément de déconcentration administrative, de décentralisation au mieux. Dans ce cas de figure, la politique locale disparaît

également et l'on ne parle plus que de gestion locale, dans la mesure où tous les enjeux essentiels sont déterminés à une autre échelle. Il n'est donc pas étonnant dans ce contexte de voir fleurir une série de travaux dont le titre même remet en question l'existence du local.[6]

Ce dernier modèle peut être vu comme totalement délocalisé puisqu'aucune caractéristique intrinsèque du niveau géographique n'intervient pour expliquer le fonctionnement politique de l'unité considérée.

Pourtant certains travaux introduisent les ressources des acteurs comme des variables importantes et l'échelle spatiale peut alors apparaître à titre de paramètre important.

3.3. Le local comme ressource

Il n'est pas question ici de citer l'ensemble des travaux qui envisage le local comme ressource mais une tradition française peut être un bon exemple. On peut décomposer ses acquis en trois temps:

1. Dès les années soixante, certains travaux ont insisté sur le rôle des réseaux de relation dans l'étude du pouvoir local, réseaux d'autant plus importants qu'ils ne se limitaient pas seulement à un niveau spatial (Kukawka, Mingasson et Roig, 1969).[7]

2. Ensuite, d'autres travaux ont montré encore plus nettement que les enjeux politiques locaux ne pouvaient se comprendre sans référence à des rapports de pouvoir entre groupes sociaux ayants leurs ressources au niveau local et d'autres ayant les leurs au niveau national (Biarez et al.).[8]

3. Le cas de la régionalisation en France est en fait le couronnement de ce processus puisque les travaux sur ce mécanisme avancent l'hypothèse qu'il a eu lieu parce que le personnel politique a été nationalisée (d'Arcy, 1985), ce qui ne l'empêche pas de jouer parfois la carte du local.

Dans les autres pays, des mécanismes semblables ont été observés lors des transformations du système territorial (Racine et Joye, 1988), phénomène que l'on pourrait classer a priori parmi les mécanismes de délocalisation. En Suisse cependant, le processus de nationalisation ne s'est absolument pas passé de cette manière dans la mesure où les collectivités locales ont mieux su préserver leurs prérogatives.

Si cette dernière observation mériterait une étude spécifique, il n'en reste pas moins que nous estimons avoir montré l'intérêt de poser le problème en distinguant local et commune ou localisation et institution.

4. LE JEU DU LOCAL OU LA RELOCALISATTON

Ce bref examen de quelques analyses montre que le recours à l'idée de local est loin de renvoyer à un espace homogène. Le développement local correspond à un modèle où l'ensemble des activités doit être regroupé dans un même lieu, dans une même "localisation". C'est l'idée de l'archétype du local, du local rural d'après les termes de Lamarche (1986) "En effet le local rural représente un champ d'observation qui couvre aussi bien les rapports au travail que les rapports familiaux et domestiques. Cela implique la prise en compte dans l'analyse de tous ces rapports et de leurs interactions, puisqu'ils sont vécus par les gens dans cette totalité". (p. 71).

Certains travaux sur la politique locale correspondent à un modèle de délocalisation. Dans ce cas, le local n'apparaît plus en tant que tel. C'est en fait une hypothèse implicite de parfaite mobilité des acteurs et d'équivalence des contextes: en caricaturant c'est une autre variante du vieux principe "one man, one vote". Ce modèle a été de fait sous-jacent à l'analyse du fonctionnement de grande métropole, alors que l'on a pu parler de la "mort des quartiers". Bref c'est le modèle de la délocalisation.

Actuellement, nous posons l'hypothèse d'une relocalisation, qui ne joue plus sur une unité des espaces de vie mais plutôt sur une unité des espaces tels que les habitants se les représentent. Or cette relation avec l'espace où l'on opère n'est peut-être pas sans liens avec la manière dont les enjeux politiques fonctionnent au niveau local.

5. LOCAL ET ENJEUX POLITIQUES

En simplifiant, on peut poser que les enjeux politiques au niveau local peuvent principalement être considérés sous deux angles: celui des acteurs et celui des institutions locales.

5.1. Les enjeux politiques des acteurs locaux

Si l'on part de l'analyse des acteurs, les travaux permettent de distinguer en tout cas trois types d'enjeux. Les travaux sur la politique locale en Suisse ne montrent en effet pas tous une scène éteinte, dont toute activité serait exclue, bien au contraire. Plus précisément, on peut considérer:

1. Un modèle de politique villageoise où les lignes de fracture sont définies par des appartenances quasi claniques. Dans la littérature suisse, le cas exemplaire d'une telle structure est le village valaisan de Chermignon (Windisch, 1976 et 1980, voir également Wiegandt 1980). Dans cette commune agricole et touristique, deux clans autour d'un noyau de deux familles importantes (qui à l'origine étaient apparentées) se partagent le pouvoir et se démarquent par des rites et symboles développés au cours de ce siècle (fanfares, emblêmes). Toute l'infrastructure privée du village est dédoublée (restaurants, magasins etc.). Malgré les oppositions parfois farouches entre les groupes en ce qui concerne des projets concrets, les tendances politiques et les positions à l'égard du développement de la commune ne se distinguent pas fondamentalement; sur le niveau cantonal, les deux groupes appartiennent d'ailleurs au même parti. Toute cette forte scission de la société locale commence de se réduire depuis quelques années.
2. Un modèle lié au développement des communes périurbaines où ce sont deux populations aux modes d'attachement différents qui s'opposent (Amphoux et al., 1987 pour les deux villages genevois de Presinge et de Puplinge; "ennemis" depuis toujours et appartenant à deux confessions différentes). Comme de nombreuses communes rurales proches des centres, les deux communes ont subi la pression urbaine. Pourtant l'attitude à l'égard d'un tel changement a montré des variations profondes qui trouvent parfois des explications dans des particularités historiques, des structures sociales et économiques et dans l'attitude de certains acteurs importants à des moments-charnières. Ainsi la réaction à l'égard de nouvelles lois cantonales ou à l'égard d'une innovation technologique peut être très différente: remaniement parcellaire, désignation du plan de zone communal, vente ou sauvegarde de terrains, refus ou accueil d'un entreprise. Le choix d'un moment donné reste par la suite souvent maintenu pendant une longue période, même s'il ne correspond plus à une solution "raisonable".

   L'attitude des communes périurbaines de ce type se modifie par la suite sous l'influence des nouveaux arrivés; souvent dans le sens d'un frein au développement initialement lancé. Il se peut donc que le processus du développement change d'orientation: actuellement, c'est la commune la plus arriérée des deux qui est la plus "moderne".

3. Dans un troisième modèle, les enjeux se situent plus directement en

rapport avec les modifications du cadre de vie (Soedestrom, 1988). La dégradation de l'environnement social ou construit devient l'objet de contestation de la population d'un quartier ou d'une région. Souvent ces manifestations ont un caractère écologique et elles sont proches des nouveaux mouvements sociaux. Agissant au moins dans une première phase en dehors des institutions traditionnelles, ils ne se réfèrent pas forcément à un espace bien délimité. Le quartier, souvent flou dans les villes suisses, représentait ainsi au cours des années '70 et au début des années '80 un espace d'action de prédilection. La région, un autre espace ne jouissant pas de structures institutionelles bien ancrées, jouait un rôle important de changement social.

Le quartier ainsi que la région détiennent une position de périphérie par rapport au pouvoir de la Confédération ou d'une ville. Ce statut justifiait jusqu'à maintenant de considérer leurs revendications comme l'expression d'une injustice spatiale (et sociale). Il nous semble pourtant que le discours régionaliste et localiste soit de plus en plus récupéré par n'importe quelle unité spatiale qui souhaite promouvoir ses intérêts. La libre concurrence entre acteurs spatiaux contribue ainsi à une segrégation spatiale à nouveau accentuée.

Dans ces différents types d'enjeux locaux, on s'aperçoit que le rapport au local est une variable déterminante.

5.2. La commune et les enjeux politiques

Comme nous l'avons esquissé rapidement à l'aide de trois exemples, la commune est un lieu de pouvoir qui gère des ressources locales. Il est bien clair que des ressources sont elles-même à la base d'enjeux politiques. Or le développement historique de la commune peut être résumé en trois étapes, où le rôle de la localisation n'est peut-être pas nul.

1. Dans les siècles passés, les enjeux essentiels se jouent par rapport à la propriété des ressources. C'est tout le débat sur le rôle des bourgeoisie et la gestion des propriétés communales. Bref, c'est une phase de localisation.
2. Dans un deuxième temps, les ressources communales ont liées aux entreprises implantées. De facto, en vertu des stratégies des entreprises économiques, on peut parler d'une phase de délocalisation progressive.
3. Dans un troisième temps, les ressources dans de nombreuses communes en Suisse sont de plus en plus liées aux contributions

fiscales dès personnes physiques et les transferts financiers enre les différents niveaux spatiaux. C'est ainsi que la position (en termes absolues ou relatives) des villes-centre perd d'importance par rapport aux communes sub- et périurbaines (et parfois même périphériques). Dans cette situation ou le pouvoir spatial et de moins en moins localisable, toute commune est amené d'accorder plus d'importance à son image. Cela n'est pas seulement un facteur de "public relations" dans la concurrence entre les villes et entre les communes (ainsi qu'entre les pays), mais l'image d'un lieu à la tendance de remplacer pour une grande partie de la population l'appartenance à un endroit. L'acquisition d'une image ne demande d'ailleurs moins d'efforts que la conquête de l'appartenance...

6. EN CONCLUSION

A suivre ces travaux, on a un peu l'impression d'une double impasse, aussi bien normative que descriptive: d'une part, nier le local dans sa spécificité permet à des acteurs d'en profiter pour imposer des intérêts sectoriels mais, d'autre part, l'affirmer comme unique et dynamique permet peut-être un discours qui favorise l'action, celui du développement local, mais qui ignore les spécifictés sociales et les déséquilibres globaux. Dans un cas comme dans l'autre, les catégories utilisées rendent l'analyse délicate.

Mais ce parallèle a la vertu d'accentuer l'importance de la localistion comme catégorie d'analyse. Plus précisément, il apparaît dès lors qu'il faut distinguer les mécanismes de localisation des institutions locales. Ce n'est qu'à cette condition que l'on peut comprendre l'insertion locale des citoyens et la manière dont ils définissent leur destin au niveau local.

Mais cela montre aussi qu'à l'instar d'autres domaines politiques, il faut dorénavant raisonner sur une pluralité d'espace de références qui fonctionnent à l'instar d'une nouvelle grammaire pour structurer les comportements.

---

[1] Version préliminaire

[2] Cf aussi Jean (1989), p. 142.

[3] Il suffit de penser à des mouvements comme le développement social des quartiers ou la culture de quartier.

[4] "Généralement initié par des élus locaux, un processus de développement local s'élabore à partir d'une concertation large de l'ensemble des citoyens" (DATAR citée par Guigou, 1986, p. 47).

[5] Dans ce sens, B. Jean n'écrit-il pas à propos du développement local: "cette notion n'annonce-t-elle pas une nouvelle conception des rapports entre les hommes, une nouvelle vision du politique, une nouvelle gestion sociale et territoriale." (Jean, 1989, p. 126).

[6] "Irrelevant elections?" (Miller, 1988) pour n'en citer qu'un exemple.

[7] Par exemple, contacts du maire avec préfet et Paris.

[8] Jeu entre bourgeoisie locale et bourgeoisie nationale.

REFERENCES

AMPHOUX P. and al. (1987) *Mémoire collective et urbanisation*, CREPU ET IREC, Genève et Lausanne.

d'ARCY F. (1985) "La classe politique française à l'épreuve de la décentralisation" in *Revue internationale d'action communautaire*, No 13/53.

BASSAND M. and R. PERRINJAQUET (1985) "La politique locale" in *Manuel, système politique Suisse*, Vol. 3, Haupt, Berne.

GATTEL J. and S. PASSARIS (1986) "Le développement local, des territoires, des hommes, des initiatives, le partenariat" in *Revue d'économie régionale et urbaine*, No 1, p. 3 et sq.

GREFFE X. (1989) *Décentraliser pour l'emploi, les initiatives locales de développement*, Economica, Paris.

GUIGOU J.L. (1986) "Le développement local, espoirs et freins" in B. GUESNIER, *Développement local et décentralisation*, éd. régionales et européennes, Paris.

JEAN B. (1986) "Le développement à sa place" in M. BASSAND et L. BRIDEL, *La dynamique locale et sa gestion*, Unesco, Berne.

KUKAWKA P., MINGASSON Ch. and Ch. ROIG (1969) *Recherche sur la structure du pouvoir local et urbain*, Université de Grenoble, 1969.

KUKLINSKI A. (1989) "Local dynamics and environments" in M. BASSAND et L. BRIDEL, *La dynamique locale et sa gestion*, Unesco, Berne.

LAMARCHE H. (1986) "Localisation, délocalisation et relocalisation en milieu rural" in *L'esprit des lieux*, CNRS, Paris.

LOPRENO D. (1989) *Le concept de post-industrialisme*, le concept moderne, Genève.

MABILEAU A., G. MOYSER, G. PARRY and P. QUANTIN (1987) *Les citoyens et la politique locale*, Pedone, Paris.

MILLER W.L. (1988) *Irrelevant elections?*, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

SOEDERSTROM O. (1988) "La question patrimoniale" in M. BASSAND, D. JOYE and M. SCHULER, *Les enjeux de l'urbanisation : Agglomerationsprobleme in der Schweiz*, Lang, Berne.

WIEGANDT E. (1980) "Classe, clan ou conflit d'intérêts? Une étude dynamique de la politique locale dynamique" in *Annuaire suisse de science politique.*

WINDISCH U. (1976) *Lutte de clans, lutte de classe*, Age d'homme, Lausanne.

WINDISCH U. (1980) "Mythes et réalités de la politique locale" in *Annuaire suisse de science politique.*

Dominique Joye et Martin Schuler
Institut de Recherche sur l'Environnement Construit
Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne

DEVELOPPEMENT ET GOUVERNEMENT "LOCAL" OU L'IMPORTANCE DES LIEUX

1. INTRODUCTION

Le terme de "local" est utilisé depuis très longtemps dans les sciences sociales: pouvoir local, culture locale, développement local, etc. Pourtant, sous l'apparente homogénéité de cet adjectif, il y a des différences énormes dans la manière dont son rôle et son contenu se définissent. Plus précisément, cet article vise deux buts.

D'abord éclaircir le vocabulaire utilisée dans l'analyse du local à partir de deux approches: le développement local et la politique locale. Plus particulièrement, il nous semble que le modèle du développement local insiste d'une manière programmatique sur l'innovation et le dynamisme local. Dans ce sens, l'hypothèse d'homogénéité de la société à laquelle il s'applique est particulièrement importante. A l'inverse, la politique locale peut mettre en lumière les inégalités et les rapports de force aussi bien locaux que régionaux.

Mais cette analyse vise aussi à reposer le statut du local dans la recherche pour aboutir à une conceptualisation plus systématique, pour laquelle l'analyse des acteurs et de leur rapport au local apparaît comme un élément important. Plus généralement l'étude des mécamismes de localisation devrait permettre de lier problèmes spatiaux, sociaux et politique. C'est dans ce rapport que se situe un des enjeux de l'impact du contexte géographique.

2. LE DEVELOPPEMENT LOCAL

De très nombreux travaux se sont consacrés au développement local et il serait sans doute vain de les supposer homogènes. Néanmoins, il semble que le développement local puisse être compris comme la tentative de mobiliser la solidarité interne à une unité spatiale pour en promouvoir le développement. D'un point de vue économique, il s'agit de la reconquête de l'outil de travail (Guigou, 1986, p.45), ou, plus généralement, de l'utilisation de ressources locales qui seraient autrement totalement éparpillées (Greffe, 1989, p.274).

Généralement, les auteurs que nous venons de citer parlent du développement local comme d'une action particulièrement adaptée aux régions périphériques. Ainsi pour Gattel et Passaris, "le développement local trouve sa tradition dans le monde rural, dans les zones dites défavorisées".[1] Guigou élargit cette définition en posant le caractère périphérique non pas dans des termes géographiques mais plutôt par rapport au pouvoir. Et c'est ce qui explique que, d'un point de vue théorique, l'on puisse aujourd'hui parler de développement local à propos des quartiers des grandes métropoles aussi bien que par rapport aux régions les plus défavorisées.

Cet aspect de réponse d'une périphérie aux actions du centre se retrouve quand est évoqué l'importance de la solidarité entendue comme réponse à une agression extérieure (Guigou, p.45). Mais orienter la discussion dans ce sens n'est pourtant pas sans poser des problèmes. Certains parleront, en reprenant le concept marcusien, de glissement vers une société uni-dimensionnelle (Lopreno, 1989) dans la mesure où le développement assigné est unique et d'abord économique. Dans une telle perspective, l'animation socio-culturelle ne ferait que permettre de gérer les inégalités. Sans nécessairement adopter ce point de vue, il n'en reste pas moins qu'une démarche posée dans ces termes implique, à tout le moins, une large concertation dans le lieu considéré.[2]

De facto, beaucoup de travaux ne postulent pas seulement la concertation mais bien la cohérence sociale. Or quelles sont les conditions qui permettent une image d'homogénéité? Les éléments d'explication suivants, qu'ils soient considérés isolément ou en combinaison, ont été avancés comme justifications idéologiques (Kuklinski, 1989, p.223-224) et il vaut la peine d'examiner de plus près ces arguments.

1. La petite taille serait une condition nécessaire et suffisante pour défendre une homogénéité.
   L'analyse des collectivités locales montre que les petites unités sont aussi conflictuelles, parfois encore plus que les grandes dans la mesure où, notamment, un nombre inférieur de groupes peut rendre l'établissement d'un consensus encore plus difficile. Plus généralement, ce sont les modes de résolution des conflits qui peuvent différer.[3]
2. L'idéologie du développement postule une unité de l'espace de référence des acteurs locaux. En d'autres termes, il faudra probablement que leurs espaces de résidence et de travail coïncident pour qu'un tel type de développement puisse être envisagé.[4]
   L'analyse de la société actuelle montre que cette condition qui, dans certains cas, fondait la notion de localisation, est de moins en moins vraie. Nous y reviendrons bientôt.
3. L'hypothèse de cohérence postule le développement d'une identité socio-culturelle propre. Dans, ce sens, il devrait y avoir la création d'un acteur collectif.
   Autant il est clair que la prise en compte des ressources culturelles est une condition nécessaire à la réussite d'un quelconque changement, autant il est important de distinguer suivant ressources et domaines en jeu.
4. Le projet de développement proposé requiert une unité de contenu. Actuellement, l'idée de développement "écologique" ou d'un fort contenu "innovatif" est souvent envisagé (Greffe, 1989).
   Nous voyons aussi un fort contenu programmatique à ce modèle dans la mesure où le changement impliqué par l'innovation, de même que l'inclination à l'écologie, n'apparaissent pas nécessairement comme les qualités premières des régions périphériques, a fortiori rurales.

Plus généralement cette conceptualisation nous paraît poser deux problèmes importants. D'abord, l'idée d'un développement local dans une société nécessairement plurielle est en fait l'imposition d'une rationalité unique. Cela revient à justifier une position dominante d'un groupe social et implique de raisonner sur les stratégies qui peuvent alors être mises en place. Ensuite, un développement local, s'il est couronné de succès, remet nécessairement en cause les rapports de pouvoir au niveau national dans la mesure où les rapports entre les ressources des différentes unités géographiques sont modifiés.

Pour répondre à ces questions, pour comprendre les chances de réaliser un modèle de développement local, et cela sans s'arrêter à une démarche volontariste et normative,[5] on est obligé de recourir aux travaux sur le pouvoir local.

3. LA POLITIQUE LOCALE

Les travaux sur la politique locale représentent une somme impressionnante de contributions. Un peu toutes les facettes de la science politique s'y retrouvent: mode d'organisation du pouvoir, science administrative, représentation des intérêts, comportement politique, pour n'en citer qu'un petit nombre. La définition stricte de ce champ de recherche est difficile précisément à cause de cette pluralité d'approche. Certes on peut distinguer entre des notions comme gouvernement local, qui renvoit le plus souvent aux institutions; pouvoir local qui évoque davantage les acteurs; ou politique locale comme concept générique. Mais finalement, l'imprécision provient davantage de la manière dont la localité est considérée que du contenu politique.

En général, la caractéristique qui constitue le local n'est pas posée en tant que telle. Par exemple, un spécialiste de ce type de recherche, A. Mabileau parle du local comme lieu de la vie quotidienne (p.11), sans préciser davantage; de la participation locale comme simplement circonscrite à une "localité" (p.19), sans qu'elle ait d'autre spécificité.

Plus précisément, on peut poser que le "local" est souvent utilisé par les politologues dans deux sens très différents, mais qui tous deux font impasse sur ce qui le constitue. Reprenons ces deux approches, au risque de la caricature pour que les enjeux apparaissent nettement, avant de tenter une première synthèse.

Une première approche considère les localités comme des unités autonomes, dont l'étude en soi est nécessairement justifiée. Les célèbres études de "communautés locales"[6] ont ainsi postulé que le local constitue un laboratoire du social: au lieu de s'attaquer à des systèmes complexes qu'un chercheur ne peut maîtriser à lui seul, il est plus pertinent dans une telle optique de se restreindre à une scène bien délimitée qui permette de montrer explicitement les jeux et enjeux du pouvoir.

De telles démarches font aujourd'hui partie du bagage général des sciences sociales et leurs acquis ne sont pas contestés. Cependant certains de leurs résultats posent des problèmes. De nombreuses critiques ont relevé

le caractère monographique de beaucoup de ces travaux et la difficulté de généralisation qui en découle. Pour notre part, nous aimerions, avec Tiévant (1983), davantage insister sur un autre type d'argument. D'abord, comme on l'a vu, le local n'est pas simple du seul fait des petites tailles en jeu, ce qui veut dire que l'hypothèse d'un laboratoire du social n'est pas a priori vérifiée. Mais surtout ce type de découpage extrait le local de son contexte national. En termes systémistes, on pourrait même parler de fermeture du système d'analyse dans la mesure où ce type de recherche postule de manière implicite que les variables pertinentes pour expliquer la structure locale du pouvoir sont intrinsèques à l'unité étudiée.

D'autres recherches posent plutôt le problème en termes d'espaces institutionnels, en faisant référence au monde de la "commune".[7] Dans ce cas, il y a de facto hypothèse d'un maillage régulier du territoire puisque toutes les communes d'un pays ont formellement les mêmes compétences.[8] Le risque est alors grand de vider le système de localité de ce qui fait sa substance.

Dans le même esprit, certains ne voient le local que comme espace de déconcentration administrative, de décentralisation au mieux.[9] Dans ce cas de figure, la politique locale disparaît également et l'on ne parle plus que de gestion locale, dans la mesure où tous les enjeux essentiels sont déterminés à une autre échelle. Il n'est donc pas étonnant dans ce contexte de voir fleurir une série de travaux dont le titre même remet en question l'existence du local.[10]

Pourtant une longue tradition d'analyse introduit les ressources des acteurs comme des variables importantes et l'échelle spatiale peut alors apparaître à titre de paramètre essentiel. Il n'est pas question ici de citer l'ensemble des travaux qui envisage le local comme ressource mais une tradition française peut être un bon exemple. On peut décomposer ses acquis en trois temps:

1. Dès les années soixante, certains travaux ont insisté sur le rôle des réseaux de relation dans l'étude du pouvoir local, réseaux d'autant plus importants qu'ils ne se limitaient pas seulement à un niveau spatial (Kukawka, Mingasson et Roig, 1969).
2. Ensuite, d'autres travaux ont montré encore plus nettement que les enjeux politiques locaux ne pouvaient se comprendre sans référence à des rapports de pouvoir entre groupes sociaux ayant leurs ressources au niveau local et d'autres ayant les leurs au niveau national (Biarez et al., 1973).

3. Le cas de la régionalisation en France est en fait le couronnement de ce processus puisque certains travaux avancent l'hypothèse que cette transformation n'a pu avoir lieu que parce que le personnel politique avait déjà un tel réseau d'interconnaissance, participait en fait d'un système national (d'Arcy, 1985). Ceci n'empêche cependant pas de considérer des ressources locales aux principaux acteurs."

En résumé, ces quelques remarquent montrent la nécessité de prendre en compte la pluralité des niveaux géographiques dans l'analyse des mécanismes politiques. Cependant, si l'on veut aller plus loin, il faut s'efforcer de préciser le rôle et la définition du local dans l'analyse.

4. LE JEU DU LOCAL ET LES ENJEUX POLITIQUES

Le rapport aux caractéristiques des localités apparaît donc comme essentiel dans les démarches envisagées. On peut toutefois essayer de systématiser la manière dont il est posé en considérant un triptyque localisation-délocalisation-relocalisation, que nous allons essayer d'illustrer à partir d'exemples d'études suisses. Dans tous les cas nous envisagerons la question aussi bien du point de vue des acteurs politiques, à commencer par les citoyens, que de celui des institutions locales.

4.1 Localisation

Le développement local correspond à un modèle où l'ensemble des activités doit être regroupé dans un même lieu, dans une même "localisation". C'est l'idée de l'archétype du local, du local rural d'après les termes de Lamarche (1986). "En effet le local rural représente un champ d'observation qui couvre aussi bien les rapports au travail que les rapports familiaux et domestiques. Cela implique la prise en compte dans l'analyse de tous ces rapports et de leurs interactions, puisqu'ils sont vécus par les gens dans cette totalité." (p.71). Cette hypothèse d'un tout englobant, donné a priori, est aussi celle des études de "communautés locales".

Du point de vue des acteurs, des études encore récentes ont montré l'existence de modèles de politique villageoise où les lignes de fracture sont définies par des appartenances quasi claniques. Le cas exemplaire d'une telle structure est le village valaisan de Chermignon (Windisch, 1976 et

1980).[12] Dans cette commune d'abord agricole, aujourd'hui touristique, deux clans se sont longtemps battus pour le gouvernement local, en se démarquant par des symboles encore développés au cours de ce siècle (fanfares, emblèmes). Toute l'infrastructure privée du village est dédoublée: restaurants, magasins etc. Malgré les oppositions parfois farouches entre les groupes en ce qui concerne des projets concrets, les tendances politiques et les positions à l'égard du développement de la commune ne se distinguent pas fondamentalement; sur le niveau cantonal, les deux groupes appartiennent d'ailleurs au même parti politique. La décennie passée a vu apparaître un troisième groupe, plis directement lié à la promotion de la station touristique et ce changement structurel explique peut-être une tendance à la réduction de cette scission de la société locale.

D'un point de vue de gestion politique, les enjeux essentiels dans un tel modèle nous semblent se jouer par rapport à la propriété des ressources. C'est tout le débat sur le rôle des "bourgeoisie"[13] et la gestion des propriétés communales, système archaïque mais dont les dernières transformations sont encore d'actualité.

Bien sûr, ce genre de modèles devient de plus en plus rares mais, comme type idéal, il n'est de loin pas vidé de sa substance. Il importe cependant de se souvenir qu'il ne s'agit là que d'une modalité particulière d'un modèle plus vaste, tandis que d'autres formes ont ensuite pris une place dominante.

4.2 Délocalisation

D'autres travaux sur la politique locale correspondent à un modèle que nous qualifions de délocalisation. Dans ce cas, le local n'apparaît plus en tant que tel dans la mesure où tout lieu est posé comme équivalent. C'est en fait une hypothèse implicite de parfaite mobilité des acteurs qui sont libres de s'installer dans n'importe quel endroit.[14]

Ce modèle a été de fait sous-jacent à l'analyse du fonctionnement des grandes métropoles dans les années soixante, alors que l'on parlait de la "mort des quartiers". Ce modèle de délocalisation a donc avant tout été postulé en milieu urbain.

Du point de vue des habitants, l'approche est avant tout fonctionnelle: quasiment chaque ménage a besoin d'un logement et d'un travail, les deux devant ne pas être trop éloigné ni susciter de désagréments majeurs. Mais au-delà des questions d'accessibilité, la localisation n'apparaît plus comme

telle et les relations sociales sont censées remplacer les relations de voisinages.

D'un point de vue de gestion locale, on peut faire l'hypothèse que dans ce modèle, les ressources communales sont liées aux entreprises implantées. C'est d'ailleurs aussi ce qui explique que l'on puisse parler de délocalisation, l'implantation des acteurs économiques étant très lié à des stratégies globales, d'autant plus que les acteurs en question se situent dans un réseau mondial.

Le développement des villes aurait du renforcer cette tendance à la délocalisation des activités. Paradoxalement, on s'est cependant aperçu que la typologie locale des grandes régions urbaines n'étaient pas sans influence sur la vie des collectivités locales, et donc que le modèle de délocalisation n'était pas suffisant pour en rendre compte..

4.3 Relocalisation

Actuellement, nous posons l'hypothèse d'une relocalisation, qui ne joue plus sur une unité des espaces de vie mais plutôt sur une unité des espaces tels que les habitants se les représentent (Amphoux, 1987). Or cette relation avec l'espace où l'on opère n'est peut-être pas sans liens avec la manière dont les enjeux politiques fonctionnent au niveau local.

Dans ce troisième modèle, les enjeux se situent plus directement en rapport avec les modifications du cadre de vie (Soederstrom, 1988). La dégradation de l'environnement social ou construit devient l'objet de contestation de la population d'un quartier ou d'une région. Souvent ces manifestations ont un caractère écologique et elles sont proches des nouveaux mouvements sociaux.[15] Agissant au moins dans une première phase en dehors des institutions traditionnelles, elles ne se réfèrent pas forcément à un espace délimité officiellement. Même flou dans les villes suisses, le quartier représentait ainsi au cours des années septante et au début des années quatre-vingts un espace d'action de prédilection.

D'un point de vue de gestion, les ressources dans de nombreuses communes en Suisse sont de plus en plus liées aux contributions fiscales des personnes physiques et les transferts financiers entre les différents niveaux spatiaux. C'est ainsi que la position (en termes absolues ou relatives) des villes-centres perd d'importance par rapport aux communes sub- et périurbaines (et parfois même périphériques). Dans cette situation où la répartition des ressources de pouvoir est de moins en moins claire

dans la hiérarchie urbaine et à l'intérieur de l'agglomération, toute commune est amenée à accorder plus d'importance à son image.[16] Cela n'est pas seulement un facteur de "public relations" dans la concurrence entre les villes et entre les communes (ainsi qu'entre les pays), mais l'image d'un lieu à la tendance de remplacer pour une grande partie de la population l'appartenance à un endroit. L'acquisition d'une image ne demande d'ailleurs moins d'efforts que la conquête de l'appartenance telle qu'on pouvait la concevoir dans d'autres contextes.

5. EN CONCLUSION

A suivre ces travaux, on a un peu l'impression d'une double impasse, aussi bien normative que descriptive: d'une part, nier le local dans sa spécificité permet à des acteurs d'en profiter pour imposer des intérêts sectoriels mais, d'autre part, l'affirmer comme unique et dynamique permet peut-être un discours qui favorise l'action, celui du développement local, mais qui ignore les spécificités sociales et les déséquilibres globaux. Dans un cas comme dans l'autre, les catégories utilisées rendent l'analyse délicate. Dans ce sens, il paraît indispensable de tenir compte des problématiques nationales au niveau local mais aussi de ne pas ignorer les ressources locales dans une approche globale.

Mais ce parallèle a la vertu d'accentuer l'importance du local comme catégorie d'analyse. Plus précisément, il apparaît dès lors qu'il faut distinguer les mécanismes de localisation des individus des institutions locales. Ce n'est qu'à cette condition que l'on peut comprendre l'insertion locale des citoyens et la manière dont ils définissent leur destin au niveau local.

Enfin, l'insertion locale n'est pas morte, loin de là même si ces modalités se sont transformées. Dans ce sens, l'image suscitée par des actions semblables apparaît comme un moteur aussi puissant que les activités communes que l'on pouvait observer autrefois. Mais cela montre aussi qu'à l'instar d'autres domaines politiques, il faut dorénavant raisonner sur une pluralité d'espace de références qui fonctionnent à l'instar d'une nouvelle grammaire pour structurer les comportements.

Dans ce sens, la relocalisation, telle que nous l'avons vue fonctionner, apparaît comme un élément important dans la mesure où elle peut renouveler les hypothèses trop réductrices du modèle du développement local, en particulier celle d'homogénéité sociale. En matière de politique

locale aussi, elle peut fournir une clé pour interpréter la modification des systèmes d'appartenance et les relations entre local et global. Ceci est d'autant plus vrai quuand on pense que les mécanismes de relocalisation s'imposent dans un monde où l'on parle d'individualisme et d'appartenances multiples, en négligeant peut-être par là-même les modèles redistributifs des années septante.

---

[1] Cf aussi par exemple Jean (1989), p. 142 ou Mathieu (1989, p.113)

[2] "Généralement initié par des élus locaux, un processus de développement local s'élabore à partir d'une concertation large de l'ensemble des citoyens" (DATAR citee par Guigou, 1986, p.47).

[3] Bien d'autres mécanismes interviennent dans les oppositions à l'intérieur des collectivités locales. Windisch (1976) en donne un exemple intéressant pour la Suisse sur lequel nous reviendrons bientôt.

[4] Cette manière de poser le problème est intéressante à comparer avec les travaux sur le développement régional. En effet, au niveau régional, la correspondance est plus facile entre les différents espaces: résidence, travail, etc. A l'inverse, dans la plupart des pays, le régional n'est pas institutionnalisé, ce qui pose des problèmes de mise en oeuvre.

[5] Dans ce sens, B. Jean écrit à propos du développement local: " cette notion n'annonce-t-elle pas une nouvelle conception des rapports entre les hommes, une nouvelle vision du politique, une nouvelle gestion sociale et territoriale." (Jean, 1989, p. 126).

[6] L'usage actuel est de parler de collectivités locales plutôt que de communautés locales, concept davantage connoté. Le travail de ces pionniers n'était cependant pas toujours exempt d'une hypothèse d'homogénéité sociale du lieu considéré.

[7] Parler de commune et de local posent un problème de vocabulaire. Pour certains, le local renvoit à tous les niveaux qui ne sont pas le niveau national; c'est l'optique de la DATAR par exemple. Pour notre part, nous avons davantage une conception où est local le niveau le plus désagrégé, le niveau intermédiaire étant qualifié de "régional". Dans la plupart des pays d'Europe occidental, c'est la commune qui est l'institution politique correspondante.

[8] Il est en effet très rare qu'un pays connaisse des compétences différentes suivant la taille des communes, alors qu'autrefois communes urbaines et rurales pouvaient avoir des rôles et des compétences différents. Ce fut notamment le cas en Allemagne fédérale avant la transformation du système communal, ou en Grande-Bretagne. Par contre les modes d'organisation peuvent différer suivant la taille.

[9] Notons que c'est dans ce sens que des recherches sur la taille optimale des communes ont été menées, notamment en RFA au moment de la transformation du système de gouvernement local. Cette discussion est intéressante car faire l'hypothèse d'un optimum implique de le supposer unique, et donc qu'un seul type de fonction doit être rempli par cet espace politique.

[10] Certains ont posés carrément la question "Does local matter? en paraphrasant un titre célèbre. D'autres (Miller, 1988) s'interrogent sur l'importance actuelle des élections locales.

[11] La plupart des pays européens ont également connu une réforme du système de gouvernement local dans les années septante. La plupart du temps, cette réforme n'était acceptable que si les ressources du personnel politique avait suffisament changé. La Suisse est

un peu un exemple a contrario de ce même type de processus. Cf. Racine et Joye (1988) ou Mény (1984).

[12] Certaines de ces caractéristiques de la politique villageoise se retrouvent sous certaines conditions dans d'autres villages du même canton (Wiegandt 1980).

[13] Certains cantons en Suisse connaissent encore une forme particulière de dualisme communal entre la commune politique qui regroupe les habitants et la commune "bourgeoise" limitée aux familles "originaires" du lieu.

[14] En poussant peut-être un peu loin la comparaison, nous aimerions faire le parallèle avec le vieux principe "one man, one vote" qui postule l'équivalence de tout les acteurs.

[15] Jałowiecki (1989, p.227), à la suite des travaux de Touraine et de Castels distingue entre mouvements sociaux globaux, sectoriels et locaux. Nous aimerions cependant poser l'hypothèse que la plupart des mouvements sociaux ont d'abord été locaux avant de développer des approches sectorielles ou globales.

[16] Il importe de préciser que dans ce contexte, aussi bienpour les citoyens que pour les communes, le terme d'image peut aussi bien être pris dans un sens positif que négatif; une image peut aussi bien repousser qu'attirer.

Références

AMPHOUX P. & al. (1987) *Mémoire collective et urbanisation*, CREPU ET IREC, Genève et Lausanne.

d'ARCY F. (1985) "La classe politique française à l'épreuve de la décentralisation" in *Revue internationale d'action communautaire*, No13/53.

BASSAND M. & R. PERRINJAQUET (198.) "La politique locale" in *Manuel, système politique Suisse*, Vol. 3, Haupt, Berne.

BIAREZ S. & al. (1973) *Institution communale et pouvoir politique, le cas de Roanne*, Mouton.

BIAREZ S. (1989) *Le pouvoir local*, Economica, Paris.

GATTEL J. & S. PASSARIS (1986) "Le développement local, des territoires, des hommes, des initiatives, le partenariat" in *Revue d'économie régionale et urbaine*, No1, p.3 et sq.

GREFFE X. (1989) *Décentraliser pour l'emploi, les initiatives locales de développement*, Economica, Paris.

GUIGOU J.L. (1986) "Le développement local, espoirs et freins" in B. GUESNIER, *Développement local et décentralisation*, éd. régionales et européennes, Paris.

JAŁOWIECKI B. (1989) "Mouvement sociaux dans la perspective globale" in B. JAŁOWIECKI et M. SCOTNICKI, *Etudes régionales et locales No2*, Université de Varsovie, Varsovie.

JEAN B. (1986) "Le développement à sa place" in M. BASSAND et L. BRIDEL, *La dynamique locale et sa gestion*, Unesco, Berne.

KUKAWKA P., MINGASSON Ch. & Ch. ROIG (1969) *Recherche sur la structure du pouvoir local et urbain*, Université de Grenoble, 1969.

KUKLIŃSKI A: (1989) "Local dynamics and environments" in M. BASSAND et L. BRIDEL, *La dynamique locale et sa gestion*, Unesco, Berne.

LAMARCHE H. (1986) "Localisation, délocalisation et relocalisation en milieu rural" in *L'esprit des lieux*, CNRS, Paris.

LOPRENO D (1989) *Le concept de post-industrialisme*, le concept moderne, Genève.

MABILEAU A., G. MOYSER, G. PARRY & P. QUANTIN (1987) *Les citoyens et la politique locale*, Pedone, Paris.

MATHIEU N. (1989) Les politiques de développement rural, unité ou diversité?" in B. JAŁOWIECKI et M. SCOTNICKI, *Etudes régionales et locales No2*, Université de Varsovie, Varsovie.

MENY Y. (1984) *La réforme des collectivités locales en Europe*, La documentation framçaise, Paris.

MILLER W. L. (1988) *Irrelevant elections?*, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

RACINE J.-B, & D. JOYE (1988) "Le système urbain helvétique à l'aune européenne" in M. BASSAND, D. JOYE & M. SCHULER, *Les enjeux de l'urbanisation: Agglomerationsprobleme in der Schweiz*, Lang, Berne.

SOEDERSTROM O. (1988) "La question patrimoniale" in M. BASSAND, D. JOYE & M. SCHULER, *Les enjeux de l'urbanisation: Agglomerationsprobleme in der Schweiz*, Lang, Berne.

TIEVANT S. (1983) "Les études de «communauté» et la ville: héritage et problème" in *Sociologie du travail*, No2, pp.243-256.

WIEGANDT E. (1980) "Classe, clan ou conflit d'intérêts? Une étude dynamique de la politique locale dynamique" in *Annuaire suisse de science politique*.

WINDISCH U. (1976) *Lutte de clans, lutte de classe*, Age d'homme, Lausanne.

WINDISCH U. (1980) "Mythes et réalités de la politique locale" in *Annuaire suisse de science politique*.

Gertjan Dijkink
University of Amsterdam, Netherlands

SHIFTING VALUES IN LOCAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY

In the wake of Wallerstein's ideas about the world system many authors nowadays assert that national ideologies will yield inevitably to the realism of the international economic conditions. Most recently Fukuyama successfully caught international public attention with his prediction of the 'end of ideology'. Peter Taylor, in his book Political Geography (1983), associated the three levels international, national and local with the epistemological categories reality, ideology and experience. Such approaches illustrate how attention to ideology is particularly focused on the national level and how the international level is seen as the domain of hard political facts.

As an interested observer of the all of rigid political beliefs during the last decade in my own country, I as just as well impressed by the sensitivity of politics and bureaucracy to 'instant' perspectives that are hardly more realistic than the hackneyed values of the past. I have analysed cases of instant politics (and instant 'ideologies') on the national and the local level, particularly in the field of housing and planning.

1. NATIONAL POLITICAL CULTURE

As a country, the Netherlands have the highest population density in the world (some dwarf states excluded). I often have the impression that it also has the highest density of opinion in the world. On radio and tv, eight more or less big broadcasting-license holders (as we call them) and a number of smaller ones compete for the attention of the public and for winning members (subscribers). Since many decades the national parliament houses representatives of about ten political parties. The number of book titles published each year is (in proportion to the number of inhabitants) considerably larger than in countries like Britain and France (which is the more striking when we account for the restricted language area). The number of sold copies of books with some kind of

message about world affairs or the destiny of mankind is the highest in the world (all of course in proportion to the number of inhabitants). Books that in comparison with other countries received the highest sales figures were: P. Teilhard de Chardin, The phenomenon of man (Le phénomène humain, 1956), D. Meadows, The limits to growth (1971, half of he entire world edition) and M. Gorbachev, Perestroika (1988, proportionately slightly more than the German sales at the end of that year!). This society teems with nervous searches for the last truth in many wide-ranging and smaller matters. But the search often turns out to be shallow, fashionable, transient or quickly exhausted. How can this spiritual infra-structure of concern with social problems and short-lived beliefs about management and control be explained? I have listed four possible causes.

1) The ecological vulnerability of the country. Because of the high population density and the man-made character of the land, the Dutch have an age-old urge to think about the systematic impact of human decisions (population control, flood control and more recently the impact of environmental pollution and nuclear war).
2) The tradition of 'pillarization'. Nationalistic feeling has always been of secondary importance in the Netherlands. Membership of a religious or social group ('pillar') ranked first as a determinant of the individual worldview. The existence of many groups with outspoken ideologies and feelings of dividedness was a danger to the national integration process in the 19th century. The solution of 'pillarization', successfully put into practice in the first half of the 20th century, was to restrict ideology to in-group discussions and to establish a realistic cooperation between the political elites with regard to national (economic) affairs (Lijphart 1968). The end of pillarization in the sixties transformed the national forum into a stage for competing ideologies or 'confessions'. This confessional character of politics survived (together with a manifold of associations like broadcasting organisations, labour unions, etc.) although the meaning of he original borderlines faded away.
3) Some national character traits like a rather developed feeling of guilt and responsibility that may easily reverse a policy when groups are pictured as deprived or treated unfairly. The media are sensitive to complaints and eager to disclose the human interest side of a dominant policy.
4) The open communication structure with other parts of the world – heritage of a former world empire – and an economy that still depends

for a large part on transit trade and international services. Together with the feeling to be an insignificant power, this creates a sensitivity to innovations or visions from elsewhere.

Many political commentators have called the period from 1967 to 1977 an ideological phase in Dutch politics. In these years the 'depillarization' process shifted the attention to the domain of practical policy-making as a subject for ideological satisfaction. A far-reaching democratization of the universities was pushed through. The national government developed plans for a radical administrative reform. In national physical planning a policy to stop metropolitan growth and to concentrate the population in smaller cities was enforced. Although many other demands were ritualistic and never put into practice (like the administrative reform) they contributed to the image of the era as one in which political ideas flourished and the society was seen as something 'makeable'. Politicians looking back in the 80s were eager to deny the last claim and to uncover its ideological 'bias' or its financial carelessness. They stressed more conservative ideas of self-organization and adaptation to economic forces. Solutions of the 70s were even reorganized, for instance the policy of 'controlled deconcentration' of metropolitan growth was abandoned and measured favoring the Randstad area were recommended (Dijkink and van der Wusten 1989). Undoubtedly such measures were inspired by international economic necessity and fiscal austerity. But the political culture, with its above suggested roots, was not wept way by the prime-minister's confession to 'no-nonsense policy' at the beginning of the 80s. In fact politicians and bureaucrats never dropped their appetite for 'ideological' justification of a certain policy, even when retrenchment was the real motivation. There has always been an element of overacting in the attitudes of politicians and civil servants, a kind of hegemonial play to reach consensus. The price to be paid for his strategy is ideological instability. A readiness to change point of views and to keep in tune with the opinion climate when conditions change.

2. LOCAL DEVELOPMENT AND SHIFTING POLITICAL VALUES

The three big cities in the Netherlands, Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Den Haag, displayed comparable shifts in policy philosophies, but in Amsterdam the shifts have caused the greatest controversies. Therefore I will take my examples mainly from this city.

The shifts in local policy philosophy (since the ar) can be associated with three phases:

1945-1970: Expansion of the inner city as a business center. Only marginal attempts of local government to control the transformation processes going on in the central parts of the city. Continuation of the (pre-war) policy to expand the city by large low-density residential quarters at the outskirts.

1971-1982: New political values directing local policy aims to the conservation of the residential function of the inner city, public housing programs and urban renewal.

1983- : Local policy tries to restore confidence in the economic and cultural functions of the city and reassesses the role of urban residential elites: urban revitalization.

The political discontinuity during the last shift is nicely illustrated by the completely different political reactions to a more or less identical proposal in both periods: the establishment of a hotel in an urban renewal area called Nieuwmarkt. In 1972 plans to transform some premises (mainly used by small industries) into a hotel were denounced by the municipal council as an intolerable attack on the residential integrity of the neighbourhood. The local government decided to buy the buildings which were subsequently renovated and distributed to small households. In 1983 several plans by private companies to establish hotels in the same area were hailed as a strong support in the struggle against urban degradation. Before 1983 young people who illegally occupied old houses – squatters – often succeeded in persuading the local government to buy such houses and to get a cheap lease after renovation. After 1983 this policy was completely abandoned. Squatters were forcefully expelled from their premises without any compensation.

The ideas emerging in 1983 were inspired by American success stories on gentrification and by the new urban spirit emanating from Paris and London (with projects like Centre Beaubourg and Covent Garden) (Hajer 1989). The need for a new policy was emphasized by the rising crime figure, large unemployment, firms and shops considering to leave the city, decay of brand-new public housing projects and a general decrease in the level of urban facilities. Ultimately the only succesfull urban functions and initiatives appeared to be those that were formerly neglected or discouraged by the authorities: hedonistic and elitist concentrations of

shops and services. The new vision propagated in Amsterdam was announced as 'compact city' policy, reversing the migration patterns.

Encouraged by foreign examples, plans were prepared for a large-scale (re)development of the Y-waterfront. The Y is an old inland sea estuary that lost its economic function when harbour activities dwindled. The first aim was to revive this area as a typical urban space, taking advantage of the opportunities that waterfronts offer to the architectural imagination. More recently the plans stressed the reinforcement of the entire inner city of Amsterdam and its international attractiveness. The last revision considers the creation of a million square meters of floor area allocated to residential use (37%), offices (46%), hotels and conference-rooms (8%) and other public functions (9%).

Projects of his kind can only be financed through the participation of private firms. A fact that is presented under the new and magical title of 'public-private-partnership'. The name suggests a common interest: the presence of capital and public planning. But the common interest is not beyond discussion: the public side requires a strong emphasis on the public domain whereas the private financiers gain most by increasing the percentage of office space. The result in Amsterdam has been a debatable share of the public functions (including shops) in the project.

A further problem is that the architectural emphasis on grand style and status as a symbol of economic healthiness does not automatically contribute to the desired quality of city life. All over the country, towns and cities are now succumbing for office palaces put up with glass and marble to prove their high international standards. The influence of these buildings on the experience of urban space is hardly better than the effect of the oversized office buildings emerging in the 60s and unanimously dismissed in the 70s. The idea of urban revitalization threatens to develop into a caricature when provincial towns strive for Manhattan-townscapes. The managerial attitude displayed by local governments that were strongly committed to the goal of urban revitalization was disapproved by the voters in the march 1990 local elections. Since these policies were often associated with labour-dominated governments the downfall of the labour party was most dramatic. In the muncipal council of Amsterdam, where the labour party occupied 21 of the 45 seats, it lost 9 seats.

The negative aspects of urban revitalization have hardly penetrated the public discussions or a new idea comes to enrich local politics: social

revitalization. The concept, introduced by a commission working under the authority of the Rotterdam government (1989), refers to the tenacious group of unemployed that remain untouched by the urban revitalization forces. In Amsterdam 25% of the labour force is unemployed (the national figure is 12%). Ethnic minorities, people who have stayed jobless for a number of years and other social dropouts appear unable to change their situation. The bureaucratic welfare system is disabling them even further. The social revitalization approach suggests new policies to amplify the self-organizing and self-helping power of these groups.

Social workers have known these facts for ten years or more, but politicians remaind deaf for their warnings and complaints. Why then is such an idea suddenly politically succesfull and why this pretentious name? In the local context of Rotterdam mixed feelings of guilt and intellectual passion for the idea of urban élan have inspired the municipal commission on social revitalization. On the national level the concept was welcomed because a fresh coalition between the labour party and the christian democrats created a need for concepts that could bridge the uncomfortable gap between the two parties. And in many cities the term is gratefully adopted because of its mobilizing effect in the domain of political decision making. The label is an exaggeration because it suggests a policy that concerns the entire society whereas the target is only a group of marginalized people. Possible contradictions in this approach are easy to single out: the impossibility to separate the fate of one group from the behaviour of other segments in society and the strategy to stimulate independence by active (local) government interference.

3. Some philosophical questions

These shifting policy aims and values raise a number of questions on which I have only incomplete answers.

1) is it useful to associate these shifting policy goals with ideology?

This terms is useful because the dominant policies are tied up with moral judgments (strong and weak social groups), symbolic acts (status architecture) and exaggerated jargon (social revitalization). The function of these courses of action is to create consensus and they often succeed in bridging the differences between several political parties. The so-called 'end of ideology' did not terminate this condition. It only accelerated the

change of perspectives and the search for new mobilizing ideas ('fashions').

2) Isn't it more appropriate to see the policy swings as necessary corrections of initially sound social processes which are ultimately harmful because they keep self-amplifying?

This argument tacitly refers to the organic idea of 'homeostasis', the process that controls values (temperature, chemical composition) by negative feedback. The argument has been disputed by the economist A.O. Hirschman (1982) in his book on the swing between private and public values in capitalist societies. According to Hirschman such shifts are incomparable to the healthy alternation of work and recreation. The shifting political involvements subject man to a permanent state of one-sidedness. This does not quite refer to the same condition as the policies that I have presented in this paper but I tend to agree with Hirschman that we have to search for political guidelines that are richer than the 'reactive' principles that now prevail.

Another argument against a frequent change in policy values is the loss of political legitimation. When punishment and reward reverse repeatedly, people loose their confidence in government and in values in general. I fear that we have approached this condition very closely in our society.

3) How can we escape the dominance of 'corrective' (negative) motives in (local) policy?

The problem in our society is that we are busier controlling human behaviour than stimulating human resources. Often one attempt to control a course of actions provokes another. Can something good develop from city planning that is guided by the idea to suppress crime? Or will crime be abated by striving for a more joyful environment? (Cohen 1986). Such questions are never asked and this is revealing. Too many projects are justified because they re conceived as a means to the realization of something different. We have to reverse this trend and concentrate on the intrinsic value of each project. Many problems, like the bad quality of post war housing, would be less severe when this point of view had been adopted.

References

COHEN, S. (1985). *Visions of social control.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

DIJKINK, G., VAN DER WUSTEN, H. (1989). *Global competition*

as an argument in local development policy : the case of Randstad. Conference Globality and Locality Warsaw.

HAJER, M. (1989). *City politics.* Gower: Westmead.

HIRSCHMAN, A.O. (1982). *Shifting involvements : Private interest and public action.* Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press.

LIJPHART, A. (1968, 1975). *The politics of accomodation : pluralism and democracy in the Netherlands.* Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press.

TAYLOR, P.J. (1983). *Political geography.* London: Longman.

Antoni Kukliński

LOCAL POLAND - PRIORITIES OF RESEARCH AT THE TURN OF THE XX AND XXI CENTURY

I. LOCAL POLAND AS AN INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH PROGRAMME IN THE EIGHTIES

Comprehensive studies on Local Poland, proposed in 1984, created quite impressive results.

Via the activity of an Interdisciplinary Research Programme on Regional Development – Local Development – Territorial Self-government a small Library of Studies on Local Poland has been created in the years 1985-1990.

Those 30 volumes are, to my mind, a permanent element of the Polish academic landscape and will be seen also in international discussions on Local Studies.

The evaluation of that library can be seen in three perspectives –

1) As a source of critical knowledge on Local Poland as a historical phenomenon of the Third Republic (1944-1989)
2) As a source of materials useful in the preparation of the prognoses on Local Poland as a phenomenon of the Fourth Republic started in the miraculous year 1989
3) As a source of comparative evaluations of Local Poland as an European, and especially Central and East-European phenomenon.

The evaluation of that Library, along the lines, will be presented in a separate study by K. Mularczyk.

In this context, I will outline 10 research topics that should be important in the programme of our studies, in the nineties.

II. LOCAL POLAND - A TENTATIVE LIST OF RESEARCH PRIORITIES

It is now extremely important to promote a set of studies on Local Poland as a phenomenon of the Third and Fourth Republic. I think 10 topics could be outlined in this context –

1. Local Poland – the experience of accelerated uniformization
2. Local Poland – the experience of accelerated differentiation
3. Local Poland and the leading political forces in the years 1944-1989
4. Local Poland in the conditions of the development and disintegration of the welfare state
5. Local Poland and the Polish caricature of Fordism
6. Local Poland and the development of market economy
7. Local Poland and the development of parliamentary democracy
8. The status of the public administration of Local Poland
9. The élites and the image of Local Poland
10. Local Poland in the European perspective

III. LOCAL POLAND - THE EXPERIENCE OF ACCELERATED UNIFORMIZATION

It is necessary to define the forces and means which were applied no liquidate the identity of Local Poland in the framework of the Third Republic.

That aim was never achieved but the experience of the Third Republic was very strongly influenced by centralistic policies that tried to impose a pattern of uniformity on all local communities. The promotion of uniformization was was always present in the nature of Real Socialism in Poland, and not only in Poland. There were, however, some historical periods when the uniformity strive was especially accelerated. I would like to mention three such periods –

1) The years 1944-1945 when the agrarian reform was implemented in Poland. That agrarian reform has eliminated the Polish landlord and the landlord culture as an element shaping the individuality of Local Poland from the XV century to 1945.
2) The years 1949-1951 when the regional and local government in Poland was deeply transformed. The essence of that transformation was the

elimination of the territorial self-government and the creation of a system of councils of the Soviet type.

It was the most important element in the sovietization of Local Poland.

3) The years 1972-1975 when an extremely centralistic pattern of local and regional government was introduced in Poland. It was a caricature of the French Napoleonic model of the territorial organisation of the country. That change also annihilated the beneficial influence of the Polish October on Local Poland.

Naturally, those examples are not presenting the totality of experiences in the field of uniformization of Local Poland.

IV. LOCAL POLAND - THE EXPERIENCE OF ACCELERATED DIFFERENTIATION

In the recent history, the pressure for uniformization was fortunately relaxed from time to time or even interrupted by short periods of renaissance of Local Poland.

In the framework of the Third Republic there were two periods of that renaissance that could symbolically be called the period of Polish October and the period of Polish August.

The Polish October of 1956 opened a short period of the renaissance of Local Poland. The most known example of that renaissance was the experiment of Nowy Sącz. For the identity of Local Poland the decision to abandon the collective model of agriculture was most important.

The Polish August of 1980 and the emergence of Solidarity as a great social and political movement was an inducement for the renaissance of Local Poland in the eighties. Unfortunately, that renaissance was stopped by the introduction of the martial law, in December 1981.

In the framework of the Fourth Republic the most important event, and lot us hope a final breakthrough, in the development of Local Poland will be the first free local elections envisaged for May 1990.

V. LOCAL POLAND AND THE LEADING POLITICAL FORCES IN THE YEARS 1944-1989.

The leading political force of the Third Republic was the Polish United Workers' Party, a semi-communistic monoparty functioning in a soft semi-totalitarian state. A research project has been started to answer the question – how the power of the monoparty was imposed on Local Poland, and what were the mechanisms used to rule over Local Poland in those conditions.

That study will be one of first research projects analysing the historical experience in the field of Local party rule in East-Central Europe. The study will approach the Polish experience from the point of view that the local party rule is a closed historical chapter.

In the experience of the eighties the role of Solidarity as a political and social movement is of great importance. We need again a special study to analyse the role of Solidarity in the transformation of Local Poland and vice versa.

We have to remember, however, that Solidarity was fist of all a movement of the metropolitan cities in Poland. The agricultural branch of Solidarity was relatively weaker.

Last but not least, we should mention in this context the Catholic Church which performed an important political role in the time of the Third Republic. That role was especially pronounced in Local Poland where the Parish provided an alternative in relation to the Party and the State.

Shortly a comprehensive study will be published presenting the results of research on religious and non-religious functions of the Parish. The study will help to answer the question concerning the role of the Catholic Church in the transformation of Local Poland.

VI. LOCAL POLAND IN THE CONDITIONS OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND DISINTEGRATION OF THE WELFARE STATE

Poland of the seventies could be described as an indolent copy or caricature of the Swedish welfare state.

In this framework the experience of Local Poland of the seventies could be seen in a new interesting light.

In the eighties, under the pressure of Solidarity, the processes of disintegration of the Party and the state of real socialism were very strong. However, Solidarity until January 1, 1990 supported de facto the assumption that Poland should try to be an indolent copy of the Swedish welfare state.

The implementation of the Balcerowicz Programme, designed in the spirit of IMF, is in fact the resignation from the dream of a Solidarity welfare state in the nineties.

VII. LOCAL POLAND AND THE CARICATURE OF FORDISM

Fordism as a model of technological, social and economic organisation of the capitalistic societies, promoting mass production and mass consumption was dominating the scene of the Western countries from the thirties to the seventies.

In the early seventies, Edward Gierek tried to develop in Poland a version of Fordism adapted to the conditions of real socialism. That dream of Edward Gierek was implemented with the assistance of large Western credits in order to create a Polish version of Fordism in the historical moment when the original already was the past experience in the Western countries.

The Polish Fordism was designed and implemented in a way leading almost to the total liquidation of Local economy. Thus the Polish version

of Fordism was such more hostile to local economy than the original version of the Western countries. We have to promote studies on the history of Polish Fordism and on the impact of Fordism on Local Poland.

VIII. LOCAL POLAND AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MARKET ECONOMY

The post-Fordist model dominating now in Western Europe has opened new perspectives for the development of local economy. The flexible organisation of production and the microelectronic revolution have created new conditions for the development of small- and medium-scale enterprises well incorporated in the local economy. It is an open question how quickly the post-Fordist model will find its way into Local Poland. In a short run, we have to prepare the evaluation of the impact of the Balcerowicz reform of Local Poland. The blessings of this reform have a very mixed nature.

The reform is generating some positive changes in the field of labour and commodity markets. However the fiscal drive of this reform has a negative impact on agriculture and on medium- and small-scale private enterprises which are so important for the development of local economy.

The expansion of market economy in Local Poland of the nineties is a very complicated and spatially differentiated process. Different regions in Poland will enjoy different scales of success in the development of Local Economy.

IX. LOCAL POLAND AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY

In May 1990, we will have the first free local elections after the World War II. These elections will create one of the new political cornerstones of the Fourth Republic.

It is an open question to what extent the Polish society is really interested in the local issues. The intensity of this interest will be demonstrated by the scale of participation in the electoral process and by

the quality of persons elected to the local councils.

Local Poland is a differentiated phenomenon, therefore the success and failure of the May elections will also be differentiated. Even in a more pessimistic scenario, one aim will be achieved anyway. The free elections will start a difficult process of the development of local democracy in Poland and, after some years of trial and error, the Polish scene will have the normal European features. The pessimistic and optimistic approaches are related only to the time horizon in this field.

X. THE STATUS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION OF LOCAL POLAND

There are two criteria in the evaluation of the status of public administration of Local Poland.

The first criterion is political. The local administration is a direct creation of the political process based on free elections.

The second criterion is professional. The local administration is a competent administration representing a high level of professional performance demonstrated by honest and efficient everyday activity. It remains to be seen how the elections in May will solve the problem of the political status of the local administration.

Then, the following months and years will answer the question how pragmatic are the political leaders of Local Poland in the construction of a professional administrative apparatus. The problem of continuity and change is very important in this field. Will the principle of competence save some really competent civil servants of the ancien régime? or will the new political order of Local Poland start everything from the beginning?

XI. THE ELITES AND IMAGE OF LOCAL POLAND

The image of Local Poland was historically determined by the quality of social élites dominating on the local scene via means and instruments characteristics of the given time. The most important élite in the history of Local Poland were the landlords dominating on the local scene from the

XV century until 1945. Naturally this domination was not uniform and stable. The visibility of the landlord was different in different regions. Such was also the perception of different types of Polish, Jewish and German middle class represented, in different scale, in Local Poland.

That traditional élite of Local Poland was annihilated by the World War II and by the agrarian reform implemented in the middle forties.

The Third Republic created a new élite of Local Poland, dominated by the communistic party for about 40 years, from 1950 to 1990.

In the eighties, the process of disintegration of the old élite was very quick. At the same time, the social movement of Solidarity created conditions for the emergence of a new élite in Local Poland.

The elections of May 1990 will be the final stage of this process – the elimination of he old party élite and the beginning of the emergence of a new political élite in Local Poland.

It remains to be seen if this new political élite will be more or less monolithic, representing grosso modo the Solidarity, or if the new élite will be really pluralistic, representing a mirror of new political parties of the left, the center and the right. Probably we have to wait to the next local and general elections to see the emergence of a new system of political parties at the local and national level.

The political élite is not the only one in Local Poland. The economic élite is also very important. For the time being, the entrepreneur élite of Local Poland is very weak. It is an open question how quickly this situation will be changed to create in Local Poland a strong middle class being the foundation of local demooracy and local economy.

We have also to mention the religious élite created in the framework of the Parish. Unfortunately, from this point of view, the Catholic Church is less efficient then the Protestant Church. The married protestant priest is more successful in the process of the creation of the local élite than the non-married catholic priest. But even in the framework of the Catholic Church the role of the Parish Council in e.g. Western Germany in much stronger than that in Poland. The movement to have real elections to the Parish councils would be important as a new source for the creation of local élite in Poland.

I am not suggesting to diminish the autocratic rule of the parish priest but I would suggest to study the West German experiences and the possibility of their usefulness in the development of Parish councils in Local Poland.

XII. LOCAL POLAND IN THE EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

I think the experience of the Interdisciplinary Research Programme Regional Development – Local Development – Territorial Self-government could be extended and a similar programme for all Central and East European countries could be formulated very soon. That international programme could be sponsored as a new European venture and a contribution to the integration of Europe in the field of local development.

The transformations of Central and Eastern Europe in the nineties will open the problem of local democracy and local economy in the respective countries. I am convinced that the questions asked in this paper are not only Polish but also – to a large extent – Hungarian, Russian, Bulgarian, Ukrainian, Lithuanian questions, to name only a few examples. That new international programme should not refrain from value judgements and options.

Three diagnostic and prognostic scenarios could be envisaged.

1) The social democratic or leftist scenario
2) The liberal or centristic scenario
3) The conservative or rightist scenario.

It would be extremely interesting to have these three interpretations of the experiences of Central and Eastern Europe in the field of Local Development.

The proposed International Research Programme on Local Development, Local Democracy and Local Economy in Central and Eastern Europe should be designed and implemented in the early nineties as a joint venture of Western, Central and East European scholars.

Warszawa, February 25, 1990.

Antoni Kukliński

LOCAL DEVELOPMENT - EXPERIENCES AND PROSPECTS

Twenty years ago, in Belfast, the Regional Planning Conference Ireland 1969 was held. I had had the priviledge to participate in that conference and then to call attention to the Conference volume[1] in a conversation with Professor John Blacking during his visit to Warsaw, in January 1988. The extraordinary spirit of John Blacking and the good will of Prof. H.W. Singer and Prof. René Prendergast have changed this set of events into an invitation for me to present this paper at the Development Studies Association 1989 Annual Conference and to visit the Queen's University of Belfast. Let me express my deep gratitude for this unique opportunity to enrich my personal and academic experience.

This opportunity is shared indirectly by the whole interdisciplinary group involved in the implementation of the Research Programme – Regional Development, Local Development, Territorial Self-government coordinated by the University of Warsaw in the years 1986-1990.

The publications[2] of that Programme are available to all persons and institutions interested in the Polish experiences in the field of local development and local studies. Some evaluation of those experiences has been presented in a recent issue of Geoforum where the Polish contributions are seen in the comparative British perspective[3].

However in this paper, I will try to go beyond the limits of Polish and British experiences and to present a more general paper trying to explain the crisis and renaissance of local development. I would like to consider the crisis and renaissance of local development and local studies in the following framework.

I. The debate on development
II. Local development – the differentia specifica
III. Five foundations of local development
IV. Territorial collectivities, local communities, local systems
V. Local development – The experiences of the fifties and sixties
VI. Local development – The experiences of the seventies and eighties

VII. Local development – Prospects for the future
VIII. The dilemma of socially – versus globally-minded local policies
IX. Globality versus Locality – a new Research Programme of the Club of Rome
X. Local studies. Towards a research agenda
XI. Local studies and the activity of the Development Studies Association

I. THE DEBATE ON DEVELOPMENT

The debate on development has been one of most characteristic features in the landscape of social sciences in the recent 30 years[4].

It would be a challenging task to prepare an inventory of the most important contributions in this field.I am convinced the CEPAL Review will get a very high rank in that inventory. Particular attention should be given to Number 34 of this Review where neoconservative and neostructural approaches to development have been outlined[5]. Although this ideological, political and academic debate is highly relevant to my paper, I would like to concentrate my attention on three dilemmas which, to my mind, should have a prominent place in place in the present stage of the general debate on development.

1. Automacity versus guidance
2. Efficiency versus equality
3. Uniformity versus diversity

Ad 1) Automacity versus guidance

The dilemma of automatic versus guided development is one of the oldest ones of social and economic sciences and policies. The recent renaissance of neoconservative laissez faire approaches creates sometimes the impression that we are again in the middle of the XIX century and that all the experiences in the field of guided economic, social and cultural change are just a great mistake of the history (the welfare state) or a great crime of the history (the totalitarian state).

The experience of the XX century in the field of guided change is an extremely complicated and controversial issue discussed, for example, by J.K. Galbraith[6] as "the issue of automacity against the guided economy" and "the rejection of automatic good performance by the economy".

This issue has recently been formulated by CEPAL Review as "Planning" versus "Letting the future look after itself".

A comprehensive analysis of the dilemma "automacity versus guidance" is outside the scope of this paper. Let me say only, in this context, that local development in both the past and the future was and will be a more or less successful integration of spontaneous and guided change.

Ad 2) Efficiency versus equality

In the ideology of the welfare state it was assumed that – especially in the long run – there was no conflict efficiency versus equality.

Latin American experiences were quoted as an example: drastic inequalities are de facto paralysing serious efforts to increase efficiency in both micro and macro scale.

On the other side of the spectrum the Swedish experience was quoted as an argument that strongly proegalitarian socio-economic policies were not able to diminish the competitive rank of Swedish economy, especially since about a half of that economy had its location outside Sweden.

Nevertheless, to my mind, efficiency versus equality is a real dilemma seen, among others, in the present crisis of the welfare state in Western Europe. This dilemma has, however, a dramatic importance in Eastern Europe where the ideology and phraseology of full employment and social justice are a very serious barrier for real economic and social reforms which would create new conditions to overcome the present crisis and to enter the road of efficient development.

In more general terms, I believe that the idea of economic and social equality is an Utopian dream.

In order to create motivations for efficient human activities we need an optimal amount of inequality. This optimal amount is a relative phenomenon in both time and space and it should be different e.g. in Poland and in Sweden.

Ad 3) Uniformity versus diversity

The idea of guided development was very often associated with the temptation to promote social, economic, cultural, regional, and local uniformity.

Uniformity was a permanent feature of centralistic socio-economic policies. However uniformity is also promoted by the market mechanisms.

The dilemma uniformity versus diversity is extremely important for

local development. It is not an accident that local development needs the climate of diversity. The renaissance of the ideology of diversity is, at the same time, the renaissance of locality as a nucleus of development.

In more general terms, let me outline the following question – how to promote a new model of guided change which will stimulate not a uniform but diversified development?

For the debate on development I would like to offer not only the three dilemmas but also the following four interpretations of development[8] -

(1) development as a fact of the objective reality (the measurement of development)
(2) development of a social, cultural and political movement organised sometimes within and sometimes outside the dominating legal and institutional order
(3) development as a goal, task or instrument in the activity of public authorities at the local, regional, national, and international level
(4) development as an academic doctrine promoted both with classical disciplines and as an interdisciplinary or metadisciplinary field

II. LOCAL DEVELOPMENT - THE DIFFERENTIA SPECIFICA

The concept of development is applied in a multiplicity of situations, contexts and meanings. There are two families of this application.

The first is the functional and sectoral family. In this context we use the terms economic development, social development, industrial development, agricultural development, and so on.

The second is the territorial and locational family. In this context we use the terms global, continental, national, regional, and local development.

The diferentia specifica of local development is related to the following features of this phenomena –

1) it is a place-bound phenomenon associated with a locality or a group of localities existing in a well defined physical space, clearly expressed in cartographic terms;
2) it is a tangible phenomenon which can be tested in direct human experience. In many situations, local development is the most reliable test of the general development of the given country and, at the same time,

the most difficult barrier for any propaganda to create false illusions of development;

3) it is an environment where the relation between the "input" of work, ingenuity and good will and the "output" of visible results is a stimulus for individual and collective activities;
4) it is the best laboratory for the promotion of positive multidimensional change easily perceived by public opinion.

Naturally, the diferentia specifica of local development is a relative phenomenon in both time and space. In different countries, the specific features of local development will not be defined in the same way and compared along the same lines with other types of development.

It is a false illusion that, at any time of our history, local development was a purely laissez-faire phenomenon. Local development was always an art of integration of spontaneous activities and the mechanisms of guided change. Therefore the present crisis of planning, including local planning, should be interpreted in relative terms. We have crises of some types of planning developed in some countries, in particular historical conditions. There is no doubt, however, that new effective types of local planning will emerge in the near future. Planning as an art to reduce the uncertainty is and will be an important instrument in the promotion of local development.

III. FIVE FOUNDATIONS OF LOCAL DEVELOPMENT

Local development is a multidimensional phenomenon where the interaction of different factors and elements creates almost unique compositions characteristics of the given place and time. Therefore we should consider at least the following five foundations of local development –

1) local ecology
2) local culture
3) local society
4) local economy
5) local autonomy and local government

Ad 1) Local ecology

Local communities were always deeply incorporated in the ecological environment. The adaptation to this environment and the transformation of this environment were always important demonstrations of the local genius loci. In the historical experience, the local ecology was a foundation of survival while in the contemporary conditions it is a factor of growing importance for the creation or attraction of most advanced persons, institutions and enterprises.

Local communities have an active attitude in relation to ecological problems not only at the local level. It is well known that the state of local ecology is determined by internal and external factors. Sometimes external factors, representing the regional, national or even continental scale, have a very strong impact on the local ecological scene.

Ad 2) Local culture

The development of local culture is both a final and instrumental goal as a precondition for technological and economic innovations.

Local culture may represent three attitudes in relation to global or national culture.

a) A skansenic attitude when local culture is just a relict of the historical experience.
b) An adaptative attitude when local culture is in the process of constant active adaptation in relation to global cultural change.
c) An innovative attitude when local culture is a pioneer of cultural change which, in the process of diffusion, is adopted by other communities on national and international scale.

Ad 3)Local society

The existence of élite is a permanent feature of any society, known in historical experience.

Naturally the élites change, sometimes the élites are even exterminated by a revolution. But the same revolution is very quickly creating a new élite to replace the old one.

The phenomenon of élite is especially visible in local societies.

To my mind, the local élite is a highly positive phenomenon. But there is always a danger that the local élite may be transformed into the local mafia.

I use the term mafia sensu largo – as a set of pressure groups establishing formal or informal control over the local public performance and sometimes even a continuous stream of interventions influencing the behaviour of many individual persons located in strategic points of local government and local economy.

Ad 4) Local economy

The classical local economy was generated by the genius loci and by the genius of proximity in both physical and social sense. The local entrepreneur was very deeply incorporated in the local social structure, in most cases in the local élite.

The local entrepreneur is facing the dilemma 'globality versus locality', sometimes in very dramatic terms of ruthless competition and destruction by the transnational corporation. A new challenge is created by the informal sector which, by definition, has developed outside the traditional structure of the local establishment. It would be interesting to outline the models of the old and new local entrepreneur. I think that for the new local entrepreneur the local market is not a most important element. The essential element for he new local entrepreneur is the local environment creating inducements for the comfortable quality of life and the inducements in the field of technological and managerial innovations.

The essence of local economy is local entrepreneurship by origin or by choice.

In any case, local entrepreneurship should have a consciousness of local identity – a deep feeling of co-responsibility for the local environment and local community.

Ad 5) Local autonomy and local government

The interpretation of local autonomy is subject to change in both time and space. With some simplification we can say that the old local autonomy was based on isolation and that the new local autonomy is based on information.

Autonomy is a multidimensional phenomenon –

– a political phenomenon as an autonomy of local government

– an economic phenomenon as an autonomy of local entrepreneur

– a culture phenomenon as an autonomy of local culture.

In the system of values, local autonomy is something very precious for

its own sake or local autonomy is an instrumental value in this sense that local autonomy is an institution building up the strength of the political, social and economic system of the given country.

Local autonomy is a vehicle promoting the elasticity of the system, its ability to develop and to innovate, its ability of adaptation to global change and its resistance to disaster and crisis. Last but not least, local autonomy is an efficient engine of continuous production of diversity – of ideas, approaches and solutions.

The local autonomy in Switzerland is not only a source of satisfaction for local and cantonal communities but also one of the important sources of international power of the Swiss Federation.

The Swiss example is indicating how important for local autonomy and local development is a good, honest and efficient local government being the creation of the local self-governing community. Unfortunately, a global review will indicate that there are very few countries which – like Switzerland – have an honest and efficient local government. Poland will try now to create such a local government.

IV. TERRITORIAL COLLECTIVITIES, LOCAL COMMUNITIES, LOCAL SYSTEMS

These three concepts are well defined by B. Jałowiecki in the following context[10].

"Industrial civilizations transform local systems and pose a threat to the existence of their communities. The logic of economic process brings about a spatial concentration of decision-making, management and authority. Industrialization results in a transformation of agriculture and a migration of rural dwellers to industry which is becoming the pole of urbanized development. In the housing estates of those areas a new element of the social structure is being shaped, a new territorial collectivity. As opposed to the local community which is an integrated group of extended families bound with family or neighbourly relationships, the collectivity is made up of atomized nuclear families and lone people. Typical of the collectivity is its fluid composition which makes it impossible to

establish permanent and important social ties. Unlike local communities, territorial collectivities do not have a political or institutional expression, which used to be a traditional commune, because they are organized and run by the local branches of state institutions. Finally, unlike communities, collectivities inhabit an area and not a locality. As opposed to the latter, the area inhabited by a collectivity is an abstract operational space hastily constructed and shaped by anonymous technological-economic forces set in motion by economic organizations and bureaucratized political institutions. The place occupied by a community was constructed by that community during a long process of the mutual adaptation of people and environment. The ways of adapting to a locality and to an area are very different. A locality is something well-known, assimilated, one's own, whereas an area is no one's and alien. This brings us to the definition of the local system: a place inhabited by a self-governing community."

V. LOCAL DEVELOPMENT - THE EXPERIENCES OF THE FIFTIES AND SIXTIES

These two decades were dominated by four leading developmental ideologies namely –

1) the ideology of economic growth as the most important engine of progress
2) the ideology of industrialization as the fundamental process of structural transformation
3) the ideology of urbanization as the fundamental process of societal change and the main engine in the creation of new spatial organization
4) the ideology of large-scale solutions created by the spirit of technocratic efficiency.

To my mind, it is interesting to note that those ideologies – although in somehow different interpretations, motivations and results – existed in both Western and Eastern Europe.

Those ideologies have created a climate promoting international, interregional and interlocal uniformity – climate of positive value

judgement in relation to mass production, mass consumption and large-scale solutions. It is not astonishing that in this climate, the local government, local economy, local society, and local culture were driven more and more towards a Sunset Boulevard location. In some European countries one could even envisage, at that time, that before the end of the century locality would be only a historical concept.

VI. LOCAL DEVELOPMENT - THE EXPERIENCES OF THE SEVENTIES AND EIGHTIES[11]

The events of 1968 have formulated some important question marks in relation to the unqualified success of the golden fifties and sixties.

In the turbulent seventies, we saw the emergence of a deep structural and multidimensional crisis which should not be interpreted only in economic terms.

I think that the sensu largo interpretation of that crisis by J. Graciarena should be quoted in this context[12].

"The concept of crisis as used in the present paper covers a broad spectrum which presupposes the existence of a moment in history when he weight of social contradictions is so overwhelming that it disrupts the functioning of society and alters its structural foundations. The crisis thus tends to become a break in at least two senses. In the first place, something comes to an end, and something else begins. Hence a crisis is a moment of flexion between two differentiable historical periods, of social indecision characterized by a kind of deadlock in which the system is unable to resolve the conflicts stemming from its contradictions. Secondly, a crisis is accompanied by a state of dissociation which involves the loss of the notion of entireness, whether of an institution, a social class, a nation-State or an international order. The social indecision this implies entails a fragmentation of reality springing primarily from the aforesaid dissociative nature of crisis, due above all to the generation and accentuation of more and more conflictual confrontations, which are exacerbated by the loss of identification with the

meaningful unit in question. Overcoming the crisis necessarily implies some degree of recomposition of the whole...

In more concrete terms, the present crisis is characterized by : a) a progressive and irreversible breakdown in the social and political orders of industrial civilization ; b) a greater confusion and ambiguity of objectives and values ; c) a considerable weakening of moral responsibility and of spontaneous consensus, with the consequent increase in dissension, apathy, alienation and conscious social repression ; d) the predominance and spread of decadent, sensualist life styles, of which consumerism is one of the most tangible expressions ; e) widespread questioning of the future possibility of indefinite economic growth ; f) and finally, swindling confidence in the prevailing societal models and the absence of viable alternatives with which to replace them. What is at stake is the survival not of particular social orders but of nothing less than industrial civilization and the Faustian drive which animates it."

This crisis has in turn created strong inducements to promote deep structural transformations in all spheres of human activity (technological, economic, social, cultural, political).

In this climate we have seen the birth or renaissance of four developmental ideologies –

1) the ideology of small-scale solutions supported by high technology and a strong economic and social demand to escape from the shadow of the monopoly of mega- and macrosolutions
2) the ideology of endogenous and self-reliant development[13] formulated in different versions and approaches but always stressing the development from below as the main vehicle of progressive change
3) the ideology of ecodevelopment as an important factor not only of the quality of life but as a necessary condition of the survival of the biological foundations of the European continent
4) the ideology of cultural identity as a valid inducement to develop the characteristic features of smaller communities.

These changes and transformations have created new facts and approaches to the old dilemma 'uniformity versus diversity'. I think that the turbulent seventies and eighties have released forces which promote growing diversities in interpersonal, interlocal, interregional, international,

and intercontinental scales. I am convinced that empirical studies of the European experiences of the years 1950-1970 and of the years 1970-1990 will verify the hypothesis of growing uniformization in the first period and of growing diversity in the second period.

In this political, social and intellectual climate, the renaissance of locality – of local ecology, local culture, local society, local economy, and local government – is an important phenomenon observed in many countries.

The demand for a new model of local development, adapted to the technological, economic and social conditions of post-Fordism was created[14].

In this context, the question of the spatial behaviour of the transnational corporation should be briefly discussed.

The paper of Ash Amin and Kevin Robins[15] is an inducement to formulate the dilemma: placebound versus placeless corporation.

The placebound corporation is presented in the following way as a summary of the analysis of Scott and Storper[16].

"The point is to identify the changing character and balance of mobility and fixity in the restructuring of capitalist accumulation. The new consensus clearly emphasises the growing importance of fixity, the emergence of a new territorial logic, as a distinctive feature of pot-Fordism. Scott and Storper point to the growing significance of place as the foundation for efficient and effective production apparatuses, and to the associated formation of systems of placebound norms integral to the functioning of any locale as a centre of economic and social life. The overriding emphasis is on the emerging salience of the particular, of place, locality, region. Indeed, the historical progression from Fordism to post-Fordism is oriented around the supposed transformation from mobility (the footloose corporation) to fixity (allegiance to place)."

The placeless corporation is presented via quotation of Castells and Henderson[17].

"The development of the international economy, the dramatic growth of new information and communications technologies, the formation of powerful transnational organisations linked in the process that provides the structural meaning for each territory in terms of the function that territory performs in the

broader framework of independent operations. We certainly still have spatial forms, since societies and economies develop on a given territory and unevenly across the globe. Yet the logic and dynamics of territorial development are increasingly placeless from the point of view of the dominant organisations and social interests."

I think that the corporations are both placeless and placebound.

They are placeless via the logic of technology and economy which has drastically reduced the friction of space and distance.

From this point of view the corporation has an increasingly nomadic existence, having wide choices among seemingly innumerable number of places. We have to introduce, however, an important qualification. The corporation is looking not for any place but for a place with strictly defined qualities of economic, social, political, and natural environment.

If these qualities are very important for the corporation then this corporation is bound maybe not to one place but to a limited number of places of a certain type. So, in practical terms, the choice of the corporation is in the framework of a spectrum from placeless to placebound. The spatial behaviour of the corporation is not a one-way process in the sense that the decision of the corporation must get a positive response of the local and regional community. I think many local and regional communities in Europe are highly selective in the acceptance of external inducements of development generated by large corporations and other enterprises and institutions.

VII. LOCAL DEVELOPMENT - PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

The reality and magic of the year 2000 are creating the climate of fin du siècle. In the nineties, we will have a new golden period of futurology which lost its intellectual and pragmatic power in the seventies.

This new futurology of the nineties will face among others the challenging task of a comparative evaluation of the XX and XXI century. This relection is related to the following questions.

1) To what extent the XX century was the continuation of the XIX century.

2) To what extent the XX century has created the real turning points in the history of humanity. How these turning points should be defined.
3) To what extent the XXI century will be the continuation of the XX century.
4) How to anticipate and define the most important turning points of the XXI century.

In this broad framework, some important questions concerning local development could be formulated and answered.

1. Is the recent renaissance of local development a permanent phenomenon which will firmly enter the experience of the XXI century.
2. How to define the changing demand for local solutions generated in the spheres of technology, economy, society, and culture.

I am convinced that both questions can be answered in a positive way, at least in the framework of the present futurological capacity. The new power of local development is derived inter alia from the local-global nexus creating direct links between locality an globality: The challenging paper of Ch.F Alger[18] is an excellent starting point for the analysis of the local-global nexus.

VIII. THE DILEMMA OF SOCIALITY VERSUS GLOBALLY-MINDED LOCAL POLICIES

Local development was in the past and will be in the future an efficient integration of spontaneous and guided change. This means that the sphere of local policies remains an important field in the activity of local government and other institutions which express the values and aims of the local community.

There are many options, choices and dilemmas in local policies. However the dilemma of socially- versus globally-minded local policies is the most important one.

The globally-minded local policies derive their inspiration from different de facto neodarwinistic approaches stressing the necessity to support strong persons, institutions and enterprises which build up the rank of the given locality within the global economy and society.

The socially-minded local policies continue the classical traditions of

the welfare state and defend the weaker members of the local community, following the approaches of ideologies inspired by social justice.

In pragmatic terms of hinc and nunc of a given local community the options and choices are much less clear and specific combinations of socially- and globally-minded approaches are implemented in local policies, with different amount of dedication and success.

Nevertheless, the dilemma socially-versus globally-minded local policies is a real dilemma in a growing number of countries.

IX. GLOBALITY VERSUS LOCALITY - A NEW RESEARCH PROGRAMME OF THE CLUB OF ROME

In May 1988, the University of Warsaw and the Polish Association for the Club of Rome organised, in Nieborów, an International Conference on Globality versus Locality – which has created a new approach to global studies[19].

The splendid success of those studies is explained by the ability to demonstrate that a growing scope of global challenges must be seen as an universal phenomenon in the perspective of the space-ship Earth.

However these global phenomena are heterogeneous and not homogeneous – our globe is a deeply differentiated object. This differentiation is – inter alia – reflected in different pattern of behaviour demonstrated in the local scale.

So the results of the global studies of the Club of Rome should be tested in the framework of a consistent and well defined network of 50 well chosen localities which would perform the role of a laboratory space for the studies of the Club of Rome.

We need some serious methodological and empirical reflection in order to answer the question how to select properly the 50 laboratory localities and how to build up the local laboratory space in the framework of the scientific ideology of the Club of Rome.

At this moment the following tentative typology of those localities can be presented:

1) Innovative localities

All industrial revolutions, all great innovations were created in specific places, localities and regions. Innovative localities are pioneers of global change which, in this case, is first local, then global. We should prepare the changing maps of innovative localities and explain the mechanism of their birth, growth and decay.

2) Adaptive localities

Adaptive localities are the most important environments in the process of the diffusion of innovation. In those localities, the individual achievements of the pioneering sectors an pioneering localities are transformed into widely spread structural changes which create new local and later, global realities. It remains an open question to what extent the processes of adaptation should be recognized as spontaneous phenomena, and to what extent these processes should be guided by different socio-economic policies including local policies. Naturally, in real terms, we have to take into account that the difference between innovative and adaptive localities are not always quite clear – in many cases we have a situation of innovative adaptation. The locality which is, in a given country, a pioneer in the processes of adaptation to global change – is also a relatively innovative locality.

3) Lagging localities

Lagging localities are not able to participate in the processes of global change. The economic, social and political barriers to develop an adaptive capacity in those localities are so strong that not only in short run but also in long run the mechanisms of the structural change are partially or totally paralysed.

This new Research and Publication Programme will develop not only the library of the Club of Rome but it will also contribute to the comprehensive analysis of the local-global nexus. The Programme will indirectly supply valuable materials useful in the discussion of the dilemma of socially- versus globally-minded local policies.

In December 1989, the University of Warsaw and the Polish Association for the Club of Rome are organising a Polish-Soviet Seminar to start the process of the selection and description of innovative, adaptive and lagging localities.

I would like to extend a most cordial invitation to the interested

members of the Development Studies Association to join this Research and Publication Programme. The first volume of a new Publication Series on Globality versus Locality will be published in 1990.

X. LOCAL STUDIES - TOWARDS A RESEARCH AGENDA

The renaissance of the local problem has in the last twenty years created a new interdisciplinary field – the field of Local Studies – with the leading contributions of economics, anthropology, sociology, geography, and politology.

The rapid development of this new interdisciplinary field is specially visible in Europe, in such countries like Great Britain, France, Italy, Switzerland, Sweden, Netherlands, Poland, and Spain.

There is no doubt, however, that the qualitative and quantitative expansion of local studies is a world-wide phenomenon, particularly important in developing countries.

This paper is to be seen only as a very modest beginning of the state of art review of the field of local development and local studies. This review should be concluded by a tentative list of questions that would stimulate the development of fundamental and applied local studies as a semi-universal phenomenon being promoted in a growing number of countries representing all civilizations, continents and socio-economic systems. Let me outline the first version of this tentative list of questions in the following way.

1. How to define the diferentia specifica of local development in the broad context of the general debate on the substance, mechanisms an goals of development?
2. Is the recent renaissance of local development and the creation of a new interdisciplinary field of local studies[20] a permanent phenomenon which will firmly enter the experience of the XXI century?
3. How to define the changing demand for local solutions generated in the spheres of technology, economy, society, and culture?
4. How to define the changing demand for local solutions in different regions, countries and continents? How to explain the dynamics of this demand in both time and space?

5. How to analyse and explain the local-global nexus in both methodological and pragmatic perspective?
6. How to promote international comparative research programmes on local ecology, local culture, local society, local economy, and local government?
7. How to analyse the problem of universality versus uniqueness in the field of local development and local studies?
8. How to improve the mechanisms of the transfer of experiences in the field of local development across the borders of localities, regions, nations, and continents?
9. How to develop modern information systems in the field of local development to stimulate the expansion of comparative studies and the transfer of pragmatic experiences?
10. How to develop the new interdisciplinary field of local studies as a world-wide phenomenon?

Naturally this list of questions should not be taken too seriously. It is only an attempt to create a starting point for the international and interdisciplinary discussion on local development and local studies.

Warszawa, 1st September 1989

---

[1] M. Viney (ed.), *An Appraisal of Regional Planning in Ireland.* Seven Seminars. Dublin 1969.

[2] P. Dutkiewicz, G. Gorzelak (eds.), *Local Studies in Poland.* Warsaw 1987.

[3] S.S. Duncan, Creating Geographies: *Society and Space in Britain and in Poland.* Geoforum 2/1989.

[4] Compare: J. Blacking, *Development Studies and the Reinvention of Tradition.* World Development 4/1987. M. Wolfe, Elusive Development. UNRISD, CEPAL 1981.

[5] S. Bitar, *Neo-conservatism versus Neo-structuralism in Latin America.* CEPAL Review vol. 34, Santiago de Chile 1988.

[6] J. K. Galbraith, *Economics and the Art Controversy.* Rutgers University Press 1955, p. 44 and 48.

[7] CEPAL Review vol. 31, p. 19.

[8] compare: A. Kukliński, *Four Interpretations of Regional Development* (in) Local Studies in Poland, op. cit.

[9] In this part of my paper I have repeated some formulations presented in my contribution to the Conference on Local Dynamics and Environment. Lausanne, October 1988.

[10] B. Jałowiecki, *Local Systems and Social Development* (in) Geoforum, op. cit.

[11] In this part of my paper I have again used my Lausanne contribution.

[12] I. Graciarena, *Between the Reality and Utopia. The Dialectics of Social Sciences in Latin America.* CEPAL Review 1978.

[13] compare the following opinion of M. Bassand:

"... self-reliant regional development refers to the process used by the inhabitants of a region to direct their region's adaptation to the world and the future in an autonomous way, i.e. according to goals which are coherent with the local cultural background. Simultaneously, development models which neither meet local problems nor reflect local aspirations are rejected. The concept of endogeneity should not be considered as it is applied in the natural sciences. The dynamics of any human group is not exclusively self-reliant; likewise, external factors never operate alone. A strategy of self-reliant regional development does not isolate or enclose a region, rather it utilises resources and specific characteristics to shape local development." (in) Self-reliant Development in Europe. Theory, Problems, Actions. Edited by Michel Bassand, Ernst A. Brugger, John M. Bryden, John Friedmann, Barbara Stuckey. Gower Publishing Company Ltd., Aldershot, Hampshire, U.K., pp. 234, 1986.

[14] A.J.M. Roobeek, *The Crisis of Fordism and the Rise of New Technological Paradigm.* Futures, April 1987.

[15] A. Amin, K. Robins, *Industrial Districts and Regional Development – Limits and Possibilities.* University of Newcastle upon Tyne, February 1989.

[16] op. and loc. cit., p. 39.

[17] op. and loc. cit., p. 40.

[18] Ch. F Alger, *Perceiving, Analysing and Coping with the Local- Global Nexus.* ISSJ, vol. 117/1988.

[19] compare especially the paper of J.G. Lambooy, *Local and Global Economy – A New Dilemma?* Amsterdam – Nieborów 1988.

[20] compare: A. Kukliński, *Regional and Local Studies in Poland – Towards a Research Agenda.* Geoforum op. cit.

Grzegorz Gorzelak
Institute of Space Economy
University of Warsaw

GENERAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM IN POLAND

INTRODUCTION

The current reform of the local government in Poland is, in fact, a true political, social and economic revolution. Its main objectives are to restore the territorial self-government, which was abolished in 1950 by introducing the principle of "united state power" into the system of local government in Poland.

The "united state power" principle meant that the state authority extends from the central level to the level of the local government. The local authorities were said to follow the principles of the state policy and, at the same time, to be responsible for pursuing the local interests and goals. It is obvious that in a centralized, mono-party political and economic system in any situation in which these two sets of goals appeared to oppose each other, the state interests prevailed over the needs and wishes of the local communities.

The present reform changes this pattern of direct subordination of he local units to the higher authorities. A sphere of true self-governmental responsibilities and powers is to be clearly drawn, and within this sphere the local authorities are to be controlled only from the point of view of the legality of their actions. The "purpose-control" is to be restricted only to these tasks which had been mandated by the state to the local units. That is why we in Poland speak about the "self-government" instead of simple "local government", in order to distinguish between the previous system in which local government was much more "governmental" than "self-governmental".

It was said that the introduction of the self-government system is a

revolutionary change. The rest of this paper is aimed to prove his statement by referring to the changes in particular spheres of the social, political and economic life this reform brings.

1. SOCIAL ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOURS, SYSTEMS OF VALUES

The Polish society, as well as other East and Central European ones, for the life time of last two generations has been educated in what could be called "a welfare state without too much welfare". The system of "real socialism" has taught people to wait for decisions that would be taken in their name, to wait for resources covering the basic needs that would be provided from the state, to use direct and indirect pressure to improve the present conditions. Only few people saw the connection between own effort and initiative and the reward. The "requesting" or "bargaining" attitude has been the common social attitude expressed in almost every sphere of socio-economic life: in disputes between ministers for their ministries' budgets; in the play between the state enterprise and government for investment funds; in the play between the employees and employers for wages and sallaries; in requests from children to parents for pocket money; and – what brings us to our topic, in bargaining of local government with regional and central authorities for more money to be spent on the local level.

This type of attitudes can be met in any political or economic system. There is no problem, however, when it merely exists. The problem begins when these attitudes dominate and shape the way the decisions are made and funds allocated. The problem becomes even more serious when a system based on these attitudes is to e replaced by a system in which selfresponsibility and selfreliance are to play the basic role.

It is projected that in the present unstable and spatially differentiated economic conditions the basic needs of the local units will be taken care by the state in the form of the state grants. But these grants will cover only the expenses matching the "social minimum" of the local units. Any needs exceeding this minimal level will have to be paid for by the own revenues of the local authorities. How to find these revenues? In the old system approaching the upper level was the most common way of finding

extra founds (having access to higher level made the chances greater). In the new system these money has to be raised by own initiative and activity, as it happens in the Western systems of local government.

The state ownership of the national wealth deprived the people of the feeling that what is "national" is also theirs. "National" meant "nobody's". That is why the staircase in a cooperative (the cooperatives were, in fact, a state structures) building may be devastated and dirty – but the homes are tidy and well arranged. The public telephones could be damaged, even when the private telephones are in acute shortage and the public booth is the only mean of calling for emergency. The lawn or the children's (our children) playground may be a mass, but it is not us who should make some order for our own sake, but the administration of the housing estate. These examples could be multiplied, all referring to the lack of responsibility for anything but private property. Can this attitude be easily changed and can a feeling of responsibility for local (that will be ours!) be created?

It would be even more difficult to achieve because the reintroduction of the local self-government means also another change – change in the way the society is organized. In the previous reality the organization around the place of work was the basic way of creating "a community" (Regulski, 1989). The enterprises were responsible not only for providing production, but also for providing basic social services: housing, kindergartens, vocational training, leisure, etc. The structure of the communist party was also based on enterprises and firms, only the higher-level authorities were organized on the territorial basis (the same structure was also adopted by the "Solidarity", what proves that it as not only a trade union, as usually had been claimed). All that produced a much stronger identification with the place of work than with the place of living. One again, the introduction of the local self-government calls for a deep change in the social attitude and for reorientation of the ways the structure of the outside world is perceived.

These are only few examples of the changes in social consciousness the local government reform will bring. The success of the reform depends to a great extent on emergence of these changes.

2. THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

The national political stage is still not furnished completely. The breakdown of the PUWP created an empty place on the left, what, not surprisingly, does not cause too many worries in the nation. However, the right side of this stage does not have its actors, too. Some existing right-oriented parties do not have their place in the Polish Parliament (the Seym and Senate) and their social base is not too wide. The only strong political power in Poland is Solidarity, but officially it is not a political party but a trade union, or, at the most what is admitted, a "social movement". Solidarity itself is strongly heterogeneous, for within this movement almost all political standpoints could be found – from leftist orientation waving banners of "social justice" to liberal economic attitudes, such as now implemented in the Polish economic reform.

The same applies to the set of local political stages. With not too great error one can say that only two political forces have chances to gain strong support in the local elections: the "citizens' committees" which support Solidarity and the agrarian party (or parties, which, however, will create common platform for the local elections). The programmes of the citizens' committees are not clear enough, for they reflect the differentiated orientations present within the Solidarity itself. The agrarian parties will naturally defend the interest of the farmers, what does not constitute the sufficient platform for the local affairs.

What could be foreseen in the local elections that are to be held on May 27 is the following picture:

- in rural communes and small towns (i.e. in localities under 40.000 inhabitants, where a majority vote principle is to be applied) the power will be shared by the citizens' committees and the agrarian parties, but the former will gain majority. Some locally popular people (also some former communist party members) will enter the councils on the basis of personal relationships with the electorate.
- in greater localities (where the proportional vote principle will be in use) the citizens' committees are likely to gain vast majority of the votes, thus forming a uniform composition of local authorities.

That was projected some weeks ago. The premises for this forecasts were based on the unification of the nation – and local communities as well – around the negation of the former system and around the which will to replace the old (i.e. involved in the communist-dominated local

government) people by the activists of the former opposition. Negation therefore seems to create, at least at present, the common political platform. Recents polls, however, indicate that the local support for the Solidarity based "citizens committees" does not appear to be so uniformily distributed around the country. The committees have nominated 32 per cent of all 164.000 candidates (running for 52.000 seats in local councils), but in some wards there is no one Solidarity supported candidate. The recently united peasant party (PSL) seems to have high chances to challenge Solidarity in rural areas, especially in those where the agricultural policy of the central government meets with strong opposition. 44 percent of the candidates have not afiliated themselves to any political party, so their ideological picture is still unclear.

What is going to happen in a more distant future is much less clear. The negation principle will be replaced by the necessity of solving the local problems in a situation if conflicting local interests. The ideological options will come to the fore as the basis of values systems and attitudes to the local needs and priorities. The division of the uniformly elected councils into groups of different political platforms is very probable, if not sure. What the constituting factors of these groups would be is not obvious at the moment. Moreover, it would be impossible to say if the political division are going to be the same in every local council, or if any systematic factor (such as regional traditions or socio-economic features of the local units) would be responsible for these divisions, or, finally, if the political structures of particular local governments will be created according only to local conditions.

The coming elections will be not only the struggle for power between the political structures, but also the struggle for power which will have a clear personal character. Rejection of the old system means also rejection of the old people. But these people, who had been involved in local affairs for several years, have the experience. Some of them have the experience of no use in new conditions. But a great deal of professional knowledge is purely technical and could be useful even under new conditions. The stigma of involvement with the "old regime" can be, however, a sufficient reason to getting rid of these people. Thus a lot of skills could be lost and the new people, replacing the former professionals, will need to take their time to learn how to fulfill their tasks. Some disorder and errors thus can appear and the anxiety of the local communities to improve the local conditions immediately would not be satisfied.

The political phenomena in the local units will have also another dimension. In the old system there always existed some external authority which solved all conflicts. The solutions did not necessarily have to be accepted – but they were provided and had to be obeyed. Now the conflicts will have to e solved by the local communities themselves on the grounds of democratic institutions and procedures. Will the losers – and in any conflict there must be some losers – accept the verdict of the body elected in a democratic way? Will the local communities "invent" own procedures of conflict resolving or will they follow the experience already existing elsewhere? If not, the new system could become partly unmanagable and the scope of the local autonomy would have to be limited by calling upon the decisions of the external judges.

The existence of an external, "omnipotent" authority lead to another phenomenon. In the general social consciousness there was just one center of power. This could be either the state administration or the party unit, in fact the social picture of the "authority" did not – and did not have to – distinguish between the administration and the party, for, to a great extent, those two lines of power were united and uniform.

In a democratic system, however, a whole complex of "authorities" emerges. The property rights, for example, constitute one rule of establishing "authority". Although the local council and local administration have the power over their territory, the housing settlement run – and owned – by the housing cooperative would be, to a great extent, autonomous and the local authorities would be only able to supervise the legality of the decisions taken by the independent cooperative elected bodies and the cooperative administration. The traditional channel of influencing the cooperative administration through the direct or indirect influence of the communist party (the president of his administration usually belonged to the party or could be dismissed by the decision of appropriate party committee) simply vanishes. The same applies to the schools, hospitals – to any unit or institution not directly subordinated to the local authorities. The local councilors and local administrators would have to learn how to operate in this new political situation. Also the ordinary people would have to take into account that the local authorities are not to be blamed for everything that does not go well at the moment, for these authorities would not be as omnipotent and powerful, as before.

3. LOCAL ECONOMY

The Polish economic development in the post-war period, which with no doubt cannot be fully denied (what sometimes unjustly happens) was based on large-scale investment and traditional branches of industry (Gorzelak, Szul, 1989). The state ownership of the means of production and of the infrastructure still dominates. The social services are deeply underdeveloped and the non-productive capital is heavily worn out. Natural environment is in a very bad shape and in many parts of the country pollution jeopardizes the physical well-being of the inhabitants.

The economic situation is very unstable. Poland goes through a deep restructuring process the final outcome of which is not clear. Moreover, the structural changes will have strong spatial concentration – some parts of the country, such as heavy industry dominated Upper Silesia, for example, will be exposed to the dramatic change of entire economic base. The traditional sources of the local revenues, based on the taxes from the state industry, could shrink in some localities almost to nil and, at the same time, new problems could emerge, such as unemployment and social pathologies.

In some local units the economic base is really very limited. These are the peripherial, mostly agricultural, remote localities, lacking urban centres, with no industry, having few infrastructural facilities, etc. The tax-base would be small, the economic activity limited and the chances for endogenous development not too great. In some cases the local budget, if based on the own revenues, would not be able to pay for the basic social services as education, health care, roads, communal housing, etc.

The only rational solution is the introduction of the broad system of state grants already mentioned. But that is strongly opposed by the extreme advocates of the "local autonomy" and "local independence". How to solve this problem and persuade the opponents of the grant system that it does not necessarily hampers the local autonomy, and still provides wide margin for local initiative and own actions promoting local development? On the other hand, how to create a system of state grants employing the objective criteria in a situation in which the local budgets have been based on arbitrary decisions and their levels do not follow any clear patterns? The additional difficulty is the necessity of reforming the entire financial system of the state, of which the local finances are only a part. Before

having that done, the local governments will have to survive somehow, but their financial situation will be far from stable and clear.

Speaking about the economic conditions of the local units after the reform we should also mention the limited experience of the local officials in running the local economy under the new national economic system. The local people are not very much different from the rest of the nation. Only some businessmen have any experience in operating on a free market and running a firm that has to make profit. The civil servants of both state and local institutions have been accustomed to making decisions the financial effect of which was indirect and the responsibility of which was dissolved. For example a local physical planner was free to draw almost anything on a map without taking into account the economic profitability of the plans he made. In a new system any planning decision would imply a direct economic effect for the local budget, either positive or negative. The local officials will cease to be just the clerks and bureaucrats – they will have to become also the businessmen and economists, for the balance of the local budget will be – to a great extent – a worry of the local authority.

The scope in which the local authorities will have to make their economic decisions will be broad. The local authorities will be provided with the communal property which will embrace all municipal infrastructure, land, communal housing, means of public transport, etc. The local authorities will be allowed to create own financial institutions and to operate on the financial market. They will be also entitled to undertake their own economic, profit-oriented activity. Some of the localities are well endowed with natural and economic resources. However, some are much less well-off and the new possibilities cannot be utilized there, for here is no potential for introducing much change in their economic situation. The outcome is clear: the growing differentiation of the level of development, the living conditions, the prospects for the future. Will the society of strong egalitarian attitude accept these differences? Or will the growing discrepancies lead to social unrests, outmigrations and resentments of the new system of local government?

4. REGIONAL PATTERNS

Poland is a regionally differentiated country. Two factors are mainly responsible for this differentiation: historical trajectories of particular regions and the results of he socialist industrialization of the post-war period. These two factors produce a clear regional pattern of material endowment and social characteristics of regions. The origins of the historical factor could be traced as far into past as to XVII century, although the impact of the XIX and XX centuries should be regarded as crucial. The boundaries of the partitions (since 1795 until 1918 Poland has not existed on the map of Europe and was divided between Russia, Prussia and Austria) still can be easily seen in such spheres as demographic structure, agrarian structure, development of infrastructure, etc. The mide-war boundaries produced regional differences persisting till to-day, too.

The socialist industrialization introduced new factors to the traditional divisions of the country. New industrial centers – mainly based on extracting raw materials – emerged and traditionally backward regions profitted from the new state investment. However, these processes did not brake the historical patterns of regional differences in Poland, and – in some cases, as for example in Upper Silesia – even reinforced them.

Not going too far into details we may generally say that Poland could be divided into four great parts (see Swianiewicz, 1990, for the regional differentiation of self-governmental attitudes and traditions):

- Central and Eastern, under historical Russian influence, with relatively low level of development, older population, little industry, poor and inefficient farming, poorly developed urban system, small self-governmental experience; this could be seen even before the elections, for in some eastern regions the selection of candidates for the future councils encounters social indifference and lack of interest in the local elections.
- East-Southern, of Austrian domination in XIX century, (Polish Galicia) with higher level of development, well developed settlement system, dispersed industry, overpopulated farming, higher educational level and well established self-governmental traditions; traditionally the turn-out for the elections was the greatest, as well as the support for Solidarity candidates in 1989 elections for the Diet and the Senate.
- Mid-Western (so called Greater Poland), since XVII century the

"heart" of the country, with best agriculture, diversified industry, best developed settlement system, richest infrastructure, longest organizational experience and self-governmental traditions.

- Northern and Western regained from Germany after World War Two, with new population that came mostly from behind the present Eastern frontier, with relatively well developed infrastructure and urban system, modest industrialization level, but without too great selfgovernmental skills and traditions.

That general divisions of the Polish socio-economic space do not take into account the specific features of particular places and localities. The big cities, obviously, constitute a special type of socio-economic features' complex. But even these big cities are strongly influenced by the general regional specifities, so we may say that Kraków is truly a "Galician" city, Wrocław represents the features of the "regained" territories, Poznań is the core of Great Poland and Warsaw has many features of the formerly Russian part of the country.

The static description provided above should be supplemented with the dynamic perspective of development potential and chances in the new economic system that Poland has recently entered into. The present deep recession and reconstruction of economic mechanisms will have a very differentiated impact on development trajectories of particular regions and localities. Once again adopting a very general framework we can forsee that the Greater Poland shows the best economic and social potential for coping with new economic situation, while the Eastern and central parts of the country would be confronted with the most heavy tasks of establishing foundations for new type of development. Restructuring processes would probably create greatest problems for old industrial regions (such as Upper Silesia, for example), for regions of traditional agriculture (mostly for Galicia, but for some central regions, too), for depopulation regions (North-East and South-West). Some of the big cities, which are the industrial centers, will also have heavy problems with adjusting their economic structures to new conditions and requirements of the market, internationally open, economy.

The local government after the reform will operate in this differentiated socio-economic environment, constructed by two main factors:

- the social traditions of self-government and organizational skills and capabilities,

– objective economic situation and adaptation to new economic mechanisms and processes stemming from economic reconstruction and introduction of market system.

Thus the future situation of the local authorities would be the cross-product of these two factors: the "subjective" – social and the "objective" – economic. The Greater Poland would be definitely in the best situation: the economic difficulties would be the smallest and the social abilities of the local governments to cope with them the greatest. In the rest of the country the picture would be much less clear. Thus the successes and failures of the local governments will not be uniformly distributed over the Polish territory and Poland would become a country much more regionally and locally differentiated than she used to be during the last decades.

5. POLAND: UNIQUE OR TYPICAL?

In several places of this paper Poland was coupled with other countries of Eastern and Central Europe. An important question arises: is Poland specific or is she a typical country undergoing the deep democratization process? Are the processes observed in this country also present in other places, or our problems are specifically ours and our successes and errors will also be only specifically ours?

This question could even embrace some other cases. Poland is a laboratory of change (Kukliński, 1989), the change of the human mind and of human attitudes. Perhaps the observation of this country could be also useful for other nations, even for those, who consider their situation as stable and not changing. But some change in some place is always present – the world, the country, and the locality are the dynamic systems. Perhaps some Polish lessons have more universal meaning.

These questions are rhetoric – the answers seem obvious. But one further step should be done: the creation of a comparative academic programme seems very worthy. The programme could embrace mainly the Central and East European countries, but with active participation of partners from other countries as well. The usefulness of the results of the investigation of the socio-economic change on the local level would be even much broader than purely academic. The programme could provide many very practical suggestions, at least it could indicate what should not be done. Learning on errors is a common method – but the most efficient method is to learn on somebody else's errors.

6. SOME CONCLUSIONS

This paper should not be seen as a register of dangers which could be triggered by introduction of the new local self-government in Poland, dangers which would kill the reform itself. The reform is a necessary and long awaited step of democratization in this country. It became possible under the new national government an will support the general changes now going on in Poland. But the general acceptance of the reform does not mean that these dangers should be forgotten or neglected. They are real and should be brought into light if they are to be overcome.

Although the paper was structured according to three spheres of the local problems: social, political and economic, it can be easily seen that in every of these spheres one topic was crucial. This is the social consciousness. The reforms in Poland – and not only in Poland – encounter one common barrier: the state of people's minds, shaped by the former system. The success of the reforms, not only that of the local government, but also the economic reform, the political reform, and of everything that should be changed, relies on the ability of the society to adapt to new conditions. The declarations seem to prove that this ability exists. But declarations have not been tested against the real life in new conditions. This test is still in front of us.

In any case, the emergence of democraticly elected local councils will become a general school of democracy for the whole Polish society. Lack of external authority which solves any problems and conflicts, which makes decisions in the name of the local community will leave the people with their own problems, and these problem will have to be solved by these people themselves. Also only they will bear any responsibility for the decisions they would take. Will the people succeed in these entirely new conditions, not having much experience in self-governing their own issues? This is a fundamental question concerned with the reform of the local government in Poland.

References

Gorzelak G., R. Szul (1989): *Spatial Order and Polish Disorder : Problems in the Polish Space Economy*, Geoforum vol. 20 no. 2

Kukliński A. (1989): *Poland – the challenging laboratory of space economy*, University of Warsaw (mimeo)

Regulski J. (1989): *Polish Local Government in Transition*, Environment and Planning vol. 7

Swianiewicz P. (1990): *Local Government in Poland. Transition from Real Socialism Model to Local Democracy*, paper presented at the International Seminar on "Reforms Strategies for Local Government in a Time of Transition. Eastern and Western Experiences", Radziejowice, Poland, April, 20-23.

Grzegorz Gorzelak
Krzysztof Mularczyk
University of Warsaw

NEW LOCAL GOVERNMENT LEGISLATION IN POLAND*)

1. THE BEGINNING OF THE REFORM PROCESS

The waves of strikes in May and August, 1988 lead to negotiations between the Communist authorities and Solidarity in the winter of 1989. During these negotiations at "The Round Table" one of the Solidarity's propositions was a radical shake-up of Poland's system of government. Prof. Jerzy Regulski, Solidarity's local government spokesman and now the Minister responsible for reforming local authorities, argued that they should have their own budgets and taxes; be able to hire and fire staff; be totally separate from the state's administration and be freely elected.

The reform of the local government system was a necessary step in the whole process of democratization in Poland. Introduction of local democracy meant a natural supplement to the new rules and principles brought up on the national political stage by the new, non-communist government headed by Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki.

The draft bills of the were considered by the Senate in January, 1990 and the fundamental legislation cleared Parliament on 16th March, 1990. Other Parliamentary Acts on local government reform were also voted in time for the elections which took place on May 27 this year.

*) This is a part of the report "Local Government Reform in Poland" prepared for the Foundation in Support of Local Democracy and the International Union of Local Authorities.

2. LOCAL GOVERNMENT LEGISLATION IN POLAND

The legislative package includes:

1. An Act defining the structure and organization of local government in Poland.
2. An Act setting out the electoral system to be used in the local elections
3. An Act amending the Constitution of the Polish Republic.
4. An Act defining the roles and functions of local authority staff.
5. A set of paving regulations for the transition from the old system of National Councils to the system as described in the new legislation (see 1).
6. An Act which defines the powers and responsibilities of territorial units of government administration.
7. An Act on division of competence between the state administration and local authorities.

3. THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT 1990

This Act makes the Commune the only directly elected unit of local government. It gives communes the right to own municipal property and the right to manage their own staff and resources. However, the boundaries of the communes will be set centrally by the Council of Ministers although Councils will have the discretionary power of decentralizing powers to neighbourhood forums or Councils. Any such decentralized unit will not be a legal entity on its own and will be responsible directly to the originating local authority.

The commune councils will be able to take decisions on all matters affecting their locality as long as those decisions are within the law. Only the courts will have the right to ultimately determine whether a commune has breached any law.

3.1. Functions

The commune councils are to be responsible for the following public services:

1. Roads, bridges, traffic control
2. Planning and land development
3. Water, electricity and gas supply
4. Road cleaning, rubbish collection, waste disposal and sewerage
5. Local public transport
6. Social services
7. Municipal house building and housing management
8. Education and the Arts
9. Management of public parks, markets, cementaries and public buildings
10. Health services
11. Enforcement of local law and order and provision of fire services

Future legislation is to determine which of these functions are to be made obligatory. Central government may delegate some of its powers and functions via specific legislation or mutual agreement being reached with the commune(s) but must finance any such activities in full. The commune is to be allowed to organize its services through agencies, ltd. companies, joint agreements with other bodies and associations and lead commune agreements.

3.2. Local Referenda

The Act makes provision for the holding of local referenda on the level of local taxation, the recall of existing Councillors or any other matter within the jurisdiction of the commune. A referendum may be called by the Council itself or as a result of a petition signed by a minimum of 1/10 of electors in the commune. For the result of the referendum to be binding the turnout must be no less than 30%.

3.3. Number of Members

The Commune Council will serve a term of office of 4 years. The number of Councillors in each commune will depend on the size of that commune:

12-16 members: up to 4,000 electors
16-20 members: 4,001-7,000 electors
18-24 members: 7,001-15,000 electors
20-26 members: 15,001-20,000 electors
22-28 members: 25,001-40,000 electors
26-32 members: over 40,000 electors

Communes with over 100,000 inhabitants will elect at least 34 Councillors and five more for every subsequent 100,000 electors with the provision that no Council may have more than 100 members.

3.4. Responsibilities

The commune council will be responsible for:

1. Determining its own standing orders
2. Electing a Board to manage its affairs
3. Appoint the Communes Secretary and Chief Accountant
4. Set the Commune's budget
5. Select membership of its committees
6. Decide upon the powers and functions of neighbourhood forums and district councils
7. Set the levels of local taxes and charges
8. Determine local land-use plans
9. Take decisions on the sale, purchase, leasing and renting of land and property, borrowing and lending and the creation of local bodies/companies
10. Reach agreements over delegated powers
11. Agree a maximum limit for spending decisions taken by the board without prior approval by the Council
12. Decide on ways of taking joint action with other communes
13. Take decisions on street names and the erection of monuments
14. Award the freemanship of the commune/city.

3.5. Internal Organization

The meetings of the Council are to be chaired by the Mayor. If the Mayor is not a member of the Council the Council must appoint its own chairman for its whole term of office. The Council must meet at least once every quarter. The Mayor is responsible for calling meetings of the Council but a meeting may be called if 1/4 of the members of the Council requests it. The Council may appoint committees and agree co-options onto them (the limit on co-options = 50% of the membership of any committee). The committees are responsible to the Council for tàsks which they have been set and must report in full on their deliberations. Their functioning will be determined by the Council's standing orders.

3.6. Members of the Council

The member of the Council is responsible only to his electors and the courts. He has a duty to participate in the work of the Council and his employer must allow him the necessary time off work to fulfil his Council duties. A Councillor is entitled to allowances, the levels of which will be set by the Council, and to claim the full cost of travel expenses incurred as part of his Council duties.

3.7. The Board and the Mayor

The Council's executive body is the Board. The Board is to be composed of the Mayor, his deputy and a maximum of 5 other members elected by the Council. All members of the Board, with the exception of the Mayor must be members of the Council. The Mayor is elected by secret ballot of the Council, his deputy is chosen by the board amongst its members. No member of a Board in a commune may at the same time serve as part of the administration of the central state.

The Board is to be responsible for preparing motions to appear before full Council, implementing Council decisions, managing Council property, budgetary control, employing and releasing Council staff and carrying out delegated powers. The Mayor is responsible for organizing the work of the Board, day-to-day administration and external representation. He is entitled to take emergency action on public order matters which must subsequently be ratified at the next full meeting of Council.

The Board is to carry out its duties through the Commune Office. The Mayor is the chief executive of that office unless he delegates his powers to the Secretary. The Secretary and the Chief Accountant will participate, ex- officio, in Board meetings.

The commune may take decisions on its administrative structures, management of its property and rules governing the use of commune property. Commune/municipal property is acquired as a result of legislation, boundary changes or decisions taken by the courts. Any decision to alter the designated use or to sell off any public building must be ratified by the Voivodship Assembly.

3.8. Budgeting

The Commune is to set its budget annually. It is to be prepared by the Board and must be submitted to the Council by the end of November of the preceding financial year so that it can be agreed by the end of that year ie. December. The Commune is to have the following resources available for budgetary purposes:

- government grants,
- local taxes,
- income derived from charges,
- earnings from Council rents,
- budget surpluses,
- earnings from lotteries and events .
- income from loans.

Government grant will be set by separate legislation and distributed directly to the communes by the Ministry of Finance. Short-term loans entered into by the Commune may not exceed 5% of its annual budgeted expenditure.

3.9. Audit

The Regional Auditors, appointed by the Prime Minister following nominations by the Ministry of Finance and consultation with the National Association of Communes, will oversee the conduct of financial affairs in the communes. The Auditors will monitor commune practices and ensure that budgets are legal ie. that income and expenditure balance.

Separate legislation on powers of the auditors, local taxation, financial control and borrowing will follow in due course.

3.10. Voluntary Associations

The act allows communes to enter into associations in order to perform certain functions jointly. These associations are to be voluntary, they can only be made obligatory by an Act of Parliament. Any proposal to form an association must be reported to the Voivodship Assembly and the Voivod. Any association agreement must set out the name and residence of the association, list its participants, functions and term of office, declare its service principles, agree its standing orders, agree the principles by which costs, profits and losses within the association are shared, and set out procedures by which communes may leave the association or by which the association may be wound up. Any such agreement is subject to ratification by the Prime Minister and registration by the Ministry of Finance. The decision-making body of the association is to be the Association Assembly which will be responsible for performing the functions delegated to it by member communes. The assembly is to be composed of Mayors and other members delegated by the communes. The executive body of the association is to be a

Board the membership of which is to be determined by the standing orders of the association. It will be elected by the assembly with a maximum of 1/3 of its members being co-opted. The chairman of this board is to have the same powers and obligations as a commune mayor. Communes may also enter into agreements by which one commune takes on responsibilities for performing functions defined in an agreement which spells out the policy for sharing costs.

3.11. Voivodship Assemblies

The Voivodship Assembly is to be constituted from delegates of all communes in the voivodship. Its responsibilities will cover: monitoring the performance of communes, disseminating information on the experience of commune activities, mediation/arbitration in disputes, overseeing the functioning of the state administration in the voivodship and carrying out any delegated powers as determined by the communes and the state.

The commune delegates will be chosen within the communes according to their population size but no commune will have more than 10 delegates to the assembly. The Voivod will call the first meeting of the assembly within 14 days polling. At that first meeting the assembly will choose a chairman, two deputies and a six-member presidium. The delegates will have a right to question the Voivod in plenary sessions and all their question must be answered within 30 days of the meeting. The assembly will set its own standing orders and timetable. The costs of the working of the assembly will be met in full by the communes. The contributions will be calculated on the basis of the number of inhabitants. The Voivod is to be responsible for finding premises for the assembly.

3.12. Supervision

The communes and the associations of communes will come under scrutiny for legality of their actions by the Prime Minister, the Voivod and the Regional Auditors. The above mentioned supervisory authorities will have the right to demand any information, to visit the commune in an official capacity and to participate in its deliberations.

The Board of the Commune has a duty to inform the Voivod about its decisions within 7 days of it being taken and to present its budget to the Regional Auditor. The Voivod and the auditors have the right to suspend any decision taken by the commune within 30 days of it having been taken. The local authority can contest any such decision in the courts. The Voivod also has the power to over-rule any local authority practice which is inconsistent with government wishes in the domain of powers delegated to the local authority and the Prime Minister may dissolve any Council and institute Commissioner rule if the Council repeatedly violates the Constitution or the law. All communes may appeal against any such decision to the courts and all citizens are entitled to challenge any administrative decision taken by the communes in the Administrative Court. The costs of all such cases will be free of any government taxation and charges.

3.13. Economic Activity

The legislation allows local authorities to conduct income-generating activity in all walks of life as long as they can prove that a genuine social need is not being met by any other producer/service delivered.

3.14. City Government

The legislation gives the Prime Minister the discretionary power to allow for the formation of obligatory association of Communes to be formed in Poland's largest cities: Warsaw, Łódź, Kraków, Poznań and Wrocław. If formed, these associations would have statutory strategic powers over planning, construction, technical infrastructure, public transport, waste disposal, health, education, the Arts, public order, fire services, parks and cementaries.

The Prime Minister was asked to allow Warsaw to form an association of 7 district communes with each district having the power to formulate proposals for further decentralization following local referenda. The decision was positive and Warsaw entered the elections as a composition of 7 districts, having the status as any other commune. The Parliament passed an Act on Warsaw, creating the compulsory Association of Warsaw districts and regulating its competencies.

4. THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS ACT

The Act provides a legal framework for electing Councillors in urban and rural communities. The Councillors who will serve on Commune Councils are to be elected by secret ballot in constituencies.

4.1. Eligibility

All persons eligible to vote are eligible to be forward as candidates with the exception of returning officers and polling agents serving on Electoral Commissions. All Polish citizens over the age of 18 will be entitled to vote with the exception of convicted prisoners and these certified as mentally unfit.

4.2. Electoral Boundaries

Electoral constituencies - their number, boundaries and the number of members elected in each will be agreed using the following criteria:

- in rural areas a district must cover one whole or several administrative neighbourhoods. No neighbourhood may be divided between two or more electoral districts,
- current borders of cities, city districts and communes apply as electoral boundaries, unless the cities that have been previously divided into districts decide otherwise (what was the case in 4 cities which constituted single units).

All districts will be divided into polling precincts by the District Election Commission using the following formula:

- the polling precinct must have between 500 and 3000 electors,
- no elector has to travel more than 5 km to the precinct
- a hospital may be declared a precinct in its own right regardless of the number of registered electors.

Full notification of the sitting of polling precincts must be displayed in public places at least 35 days before polling.

4.3. Supervision

The elections will be called by the President of the Republic 35 days before polling. The supervision of the election process shall the responsibility of:

1. The National Returning Officer
2. The Voivodship Returning Officer
3. The District Election Commission
4. The Polling Precinct (Station) Election Commission

The electoral commissions will be composed of nominees of all the parties contesting the elections and representatives of recognized (legally) local organizations.

The National and Regional Returning Officers will be appointed by the Council of Ministers. The National Returning Officer will be responsible for the conduct of the elections in accordance with the law. The Voivodship Returning Officer will supervise the work of the District Commission, decide on constituency boundaries and set the number of Coun-

cillors to be elected in each constituency and commune and receive all complaints about the conduct of the elections.

District Commissions will be responsible for dividing the district into precincts, supplying them with ballot papers and envelopes, registering the candidates, announcing results and compiling a full report on the conduct of the election within their district. The Polling Precinct Commissions are

to be responsible for updating the electoral register, counting the votes and sending the results to the District Commission.

All persons who are appointed as members of electoral commissions will have the right to be released from work when required and will be entitled to receive day, travel and loss of earnings allowances the levels of whichwill be decreed by the Council of Ministers.

4.4. Electoral Registers

Existing units of local state administration are to be responsible for compiling the electoral registers from existing census data. The registers must be displayed at the Polling Precinct for two weeks in the pre-election period so that inclusion and exclusion appeals can be lodged and decided upon by the Precinct Commissions and, if necessary, the courts.

4.5. Nominating Candidates

Candidates can be nominated by political parties, trades, unions, Civic Committees and other groups of citizens. A list of candidates, to be validly nominated, must receive the support of 150 signatures of electors living in the relevant constituency and must physically reside in that constituency.

The above applies in communes with over 20,000 electors. In all other communes each candidate must receive the support of 15 signatures of electors residing in that constituency and must himself be a resident of that constituency.

4.6. Polling Day

On polling day voting will take place between 6am and 10pm. In order to vote each elector will be obliged to prove his/her identity.

At the close of polling the Precinct Commissions are to immediately begin counting the votes. They must determine the number of votes cast, the number of spoilt ballot papers and then proceed to count the votes cast for each candidate. Having completed this process the Precinct Commissions must compile a full report and submit it immediately to the District Commission.

4.7. The Electoral System

The legislation provides for elections to be held in single member constituencies in communes with less than 40,000 electors. The candidate obtaining a plurality of the votes cast will be elected in each of these constituencies.

In communes which have over 20,000 electors Councillors will be elected by Proportional Representation in multi-member constituencies electing between 5 and 10 Councillors. In these communes voters will have to vote for one candidate on one of the lists which have been validly nominated. On the first count the election commissions will count the number of votes cast for each list and divide the seats amongst the lists in proportion to the number of votes cast for each list. On a subsequent count the commissions will count the number of votes cast for each candidate on these lists in order to determine which of them have individually been elected as part of the quota allowed for their particular list.

4.8. Financing the Election

The cost of holding local government elections will be met in full by the Government. Local units of state administration will be obliged to assist the Election Commissions in work on electoral registers and in finding accommodation for polling precincts.

The legislation makes no provision for state financial support of any political parties or individual candidates.

4.9. Elections to the Voivodship Assemblies

Delegates to the Voivodship Assemblies will be chosen by a secret ballot of members of each commune. The elected delegate will retain his commune seat and will cease to be a delegate if he resigns his Commune

seat or if the commune recalls him on a 2/3 majority vote with a quorum of 50% of members present. The Voivodship Assemblies will be elected for the same term of office as the Communes.

4.10. Elections to Neighbourhood Forums

The elections to Neighbourhood Forums are to take place within six months of this legislation coming into effect. The elections are to be held at neighbourhood meetings at which all inhabitants of the neighbourhood are entitled to vote. The meeting will be called by the Mayor and will have a quorum of 50% of those entitled to vote attending. If the quorum is not reached another meeting must be called no sooner than a week hence at which the elections will be held regardless of the attendance.

The Neighbourhood Forum is to be composed of 3-7 members according to Council regulations. Candidates can be validly nominated by any voting participant at the meeting. The elections will be by secret ballot and the votes will be counted by a small committee appointed by the meeting.

5. THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT ACT

This Act defines the basic rights and duties of local government staff. It does not preclude the local authorities from adding other conditions of employment as long as they do not conflict with this or any other piece of labour legislation.

5.1. Conditions of Employment

A local government employee must:

- be a Polish citizen,
- be over 18 years of age,
- have a medical certificate qualifying them as fit for work,
- have the necessary academic qualifications.

The local Council will determine the qualifications necessary for any given post and the methods by which they are assessed.

All employees nominated, appointed or contracted must sign a declaration of loyalty to the local authority, the state authorities and the local

community. Married people and those very closely related will not be allowed to serve in the same department. Nominated employees can be expected to perform functions other than those declared in the original terms of appointment. They can be moved to a different location and can be demoted. Employees can be suspended for three months by decision of the Mayor and their terms of employment can be terminated if the Council decides to dissolve their post or if they lost the necessary physical and mental fitness to perform their duties or if they have reached pensionable age. An employee is entitled to three months notice of termination of his contract and six months pay. His/her trades union has the right to appeal against the decision.

5.2. Definition

The term local government employee includes:

1. The Mayor, his deputy, members of the Local Board elected by the Council, the leader of the Voivodship Assembly, his deputy and members of the Assembly's Panel and the members of the Executive of Associations of Communes. All the above posts will be elected.
2. Directors of local authority departments, agencies, institutes and enterprises who will all be nominated.
3. The chief accountant who will be appointed.
4. Staff appointed by the local authorities who will be contracted.

The Board of the local Council will be responsible for employing and dismissing local authority employees.

5.3. Pay

Elected and nominated employees cannot be paid less than contracted staff. The Council of Ministers will determine the pay scales which will be used in rewarding local authority employees. The Council will however be able to institute its own system of awards and bonus payments.

5.4. Disciplinary Matters

Each Council will have two disciplinary Panels, one composed of employees appointed by the Board of the Council and an Appeals Panel made

up of Councillors appointed by the Board. Rules governing the working of these Panels will be laid down by the Council of Ministers.

5.5. Existing Employees

Staff currently in post as employees of the units of local state administration will, once the bill becomes law, become local authority employees. However, their contract of employment will only be valid until 31 December 1990 unless the local authority decides otherwise.

6. THE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM ACT

The act removes all mention of "National Councils" as part of the administrative structures of the state and introduces the term "Commune Council" into the Constitution. The act also redefines the constitutional role of the Voivod as the representative of the government in the territory covered by his/her voivodship.

The proposals in this act are an interim measure. The joint Parliamentary Committee which is working on a draft of the new Constitution will unveil a fuller definition of the constitutional rights and obligations of local authorities in due course.

7. PAVING REGULATIONS

This set of regulations defines municipal property as:

1. All property currently managed by administrative organs responsible to the National Councils.
2. Enterprises formed by bodies described in 1.
3. All public buildings managed previously by the Voivodship National Councils which are not to be used as units of state administration.

Communes will be able to own property outside of their own territories as long as host commune gives its permission and the property is to be used for the provision of local services to the commune owning the property.

Inventory Commissions will be set up in each Voivodship by the government to adjudicate on the handover of property. The process will be phased. At first local councils will take over responsibilities for resources

and properties currently under direct management by bodies responsible to the national councils. The handover of state enterprises and other institutions will take place gradually as and when the local authorities are able to organize the running of these units.

These regulations have also highlighted a list of legislation necessary to divide responsibilities between the state and the local authorities. Legislation will be needed in the following fields: education, health, social security, the Arts, financial control, planning, housing, environmental protection, water, private property, tourist resorts and metropolitan areas.

8. AREA ADMINISTRATION BILL

This bill reforms state administration in order to make it clearly separate from local authority administration. The bill gives the Voivod, a prefect appointed by the Prime Minister, the following responsibilities:

- coordination of state administration in the voivodship,
- supervision of commune performance in carrying out delegated powers,
- reporting to the Council of ministers on his activities and on the state of the voivodship,
- representing the government at official events held in the voivodship,

The bill obliges the Voivod to consider all initiatives and motions put forward by the Voivodship Assembly, to present an annual report on his activities to be considered by the Assembly and to present to the Assembly all regulations and bye-laws being proposed by him.

The Voivod is to be allowed to delegate his powers to senior officers and area officers and offices appointed by him.

The Council of Ministers is to be given the authority to decide on future boundary changes after consultation with the Voivods, the Commune Councils and the local communities concerned.

9. LOCAL GOVERNMENT DUTIES AND POWERS ACT

The Sejm passed the Local Government Duties and Powers Act on 12 May 1990. The Act defines specific powers and functions of local authorities in Poland.

1. Powers currently under the auspices of (former) National Councils:
   a) street names and numbers,
   b) cemeteries and burial organization of cemeteries, decisions on closure, upkeep and management, decisions on change of land-use 40 years following the last burial,
   c) gamekeeping: administration, changes of animal protection,
   d) education: nurseries - formation of equipping, financing, housing, paying teachers and staff,
   e) museums: registering and protecting listed buildings,
   f) land registry,
   g) planning permission,
   h) informing the health service about any outbreak of infectious diseases,
   i) registering wills,
   j) spa facilities: right to be consulted on appointment of chief officer,
   k) libraries: forming, merging, closing, naming, housing, equipping, financing, training staff, managing, supervising,
   l) forestry: registry of forest land, permission for forestation of agricultural land,
   m) housing: tenancy agreements, tent-level settings, rent-tribunals for private sector, compulsory purchase, housing allocation, short-term lease, temporary housing, changing use of property, emergency housing at times of disaster, dealing with nuisance, management and maintenance,
   n) flood: evacuation, emergency services, coordination, inspecting,
   o) building: quality control,
   p) allotments: recultivation, provision of infrastructure, cleansing,
   q) taxis: fare setting,
   r) alcohol: upkeep and management of detoxification centres,
   s) recreation: life-guards, mountain rescue,
   t) dogs: taxing, licensing, removal of strays,

u) markets: charges, cleansing, management,
v) public highways: consulted on voivodship plans plus classification of roads, planning, financing and modernizing.

2. Commune Councils will take-over the following powers and functions from the now defunct voivodship councils:
   a) museum charges,
   b) right to be consulted on siting of motorways and A-road routes,
   c) all voivodship powers over land-use and physical planning.
3. The following are to be delegated powers and functions:
   a) destruction of rabid animals
   b) informing neighbouring local authorities of infectious animal disease outbreaks and meeting costs of any such outbreak,
   c) administering sale discounts on state land and property,
   d) auctions of state property,
   e) registering: marriages, births, deaths,
   f) childcare: appointing foster parents, administering alimony,
   g) civil defense: shelter, evacuation, childcare, food, board and lodgings for soldiers stationed in time of state emergency,
   h) records: identity cards, registering place of abode, census.
4. The following powers and functions of National Councils are now to be the responsibility of state territorial administration:
   a) register of properties,
   b) environmental protection inspectorate,
   c) determination of citizenship,
   d) military service,
   e) building inspectorate,
   f) car registration and driving licences.
5. Councils are being given the right to decide which secondary schools they wish to manage. Art schools are to be handed over to the Ministry for the Arts.
6. Councils will be responsible for administering GP health services as part of the Health Service.

10. THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF WARSAW ACT (18 MAY 1990)

1. The capital city of Warsaw is an obligatory Union of District Communes and is a legal entity.
2. The Governing body of the Warsaw Union of District Communes is the Warsaw Capital City Council responsible for all City-wide services and strategic functions. Its legal status is the same as that of any commune as described in the 1990 Local Government Act.
3. The City of Warsaw Council is to be elected from the District Councils on the basis of 4 delegates from each district. The Council selects its board, elects the Mayor and agrees a budget.
4. Its powers are:
   a) setting administrative charges,
   b) levying a rate on the districts,
   c) mediation between districts,
   d) representing the city to government,
   e) monitoring local authority performance and training staff,
   f) joint ventures with state and private agencies,
   g) co-opt onto its committees,
   h) determine standing orders (to be approved by the Prime Minister).
5. The powers of the President are the same as those of any commune Mayor or President of a City Councils.
6. The Warsaw City Council will be financed through:
   a) economic activity and property,
   b) participation in taxes levied by District Communes,
   c) budget surpluses,
   d) block grant,
   e) voluntary District Commune contributions,
   f) loans and bonds,
   g) gifts and donations.

   The City Council is to determine the level of b).
7. President of the City Council can veto District Commune decisions if they conflict with the law of the land or City Council decisions. Any such veto can be challenged in court.
8. The City Council will own municipal property of a City-wide nature the criteria for which will be prescribed in future legislation.

9. The City Council is to bring forward proposals for a new division into district communes by October 1991.
10. Existing District Commune Councils may appeal to the Council of Ministers for their district to be divided into two or more district commune councils. If such a division takes place existing District Commune Councillors will serve as councillors in the new councils depending on the place of their election.

11. FIRST EXPERIENCE

The local government in Poland is still very young. The newcomers to the local elites have just had their first opportunities to get acquainted with their offices, their colleagues and the new legislation. The general social experience of the new system of local democracy is still very fragmentary and based rather on hopes and wishes than on a good understanding of reality that sometimes appears hard and discouraging. The representatives of the central administration have to cope with new situation in which they cannot just transfer money and put forward demands, but are obliged to negotiate and to react to new, sometimes really hard situations (such as the threat of teachers' strike as a reaction to lack of money in some local budgets for their pay). The new local government system, as has already been said in this report, has proved to be a challenging, entirely new situation for almost everybody in this country.

The last statement of the previous paragraph is, in fact, the only firm proof of the hypotheses put forward in this report. It would be very immodest to attempt an evaluation of the local government experience in Poland. However, some remarks can be made even at this very early stage.

First of all, several phenomena give support to the thesis saying that the local communities have felt their strength. They feel so responsible for their own local affairs that they often attempt to exert more power than was granted to them by the legislation. This is clearly seen during the discussions on the organization of the state territorial administration and the introduction of its lowest level, the already mentioned "rejony". The local patriotism, often supported by local conflicts, lead some of the local authorities to vivid protests when a locality has not been appointed as a site of the "rejony". The fact that the "rejony" are the structures of the state administration, and not a part of the self-governmental system, is simply forgotten. "We do not want to be subordinated to the nearby locality, we

want our own rejon!" - these are the claims and requests of some of the local authorities and local communities. The state administration is often put under pressure as a result of misunderstandings. But this pressure stems from the local communities' and local authorities' feeling of empowerment that could emerge only under the new local government system.

Secondly, the first experience shows how unprepared the whole society - including the state and local authorities - was to the new local government system. The legislation is still half-way. Although the general framework of the new system has already been created, "the devil hides in details" has not been clearly defined yet. The most crucial point, the financial system, is still to be designed. This system will shape the reality of the local governments in coming years. Before it is implemented any comprehensive evaluation of the local government system has to be preliminary. The inventory of the state and municipal assets will not be completed in scheduled time as the registers are far from satisfactory. The state enterprises that were to come under municipal ownership and management, and then were to be shifted to private hands, still wait for final regulations. The foreign or domestic investors who apply to local authorities for land, premises and permissions still wait for final

decisions. These examples could be multiplied. Some time has to pass until the new system will be able to operate fully and smoothly.

Thirdly and finally, the new situation creates demand for extensive training, consulting and advising. Any initiative, no matter if of domestic or foreign origin, is badly needed and will be heartly welcome by the inexperienced local, and sometimes even central, authorities. These initiatives should, obviously, be subordinated to continuous supervision and scrutiny by reliable institutions and organizations. The Association of Local Authorities that should be created shortly will have an immense opportunity to become such a body. But even this Association will have to be helped from outside in its efforts to organize itself and to become effective and efficient. This last example also demonstrates, how long the road in front of the newly-born Polish local government and local democracy really is.

Paweł Swianiewicz
Institute of Space Economy
University of Warsaw

LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN POLAND. THE TRANSITION FROM THE REAL-SOCIALISM MODEL TO THE LOCAL DEMOCRACY.

1. CHARACTERISTIC OF REAL-SOCIALISM MODEL

According to this model the base of the local authorities' situation is a doctrine of the *"homogenous state authority"*. This doctrine states that a local authority is only a representant of the state government, the local self-government can not exist. Also, there is no separate communal property. Local budget and administration are only the parts of the state ones. Local decision-making should be based on the so called *general interest of the society and the state* but not on particular *local interests.* Regional or central authorities can abolish a local law or even dissolve local council if the local decisions are in contradiction with the policy of a state. In Poland the introduction of this doctrine had to be secured by the *"Law about Local and Regional Organs of Homogenous State Authority"* (1950).

Practically, the realization of these assumptions appears in pathological forms. Local activity is dominated by bureaucratic forms of control. Decisions, like what is a *general interest of society*, depend on opinions of particular civil servants. This system causes hyper-centralization. But at the same time, supervision of all local behaviour is impossible, so adaptation of local societies and local authorities to the existing environment includes many informal activities. Such adaptation has been characterized in detail in the seventies and at the beginning of eighties by J.J. Wiatr (1983, 1987). In the result of his research (among others) following strategies can be distinguished:

- *wild capital expenditures* (theoretically all investments should exist in an official plan, in this strategy an investment is begun outside the limits of the plan. Afterwards, the local authority tries to get some grants for this investment and to put it in the next version of the plan);
- *help of "patrons"* (i.e. using the informal contacts with some members of regional or central authorities);
- *"pulling" of some central investments* (a central investment localized in a local unit usually brought about obtaining some funds for so-called "associated investments", as for example: gas pipelines, schools, housing estates;
- *organization of fictious so-called "collective actions"* ("collective actions" allowed to obtain some additional funds from regional and central budget).

Very important is also a fact that since 1945 there has been no free local election. Political career of local leaders has been dependent mainly on their contacts with regional and central politicians but not on opinions of their voters.

The socio-economic crisis of 1980-1981, the deepest one in the Polish post-war history, marked the beginning of attempts at important reforms. According to official declarations, decentralization – especially the development of local self-government – was one of the most important aims of those reforms.

This situation caused many important changes however we could hardly speak about the turning-point until the official doctrine of the homogeneous state authority has been rejected.

The announcement of the introduction of the local self-government has been the political change at the end of 1988 and the beginning of 1989. A new Local-Government Act was voted by parliament on March 30, 1990. The new system provides (among others) democratic election to local councils, comunal property, introduces local administration and local budget separate from the state one, decides that the supervision over municipalities shall be exercised only on the basis of the criterion of conformity with the law. The new system will be introduced shortly after the local election in May, 1990. This deepness of these changes is not common in local government reforms in Eastern Europe. For example, in Bulgaria or in Soviet Union we may still observe the system very similar to classic assumption of real-socialism model (J. Stankiewicz, 1989).

The deepness of necessary changes cause that we should not talk about

the reforms of the local government system but about a transition from one system to another. But the transition is a process, and some elements of the old system will still be present in the near future. For example, the reform of local finances (which are actually very centralized – see section 4 of this paper) is planned for the beginning of 1991. But the most important are elements of old, centralistic system which are present in the way of thinking of old and new local leaders and in whole local societies as well. Transition to the local government system demands transition from "claiming" thinking in terms of dependence on central authorities to "innovative" thinking in terms of self-dependence. This transition is probably the crucial and the most uncertain point of present reforms (see section 6 of this paper).

2. CHARACTERISTIC OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

The rest of this paper is based on the results of the research which had been done at the end of 1988. At that time local authorities existed in "old" legal framework, but they were aware of the direction of future changes.



The method of the research was adopted to Polish conditions Fiscal Austerity and Urban Innovation Project questionnaire (T.N. Clark, 1985). The research was conducted in 250 towns and communes, which had been chosen in a random way (the total number of towns and communes in Poland is about 2400). In every municipality respondents were: the mayor and the chairmen of a local council. Finally, we have the results of 487 questionnaires.

The attached scheme as the theoretical framework of the research.

Particular parts of our report concern the particular elements of the scheme and the relations among them[1].

The public finances are one of the best starting points for an investigation of society. The full fruitfulness of this approach is seen particularly at those turning-points ... during which existing forms begin to die off and to change into something new, and which always involve a crisis of the old fiscal methods... (J. Schumpeter, 1918 *The Crisis of the Tax State*, cit. after: T.N. Clark, L. Ferguson, 1983). There is no doubts that Poland is now at the turning point. That is why I thoroughly present in this paper fiscal aspects of the obtained results. The final section contains general conclusions of the research. These conclusions are formulated from the point of view of perspectives of present political changes on a local level.

The "environment box" (in the attached scheme) is especially related to the one of the crucial assumptions of the investigation. This assumption says that in spite of the equalization doctrine of the communist state, the situation in particular municipalities is much differentiated. The question what are the main factors of this differentiation is very important. There are two factors considered in the analysis

1. differences among the towns and rural communes;
2. differences among main historical regions. In the case of Poland a shape of historical state borders is very important for economic and cultural differentiation. Especially it concerns the borders from the 19th and the first half of the 20th century. We can distinguish four main historical regions:

- *Galicja* – the south-eastern Poland, which belonged to Austria in the 19th century;
- *Kongresówka*[2] – the central and eastern Poland which belonged to Russia in the 19th century;

- *Wielkopolska* – the middle-western Poland which belonged to Germany in the 19th century, and to Poland after the 1st World War;
- *Recovered Territories* – the western and northern Poland which belonged to Germany till 1945.

The final results confirm the importance of these two variables. Another environment characteristic taken into consideration is the fiscal situation measured by objective indicators.

3. IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF LOCAL TROUBLES AS SEEN BY THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES

As it was mentioned in the section 1 in socialist economy, called by Kornai (1980) as as "economy of shortages" obtaining of deficit materials or other "material" problems are very often more important than saving fiscal problems. The role of different reasons of local troubles was investigated in a question:

What difficulties in solving these problems would you indicate as the most important? if you choose a few, indicate one – the most important ;

1. lack of money
2. lack of working power
3. lack of materials
4. lack of law regulations
5. lack of inhabitants' activity
6. other

According to local leaders the lack of money is still the most important (95% indicated this answer and 84% indicated it at the first place). Lack of deficit materials is also very important (82% of indications, 6,2% at the first place). Other answers were indicated more seldom.

It is characteristic that the "lack of deficit materials" is stressed more often in "rich" municipalities, while the "poor" more often claimed the lack of funds. It is also important that leaders of the "rich" municipalities very often mentioned inadequate law regulations as a barrier of development of their units.

Summing up, the obtained results confirm the thesis that in the centralistic system local finances are among the first to be cut in case of

general fiscal troubles of a state. Kornai's statement concerns mainly industrial enterprises, and local authorities only to a lesser degree.

4. FISCAL SITUATION OF TOWNS AND COMMUNES

Local revenues in Poland consist of three sources:

– revenues from own sources[3];

– local shares in the region's budget[4];

– general and conditional grants[5].

In the eighties financial system used to be changed very often. E. Ruśkowski (1989) maintains that these changes caused deregulation of the old centralistic system, but the new system has not been born yet.

The most important statements concerning local finances in Poland are as follows:

- he character of a socialist economy (named by J. Kornai (1980) and "economy of shortages") causes that not only the level of revenues but also possibilities of spending money are very important (see section 3);
- towns and communes are very closely controlled by regional authorities (in a formal and informal way). Regional authorities very often force their decisions concerning local issues;
- fiscal situation of towns and communes depend on local politics only to some extent. Economic situation causes hat even deep changes in general law regulations will not allow for fiscal self-dependence of most municipalities. That is why the system of grants' distribution is especially important. Until today grants have depended on subjective decisions of regional administration. Introduction of the system of the objective criteria is one of the most important points of necessary changes.

4.1. Differentiation in 1985

The opinions presented above are the result of general analyses of the local finance in Poland. But, obviously, the situation in particular municipalities is very different. This problem has een analysed in one of my previous papers (P. Swianiewicz, 1989). Now I am going to present the main results of his analysis.

- despite the act that the fiscal situation of local councils is to a big great extent dependent on central and regional grants, we can observe strong differences among the fiscal situation in particular municipalities. Generally, there are two possible goals of the distribution of grants:
  - *equalization* – of possibilities of "rich" and "poor" municipalities
  - *efficiency* – tendency to satisfy only the minimal needs of every units and to prefer the municipalities with the highest own revenues (with the assumption that they are the most efficient ones, and their influence on state development can be the most positive).

During the almost 40-years period of the post-war history of Poland, the official doctrine has been equalization. The analysed materials indicate that neither of these two goals has been accomplished in Poland. Moreover, the situation in many municipalities is completely contradictory to these goals. The differentiation is very big (contradiction to the first goal), and it is not uncommon that the municipalities obtaining the biggest grants have the greatest expenditures (contradiction with the second goal);

- usually, the municipalities with a better fiscal situation are:
  - big and medium cities – units in the neighbourhood of the biggest agglomerations
  - communes with a well developed tourist function

  On the other hand, the municipalities with an especially bad fiscal situation are:
  - rural communes with a domination of small private farms (central and eastern Poland)
  - communes surrounding small and medium-sized cities

It is also visible that the fiscal situation is usually better in municipalities in traditionally strong regions.

- According to P.E. Mouritzen (1987) the differentiation of the fiscal situation and local policy is usually explained by two core models:
  - *the community equilibrium model* – the differentiation is to be explained by the characteristics of the social and economic environment of the political system
  - *the party model* – political differences among the parties are the most important.

It is obvious that these models could not be used to explain the Polish situation. What is characteristic however, is the act that in the interpretation of the differentiation of the fiscal situation in Polish

municipalities the same two factors (economic and political) are helpful.

However, the economic factor does not concern the wealth of the citizens (and revenues from income tax, like it does in may other countries) but it is connected with the taxation system in different spheres of economic activity (what is important is the level of taxation and the level of budget – local, regional or central – collecting given taxes). This factor explains the relatively good fiscal situation of communes surrounding big agglomerations, which is correlated with highly developed private handicrafts in these municipalities. The level of taxation from non-agriculture private sector economy is relatively high, and the correlation between the level of revenues from own sources and the number of people employed in non-agriculture private sector economy is 0.51. Similarly, the economic factor explains the better than average situation of tourist communes and the usually better situation of relatively well developed municipalities in the western part of Poland.

The political factor modifies this picture in many cases. This factor is not connected with different political programs of the authorities of particular municipalities (such differentiation is only just appearing) but with different possibilities of "conquering" grants and deficit goods. These differences are usually dependent on informal contacts of the members of local authorities in a given town or commune, a second very important factor is also the "position" of a municipality (for example a big city, especially the capital of a region, or a city with a big industrial enterprise localized in its area usually has "more political power" than a rural commune with the domination of small agricultural farms). The political factor explains the particularly bad situation of communes surrounding medium and small sized cities (most of the regional grants are absorbed by these cities) and the high correlation between the number of people employed in industry and the level of grants.

These conclusions are result of static research, in next section the changes of fiscal situation are analysed.

4.2. Changes in 1985-1987

The basic year of analysis is 1985. The use of earlier data is impossible because of very important differences in law regulation concerning local finances.

To measure the changes of the fiscal situation Mouritzen's fiscal slack index (FSI) was used (P.E. Mouritzen, 1989). According to Mouritzen FSI index is operationalized in the formula:

$$FSI = \frac{PREV(t)}{REVt - x/CN} \times 100$$

where

$PREV(t) = T(t - x) \times B(t) + G(t)$

$REV(t - x) = T(t - x) \times B(t - x) + G(t - x) \times r$

CN – change in expenditure needs from t-x to t (operationalized as a change in population)

T – tax effort

B – tax base

G – total grants

r - 1 + rate of inflation

But this method had been modified because of important differences of the local authority's situation in Poland and in the Western Europe. There is no sense using "projected revenue for year t" (PREV(t)) for Polish analyses because rates of taxes do not depend on local politics. Changes in local taxes, fees and charges are not results of local strategies. Instead of "projected revenues" just "revenues in t year" were used.

Final results (presented in figures at the end of the paper) can be claimed as too optimistic. Firstly, because of using of official rate of inflation; which many economists maintain to be higher. Secondly, because of widening of local competences. It is possible that the increase of revenues was eaten-up by new functions. But in 1985-1987 these changes were not very big.

In 1986 the fiscal situation of most municipalities was better than in 1985 (average FSI = 109,6) but in 1987 it collapsed in almost all municipalities (average FSI = 105,6).

Improvement of situation in 1986 concerned mainly "rich" municipalities. The "fall down" in 1987 was especially strong in the same units. The situation of the "poor" was more stable. Changes in particular municipalities are very different. FSI vary from 50,6 to 181,0.

Values of FSI are strongly correlated with the changes in grants. In 1985 two regions were relatively rich: *Wielkopolska* and *Recovered Territories*. Their strength had the different base – *Wielkopolska* was a region with the lowest grants per capita, its strength was based on revenues from own sources. Relative richness of towns and communes in *Recovered Territories* was based on big grants. In 1985-1987 grants increased very much in *Wielkopolska* region (that's in region which had obtained the lowest grants beforehand) and in *Galicja* (that's in the poorest region of Poland). The lowest increase was in *Recovered Territories*, which had been the most privileged beforehand. The differences in FSI are very similar to the changes of grants. In case of singular municipalities his rule has many exceptions but generally speaking in the 1985-1987 period we can observe changes leading to more rational distribution of grants. I can not change my opinion that the general reform of grants distribution system is one of the most important tasks.

The second factor of changes in fiscal situation is the development of private sector economy. Taxes from private sector economy belong to the most important revenues from own sources. It is characteristic that the region with the lowest FSI (*Recovered Territories*) is at the same time the region with the lowest level of development of this sector.

Analysing the town-rural commune differentiation we can observe that in 1985 grants per capita were bigger in towns (in spite of their bigger economic potential. As I have mentioned in the section 4.1. it may e explained by great political power of towns). In the 1985-1987 period the increase of grants was considerably greater in rural communes. In spite of his fact FSI in both unit groups was almost the same. It can be interpreted as the result of the faster increase of private sector economy in most of towns (especially small towns surrounding the biggest agglomerations).

G. Gorzelak (1986) has noticed that during the Polish crisis (at the beginning of the eighties) the differences between rich and poor regions had decreased. We can observe a very similar trend in 1987, which is the beginning year of the "second wave" of the Polish crisis.

Detailed data concerning 1988 and 1989 are not available but we can suppose that values of FSI decreased during that period. It was caused by

the rapid of inflation, deficit in central budget and a collapse in economic growth. Central government was trying not to increase grants for local units, in real terms it meant their decreasing. In such a situation the ability of finding new, innovative strategies (more generally: the ability of adaptation to the new conditions) seems to be extremely important.

5. FISCAL STRATEGIES OF LOCAL LEADERS

The Polish local leaders' opinions how to cope with their units' fiscal problems has been very seldom investigated. Until today scientific interests have used to concentrate rather on macro-processes, especially on general legal regulations concerning local finances. It is to some extent understandable because in the traditional model almost nothing had depended on local activity. But this situation has been changing for some years. One should expect that present political changes will cause this problem very important.

The analysis of local leaders' opinions is based on answers to the question:

What should be done to improve the fiscal situation of your municipality? If you circle more than one number, please indicate one – the most important.

1. *reduction of expenditures on administration*
2. *reduction of other current expenditures*
3. *reduction of some capital expenditures by elimination of some investments*
4. *reduction of capital expenditure by postponing them*
5. *raising loans*
6. *increasing grants from the regional level*
7. *reduction of region's shares in local budget*
8. *cooperation with other municipalities*
9. *handing some functions to private sector*
10. *ceasing granting allocations to some services*
11. *improvements in managing procedures in these enterprises which are subdued to the local authorities*
12. *applying new technologies in these enterprises*
13. *increasing of revenues by foundations of local enterprises*
14. *increasing of revenues by development of economy activities*

in the private sector (for example handicrafts)

15. increasing taxes on immovables belonging to state enterprises

16. increasing taxes on private economy activities

17. others, which?

This question is very similar to one of the points of the international FAUI survey, but there are two important differences. FAUI survey's question concerns strategies which had already been used. In Poland we could only ask about the plans for the future. The second difference concerns possible answers. Many of items from FAUI questionnaire are completely inapplicable in the Polish situation, other are specifically Polish.

The most general conclusions are mentioned below (for more details – see tables at the end of the paper):

- the most popular strategies concern increase of revenues, while reducing of expenditures in indicated most rarely. Claiming for more grants is an especially important "strategy" (4% of respondents indicate it as the only strategy). The most rare strategy is a reduction of capital expenditures;
- funding of new local enterprises and development of private sector economy is also often indicated. However it is not clear to what extent it is the result of real intentions (we should remember that at the time of doing our research these ideas were very popular in mass-media. It is probable that these answers were to some extent an effect of the propaganda. This interpretation is supported by many other answers);
- there are some differences in answers of mayors and chairmen of local councils. Generally speaking chairmen are more often pro-reformatic and supporting market economy (they indicate more often such strategy as reducing expenditures for local administration, more seldom want to increase taxes from private sector economy);
- differences among the main historical regions are considerably important. The most innovative are leaders in Wielkopolska, while on the opposite pole are leaders in Kongresówka and recovered Territories;
- innovative strategies are indicated more seldom in "poor" towns and communes;
- decreasing total revenues (low FSI) cause very often plans of making loans;
- leaders indicating inadequate law regulations as an important barrier in municipality's development are most often innovative;
- opinions of leaders who declare strong dependence of local decision

making on regional authorities are interesting. They indicate claiming for more grants and making loans very often. It is worth to stress that these strategies reinforce the existing situation and transform real dependence into a "captive mind";

- answers are considerably dependent on the level of education. Higher educated leaders are more often innovative;
- younger leaders usually indicate more answers. The biggest differences between "young" and "old" leaders concern transferring some functions to the private sector and the development of the private sector economy.

In *Handbook of Urban Fiscal Data* (1988) we can notice that strategies seeing more revenues are more popular (than reducing expenditures) in most of countries. It is because voters accept more easily increase of some taxes than reduce in public consumption. Local leaders choose strategy which can be more popular in local societies. But there are also many municipalities (especially in the USA) where cuts in expenditures are more preferable. The Polish situation is more complicated because until today the tax system has been invisible for most of people. Most of taxes have been collected from enterprises (not from the people) and almost no one knows how much he has paid. Nowadays most of people are not aware that in the situation of economic crisis it is necessary to choose either increase of taxes or reduction of consumption through the local budget. It explains to some extent the domination of the "claiming" and "pro-centralistic" strategies. From this point of view the project of introducing VAT and a new system of income tax from the 1991 are very important (income tax will be probably at least partially collected at the local level).

6. LOCAL LEADERS AND THE PERSPECTIVES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM

Local processes are to a big extent dependent on more general situation existing in the particular regions or in the whole country. So, reforms of the whole political, economic and social system of the state will condition the deep changes in Polish towns and communes. But on the other hand,

macro-processes can only stimulate local development. The final result depends mainly on activity of voters, pressure groups, leaders on a local level. Local efficiency depends at least equally on external factors and on the ability of adaptation to the changing environment. As I mentioned in section 1 Polish local leaders are very well adapted to the old centralistic system and it is a very important question if they can adapt to the democracy and the market economy.

This point is also important in case of new leaders (who will occur after the next local elections). The problem of adaptation concerns not only the present leaders but also whole societies. New leaders will probably differ (from the old ones) in opinions concerning many things but their view on ways of solving of the local problems will be very similar. This statement is based on the observation of local committees' activity inspired by "Solidarity" movement. From this point of view programs used presently in the election campaign are very interesting. Most of the programs analysed at the beginning of April 1990 consist of a list of needs which should be satisfied in the near future, but they do not include any elements of how to do it. This rule concerns especially small towns and rural communes. Positive exceptions (innovative and realistic programs) are relatively rare.

Also an impact of different groups on the local decision making is very important. In spite of many important changes, according to local leaders, the communist party has been still the most active in pursuing its goals in decision making. This is correlated with the fact that 85% of mayors and chairmen of local councils are members of the party. The enterprises located in a municipality, councils of particular villages and parts of towns, social committees (organised for pursuing specific goals) are also important. In the last few years the increasing role of councils of particular villages, social committees and boards of enterprises can be observed. This last point has its root in the economic reform and the economic crisis of the eighties which reinforced the superiority of branch system over the territorial system (G. Gorzelak, 1987). It is also interesting that activity of pressure groups is the biggest in Wielkopolska region, where traditions of local self-government are the biggest.

Most of leaders maintain that future development of a town or a commune should be the continuation of previous trends. They prefer the development of he same branch of economy. This situation can be interpreted

in two ways. On the one hand it is realism in evaluation of possibilities of their units. But on the other hand it is passiveness and pessimism – local leaders have not their own vision of the future development, they are afraid of any changes. Probably the both interpretations are to some extent true in particular municipalities. The only important change is that industry is very rarely seen as a base for the future development. That is the natural response to the forced industrialization during the last 45 years. Nevertheless, this aversion to the development of industry (in any form) is alarming.

Financial dependence of towns and communes on regional authorities is even more than it is caused by big share of grants in total local revenues. The second source has a psychological character. Although only 19% of respondents agree that there are direct interventions of the regional authorities in the decision making on a local scale, yet at the same time 44% maintain that regional authorities have decided about the structure of the local budget (only 30% maintain that local authorities are fully independent in decisions concerning local budget). This demonstrates that a situation in which many things (officially dependent on the local council only) are determined by regional bureaucracy is taken for granted by many local leaders. After many years of a centralist system they cannot imagine full self-dependence of a local unit. Sometimes dependence on higher levels is treated as a strategy. Dependence is the price paid for the smaller responsibility and for an extra-help in case of extra-troubles.

In declarations of many leaders the lack of propositions for the future can be seen. Sometimes "surviving till tomorrow" is their basic strategy. It is visible (among others) in answers concerning fiscal strategies of local leaders. As a rule they aim to solve fiscal problems by increasing revenues, not by reducing expenditures. Moreover, prospending preferences are treated as a good point for a leader, because they show his care for the commune. That's why representants of local administration evaluate spending preference of administration as higher than preferences of council members. Contrarily, council members higher evaluate their own spending preferences. It is interesting that the tendency to balancing local budget by cuts in expenditures is not evaluated in the same way. This fact is very important for the expectations concerning introducing new model of the local government. It is related to an observation of Polish sociologist Jan Szczepański (1989), who maintains that *a considerable number of*

Poles will consider it natural that the Mazowiecki government (and a new system as a whole) *will bring to us all that socialism promised. Only he will do it faster, more efficiently and in greater quantities.*

The picture characterized above is a kind of average, but the real situation is different in particular towns and communes. It is possible to distinguish two types of leaders: *conservative* (centralistic) and *innovative.*

Conservative (totalitarian-conservative, claiming) leaders treat increasing revenues as a main fiscal strategy, but seldom seek for new sources of local revenues. They maintain that the most important way of solving local problems is an external help (in form of grants, loans used for satisfaction of some needs, acceptance of regional interventions in local decision making). Their behaviour is antireformatic because in act they enforce "centralistic status quo". Such a personality is more often represented in the local administration (that among council members). This group of respondents usually pessimistically evaluate future perspectives of their communes. Also they usually accept a committee of the communist party as a local "super-government".

Another type of leaders (more seldom occured) are innovative ones. They could be also called democratic-liberal. If they tend to increase local revenues they want to achieve it by changes in local taxes or by other local fiscal politics. They plan to use future loans for profitable investments. They feel restricted by the higher levels of authorities' interventions in local decision making. They are also rather optimistic in evaluation of future perspectives of their communes.

These two types of strategies are especially often in some types of towns and communes and in case of some social characteristics of the leaders. Some statistically important features characterizing this differentiation are described in the figure 1.

It is worth to stress two rules which can be observed in this figure.

1. Innovative strategies are more seldom in poor communes. It may cause self-multiplication of present differentiation. Poverty determines the way of perceiving reality, in an excuse for passiveness.
2. Innovative strategies occur more often in units localized in regions with greater self-government traditions (*Wielkopolska* and *Galicja*). We can observe the impact of cultural heritage. Poland usually has been seen as a place of crossing of two big traditions: *Eastern* and *Western.* In the *Eastern tradition* centralism is a very important point, obedience is the most important in contacts with the authority.

In the *Western tradition* the self-organization of society and the control of authority is more important. It is natural that in regions historically connected with Germany and Austria the *Western tradition* is more important than in regions bound with Russia. The only disagreement with this interpretation is the similarity between *Recovered Territories* (Western Poland) and regions historically connected with Russia. But it is necessary to remember that after the second World War traditional social structure in Western Poland was changed. Part of its inhabitants emigrated to Germany and most of new immigrants came from eastern regions of pre-war Poland (which now belongs to Soviet Union).

The rules described above support the thesis concerning the importance of the relations illustrated by Figure 1. The links between the environment and the social characteristics of local leaders on the one hand, and chosen strategies on the other, seems to be especially important. The impact of local needs and external relations (central-local, activity of enterprises) is more indirect, however it is also existent.

Ability of adaptation to the conditions of increasing independence of local politics can be treated as an innovation. The obtained results indicate that this innovation is adopted firstly by individuals characterized by such features as: better financial situation, higher education, younger etc. More often occurrence of innovative behaviour in units surrounding the biggest agglomerations suggest the diffusion of innovation from the centre(the biggest agglomerations were not included in the investigation). This characteristics is very similar to the characteristics of innovators in the diffusion of innovation theory. Such an interpretation is optimistic because it suggests that the innovation should spread out in the nearest future. Obviously, it should be treated only as a hypothesis, especially because of a static character of research.

One of the most important questions is what the implications of the situation described above are for the future. It seems to be possible to define some important factors determining the future behaviour of local system:

- model of welfare state is commonly accepted;
- the claiming attitude (expectation of external organization of activity and external help) is dominant among local politicians and local societies;

Figure 1.

– opinions of the leaders about their municipalities	
Claiming strategies – pessimism – external help as a main way of solving fiscal problems – dependence on higher authorities as an element of strategy – passiveness of inhabitants seen as an important barrier of development – future loans planned as a way of satisfaction of some consumptive needs – negative attitudes towards private sector economy (profiscal and redistributive)	Innovative strategies – optimism – stimulation of local economy as a main way of solving fiscal problems – disagreement with dependence on higher authorities – inappropriate law regulations seen as an important barrier of development – future loans planned as a source of profitable investments – promotion of private sector economy
– characteristics of local leaders	
– less than higher education – older than 50 years	– higher education – younger than 50 years
– characteristics of towns and communes	
– localization of *Recovered Territories* or in *Kongresówka* – rural communes with domination of agriculture – fiscal situation worse than average – decisions concerning local budget dominated by regional authorities	– localization in *Wielkopolska* or *Galicja* – units surrounding the biggest agglomerations, units with developed tourist function – fiscal situation better than average – independence of decisions concerning local budget

- people are not aware that taxes are necessary for the modern state (it means that in fact only the consumptive side of a welfare-state ideology is accepted).

According to P.E. Mouritzen (1990) the bigger is municipality the smaller is an awareness of relation between level of taxation and level of public consumption. This relationship is not applicable to the Polish situation. In traditional model increasing of local revenues caused very often decreasing in obtained grants. Claiming for more grants has been usually the more profitable strategy than seeing for new local revenues' sources.

These factors cause that transition to the self-government system will not be easy. "New equilibrium" can be achieved after the period full of rapid changes and conflicts. In this period emergence of some populistic politics (and politicians) can be expected. Obviously, this process will differ in particular towns and communes. Perhaps it will be more peaceful in units in which we have observed more innovative leaders.

The fact of expected troubles in transition from the centralistic to the self-government model does not mean that such transition is not necessary. "New local equilibrium" is the *conditio sine qua non* of future development but its achievement will not be easy.

One of the important elements of the figure in the section 1 is a feedback between the chosen strategies and objective situation of a commune. This feedback may proceed in three forms: *vicious circle, learning and controlled development.* The vicious circle mechanism may be characterized as a interaction of difficult situation and centralistic (claiming) strategies strengthening the troubles. *Controlled development* assumes the active role of central government, which by some regulations (not destroying the self-government system) helps to void some mistakes and suggests another ways of acting. This scenario assumes that centrum has enough knowledge and enough experience to know what to do. This condition seems not to be fulfilled. So the most probable mechanism in most of Polish units is the scenario of *learning* on one's own mistakes and observation of effects of own decisions. From this point of view Nordic *free commune* experiments (H. Baldersheim, A.L. Fimreite, 1990) could be interesting. More freedom for the most innovative municipalities could create positive *effect of demonstration* and spreading out the innovation.

[1]For more details see: J. Bartkowski, A. Kowalczyk, P. Swianiewicz (1990). In this article I present a summary of some fragments of the book and the basic final conclusions.

[2]the name has the origin in the Congress Kingdom which had been created during the Vienna congress in 1815 and which had been supremed by Russia.

[3]M. Gintowt-Jankowicz (1989) maintain that in present model "own revenues" are not exactly "own". Revenues from own sources depend very strongly on central government; for example rates of all "local" taxes are fixed and changed on a central level, also an introduction of new taxes (or liquidation of the old ones) does not depend on local authorities.

[4]Officially shares are included in the revenues from own sources. But practice shows that shares do not differ much from the grants (W. Konieczny, 1984).

[5]In Poland all grants for towns and communes are distributed on a regional level.

Bibliography

H. Baldersheim, A.L. Fimreite, 1990, *The Nordic "Free Commune" Experiment: Collapse or Reconstruction of the Scandinavian Model?*, paper presented at the FAUI Meeting on "Reforms Strategies for Local Government in a Time of Transitions. Eastern and Western Experiences", Radziejowice, Poland, April, 20-23.

J. Bartkowski, A. Kowalczyk, P. Swianiewicz, 1990, *Strategie władz lokalnych*, "Rozwój regionalny – Rozwój lokalny – Samorząd terytorialny" z. 21.

T.N. Clark, L.C. Ferguson, 1983, *City Money*, Columbia University Press, New York.

T.N. Clark, 1985, *Fiscal Austerity and Urban Innovation Project*, [in:] T.N. Clark (ed.) *Research in Urban Policy*, JAI Press, Greenwich, Connecticut.

M. Gintowt-Jankowicz, 1989, *Prawno-systemowe uwarunkowania finansów rad narodowych* [in:] J. Wierzbicki (ed.) *Finanse gospodarki narodowej*, PWE, Warszawa.

G. Gorzelak, 1986, *The Spatial Aspects of the Polish Crisis*, GeoJournal 12.1.

G. Gorzelak, 1987, *"Local Poland" Project: Aims and Methods in: Local Studies in Poland*, Institute of Space Economy, University of Warsaw.

Handbook of Urban Fiscal Data by P.E. Mouritzen and K. Nielsen, 1988, Odense Universitet.

W. Konieczny, 1983 *Finansowoprawne instrumenty polityki budżetowej władz lokalnych*, [in:] M. Kulesza (ed.) *Model władzy*

lokalnej w systemie reformy gospodarczej, Wydział Prawa i Adminitracji UW.

J. Kornai, 1980, *Economy of Shortages*, North Holland.

P.E.Mouritzen,1987, *The Local Politician : Loyal to the Party or responsive to the Local Constituency*, Scandinavian Political Studies no 2.

P.E. Mouritzen, 1989, *What is a Fiscal Crisis?* [in:] P.E. Mouritzen (ed.) *Defending City Welfare. Urban Innovation in 10 Western Countries.*

P.E. Mouritzen, 1990 *Normative Theories of Local Government reforms*, paper presented at the FAUI Meeting on "Reforms Strategies for Local Government in a Time of Transitions. Eastern and Western Experiences", Radziejowice, Poland, April, 20-23.

E. Ruśkowski, 1989 *Założenia reformy finansów lokalnych w Polsce w świetle rozwiązań i doświadczeń wybranych krajów socjalistycznych i kapitalistycznych*, archiwum CPBP 09.8.

J. Stankiewicz, 1989, *Zmiany zasad podziału terenowego i podstawowe problemy terenowej gospodarki finansowej w Ludowej Republice Bułgarii*, [in:] E. Ruśkowski (ed.) *Finanse lokalne w wybranych krajach socjalistycznych i kapitalistycznych*, Białystok.

P. Swianiewicz, 1989, *Społeczno-ekonomiczna typologia miast i gmin w Polsce*, Biuletyn CPBP 09.8, z. 19.

J. Szczepański, 1989, *Poland : Facing the Future*, Regional and Local Studies no 3, Institute of Space Economy, University of Warsaw.

J.J. Wiatr, 1983, *Władza lokalna wobec kryzysu*, Instytut Socjologii. Uniwersytet Warszawski.

J.J. Wiatr, 1987, *Władza lokalna w warunkach kryzysu*, Instytut Socjologii. Uniwersytet Warszawski.

Figure 2. Fiscal slack index in rural and urban areas

	urban municipalities	rural communes	total
fiscal situation (1985)			
– very good	15	11	26
– good	27	24	51
– average	26	61	87
– bad	7	34	41
– very bad	2	29	31
FSI			
1985	100	100	100
1986	114.7	106.9	109.6
1987	105.1	105.8	105.6
grants per capita			
1985 (average = 100)	113	95	100
1987 (1985 = 100)	103	112	109
correlation of fiscal situation in 1985 with FSI 1987/1985	-.03	-.3	-.35

Figure 3. Fiscal slack index in main regions

	Wielkopolska	Recovered Territories	Kongresówka	Galicja
fiscal situation (1985)				
– very good	8	8	8	2
– good	6	19	18	8
– average	10	22	37	15
– bad	6	6	19	10
– very bad	1	1	22	7
FSI				
1985	100	100	100	100
1987	108.2	96.1	106.2	114.2
grants per capita				
1985 (average = 100)	84	116	96	102
1987 (1985 = 100)	110	102	105	128
correlation of fiscal situation in 1985 with FSI 1987/1985	-.42	-.13	.06	-.32

Figure 4. Strategies in rural and urban areas (indications in %)

	urban municipalities	rural communes	total
reduction of expenditures			
– on administration	11.4	11.2	11.2
– other current	7.0	5.2	5.9
– capital	1.9	2.4	2.0
– postponing of cap. exp.	3.8	3.6	3.7
– cuts in subsidies	27.8	12.5	17.4
increase revenues			
– loans	31.6	39.5	36.9
– more grants	47.8	65.1	59.5
– red. of regions' shares	45.6	46.2	46.0
– taxes from socialized sector	25.9	23.1	23.8
– taxes from private sector	13.3	14.0	13.7
innovations			
– cooperation with other communes	7.0	7.6	7.4
– transfer of some functions	20.9	14.6	16.4
– management	16.5	12.5	13.8
– new technologies	10.1	4.3	6.2
– new local enterprises	66.7	62.8	64.0
– stimulation of private sector	61.7	65.9	64.5
– other	14.6	5.8	8.6

Figure 5. Strategies in main regions (indications in %)

	Wielkopolska	Recovered Territories	Kongresówka	Galicja
reduction of expenditures				
– on administration	7	8	16	7
– other current	3	4	8	5
– capital	1	2	1	2
– postponing of cap. exp.	4	5	3	6
– cuts in subsidies	15	19	17	19
increase revenues				
– loans	36	42	37	33
– more grants	42	54	66	61
– red. of regions' shares	52	62	40	37
– taxes from socialized sector	27	28	22	23
– taxes from private sector	10	19	13	9
innovations				
– cooperation with other communes	4	12	4	12
– transfer of some functions	18	22	15	17
– management	13	18	14	11
– new technologies	7	14	4	1
– new local enterprises	57	65	65	65
– stimulation of private sector	58	65	69	62
– other	9	12	5	13

Bohdan Jałowiecki
Faculté de Géographie et d'Régionales
Institut de l'Economie Spatiale
Université de Varsovie

LES ELITES LOCALES, OU LE DEPART POUR LA DEMOCRATIE

L'étude des disparités sociales des structures locales réalisée dans le cadre du Programme CPBP 09.8 "Développement régional – Développement local – Autonomie territoriale", a démontré assez nettement le caractère distinctif de l'équipe exerçant le pouvoir dans une agglomération donnée, dont les membres peuvent être appelés leaders ou élite locale du pouvoir. Il est intéressant de savoir qui en fait partie et quels sont les critéres de leur recrutement? Les investigations du Programme fournissent un matériel assez étendu, susceptible d'être utilisé pour répondre à la question ainsi formulée. Une tentative de présentation plus exhaustive de ce problème n'a pas seulement une signification théorique, car elle permet de répondre encore à une autre question: dans quelle mesure les élites locales du pouvoir, compte tenu de leur composition et de leur structure, sont enclines à soutenir ou au contraire à freiner les actions réformatrices entreprises par les organes centraux de décision politique et administrative? Dans quelle mesure ces élites locales peuvent-elles servir de base aux prochaines collectivités autonomes locales et à leur administration?

A.Z. Kamiński distingue deux groupes dans le cadre de la classe politique existant auparavant en Pologne: l'élite intérieure et l'élite extérieure. Le caractère distinctif du premier groupe est une relation étroite entre la carrière politique et la carrière administrative, un degré d'hermé-ticité relativement élevé, un système de recrutement très spécifique – souvent parmi les organisations de jeunesse –, de fortes attaches avec la structure institutionnelle existante. L'élite extérieure, par contre, ce sont les individus qui ont atteint leur position en alliant – dans des proportions par ailleurs différentes – des éléments de la carrière politique et de la carrière professionnelle. Les représentants de ce groupe sont plus ouverts au point de vue intellectuel et plus liés à la société, et leur condition dépend

dans une grande mesure de la structure institutionnelle en place. Ce groupe se distingue également par un plus grand sentiment de solidarité tant envers l'élite intérieure qu'envers le reste de la société (A.Z. Kamiński, 1988, p. 6).

L'élite extérieure, appelée déjà auparavant peut-être moins élégamment constellation satellite de l'ancien pouvoir, ne se rencontrait que dans les plus grandes agglomérations urbaines. Dans les structures locales, par contre, nous avions affaire à l'élite intérieure.

"L'élite intérieure, constate A.Z. Kamiński, se recrute culturellement dans des milieux sociaux spécifiques, avec cette remarque que le degré de spécificité de la base de recrutement de cette partie de l'élite est susceptible de changer dans le temps... Cette constatation assez précise ne devrait pas cacher le fait que la notion même de spécificité n'est pas très claire, et il est difficile d'y appliquer des mesures quantitatives univoques quelconques, voire des indices qualitatifs. Cette question est cependant suffisamment importante dans le contexte de la problématique étudiée qu'il n'est guère possible d'y renoncer. On peut trouver une confirmation indirecte de la thèse formulée ci-dessus dans toute une série de recherches sociologiques. Premièrement, toutes les études sur la stratification sociale démontrent une absence de corrélation statistique entre la grandeur du prestige et la grandeur du pouvoir (p. ex. les études de W. Wesołowski, A. Sarapata, M. Pochoski et K. Słomczynski). Deuxièmement, les études de J. Wasilewski ayant pour objet les carrières des directeurs d'unions industrielles, qui ont été effectuées vers la fin des années soixante-dix, démontrent que les carrières "politiques" dans l'administration économique sont le fait d'individus originaires de la campagne ou de petites villes des régions les moins évoluées, c'est-à-dire de la Pologne de l'Est et du Sud-Est. Un autre terrain de recrutement non touché dans les recherches de J. Wasilewski est la Silésie. Toutefois, malgré que c'est un territoire fortement industrialisé, ses intérêts sont également liés au maintien de formes d'industrialisation et d'un ordre politico-économique dépassés. Troisièmement, cette thèse est également confirmée par les recherches de l'équipe de J. Wiatr sur le pouvoir local. A. Jasińska-Kania a constaté que les parents des dirigeants de l'appareil politique du pouvoir – dans les voïvodies concernées – ont une instruction beaucoup moins élevée que les parents des chefs de l'administration économique. D'où ce sentiment de promotion bien établi au sein de ce groupe. Le monde de recrutement serait donc, sous cet

aspect, la cause du manque de corrélation entre la grandeur du pouvoir et la grandeur du prestige" (A.Z. Kamiński, 1988, pp. 5-6).

Le texte cité ci-dessus nous rapproche de la problématique des élites locales analysée dans le présent ouvrage. Qui peut-on donc ranger dans ce groupe? Dans les études ayant pour but de désigner les leaders, on utilise habituellement deux techniques, à savoir: la technique des positions, qui consiste à énumérer les positions formellement importantes dans la structure locale concernée, ainsi que la technique de la réputation, qui consiste à demander à des experts sociaux qui de leur avis a la plus grande influence sur les décisions à prendre. La première manière met au jour les positions dans la structure formelle du pouvoir, lors que la seconde permet éventuellement de mettre au jour les positions occupées dans les structures informelles.

Dans les études réalisées dans 32 communes des voïvodies du Nord-Ouest, on a établi la liste des fonctions décidant de l'appartenance à l'élite locale du pouvoir. Dans le cas de petites communes rurales, ce sont: le chef de la commune, le Ier secrétaire du comité de commune du Parti ouvrier unifié polonais (POUP), le président du conseil municipal, le président de la Société coopérative communale, le commandant du poste de milice, le directeur de l'exploitation agricole d'Etat, plus rarement le président de la coopérative de production, le président du parti agraire et éventuellement les directeurs d'entreprises de production. Dans les plus grandes agglomérations, le groupe des leaders comprenait également les autres secrétaires du comité du POUP, les présidents du tribunal et du parquet, le directeur de la banque, etc. La liste des fonctions ainsi établie ne correspond pas étroitement, ce qui est d'ailleurs évident, à l'appareil formel du pouvoir politique et administratif, mais s'applique en règle générale à une certaine structure institutionnelle. Il est vrai que dans l'une des communes consultées a été cité le nom d'une femme qui, de l'avis général, exerçait une grande influence sur le pouvoir de décision, mais il s'agissait de l'épouse du Ier secrétaire de l'organisation locale du POUP, remplissant le rôle incontesté d'éminence grise.

Dans un total de 466 membres des élites locales du pouvoir, on notait la prédominance des hommes d'âge moyen. La plupart d'entre eux était originaires de la campagne, les deux tiers étaient nés dans une commune autre que celle de leur actuel lieu de résidence. Les pères des personnes interrogées étaient dans une plus grande mesure des ruraux et des natifs

d'autres communes que celles du domicile des personnes prenant part au sondage. Cela est évident, car les sondages avaient été effectués dans les territoires recouvrés à l'ouest, où il est difficile de parler d'enracinement des familles depuis une longue suite de générations. La plupart des membres interrogés des élites locales du pouvoir habitaient dans la localité de leur lieu de travail, mais un sur dix venait travailler d'en dehors de la commune concernée. Une grande majorité des leaders locaux du pouvoir était d'origine paysanne ou ouvrière, seulement un sur neuf provenait de la classe des intellectuels.

Il convient d'attirer l'attention sur le haut niveau d'instruction des personnes sollicitées: plus de la moitié étaient des diplômés d'une grande école et le tiers avaient une instruction secondaire. Seuls 12 représentants de l'élite locale du pouvoir n'avaient qu'une instruction élémentaire. Plus des trois quarts des élites locales du pouvoir étaient membres du POUP, la majorité (66 p. 100) remplissait une fonction rémunérée ou bénévole au sein de l'appareil du Parti.

Sont d'un grand intérêt également les informations sur les rapports réciproques entre les élites locales du pouvoir et sur leurs relations avec les élites voïvodiennes. C'est ainsi que plus de la moitié des personnes questionnées connaissent leurs homologues dans les communes avoisinantes et ont avec eux des contacts sporadiques; un pourcentage semblable de l'échantillon sondé connaît bien un personnage influent à l'échelon voïvodien et le rencontre de temps en temps (A. Głowacki, 1988).

Nous disposons également des résultats d'un sondage sur la stratégie des autorités locales, effectué parmi les chefs de commune et les présidents des conseils populaires à l'échelon le plus bas de 244 unités territoriales de la Pologne tout entière. Les coordonnées des personnes interrogées confirment les renseignements recueillis auparavant et relatifs aux caractéristiques des représentants des élites locales du pouvoir (Cf. J. Bartkowski, A. Kowalczyk, P. Swianiewicz, 1990).

Sont aussi intéressantes les données concernant la composition des organes locaux de l'administration publique. Comme il en résulte des recherches de T. Grzeszczyk réalisées en 1988, l'administration publique locale employait environ 100 000 salariés dans les années 1975-1981. Une réduction notable intervint en 1981: le nombre des travailleurs est tombé à 89 000. Dans le même temps, l'appareil administratif central augmenta ses effectifs de 35 000 à 43 000. L'auteur du sondage considère que cela est dû à la centralisation de l'administration à la suite de l'instauration de

l'"état de guerre" en décembre 1981. Dès 1983, les emplois dans les services publics locaux ne cessèrent d'augmenter systématiquement, pour atteindre en 1986 le chiffre de 128 000 travailleurs, puis ils diminuèrent d'environ 2 p. 100, alors que dans l'administration centrale leur réduction fut de presque 8 p. 100.

Au cours des dernières années, le pourcentage des fonctionnaires de l'administration publique locale augmentait: il atteignait 50 p. 100 dans les services publics voïvodiens; il continuait cependant d'être peu élevé à la base – 19 p. 100, et surtout dans les communes – 15 p. 100. Les travailleurs de l'administration publique étaient relativement jeunes: dans les services voïvodiens, les personnes ayant jusqu'à 39 ans constituaient 50 p. 100 du total, celles qui avaient plus de 49 ans étaient au nombre de 23 p. 100: dans les services publics communaux, les chiffres correspondants étaient respectivement de 75 p. 100 et 8 p. 100. Quelque 40 p. 100 des fonctionnaires de l'administration locale avaient une ancienneté de service de plus de dix ans, mais toutefois 16 p. 100 d'entre eux étaient en fonction moins d'un an et 25 p. 100 de deux à cinq ans.

Selon l'importance de la fonction, il était constaté une progression du niveau d'instruction et de l'appartenance au POUP. C'est ainsi que dans les services publics voïvodiens, plus de 90 p. 100 des directeurs de division étaient membres du POUP, ainsi que 49 p. 100 des inspecteurs de première classe, cela concernant les postes obtenus par nomination. Parmi les personnes exerçant une fonction élective, le pourcentage des membres du POUP est encore plus élevé. Les présidents de toutes les villes et ls chefs de tous les quartiers des grandes villes étaient tous membres du POUP. Parmi les chefs de ville, il y en avait 97 p. 100 qui appartenaient au POUP, ce pourcentage était presque le même parmi les chefs de commune urbaine (91 p. 100) et encore plus bas chez les chefs de commune rurale.

Dans le groupe des fonctionnaires des unités administrative de base, le nombre des membres du POUP était très élevé également. Parmi les secrétaires des municipalités urbaines-rurales, le taux d'appartenance au POUP s'élevait à 75 p. 100, et il était presque égal dans le groupe des secrétaires des communes rurales (75 p. 100). Le nombre des membres du POUP parmi les chefs de service était de 60 p. 100, et de 56 p. 100 dans le groupe des chefs de service adjoints. Parmi les cadres subalternes, le taux d'appartenance était déjà moins élevé: respectivement de 26 p. 100 et 38 p. 100.

Outre les données statistiques, l'ouvrage susmentionné de T. Grzesz-

czyk renferme également d'autres observations intéressantes. L'auteur constate que l'emploi dans l'administration publique a souvent un caractère accidentel et est considéré comme provisoire, aussi longtemps que la personne concernée n'eût pas trouvé ou plutôt obtenu – dans le cadre de la nomenklatura – un meilleur travail. Cela est compréhensible, car les émoluments dans l'Administration étaient de plusieurs dizaines pour cent inférieurs aux salaires proposés dans les entreprises de production. Parmi les personnes employées dans l'administration publique, il n'existe guère de sentiment d'appartenance à la collectivité des fonctionnaires d'Etat, ce qui est tout à fait compréhensible en l'occurrence. Outre la nécessité d'attendre un certain avant de trouver un meilleur emploi ou de se voir attribuer un poste dans la fonction publique grâce à la recommandation du POUP, il existe souvent d'autres motifs d'entrer dans l'Administration, à savoir: raisons familiales, ou possibilité de bénéficier de certains privilèges, tels que l'octroi de parcelles de terre (jardin collectif, terrain pour résidence de week-end), ou auparavant l'obtention d'un bon pour achat d'une voiture (sans l'attente habituelle et au prix officiel qui était inférieur au prix du marché). Dans les zones rurales, l'entrée dans l'administration publique donnait la possibilité d'associer les occupations officielles aux occupations non officielles. Les fonctionnaires travaillent donc souvent dans les exploitations agricoles, horticoles ou artisanales appartenant à des membres de leur famille.

L'auteur cité ci-dessus écrit: "Ceci concerne surtout les travailleurs des municipalités des communes rurales et des communes urbaines-rurales. En période d'intensification des travaux champêtres, les employés de bureau s'occupent de leur exploitation quelques heures avant d'aller au bureau, puis s'y reposent quelques heures et reviennent travailler à la ferme... La possibilité d'un tel mode d'existence constitue l'un des facteurs incitant à prendre du service dans l'administration publique (...) La pratique d'association du service dans l'Administration avec le travail dans l'exploitation agricole se rencontre plus souvent dans les territoires de la Pologne dans ses frontières de 1939, tandis qu'elle est nettement plus rare dans les territoires recouvrés à l'ouest" (T. Grzeszczyk, 1988).

L'image qui se dégage de cette analyse montre clairement que les élites locales et régionales du pouvoir se recrutaient presque uniquement parmi les membres du POUP et bénéficiaient également d'un soutien notable de la part de l'appareil exécutif maîtrisé parle Parti. De l'appartenance à l'élite décidait donc non pas la position sociale ou économique occupée

dans le milieu considéré, mais le fait d'appartenir à la nomenklatura du POUP. Au contraire des pays occidentaux, où de l'appartenance à l'élite du pouvoir décide avant tout la situation de l'individu dans la société, la position sociale en Pologne dépendait de la nomination a une fonction membre de l'élite du pouvoir. Les notables locaux ne se recrutaient pas d'une manière naturelle parmi les milieux et groupes de pression locaux, mais dans une classe politique extérieure à la communauté locale. Bien entendu, cela ne les empêchait pas, dès l'obtention de la fonction dans la structure locale du pouvoir, de vouloir donner leur soutien et de le fournir réellement à des groupes de pression. Les membres de l'élité locale du pouvoir ne se situaient cependant pas principalement par rapport à la communauté dans laquelle ils exerçaient leurs activités, mais par rapport à la classe politique à laquelle ils appartenaient, car leur carrière et leur sort personnel dépendaient de la position qu'ils y occupaient et de leur état de disponibilité. Dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions, ils épousent moins les intérêts du milieu où ils exercent leurs activités, que les intérêts primordiaux de leur classe politique. Par conséquent, les élites locales du pouvoir devaient nécessairement avoir une orientation alocale, voire parfois antilocale. Cela ne favorisait certes pas la réalisation des intérêts des collectivités respectives, ni même les processus de développement local.

En parlant des élites locales du pouvoir, nous n'avons pas fait état jusqu'à présent des conseillers muncipaux, élus au suffrage universel, qui décident – théoriquement au moins –, en commun, des principaux problèmes inhérents à une communauté donnée. Le mode de désignation des conseiller municipaux ne leur permettait cependant pas d'être les représentants des groupes respectifs existant dans la communauté locale, ni même les représentants d'intérêts déterminés quelconques. La désignation des candidats à la fonction de conseiller municipal se faisait selon un système-clé précis. Le critère essentiel en était, bien entendu, l'appartenance à un parti. On définissait en premier lieu le pourcentage des membres du Parti ouvrier unifié polonais, du Parti agraire unifié, du Parti démocrate et des sans-parti, le critère suivant concernant les institutions, car les représentants des principaux établissements de travail devaient se trouver au sein du conseil municipal. La profession du candidat était un autre critère: au conseil municipal devait faire partie un pourcentage approprié de représentants des ouvriers, des paysans, les travailleurs intellectuels, et parmi ces derniers une représentation adéquate des services

de santé, de l'instruction publique, de la culture, etc. Il fallait également prévoir une certaine proportion de jeunes, de femmes, etc.

Le système de désignation des candidats au poste de conseiller municipal provoquait cependant la présence dans cet organisme de personnes tout à fait accidentelles, car il était parfois très difficile, dans un milieu donné, de trouver, par exemple, une sans-parti âgée de 35 ans au maximum, qui serait en fonction dans l'enseignement et habiterait dans un quartier déterminé de l'agglomération. Il s'agit là d'un cas authentique de candidate élue, dans les années soixante-dix, dans la voïvodie de Katowice. Les candidats élus d'après le principe de la moyenne des caractéristiques prédéterminées n'avaient souvent pas du tout les capacités indispensables pour exercer cette fonction, n'étaient pas connus en dehors de leur entourage le plus proche, et en fait ne représentaient qu'eux-mêmes lorsqu'ils n'appartenaient à aucune organisation. En tant que membres d'un parti ou d'une organisation, par contre, les représentaient tout d'abord ses intérêts, mais non pas les intérêts des groupes respectifs de la communauté locale. C'est ainsi qu'étaient élus les conseils municipaux (conseils populaires), dont les membres étaient désignés à l'avance selon les critères imposés, puis soumis au suffrage universel qui ne laissait aucune liberté d'action aux électeurs. Une réussite en son genre de la dernière loi électorale se rapportant aux élections pour les conseils populaires, qui eurent lieu en 1988, fut la présentation de listes – dans les circonscriptions où il n'y avait qu'un seul siège à pouvoir – de deux candidats du même parti politique et travaillant dans la même institution. Tout à fait humoristique était, par exemple, l'élection d'un conseiller dans un circonscription où il avait que deux candidats sur les rangs, tous deux travaillant dans des services de la milice civique. Rien donc d'étonnat à ce que les citoyens aient renoncé en assez grand nombre à participer à ces élections.

Des conseils municipaux ainsi choisis ne pouvaient pas, bien entendu, constituer un facteur actif de stimulation du développement des communautés locales, et n'étaient qu'un ornement "démocratique" pour les élites locales du pouvoir. Toutefois, même dans cette situation, il arrivait que les conseillers municipaux ne voulaient pas voter pour des "parachutés" – voïvode, président de ville, chef de commune –, parfois même ils s'opposaient aux initiatives entreprises par l'Administration.

Le système adopté de recrutement du pouvoir local et de cooptation des élites locales ainsi que le mode de leur fonctionnement entraînaient leur éloignement de la communauté locale. Parmi les différentes significations

du mot aliénation, qui sont utilisées dans la littérature sociologique, il est possible d'en distinguer au moins trois pour nos besoins, à savoir: 1) impossibilité de pouvoir influer efficacement sur le déroulement des événements extérieurs; 2) attribution de peu de valeur aux objectifs hautement appréciés dans le système donné; 3) conviction qu'un comportement condamné par la société est indispensable pour atteindre des objectifs hautement appréciés (Cf. M. Seeman, 1959). Toutes ces acceptions citées du mot aliénation sont applicables au problème du pouvoir local, qui est traité dans cet ouvrage.

Lors d'une enquête sur l'incidence de l'industrialisation subite sur la communauté locale de la ville de Polkowice dans les années 60, j'ai analysé le processus d'aliénation du pouvoir local de cette agglomération, qui n'avait aucune influence non seulement sur la manière d'investir, mais aussi sur l'organisation de la vie quotidienne des habitants.

"Par aliénation du pouvoir local, il faut comprendre impossibilité de pouvoir influer efficacement sur le déroulement des événements extérieurs par rapport aux institutions directement concernées cependant. Indépendamment de l'aliénation du pouvoir, on voit s'accomplir également l'aliénation de la communauté locale et de certains individus, qui ont cessé d'exercer une influence sur le déroulement des événements par suite de l'aliénation du pouvoir qu'ils avaient choisi" (B. Jałowiecki, 1967, p. 149).

Cette constatation est toujours d'actualité aujourd'hui, car la situation où le pouvoir local perd toute possibilité de diriger le système dans lequel il fonctionne doit entraîner des conséquences dans la conscience des habitants et dans leur attitude envers le pouvoir en question. L'aliénation du pouvoir local n procédait cependant pas, comme ce me semblait à l'époque, uniquement de l'intervention dans la structure locale d'un facteur extérieur sous forme de grand investissement industriel, quoique évidemment cette situation influe également sur l'aliénation du pouvoir. La cause essentielle, c'est avant tout la centralisation, la hiérarchisation et la bureaucratisation des structures administratives. Si le facteur de légitimation du pouvoir local est non pas la volonté librement exprimée des citoyens, mais le vouloir de la classe politique dirigeante qui désigne ses fonctionnaires pour exercer le pouvoir local, ce pouvoir est alors doublement aliéné: d'une part par rapport à la communauté dans laquelle il s'exerce, d'autre part à cause de la position périphérique et subordonnée qu'il occupe par rapport à la classe politique qu'il représente.

Les représentants du pouvoir local agissaient dans des conditions de

double contrainte. En tant qu'exécutants des dispositions de la classe politique dirigeante, ils dépendaient totalement de cette dernière et devaient exécuter ses ordres, mais vivant et fonctionnant toutefois dans une communauté donnée, ils étaient sujets à l'influence de divers groupes de pression. Ils se trouvaient donc dans une situation de conflit de valeur et d'intérêts.

L'organisation politique de l'Etat, qui dure depuis presque quarante ans, ne pouvait évidemment rester sans influence sur l'attitude de la communauté locale à l'égard du pouvoir en général et du pouvoir local en particulier. Le pouvoir était considéré à la fois comme extérieur et imposé; c'était un tyran mais aussi un bienfaiteur. Le pouvoir garantissait à tout le monde du travail, distribuait des logements et d'autres biens hautement appréciés. Dans le même temps, il contrôlait et réglementait les comportements des individus, interdissant toute action qui dépasserait les limites imposées. Rien donc d'étonnant, dans cette situation, à ce que des attitudes aliénantes et revendicatrices se soient formées non seulement dans les communautés locales, mais aussi dans la société tout entière. Les hypothèses formulées ci-dessus sont confirmées par les études réalisées dans le cadre du Programme "Développement régional – Développement local – Autonomie territoriale".

Dans les intéressantes études de W. Gumuła portant sur l'attitude des représentants du pouvoir local à l'égard du pouvoir politique central de l'Etat, on trouve une esquisse d'un modèle de fonctionnaire et de la fonction publique dans la conscience des membres du système local du pouvoir. L'auteur en question a étudie – dans deux villages de la voïvodie de Rzeszów – l'élite du pouvoir qui se recrute dans le personnel d'encadrement des institutions de l'administration publique, des organisations économiques et des institutions sociales et politiques, ainsi que l'élite d'influence, dont les membres se recrutent parmi des groupes de pression variés et exercent leur influence sur l'élite du pouvoir.

Il s'est avéré que, de l'opinion des personnes innerrogées, la plupart des membres de ces élites recherchent avant tout leur avantage personnel, ne font que très peu pour la communauté, qu'il n'y a parmi eux aucun militant authentique et que nombre d'affaires ne peuvent être réglées que contre remise de pots-de-vin. Comme il en résulte de ces études, l'image du militant local – d'après les leaders locaux eux-mêmes – n'est guère très avantageuse. Cette opinion serait certainement encore plus mauvaise si de simples citoyens s'étaient exprimés à ce sujet.

De l'érosion croissante du pouvoir local étaient déjà conscients, dès 1988, les représentants de celui-ci. En effet, dans l'intéressant ouvrage intitulé "Rapport de la Pologne communale", réalisé par le Centre de Sondage d'Opinion Publique en 1989, nous lisons:

"Le système dirigiste-distributif, selon les représentants du pouvoir local, fonctionnait bien aussi longtemps que la distribution des biens de production et de consommation était une chance réelle et la plus grande de les obtenir. En période de crime, lorsque les attributions de marchandises déficitaires ont diminué et qu'il n'y a donc plus rien à distribuer, le pouvoir doit changer son style de travail et son attitude vis-à-vis de la population afin de pouvoir se maintenir en place. Son activité doit être axée sur la satisfaction des besoins fondamennaux de la communauté locale. L'enquêteur réalisant pour le compte du Centre de Sondage d'Opinion Publique un sondage sur ce sujet constate: 'Toutes ces personnes (chefs de commune, présidents de coopératives rurales, secrétaires communaux du POUP, etc.) vivaient confortablement dans le système dirigiste-distributif aussi longtemps que leurs besoins (et ceux de la commune) étaient assouvis jusqu'à concurrence du tiers ou du quart. Aussi longtemps qu'elles pouvaient, ne fût-ce que partiellement satisfaire les exigences de la population au moyen de bons pour biens divers et d'attributions préférentielles, elles sentaient que le pouvoir était réellement dans leurs mains... Lorsque les attributions préférentielles cessèrent, quand le pouvoir central ne fut plus en mesure de satisfaire ce minimum indispensable pour exercer le pouvoir, il dut enoncer à gouverner dans le style ancien... L'échelon communal du pouvoir comprit qu'à partir de ce moment il doit avoir de bons rapports avec la population pour pouvoir se maintenir, car le pouvoir central a fermé son parapluie protecteur sous lequel s'abritait l'administration locale'."

Aussi, l'orientation nouvelle naissante du pouvoir local procéderait non pas de convictions démocratiques, mais plutôt des circonstances pénibles dues à la crise. Nous lisons dans le rapport sus-cité: "Des entretiens avec les secrétaires des comités communaux du POUP, il résultait que leurs comportements envers les habitants de la commune et leur manière d'agir dépendent, dans une grande mesure, selon que les fonctionnaires de l'appareil du parti étaient des 'parachutés' ou bien des gens du pays. Les premiers étaient en général une attitude moins critique à l'égard de ce qui se passait tant dans la commune que dans la 'centrale'. Dans les conversations, ils déclaraient accepter toutes les initiatives locales, alors qu'en

pratique il s'avérait qu'ils ne se tornaient le plus souvent qu'à réaliser les directives de leurs supérieurs. Ils ne voulaient rien changer ni rien réformer. Ils s'efforçaient visiblement de s'adapter au ton général du pouvoir local et d'adoucir les conflits entre la commune et l'administration centrale, ou faisaient semblant de ne pas les percevoir. Le plus souvent, ils dénoncaient le particularisme en tant que mal essentiel, et c'est pourquoi ils n'étaient pas enclins à favoriser la promotion des hommes d'action locaux. Ils affirmaient catégoriquement que 'le Parti doit être ferme en matière de nomination à des postes supérieurs, sinon il perdra le pouvoir'".

Dans les études susmentionnées, W. Gumuła s'était intéressé à l'attitude des membres de l'élite locale du pouvoir envers l'appareil politique central de l'Etat. La majorité des personnes interrogées n'avait qu'une idée très vague sur la structure formelle du pouvoir central et de son rôle au sein du système politique de l'Etat. Seuls environ 50 pour 100 des personnes concernées étaient en mesure de citer nommément quatre des principales institutions centrales du pays. Parmi les membres de l'élite d'influence, le niveau de savoir était encore plus bas. Outre la désignation des noms des institutions centrales de l'Etat, rares étaient les représentants des deux catégories de fonctionnaires interrogés qui pouvaient en donner une caractéristique plus détaillée.

"Le degré de connaissance des institutions, déclare W. Gumuła, est strictement lié à l'expérience personnelle des personnes interviewées. Dans le cas de la plupart des personnes de la structure locale du pouvoir, les relations personnelles, le règlement de différentes affaires, etc., sont les principales prémisses du savoir sur les institutions. Les activités intellectuelles ne jouent ici qu'un rôle mineur".

Les membres du pouvoir local perçoivent le pouvoir central sous ses aspects individuels plutôt que sous le point de vue des rôles politiques remplis par les personnes concernées. Sur les personnes interrogées, 60 p. 100 n'étaient en mesure d'indiquer que les noms des personnalités exerçant la plus grande influence sur la vie sociale et politique en Pologne, 25 p. 100 indiquèrent les noms et les fonctions, 10 p. 100 ne donnèrent que les fonctions.

Le niveau des connaissances des représentants de l'élite locale du pouvoir surles questions juridiques est vraiment piteux: 19 p. 100 des personnes sollicitées ne connaissent aucune loi relative au fonctionnement de l'administration publique, 21 p. 100 en indiquent une, 21 p. 100 également en citent deux, 10 p. 100 en mentionnent trois, seulement 29 p.

100 se prévalent d'en connaître quatre et plus. Pour terminer cette partie des résultats de ses recherches, W. Gumuła tire la conclusion suivante:

"Lors de l'arrangement d'un certain nombre d'affaires, le pouvoir local ne se soumet pas aux réglementations émises par les institutions centrales (au moins aux réglementations formelles – note de B.J.). Il fait peu de cas ou ne tient pas compte du tout des interventions des institutions centrales ('ne faites pas attention à l'empereur, l'empereur ne sait pas de quoi il peut s'agir dans tout cela – K. Vonnegut'). Or, des réponses obtenues à toute une série de questions sur le style de fonctionnement du pouvoir local, il résulte que dans les deux structures locales du pouvoir s'est formé un certain usage politique, un certain type de culture politique qui n'est que très peu sensible aux changements des structures normatives en provenance des institutions centrales. Cela s'exprime dans les actions autonomes des structures locales du pouvoir et dans la pétrification de l'usage politique. Les changements intervenant dans les actes normatifs ne mènent guère à des changemens dans le style de fonctionnement du pouvoir local. Dans cette situation, il est possible de constater une méconnaissance des institutions centrales et des actes normatifs à portée nationale" (W. Gumuła, 1988).

Du degré d'aliénation des élites locales du pouvoir témoigne également l'énorme manque de confiance dans les instances supérieures du pouvoir. Une confiance très grande et grande dans les instances voïvodiennes du pouvoir est le fait de 23 p. 100 des personnes interrogées, contre 9 p. 100 à peine lorsqu'il s'agit du pouvoir central. Des résultats semblables ont été obtenus en ce qui concerne la question du contrôle des instances supérieures du pouvoir de la part de la société. Si ce contrôle est possible dans le cas du pouvoir local dans une proportion de 63 p. 100, il ne l'est plus qu'à 24 p. 100 pour le pouvoir de voïvodie et à 8 p. 100 pour le pouvoir central.

Les études caractérisées ci-dessus dénotent un degré élevé d'aliénation des représentants des élits locales du pouvoir, qui fon partie – il est vrai – de la classe politique dirigeante du fait des fonctions exercées et de leur appartenance au Parti, mais ne s'identifie que très faiblement à celle-ci, car elles y occupent quand même une situation périphérique. Les résultats de l'enquête de W. Gumuła sont corroborés indirectement par le rapport susmentionné du Centre de Sondage d'Opinion Publique, d'où il découle que le pouvoir central est en géneral mal apprécié par les représentants des structures locales du pouvoir.

Le pouvoir local, dans ses actions, mène un genre de jeu avec les instances supérieures de l'administration publique, qui consiste dans l'obtention de ressources décisionnaires extralocales et qui est décrit de la sorte par Z. Zychowicz: "Il s'agit d'un groupe spécifique d'actions des dirigeants communaux, qui s'avèrent indispensables à la réalisation de nombre d'affaires sur le plan local, car la commune ne dispose que d'une marge très restreinte d'autonomie et de possibilités. Nous pouvons partager ces actions en action formelles et informelles et en action qui seraient la résultante des deux précédentes. Des premières font partie toutes les interventions effectuées par voie officielle, qui ont pour objectif l'agumentation des fonds budgétaires accordés par l'administration voïvodienne, l'accroissement des parts attribués de biens réglementés, l'insertion des projets d'investissement communaux dans les plans voïvodiens, la localisation dans la commune des projets de l'administration voïvodienne, etc.... Parmi les communes concernées, il n'y en avait probablement aucune qui n'aurait fait l'objet d'une partie au moins des interventions susmentionnées. Dans plusieurs des communes, les représentants du pouvoir ont constaté que le meilleur moyen d'assurer l'efficacité des initiatives en vue de l'obtention des fonds nécessaires au démarrage d'un projet d'investissement est de commencer la réalisation de ce projet important pour la commune, car il est entendu que l'échelon voïvodien en viendra à assigner les fonds indispensables pour achever les travaux à degré d'avancement élevé en cas de manque de moyens financiers ou techniques. Dans ces cas-là, la politique des faits accomplis aide à l'obtention des fonds nécessaires.

Lors de l'appréciation du degré d'efficacité de ce genre de manoeuvres, il convient de constater que cette efficacité est limitée, car nous avons affaire ici à des actions qui rappellent quelque peu les règles du jeu à total zéro. Donc, si une commune réussit à se voir attribuer des fonds, c'est certainement au détriment d'autres communes.

Lors de l'analyse des actions informelles, il se trouve qu'elles sont vraiment difficiles à décrire avec précision, car elles sont habituellement inaccessibles au chercheur en raison du manque de traces dans la documentation, et compte tenu aussi d'une certaine réticence en la matière de la part des dirigeants intéressés. Selon les renseignements que nous possédons, il résulte que, dans la plupart des communes, au moins un des leaders "connaît quelqu'un" à l'échelon administratif voïvodien, sur la bienveillance duquel il peut compter, dans une certaine mesure, sur le plan

des affaires relevant de sa compétence. Une partie des personnages influents à l'échelon voïvodien est orginaire des communes concernées. Ces personnages sont considérés come des protecteurs, et les autorités de ces communes leur sont redevables de fonds considérables. Toute rare visite d'un tel protecteur fait queles autorités locales prennent grand soin que leur hôte passe agréablement le temps. Les autoritées des communes où les notables voïvodiens ont leur résidence secondaire peuvent compter sur une certaine reconnaissance de ceux-ci.

Sont également dans une excellente situation les communes où a son domicile habituel un député ou un membre du Comité central du POUP. Dans de nombreux cas, un tel personnage est en mesure de faire beaucoup grâce à ses relations au niveau de la voïvodie. Fait également partie des actions informelles l'octroi d'avantages matériels à ceux qui accordent des fonds à titre préférentiel... Chaque commune possède son représentant tutélaire au sein du Comité voïvodien du POUP, mais de la plupart d'entre eux – considération prise de leur rang – ne peuvent pas faire beaucoup, bien que ayons appris dans certains communes que certains d'entre eux ont été pressentis pour être représentants officiels de celles-ci auprès du pouvoir voïvodien. Dans plusieurs cas, les leaders des communes intéressées ont profité de la présence dans celle-ci des représentants du plus haut rang du pouvoir voïvodien pour présenter. A l'occasion de cérémonies officielles (ex. fête de la Moisson, inauguration de l'année scolaire), tant les réalisations communales que les problèmes existants.

L'intérêt porté aux problèmes de la commune par la presse sont des actions situées au point de contact des actions formelles et informelles. En cas de besoin particulièrement urgent et si la publication de presse est suffisamment convaincante, les résultantes des actions formelles et informelles sont susceptibles de devenir un facteur notable de soutien en faveur de la protection de l'environnement, des problèmes de l'instruction publique, etc. A ce genre d'action fait également partie... l'exemple suivant: dans l'une des communes, l'école élémentaire est située dans la ligne d'atterrissage d'avions à réaction. En dépit de sa situation en dehors de l'aéroport, dans le territoire de la commune, le ministère de la Défense nationale s'est cependant réservé le droit d'exclusivité de ce terrain. Les efforts du pouvoir local en vue de transférer l'école à un endroit plus calme n'avaient guère de chances d'être couronnés de succès, le coût de cet investissement étant énorme. Un événement tragique, la catastrophe d'un appareil à réaction à quelques centains de mètres de l'école, a fait que les

efforts des autorités communales ont trouvé l'appui d'un député-général qui est en train de régler les formalités nécessaires au ministère de la Défense nationale. Les autorités de la commune s'attendent à ce que ce problème soit réglé promptement et d'une manière d'autant plus avantageuse que, selon les affirmations du député-général, le ministère en question est disposé à couvrir une part importante des frais de cet investissement (Z. Zychowicz, 1987).

Les études dans le cadre du Programme CPBP 09.8 "Développement régional – Développement local – Autonomie régionale", présentés dans cet publication, ont été réalisées en 1987 et 1988, soit en période de crise croissante de la légitimation du pouvoir "communiste" en Pologne. Elles constituent une excellente base pour formuler des prévisions d'évolution des événements sur la scène politique locale.

L'apparition de nouveaux centres politiques décisonnaires et la mise en place d'un gouvernement non communiste ont créé une situation qualitativement nouvelle à l'échelon central. Mais les changements ne parviennent aux structures régionales et locales que très lentement et avec bien du mal. Cela est compréhensible: les membres de l'ancienne classe politique dirigeante s'efforcent de défendre les positions acquises, ce qui est devenu paradoxalement plus facile à partir de la dissolution du POUP en janvier 1990. De la scène politique a en effet disparu un adversaire bien organisé et facile à identifier, aussi les centres politiques décisionnaires nouveaux se sont-ils trouvés dans une sorte de vide. L'ancien adversaire n'est pas en mesure d'être remplacé par la "nomenklatura", car c'est là une notion assez abstraite, et les attaques dirigées contre l'ancien establishment intallé dans les structures régionales et locales ont donc en général un caractère chaotique. Ce sont tout d'abord des attaques contre les voïvodes, contre les chefs de ville et de commune, contre l'administration publique en général, et les griefs contre les fonctionnaires mis en cause sont souvent assez humoristiques. On leur reproche, par exemple, que les prix des produits alimentaires ont trop élevés dans le territoire concerné, ou queles entreprises procèdent à des licencements de travailleurs.

Ce mouvement, né à la base et stimulé par certains groupes décisionnaires politiques centraux, est critiqué lui-même par d'autres centres décisionnaires politiques. Certains des centres décisionnaires, agissant dans les structures les plus larges du syndicat "Solidarité", exigent des changements globaux immédiats dans l'administration publique régionale et locale, alors que d'autres centres décisionnaires attirent l'attention sur le

fait que nombre de travailleurs de l'administration publique sont des spécialistes hautement qualifiés, dont la loyauté politique est irréprochable, qu'il n'est guère possible de remplacer faute d'employés qualifiés.

Les deux parties semblent compter que le problème se résoudra bientôt tout naturellement, c'est-à-dire à l'issue des élections en vue de désigner les représentants du pouvoir local et dès la mise en place de collectivités se réclamant de l'autonomie territoriale. A partir de ce moment, "les collectivités locales prendront leurs propres affaires dans leurs mains" et il s'ensuivra une amélioration radicale de la situation. Il semble que la situation est toutefois beaucoup plus compliquée. Deux problèmes font émergence et méritent d'être analysés.

Le premier, c'est le problème de l'administration publique existante, qui devra se transformer en deux administrations indépendantes l'une de l'autre: l'administration gouvernemenale et l'administration autonome. Les travailleurs de l'ancienne administration publique peuvent faire l'objet d'une appréciation sous trois points de vue, à savoir: de la loyauté politique à l'égard du nouveau pouvoir,, de la compétence professionnelle et de la susceptibilité à la pensée novatrice. Malgré que la majorité des travailleurs de l'administration publique ait appartenu au POUP, on peut espérer que cette appartenance – pour nombre d'entre eux – n'avait pas du tout de causes idéologiques, qu'elle était plutôt instrumentale, et que des personnes étaient effectivement orientées critiquement envers la réalité du "socialisme réel" en Pologne. Le deuxième critère d'appréciation est la compétence professionnelle de cet appareil administratif. A l'échelon voïvodien, on peut parler de fonctionnaires à degré élevé de préparation spécialisée, alors qu'au niveau local, en particulier dans les villages et les petites villes, l'appareil administratif est désigné d'une manière plutôt accidentelle, est mal rémunéré, est caractérisé par des qualifications généralement assez basses, se distingue non seulement par une insuffisance d'instruction générale et spécialisée, mais aussi par une méconnaissance et un mépris des lois. Pour ce qui est du troisième point de vue, tout l'appareil administratif, même celui qui a les plus hautes qualifications, est contaminé par la manière de penser propre au "socialisme réel": il est caractérisé par la routine, une absence d'idées novatrices et d'esprit d'initiative, une prudence exagérée, une attente constante de directives qui viennent d'en haut.

Cette caractéristique de l'appareil administratif semble particulièrement défavorable et difficile à éliminer. Il est évident qu'il n'y aura pas

de possibilité, dans l'avenir le plus proche, de changer la totalité ou même la majorité de l'appareil actuel de l'administration publique. Il est assez vraisemblable, par ailleurs, quels fonctionnaires aux qualifications les plus élevées resteront dans l'administration publique ou y passeront dès la désignation des représentants des collectivités autonomes. Aussi, ces dernières sont-elles condamnées, surtout dans les petites agglomérations, à avoir un personnel des moins qualifiés, ou à engager des employés tout à fait nouveaux, non préparés au travail dans l'administration.

La manière de penser des gens élevés dans le "socialisme réel" est définie comme "esprit asservi" et caractérise non seulement les personnes faisant partie de la "nomenklatura", mais encore des couches beaucoup plus larges de la société. Certains représentants des Comités civiques de "Solidarité" se comportent de la même manière que les secrétaires des comités de l'ancien POUP et s'efforcent de donner des ordres par téléphone aux employés de l'administration, d'influer d'une façon informelle sur les décisions devant être prises. Il est évidemment difficile d'être étonné par ce genre de pratiques, dès lors que la société avait été élevée dans le même esprit.

Dans les communes rurales et dans les petites villes, le cercle des gens ayant les qualités voulues pour agir dans les conseils et travailler dans les services administratifs des villes et des communes rurales est très restreint. Pratiquement, presque toutes les personnes ayant de l'instruction et une compétence passable étaient plus ou moins étroitement liées à l'ancien système du pouvoir. La situation est différente dans les grandes agglomérations, car le cercle potentiel des militants et des travailleurs des collectivités autonomes y est beaucoup plus vaste. L'unique instrument de désignation de ces personnes sont les Comités civiques relevant du mouvement syndical "Solidarité", qui font évidemment une sélection de leurs militants en application de critères politiques. Les autres groupements politiques faisant partie de l'opposition extraparlementaire ont trop faibles pour pouvoir jouer un rôle notable aux élections pour désigner les représentants des collectivités autonomes territoriales.

Les Comités civiques de "Solidarité" choisiront un certain nombre de candidats aux charges de conseiller et de fonctonnaire de la nouvelle administration autonome. Ces gens-là, ralliés aux comités en question, sont certainement animés pour la plupart par le désir de changer la situation existante, d'améliorer le fonctionnement de la ville en général et de ses services techniques en particulier, d'améliorer les conditions de

fonctionnement des services consentis à la population: instruction, santé, transports en commun, sécurité publique, etc. Ils tiennent pour responsables de la situation désastreuse des agglomérations urbaines les municipalités en place jusqu'à présent et les fonctionnaires de l'administration publique. Ce problème n'est cependant pas tellement facile, car les causes de la situation catastrophique des villes polonaises restent bien encrées dans le "socialisme réel", ainsi que dans la crise économique qu'il provoqua et qui dure déjà plus de dix ans. Par suite de cette crise, la caisse de l'Etat est vide, mais ont vides avant tout les caisses des collectivités autonomes territoriales. Le budget national pour 1990 prévoit de considérables limitations des dépenses affectées à des destinations locales, souvent de plus de la moitié, comme par exemple à Varsovie. Dans cette situation, non seulement la mauvaise position économique ne pourra être améliorée, mais au contraire elle s'aggravera d'une manière dramatique. Les nouveaux militants de l'administration autonome, souvent pleine d'enthousiasme, se heurteront à la dure réalité et ne seront pas en mesure de satisfaire les aspirations sociales éveillées au cours de la campagne électorale. Cette situation peut affaiblir considérablement le dynamisme du mouvement autonome et conduire à sa compromission.

La loi sur l'autonomie territoriale accorde aux collectivités autonomes locales de grandes prérogatives et leur impose des obligations immenses en matière de satisfaction des besoins des habitants et de fonctionnement des unités administratives territoriales. Ces obligations ne s'accompagnent cependant pas d'une assurance d'obtention des moyens financiers indispensables. En effet, la Pologne ne possède pas encore de système fiscal efficace, ce qui veut dire également qu'il n'y a pas non plus de contributions locales. Il n'existe pas non plus de système de subventions objectives, car jusqu'à présent elles avaient un caractère estimatif-adjudicatif.

Le gouvernement est déchargé de la sorte de toute responsabilité pour le fonctionnement des collectivités locales, et il est procédé à la décentralisation de la crise. Il s'agit là d'une situation qui crée un risque d'effondrement des structures étatiques existant auparavant, de désintégration de l'administraton gouvernementale et d'impossibilité de mise en place des structures nouvelles fondées sur l'administration autonome. Cela peut conduire à l'accroissement de l'anarchie dans notre pays.

Une autonomie considérable du pouvoir local, associée à l'absence de traditions en matière d'autonomie territoriale, à une basse culture politique et au manque de personnel compétent et responsable, peut favoriser la

propagation de structures mafieuses dans la Pologne locale. La cause de la création de telles structures complices en sera une pénible situation économique, accompagnée d'une insuffisance très poussée de biens hautement appréciés, pour l'appropriation desquels se livrera une lutte sans pardon. Les structures complices sont susceptibles de se montrer beaucoup plus fortes et bien implantées, car le contrôle des autorités régionales et centrales sur le terrain sera nettement plus faible.

Le passage du totalitarisme à la démocratie ne peut pas se faire, bien entendu, au moyen d'une loi. Ce sera un processus de longue durée, qui nécessitera non seulement la transformation des structures de l'administration et de la gestion économique, mais aussi de profonds changements dans la conscience des gens, ainsi que la formation d'une nouvelle culture politique. Les études dans le cadre du Programme CPBP 09.8 "Développement régional – Développement local – Autonomie territoriale" ont montré le point de départ pour la démocratie locale, mais le but est loin et s'estompe dans la brume, et beaucoup de choses peuvent se passer en cours de route.

Toute action coomporte toujours deux stratégies pures: la maximalisation des avantages et la minimalisation des risques, ainsi que plusieurs stratégies mixtes. Il semble que les auteurs de la réforme polonaise de l'administration autonome ont choisi la première stratégie – la maximalisation des avantages –, sans tenir compte de l'immensité du risque couru. Le temps montrera évidemment si ce choix était juste.

Il a déjà été question du risque, et maintenant quels peuvent être les avantages du choix de cette stratégie? L'activation des communautés locales et sa mobilisation en faveur de l'amélioration de la situation dans l'entourage le plus proche. La maîtrise du mécontentement social dû à l'abaissement brutal du niveau de vie et sa répercution sur les tractations politiques au cours des élections ayant pour objectif la désignation des représentants des collectivités autonomes. Peut-être bien qu'un certain rôle a été joué égalemen par les ambitions des hommes politiques faisant leur entrée sur la scène publique et désireux d'entrer dans l'histoire en tant qu'auteurs de la réforme polonaise de l'administration autonome. Ils ne pourraient pas en réclamer la paternité avec tant de conviction si cette réforme avait été mise en application d'une manière progressive.

Varsovie, mars 1990

BIBLIOGRAPHIE

Bartkowski J., Kowalczyk A., Swianiewicz P. (1990): *Strategie władz lokalnych* (Stratégies du pouvoir local), Wyd. CPBP 09.8 "Rozwój regionalny – Rozwój lokalny – Samorząd terytorialny" (Ed. du Programme CPBP 09. "Développement régional – Développement local – Autonomie territoriale".

Głowacki A. (1988): *Funkcjonowanie lokalnego systemu władzy* (Fonctionnement du système local du pouvoir).

Grzeszczyk T. (1988): *Zatrudnienie w urzędach wojewódzkich (zarys problematyki badawczej w świetle sondażu)* Emploi dans les offices administratifs de voïvodie.

Gumuła W. (1988): *Władza lokalna wobec centrum* (Le Pouvoir local face à l'administration centrale).

Jałowiecki B. (1967): *Polkowice – przemiany społeczności lokalnej pod wpływem uprzemysłowienia* (Polkowice – changements de la communauté locale sous l'influence de l'industrialisation), Wrocław, Varsovie.

Kamiński A. Z. (1988): *Reforma czy rewolucja?* (Réforme ou révolution), dans "Res Publica" No 7.

Raport z gminnej Polski (Rapport de la Pologne communale), CBOS (Centre de Sondage d'Opinion Publique).

Seeman M. (1959): *On the Meaning of Alienation,* "American Sociological Review", t. XXI.

Zychowicz Z. (1988): *Proces artykulacji potrzeb i interesów społecznych w lokalnym systemie politycznym* (Le Processus d'articulation des besoins et des intérêts sociaux dans le système politique local).

Bohdan Jałowiecki

LA NAISSANCE DE LA DEMOCRATIE DANS LA POLOGNE LOCALE

AVANT-PROPOS

Dans la première moitié de l'année 1990 a été effectué, dans le cadre du Programme de Recherches "Développement régional – Développement local – Autonomie territoriale", un sondage sociologique ayant pour objet l'observation des changements sociaux qui sont intervenus dans les communautés locales. Les recherches portaient sur un échantillon de 21 localités situées dans différentes régions de la Pologne. Cet échantillon n'est certes pas représentatif, mais il est indéniablement suffisant pour pouvoir formuler des hypothèses documentées, d'autant plus que la généralité des communautés concernées avaient déjà été interrogées dans le cadre de ce même Programme de Recherches.

L'objet essentiel des investigations d'établir une caractéristique de la scène politique locale et des conflits y intervenant entre la formation de nouvelles élites et leurs comportements, ainsi que de définir le processus de changement des élites en conséquence des résultats des élections du mois de mai 1990, qui avaient pour but de désigner les représentants des collectivités locales autonomes.

1. LA FORMATION DES ELITES

Les conclusions générales, susceptibles d'être formulées à partir de la caractéristique des scènes politiques dans les localités faisant l'objet de l'étude, concernent quelques questions de nature politique avant tout. Pendant la période allant des élections parlamentaires de juin 1989 (Diète et Sénat) aux élections administratives de mai 1990, on pouvait observer – dans les communautés locales – le processus de formation de nouvelles élites locales, tant d'influence que dirigeantes. Les nouvelles élites qui ont

pris le pouvoir dans les collectivités locales, en conséquence de la dernière victoire électorale, sont encore très peu structurées. Elles tirent leur origine du mouvement "Solidarité" des années 1980/1981 et des structures clandestines mises en place dans les années 80. La plupart des Comités civiues ont donc une généalogie syndicale, bien que leur composition ait été considérablement élargie par l'accession des représentants des milieux ruraux de "Solidarité des Agriculteurs Individuels", ainsi que de personnes étrangères, il est vrai, au mouvement "Solidarité", mais qui ne s'étaient cependant pas salies par la collaboration avec l'ancien establishment. Dans les milieux locaux, les membres des Comités civiques se recrutent principalement dans l'intelligentsia humaniste, plutôt que technique, ainsi que parmi les paysans, surtout à la campagne; la participation des ouvriers y est nettement plus faible.

Les Comités civiques sont peu structurés intérieurement et n'ont pas de visage politique déterminé. Les facteurs de soudure, ce sont avant tout – au moins verbalement – l'éthos de "Solidarité", l'aspiratton à de profonds changements dans la vie sociale et la lutte contre l'ordre ancien représenté auparavant par le Parti ouvrier unifié polonais (POUP), maintenant par la "nomenklatura", plus précisément par l'ancienne nomenklatura. L'absence d'un adversaire bien défini fait que les attaques contre cette nomenklatura ont souvent un caractère chaotique, que l'"intensité de celles-ci dépend des arrangements locaux. Finalement, cette lutte, comme il en résulte des observations faittes jusqu'à présent, est plutôt un mot d'ordre qu'une activité dirigée contre des personnes concrètes, quoique l'on puisse également remarquer des cas de règlement de comptes envers les membres des anciennes élites.

Les Comités civiques n'ont pas d'appui social concret. Les gens qui les soutiennent sont partout et nulle part. Les Comités civiques ne représentent pas non plus les intérêts déterminés d'une classe ou couche sociale concrète. Ils représentent les intérêts de la société tout entière, qui ne concernent que très peu de choses sur le plan local. Les Comités civiques sont parfois dominés par des groupes de personnes qui ne voient que leur intérêt particulier dans l'immédiat, après quoi ces groupes se scindent en sous-groupes antagonistes rivalisant entre eux sans merci la plupart du temps.

L'amorphisme de la structure sociale fait que les intérêts plus duables, qui existent potentiellement, ne peuvent pas être verbalisés clairement. On peut constater avec approximation que certains Comités civiques

représentent plutôt les intérêts des travailleurs salariés, d'autres ceux des paysans, mais plutôt des petits exploitants que des gros fermiers capitalistes. Les organes administratifs autonomes, qui sont une émanation des Comités civiques, ne peuvent aucunement bénéficier maintenant de l'appui de la couche des entrepreneurs capitalistes qui est en train de se former. Dans les pays occidentaux, en revanche, cette catégorie sociale continue la base sociale de l'administration locale. La formation d'une nouvelle structure sociale en Pologne, à la suite de l'action des règles de l'économie de marché, sera un processus de longue durée. Pour l'instant, l'idéologie dominante des Comités civiques revêt un caractère socialiste. On y prêche, en effet, des mots d'ordre préconisant l'égalitarisme, le bien des travailleurs, la lutte contre l'enrichissement au étriment d'autrui (comme s'il était possible de s'enrichir au détriment de soi-même), la qualité de vie, les valeurs écologiques, des logements pour tous, un accès égal à l'instruction et à l'assistance médicale, etc., valeur que le socialisme érel n'a jamais pu réaliser, mais qui se sont incrustées fortement dans la conscience sociale. Dans le même temps, le mot "socialisme" est condamné et chacun prend garde de ne pas le prononcer par hasard. La rhétorique des Comités civiques porte donc l'empreinte du "syndrome de Jourdain" (Héros d'une comédie de Molière, qui ne savait pas qu'il parlait en prose).

A la lumière des études réalisées, la discussion amocée au sein des élites nationales de "Solidarité" sur l'avenir des Comités civiques n'est pas dépourvue de bon sens. Ne sont pas non plus dépourvues de fondement les craintes que les Comités civiques pourraient bientôt rappeler les anciens comités du POUP. Actuellement, ils ont déjà pris en charge un grand nombre de leurs fonctions: influence sur la politique de l'emploi, contrôle de l'activité des autorités locales, entre autres. Dans de nombreux cas, la nomination à un poste concret dépend de l'assentiment des Comités civiques. C'est là indéniablement un retour au système de la nomenklatura. L'acquisition d'une position quasi monopolistique est déjà un fait dans de nombreuses agglomérations.

Il y a des dangers de dégénération des Comités civiques comme de toute autre structure monopolistique. Comme remède à cette situation, on propose donc le pluralisme politique dans le cadre des comités, avec participation des représentants de diverses options. Ce serait peut-être une solution, mais qui n'est cependant pas du tout réelle (sauf dans les grands centres urbains), car il n'existe pas – dans la majorité des communautés

locales – de groupements politiques marquants et rien n'indique qu'il y en aura dans l'avenir le plus proche, faute de base sociale à cet effet sous l'aspect de couches et classes sociales instruites susceptibles d'exprimer des intérêts contradictoires. Les différences entre les groupements respectifs n'ont qu'un caractère secondaire ou même tertiaire; elles consistent en des disputes de nature idéologique, dont l'origine remonte aux temps lointains d'avant la Seconde Guerre mondiale ou aux plus récents ressentiments à l'égard de groupements politiques tels que la Social-Démocratie de la République polonaise (SDRP), soit les anciens communistes, le Parti démocrate (PD) et le Parti Populaire polonais (PPP), qui d'après l'opinion publique ne sont que d'anciens alliés des communistes, dissimulés sous de nouvelles couleurs. Les résultats des dernières élections administratives l'ont clairement montré. L'absence d'intérêts nettement structurés sur la base de couches et classes sociales à statut économique varié fait qu'il n'y a pas, en principe, de différence d'intérêts économiques dans la société, car la plus grande partie de cette dernière est représentée par la catégorie des travailleus salariés, dont les variantes respectives luttent, il est vrai, pour une plus grande participation à la répartition du revenu national, quoique dans des limites très étroites. On est toujours en présence du conflit fondamental entre l'Etat employeur et les citoyens salariés. Un deuxième conflit réel existe entre la ville et la campagne, c'est-à-dire entre les catégories urbaines (et rurales) de travailleurs salariés et les agriculteurs individuels. Ce conflit, qui revêt un caractère de plus en plus spectaculaire, n'est guère résoluble dans un proche avenir, car il n'est possible de le limiter qu'en restructurant l'agriculture et en réduisant considérablement l'emploi dans ce secteur de l'économie nationale.

Par suite de l'absence d'intérêts réellement contradictoires sur le plan économique, les conflits politiques commencent à présenter un caractère de plus en plus personnalisé. Peu importe quelle fraction du mouvement "Solidarité" triomphera, car chacune d'entre elles se trouvera placée devant des problèmes identiques et devra les résoudre d'une manière identique, pour la bonne raison qu'il ne peut y avoir de programme alternatif dans la situation existante, tout au plus pourra-t-on répartir les accents d'une façon différente.

Tout le monde est d'accord que l'économie nécessite une restructuration au point de vue de la propriété, de la sectorisation et de la régionalisation. Tout le monde est d'avis que la concurrence est indispensable dans le domaine de l'économie et le pluralisme en politique, que la

démocratie consiste dans le libre choix des représentants au Parlement et aux collectivités locales autonomes, dans le règle du droit, dans l'existence d'au moins deux partis – du parti au pouvoir et du parti d'opposition. La majeure partie des représentants des élites politiques estiment qu'il faut un minimum d'interventionnisme de l'Etat pour empêcher la création de zones de misère. Le consensus porte sur ces objectifs formulés en termes généraux. Peu de gens sont cependant disposés à accepter les effets de la réalisation de ces postulats: faillite de branches entières de l'industrie, ruine de un million ou plus d'exploitations paysannes, effondrement économique de régions et de nombres d'agglomérations, chômage massif et accroissement considérable des disparités sociales. Le capitalisme apparaît au Polonais moyen sous l'aspect de magasins pleins de marchandises, dans lesquels chacun peut acheter presque tout; le capitalisme, c'est le niveau de vie de la République fédérale d'Allemagne ou de la Suède, mais non celui de la Turquie ou du Mexique où des millions de gens vivent dans l'indigence, où des milliers meurent de faim. La voie de la Pologne vers le capitalisme suivra plutôt le tracé propre au modèle caractéristique des pays du tiers monde. Entrer dans cette voie est une chance, mais à l'échelle massive seulement – malheureusement – pour les générations futures.

Le développement, à l'échelon national, de partis politiques représentant des inérêts, sinon contradictoires, du moins différents est peu probaable dans l'avenir le plus proche. Les groupements respectifs, comme déjà évoqué ci-dessus, sont divisés en général par une idéologie passéiste et par des querelles persnnelles qui ne regardent personne en dehors des intéressés. Sur les scènes politiques locales, les partis présents à Varsovie et à la télévision n'existent pas du tout et n'ont aucune chance de s'implanter pour de bon. La seule chance pas tant du pluralisme que du dualisme politique est le partage de l'héritage de "Solidarité" entre deux formations qui mettraient différemment les accents dans le programme des réformes indispensables. Ce type de disposition des joueurs sur la scène politique peut cependant aussi bien stabiliser la situation, en canalisant le mécontentement social par l'acte de vote, que la déstabiliser par de fréquents changements – dans cette situation – des équipes au pouvoir. Les Comités civiques se sont avérés capables de mener une campagne électorale efficace contre le régime déclinant. Est-ce qu'il réussiront aussi facilement à gagner les élections sous l'étendard de la voie capitaliste de développement de l'économie, qui implique la nécessité de nouvelles

restrictions et l'abaissement du niveau d'existence de groupes importants de travailleurs salariés? Est-ce qu'ils seront en mesure d'agir contre leurs propres intérêts dans l'immédiat? Est-ce qu'ils peuvent être un soutien pour un gouvernement qui réalise des réformes indispensables, bien qu'elles soient de moins en moins populaires? Ou seront-ils, au contraire, le facteur du ferment antigouvernemental susceptible d'introduire efficacement des éléments anarchisants dans les rapports sociaux en Pologne? Le drame de la situation consiste dans le fait que la marge de liberté est très étroite. Si les tendances populistes prennent le dessus, il faudra repartir de zéro après quelques mois de détente apparente, mais l'économie sera alors au plus bas et le niveau de vie tombera d'une manière tout à fait catastrophique.

La discussion sur l'avenir des Comités civiques ne peut pas se ramener seulement à une controverse pour déterminer qui grâce à eux prendra le pouvoir dans un temps très rapproché. La discussion sur les Comités civiques est dans une grande mesure une discussion sur l'existence de l'Etat.

Les études des scènes politiques locales ont également montré l'aspiration des Comités civiques à s'approprier la fonction de "force dirigeante", qui impose sa volonté aux autorités locales élues constitutionnellement, à contrôler les actions de celles-ci, à réglementer les comportements des citoyens en empêchant la création d'initiatives en dehors du cercle des militants des Comités en question. Le système de cooptation et la non-acceptation de tous ceux qui donnent leur accord aux règles démocratiques du jeu politique, qui respectent les manières d'agir socialement admissibles dans la vie publique et privée, font que les Comités civiques se transforment en coteries et même en maffias. De nombreux responsables des Comités civiques considèrent ces derniers comme des tremplins qui leur permettront, de même qu'aux membres de leurs familles, d'occuper des postes réservés jusqu'alors aux membres du POUP, et ils perçoivent le changement de régime non pas comme un changement des façons d'agir dans la vie publique, mais comme une simple relève des élites. Le risque de dégénération des Comités civiques est discerné par les deux parties prenant part – sur la scène centrale – à la discussion portant sur leur avenir. D'aucuns proposent de créer une fédération qui coordonnerait leur activité, d'autres préconisent l'activité de diverses forces politiques sous le couvert des Comités civiques. Il en est aussi qui, voyant les dangereuses déformations des Comités civiques, optent pour leur dissolution.

Les principes de fonctionnement du système totalitaire sont enracinés profondément dans la conscience sociale, ce qui fait que les modèles de comportement dans la vie publique sont bien affermis. Pour les changer, il faut beaucoup de temps et de persévérance en matière d'application du nouveau modèle de culture politique. Pour l'instant, on n'a rejeté que l'enveloppe extérieure de l'ancien système, alors que l'assise psychologique en est restée intacte, ce qui s'extériorise dans la "tentation totalitaire" ressentie par de nombreux représentants des nouvelles élites dirigeantes, et ce non seulement locales.

2. LA LUTTE ELECTORALE

Il résulte de l'analyse de la campagne électorale menée dans les localités que nous avons étudiées qu'elle avait été faite avec une certaine ampleur par les Comités civiques. Diverses techniques de propagande électorale avaient été utilisées: réunions, meetings, karmesses, festins. On avait collé des affiches, distribué des prospectus, publié des annonces dans la presse, sorti des numéros spéciaux de journaux, etc. Pour recommander les candidats, on se servait aussi bien des thèses du programme que de leurs traits personnels, sans pour autant éviter de discréditer les adversaires en leur reprochant divers faits indignes.

La propagande électorale était menée principalement par les Comités civiques, qui avaient engagé d'importants moyens humains et financiers. Il semble qu'ils avaient fortement surestimé la force de l'adversaire et sa capacité de mobilisation d'électeurs potentiels. Le principal facteur de la victoire électorale est l'enseigne de "Solidarité", qui jouit d'une signification franchement positive dans la plus grande partie de la société. Voter pour les Comités civiques voulait dire se prononcer pour le changement, pour le départ des équipes usées et souvent même compromises, pour une chance d'améliorer les relations humaines et le climat moral, pour l'espoir d'un avenir meilleur pour le pays et pour des collectivités locales concrètes. En votant aux élections administratives de 1990, on ne votait pas tant pour un programme déterminé, car il n'y en avait pas du tout, mais plutôt pour le mot d'ordre "Solidarité" et les valeurs qui l'accompagnent. Un autre élément important expliquant le succès des Comités civiques est la campagne électorale, qui avait été menée, comme évoqué ci-dessus, avec adresse et ampleur. Les Comités civiques avaient su parvenir jusqu'à la communauté locale et lui présenter leur candidat d'une

manière attractive. Les rivaux des Comités civiques avaient cependant évalué la situation d'une manière erronée et n'avaient pas fait trop d'efforts, étant convaincus que leurs résultats ne seraient pas trop brillants même s'ils s'étaient donné beaucoup de peine. Il s'est avéré, toutefois, que ceux des adversaires des Comités civiques qui avaient mené une campagne électorale active remportaient souvent la victoire. La campagne électorale avait donc été menée presque au même diapason et n'avait intéressé qu'un nombre restreint de supporters. Comme tout était, à vrai dire, connu d'avance, une grande partie de l'électorat, tant partisans qu'adversaires des Comités civiques, n'a tout simplement pas pris part au vote et la participation ne s'était élevée qu'à 42 p. 100.

Les groupements liés à l'ancien système étaient convaincus a priori de ne pas pouvoir gagner la partie, aussi usaient-ils assey souvent d'un camouflage électoral consistant à ne pas se donner d'étiquette sur les listes électorales. C'était presque la règle dans le cas des candidats de la SDRP et du PPP, beaucoup plus rare lorsqu'il s'agissait du PD qui, pour cette raison entre autres, a essuyé la plus grande défaite. Cette tactique du camouflage avait été utilisée une seule fois par le Comité civique d'une localité, lors des élections parlementaires, et les résultats obtenus par "Solidarité" y avaient été très médiocres.

La cause du faible intérêt éveillé par la campagne électorale et ensuite de la forte abstention était la généralité des programmes présentés durant la campagne électorale par toutes les formations en présence, y compris les Comités civiques. C'est en cela que réside probablement la faiblesse majeure tant des Comités civiques que des futures collectivités locales autonomes. Les électons administratives, c'est quelque chose de concret, et le conseiller municipal, ce n'est pas un député ou sénateur de Varsovie, lointain et peu connu, mais c'est le voisin, le camarade de travail, un des nôtres. C'est ainsi que cela est perçu dans les communautés locales relativement petites. Les candidats utilisaient des grands mots, tels que démocratie, liberté, et des plus petits, tels qu'esprit d'entreprise, autogestion. Ils se servaient souvent du langage des médias et des intellectualistes de la capitale. Et tout à côté – la réalité: manque d'école, absence de magasin, rue défoncée, nombreux problèmes nécessitant une solution. Même lorsqu'il s'agissait de questions plus terre-à-terre, les candidats ne disaient pas qu'ils s'efforceront de faire construire une station d'épuration des eaux résiduaires, pour que la laiterie voisine cesse de polluer la rivière qui baigne la ville, mais parlaient par contre de

protection de l'environnement. Ils ne disaient pas qu'ils rachèteront des terrains à bâtir, les lotiront et y mettront en place les infrastructures, mais ils parlaient de construction d'habitations en général. Leur langage n'était guère adéquat à la réalité de la vie quotidienne, c'était le langage de ceux pour qui l'on votait maintes fois auparavant. C'était le langage des candidats du Front d'Unité nationale.

Si les candidats des Comités civiques s'adressaient de la sorte à leur électeurs potentiels, ce n'était pas tout à fait de leur faute. Ils ne savaient simplement pas ce que pouvait être vraiment cette autonomie locale. Ils ne connaissaient pas les principaux actes juridiques devant réglementer leurs activités publiques, ni leurs compétences, car la loi délimitant les attributions de l'administration locale autonome et de l'administration gouvernementale n'avait été votée que quelques jours à peine avant les élections. Rien que dans deux des localités faisant l'objet de nos investigations, les candidats à la fonction de conseiller municipal avaient suivi des cours sur l'autonomie locale, mais cet enseignement ne donnait pas non plus une information exhautive sur cette dernière. Même lorsqu'ils avaient eu la possibilité de suivre un tel cours, beaucoup n'y étaient pas allés pour cause de manque de temps ou de frais de déplacement.

L'un des thèmes de la campagne électorale était la question des règlements de comptes avec le socialisme réel, avec la nomenklatura, avec les coteries précédentes. Cela n'était pas spécialement déployé dans les communautés locales étudiées, et si ce problème s'était parfois présenté pendant la campagne électorale des Comités civiques, ce n'était que l'écho des problèmes traités par les mass media, en de nombreux cas. Certains se servaient de ces mots d'ordre, car il leur semblait qu'il fallait le faire, mais ils s'y prenaient avec prudence et parfois aussi avec une certaine gêne. Dans les comunautés locales, une personne de la nomenklatura est très souvent un camarade d'école, un copain de travail, un voisin, souvent un "gars comme ça!", qui savait vivre et aidait les autres à vivre. Lorsqu'il est question de relations amicales et familiales, on a plutôt affaire à Jasio et Franio, mais non à un représentant impersonnel de la terrible nomenklatura. La consigne donnée en vue de la lutte contre l'ordre ancien avait également été fortement affaiblie par le fait que l'organisation politique qui le représentait, le POUP, était descendue de la scène publique. On pouvait donc lutter contre une ombre, mais pas contre un adversaire réel, ce qui diminuait grandement la dynamique de ce conflit.

Le drama de la société issue du socialisme réel, ou si l'on préfère de la

société postcommuniste, consiste non seulement dans le fait que plusieurs millions de personnes se trouvaient dans la nomenklatura des organisations du Parti à des échelons variés, mais aussi dans le fait que la société tout entière a été éduquée dans un système qui contraignait les gens à se déplacer dans la réalité quotidienne par des chemins tortueux, à faire des combines et des louvoiements, à éluder et à enfreindre la loi, dans un système qui a déshabitué les gens à avoir du respect pour le travail, la concurrence, l'enrichissement, l'Etat et les institutions nationales. Rares étaient ceux qui avaient su résister aux influences, néfastes au tissu social, du socialisme réel. Seule une profonde rééducation de toute la société est en mesure de modifier cette situation.

3. QUI A GAGNE LES ELECTIONS?

Bien que, généralement parlant, les résultats du scrutin aient démontré une nette supériorité des Comités civiques "Solidarité", ils étaient cependant diversifiés. Dans 14 cas étudiés (sur 21), les Comités civiques ont obtenu la majorité absolue des suffrages, ce qui revient à dire qu'ils détiennent entièrement le pouvoir. Cependant, dans deux localités, cette supériorité n'est pas si grande: il suffit que deux conseillers municipaux ne viennent pas à la session et l'opposition devient majoritaire. Dans une localité, le Comité civique n'a obtenu que le tiers des souffrages, dans quatre autres agglomérations – environ deux cinquièmes des voix, dans une autre – exactement la moitié. N'ayant pas la majorité absolue dans cinq localités, les Comités civiques sont obligés de faire des alliances avec d'autres groupements politiques. Cela est déjà apparent lors de l'élection des membres des présidiums des conseils, des bourgmestres et des maires de commune rurale.

Il est cependant possible de donner des exemples où les Comités civiques "Solidarité" avaient obtenu la majorité des voix, mais où aux postes de bourgmestres et de maires de commune rurale étaient élus des spécialistes connus pour leur appartenance aux anciennes élites dirigeantes. Les nouvelles collectivités locales autonomes sont donc disposées à consentir à des compromis, à assurer une certaine continuité et à donner la préférence à l'expérience et au savoir-faire, qui sont parfois l'apanage des représentants de l'ancienne nomenklatura. Ce type de comportement des nouvelles collectivités autonomes est plus fréquent dans les petites communautés, car il y manquait par nature de gens ayant les qualifica-

tions voulues pour pouvoir assumer une fonction dans l'administration autonome.

On peut donc dire qu'en conséquence des élections administratives s'est effectué un changement considéable des élites et au pouvoir ont accédé des gens tout à fait nouveaux. Mais d'autre part, une partie des anciennes élites dirigeantes complète – dans une relative harmonie – les élites nouvellement venues. Ces élites doivent donc coexister dans nombre de localités. Dans une plus grande mesure encore sont restées intactes les positions des anciennes élites d'influence: bien enracinées dans les milieux locaux et grâce à des collusions amicales et familiales, elles continueront d'avoir une influence réelle sur l'évolution des processus sociaux dans la Pologne locale.

Parmi les nouveaux conseillers municipaux, qui se disaient indépendants aux élections administratives, on trouve des représentants des anciennes élites dirigeantes et surtout aussi des élites d'influence, c'est-à-dire des personnes qui n'assumaient aucune fonction formelle dans les organes du pouvoir local, mais jouissaient d'une grande popularité et d'un grand prestige en raison du rôle social qu'ils remplissaient.

On ne peut pas parler de révolution dans la Pologne locale, du moins dans les communautés qui faisaient l'objet de nos investigations, mais il y a eu néanmoins une nette évolution: les élections administratives ont causé, en effet, l'apparition d'une multitude de gens nouveaux, dont une partie pour le moins jouera un rôle important dans le processus des changements sociaux.

Les partis politiques n'ont exercé qu'un rôle minime aux élections administratives qui se sont déroulées dernièrement dans la Pologne locale. Le seul parti qui a marqué sa présence d'une manière apparente, dans certaines localités, est le PPP. Le nombre de mandats acquis par ce parti est cependant moins important que ne le laissent pressentir sa structure organisationnelle et sa logistique, héritées intactes de l'époque de l'ordre ancien. Le PPP est considéré comme un parti dissimulé sous de nouvelles couleurs, et par-dessus le marché ne l'ont pas aidé les querelles intestines menées à l'échelon central juste avant les élections. Le PD n'existe presque pas sur la scène politique locale. Il en est de même de la SDRP: elle n'a pas émergé du tout dans la plupart des localités faisant l'objet des études durant les élections. Totalement absents dans les localités en question, à l'exception de Tychy et Puławy, des nouveaux partis de droite, tels que l'Union nationale chrétienne ou la Confédération de la Pologne indépendante. Seulement à

Puławy et dans les quartiers analysés de Varsovie, ces deux dernières formations politiques ont obtenu un mandat chacune.

Les Comités civiques avaient un adversaire réel aux élections administratives: les candidats indépendants qui étaient représentés au moins en aussi grand nombre que ceux de "Solidarité". Dans de nombreuses localités, ils étaient considérés comme la concurrence la plus menaçante. Généralement parlant, les candidats indépendants provenaient des anciennes élites d'influence, c'est-à-dire qu'ils n'appartenaient pas forcément aux structures dirigeantes précédentes. Nombreux étaient parmi eux d'anciens membres du POUP, mais il s'agissait habituellement de simples membres, qui auparavant n'avaient pas accès aux milieux dirigeants et sont maintenant rejetés par les nouvelles élites. Comme l'appartenance à l'ex-POUP éliminait automatiquement ces gens-là du mouvement "Solidarité", ils posaient leur candidature aux élections en solitaire, désireux de continuer à agir en faveur de la communauté locale ou tout simplement de se confirmer eux-mêmes dans l'action. Dans nombre de cas, ils ont réussi: ils sont passés à travers le tamis vérificateur des élections, si évidemment ces dernières peuvent constituer le critère d'une telle vérification. Les milieux dans lesquels ils vivaient les ont acceptés.

De nombreux facteurs, se recouvrant les uns les autres, ont contribué à la victoire des Comités civiques. Un rôle important, quoique pas le moins du monde décisif dans la Pologne locale, a été joué par l'enseigne de "Solidarité", qui s'associait au processus des changements intervenant dans notre pays et à la nouvelle réalité politique. L'influence en a été déterminante, en revanche, dans les grandes villes, où personne ne connaissait les candidats. Un autre facteur a été la campagne électorale, menée en général bien, énergiquement et en utilisant des moyens modernes, qui a permis de donner une bonne présentation des candidats aux milieux respectifs. It était important de parvenir personnellement jusqu'aux électeurs lorsque le candidat n'était pas bien connu ou s'il n'habitait pas dans sa circonscription électorale. Dans une moindre mesure agissait le programme électoral des Comités civiques, qui presque partout ne se composait que de simples banalités peu éloquentes, qui étaient souvent répétées, quasiment dans les mêmes termes, à l'occasion des élections pour désigner les membres des conseils populaires de la République populaire de Pologne. A la victoire des Comités civiques a contribué également la situation conflictuelle entre les communautés et l'admi-

nistration locale précédente, surtout quand celle-ci était particulièrement incapable ou corrompue.

N'est pas négligeable non plus le rôle de l'Eglise qui, bien qu'elle ne s'engageât pas, en général, dans la lutte électorale, était cependant plutôt favorable aux candidats des Comités civiques, mais surtout elle encourageait à prendre part au vote, ce qui a contribué dans une certaine mesure à l'augmentation de la participation électorale qui aurait été encore plus base, probablement, si ce n'était l'attitude de la paroisse.

Une situation relativement stable dans la localité concernée et l'absence de conflits visibles entre la communauté locale et le pouvoir précédent n'étaient guère favorable aux Comités civiques "Solidarité". Le radicalisme à outrance de certains Comités civiques effrayait également les électeurs qui ne voulaient pas intensifier les querelles personnelles, faire des "purges" et déstabiliser outre mesure l'équilibre local.

Et finalement, il faut faire état d'un facteur qui pouvait agir aussi bien sur les deux camps, mais était plutôt favorable aux anciennes élites. Les choix des votants dans la Pologne locale étaient fortement personnalisés: gagnait en général celui qui était solidement enraciné dans le milieu concerné, était bien connu de ses électeurs, avait déjà eu la chance de faire ses preuves sur le plan social. Beaucoup de mandats ont été obtenus, par exemple, par des candidats qui ont su convaincre les électeurs qu'ils savaient faire quelque chose de concret, concourir à la construction d'une école, d'une route, d'un réseau de distribution de gaz, etc. Dans ces cas-là, l'appartenance organisationnelle était d'une importance minime ou même nulle.

L'absence d'une forte majorité de la part des Comités civiques "Solidarité" ou une composition diversifiée du conseil municipal sans qu'aucun des camps soit majoritaire sera, semble-t-il, salutaire à l'activité du conseil et favorisera la présentation de diverses options. L'attention des conseillers municipaux sera, par la force des choses, dirigée plus sur les questions générales que sur les querelles intestines. Dans ces cas-là, il y a une chance que les groupements politiques respectifs se consolideront intérieurement face à un concurrent puissant, tandis que la rivalité des groupements alternatifs portera sur le fond. Chacun voudra, en effet, prouver à la communauté locale qu'il est le meilleur.

Une situation tout à fait différente peut se présenter dans les conseils municipaux dominés par les Comités civiques. Certains de leur position et de l'appui social, leurs représentants pourront se concentrer sur des luttes

intestines, qui useront leurs forces et seront un empêchement au règlement des problèmes importants. On a pu observer de tels faits dans deux localités. Dans l'une d'elles, il n'a pas été possible d'élire le bourgmestre pendant un moins entier: sept candidats menaient entre eux une lutte sans merci pour cette fonction. Dans la seconde, le bourgmestre a été élu, mais une partie du Comité civique du lieu ne veut pas accepter ce choix et organise des manifestations, des piquets de grève.

Il vaut la peine également de se demander qui a remporté la victoire sur les scènes politiques de la Pologne locale, car l'affirmation que c'est les Comités civiques qui ont gagné, dans la plupart des cas, ne signifie pas grand chose. En effet, quel est le visage politique des membres de ces comités et des conseillers municipaux qu'ils ont mis en place? La plateforme électorale commune des Comités civiques, c'est la négation de la réalité existante et le désir de contribuer à la création d'un nouvel ordre social. Mais de quel ordre s'agit-il? Il n'est pas facile de le dire. Outre les principes fondamentaux se rapportant à la science sociale de l'Eglise et à l'éthos de "Solidarité", il était beaucoup question de problèmes pratiques devant être réglés. C'est là évidemment le trait caractéristique des élections au niveau de l'administration locale autonome. Ces déclarations en disent cependant plus sur les principes moraux et sur un certain pragmatisme que sur le visage politique et la forme concrète de ce nouvel ordre social. Les programmes électoraux des Comités civiques contiennent implicitement un fond socialiste. En fait, nous sommes en présence d'un programme d'ordre social socialiste sans "socialisme". Le camp adverse fait des déclarations identiques. Il semble donc que les Polonais sont bien plus divisés par le passé que par leur attitude envers l'avenir

La participation électorale est le dernier problème qui a donné lieu à tant de discussions. Dans de nombreuses communautés locales étudiées, elle a été supérieure à la moyenne nationale. Le nombre de candidats pour un mandat a été le facteur déterminant l'accroissement de la participation au scrutin. Un nombre plus important de candidats faisait diminuer les abstentions. L'engagement personnel en faveur d'un candidat exerçait également une influence positive sur la participation au vote. Les causes des abstentions étaient, comme déjà évoqué ci-dessus, variées et très complexes.

Tout d'abord n'ont pas pris part au scrutin les personnes qui ne s'intéressent pas du tout aux affaires publiques. Le deuxième groupe se compose de partisans de "Solidarité", il est vrai, mais qui étaient

convaincus qu'elle avait cause gagnée et qu'il ne valait pas la peine d'aller voter. Une partie des électeurs n'ont pas voté faute de connaître les candidats et ne voulant pas se prononcer pour une formation politique quelconque à l'occasion des élections administratives. Il y en avait aussi qui n'ont pas participé au scrutin, car aucun des candidats ne leur convenait, et pour cause – ils les connaissaient très bien. Il en était ainsi dans une partie des circonscriptions à un seul mandat. Il ne valait pas la peine non plus d'aller voter lorsqu'il n'y avait qu'un seul candidat dans la circonscription électorale. Une partie des citoyens étaient mécontents du fait qu'ils n'ont rien à dire sur la composition du conseil municipal tout entier de la commune, mais doivent voter seulement pour un seul candidat. La loi électorale elle-même était dans un certain sens une source d'abstentions. Une partie des électeurs n'ont pas voté parce que la politique du gouvernement ne leur convient pas, les agriculteurs à cause de la prétendue sous-estimation de l'agriculture par l'Etat, l'ancienne nomenklatura à cause de la persécution organisée injustement – selon elle – à son égard. Il y avait également une catégorie d'électeurs n'ayant pas participé au vote à cause du manque de stabilité dans notre pays et de l'existence de troubles sociaux (la grève des cheminots, en mai dernier). Face aux menaces pesant sur leur existence, les élections sont devenues une question tout à fait secondaire. Ces attitudes sont confirmées par les déclarations des personnes interrogées au cours de notre sondage. Comme les causes étaient nombreuses, il ne faut donc pas tirer de conclusions nettement politiques du fait que la participation électorale avait été faible. Un si grand nombre d'abstentions – environ la moitié de l'électorat de la Pologne locale – fait poser le problème de la légitimation sociale de l'autonomie territoriale. Les élections n'ont pas fourni cette légitimation. Dans certaines circonscriptions, les conseillers municipaux ont été élus en ne recueillant qu'une quinzaine de voix. Ils ne pourront obtenir cette légitimation qu'en oeuvrant en faveur de leurs communautés. Pourvu que cela se produise le plus vite possible.

Les nouveaux conseils municipaux se composent principalement de personnes ayant une instruction supérieure, ce qui est une circonstance positive. Attire l'attention l'absence presque totale de femmes: il n'y en avait que très peu parmi les candidats, et elles n'ont pas eu, en règle générale, la faveur des électeurs. Les nouveaux conseils municipaux autonomes sont masculinisés à l'extrême, ce qui n'est pas un phénomène avantageux. Dans la République populaire de Pologne, on prenait soin, du

moins formellement, de faire participer les femmes à la vie publique, ceci au moyen d'un système-clé arithmétique fonctionnant lors des élections. La démocratie élimine presque totalement, malheureusement, les femmes de la vie publique.

Le démarrage de la démocratie locale est difficile. Il n'est pas du tout facilité par la très mauvaise situation économique, les revendications croissantes des paysans et de diverses catégories de travailleurs salariés, la déstabilisation progressive des structures de l'Etat et la lutte pour le pouvoir entre différents groupements qui se réclament de "Solidarité". Les nouveaux conseils municipaux autonomes commencent à agir en l'absence d'un système de financement des budgets locaux. Dans la plupart des localités, la caisse est vide mais les besoins sont immenses. A l'heure actuelle, dans de nombreuses communes il y a à peine assez d'argent pour couvrir les dépenses courantes les plus urgentes. Il n'est absolument pas question de réaliser les investissements pressants. Dans cette situation, il n'y a pas de possibilité de réaliser les attentes sociales en matière d'amélioration sensible des conditions d'existence. Est-ce que le seul changement d'élites dirigeantes suffira et pour combien de temps?

Varsovie, juillet 1990

Janusz Hryniewicz
Technical University of Warsaw
Łódź, Puławy, Poddębice

DIFFERENTIATION OF SOCIAL-POLITICAL ATTITUDES DEPENDING ON THE PLACE OF RESIDENCE.

INTRODUCTION

The manner of presenting the gathered research results in this work differs somewhat from the recognized conventions. The nature of this study lies somewhere between a research report and a conventional study that aims to verify hypotheses.

In further analyses an attempt is made to distinguish the similarities and differences in the attitudes of inhabitants of three cities and hypotheses explaining registered differences are verified. The problems of differences and similarities in attitudes may raise doubts as to the contents and scope of the attitudes included in the observation. After all, it can always be said that the observed attitudes encompass too small a range of problems for the obtained results to be considered as a confirmation of similarities or differences in general, not only in relation to specific fragments of social reality. Since it was my intention to reveal considerable differences that would lead to the conclusion that there is an essential differentiation in the behaviour dispositions of inhabitants of small towns and big cities, I have decided to present a greater number of variables, while due to the lack of space I have resigned from the theoretical justification of their selection and the evaluation of their social significance for determining social behaviour. Irrespective of these simplifications, when discussing a given issue, I have nevertheless attempted to include as many variables related to each other thematically as possible. This is because it was necessary to supply generous evidence to support the conclusions concerning differences and similarities of attitudes towards a given problem area.

Nevertheless, I feel I have not entirely succeeded in avoiding arbitrariness in the selection of objects of observation, as well as their division into thematic groups. However, this is probably a danger that cannot be avoided during the execution of research aims conceived on a wide scale. Another important limitation of the analyses presented further is that the information layer has been quite superficially treated, being reduced down to the bare minimum. The main emphasis has been placed on the quite mechanical registration of differences in attitudes. These reductions result from lack of space and, in consequence, from the impossibility of a theoretical interpretation of the differences and similarities of attitudes within the individual problem groups.

The presented tables contain a total of 63 variables I have considered as relevant for the survey of social-political attitudes and personality traits. Each of the tables contains the name of the variable, the number of persons whose attitudes the given variable renders (in%), and an assessment as to which of the hypotheses described later fits better to the obtained results.

This study is based on three polls carried out in 1986 in Puławy, in 1987 in Poddębice and in 1988 in Łódź. In each of the towns, from among professionally active inhabitants, 450 persons were chosen at random and the same number of interviews were carried out. The studies were carried out by a team consisting of: Andrzej Boczkowski, Janusz Hryniewicz and Jacek Siewierski.

1. HYPOTHESES EXPLAINING THE DIFFERENTIATION IN THE ATTITUDES OF THE INHABITANTS OF THREE TOWNS

Further considerations shall be concentrated on the attempts to register similarities and differences in the attitudes of inhabitants of a big city and of local communities. Four our own use, we have assumed that the term local community can justifiably refer to small towns, gminas and villages. In our case, Puławy and Poddębice are the local communities. In order to explain the differences in the attitudes of the inhabitants of the three

towns, two hypotheses shall be developed. The first takes as a starting point the relation between positions in the social-economic structure and the demographic features, and the social-political attitudes. This hypothesis shall be called a structural hypothesis. On the grounds of this hypothesis, the social-political attitudes are fully explained by such factors as: class position, autonomy of work, the size of the work establishment and demographic features, e.g. sex, education, etc. The registered differences in attitudes between the inhabitants of the three investigated towns could thus be explained on the basis of differences in the social-economic structure and differences in the demographic features of the inhabitants of the three towns. The second tested hypothesis, which we shall call an interaction hypothesis, refers to the differences in the size of the examined towns and the associated differences in the course of the social interactions, different in a big city and in the local communities. It is assumed that today, in local communities to a greater degree than in big cities, there is an exposition of the role and meaning of the informal structure and its coexistence with the dominating formal organization of the given town[1]. Generally speaking, the dimensions of the local arrangement[2], which is relatively small in area and population, makes it possible to expect that contacts between inhabitants are of a relatively personal nature; the same applies to contacts with economic, administrative and political organizations.

Confirmation of the first or second hypothesis depends on how the differences between the towns are shaped. If, for instance, it turns out that the attitudes of Puławy and Poddębice inhabitants are similar to each other, while being different from the attitudes of Łódź inhabitants, I shall treat this result as a confirmation of the interaction hypothesis. Any other results point to the explanation of the obtained differences on the basis of the factors described by the structural hypothesis or to the rejection of both hypotheses. It is obvious that, inasmuch as further considerations shall be concentrated on the differences between the towns, this does not signify a negation of the existence of certain universal laws regulating the attitudes of Poles of today. These shall also be mentioned later on.

2. THE DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIAL-ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF THE THREE TOWNS

Observation of the social-economic structure has been carried out on the basis of the following information: the employment structure according to divisions and ownership of work establishments, work features, the manner of directing employees and class positions. The obtained results prove that a characterization of the social-economic structure gives no grounds for outlining any unequivocally defined model of accumulation of structural features that clearly outline the specific social-economic character of the investigated towns. The arrangement of these features from the point of view of our analyses is of a random nature. This we can conclude from the act that we have noted similarities between Puławy and Łódź on certain variables, and of Łódź and Poddębice on others. In addition, there is the specific character of Puławy as a town dominated by one big industrial plant.

Of the registered demographic differences, it is worth drawing attention to the greater in Puławy than in the two remaining towns percentage of respondents with a secondary and higher education and the participation of members of the Polish United Workers' Party – smaller in Łódź and greater in the remaining two towns.

The random nature of the arrangement of economic-social and demographic features is a favourable condition from the point of view of verification of the structural and interaction hypotheses. If it turned out that the structural and demographic differences re shaped in such a way that Puławy is similar to Poddębice and that both towns are different from Łódź, it would not be possible to separate cases pointing to the confirmation of one or the other hypothesis. In a situation with a random arrangement, verification of both hypotheses becomes an easier task.

3. PARTICIPATION IN THE SECONDARY ECONOMIC CIRCULATION AND ATTITUDES TOWARD ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

The observation of participation in the secondary economic circulation has been based on such indicators as: providing private services at work and outside of it, work when on leave and on weekends, using supply sources besides stores, and also whether the respondent has come across, during the past year, a situation demanding a bribe to be given. The obtained results prove that in all three towns these occurrences are quite common, encompassing about one half of the inhabitants of each town (see tab. 1). Work outside the work establishment is easiest to find among inhabitants of Puławy and Łódź, while in Poddębice this happens less frequently. Work during free time is taken up least frequently by inhabitants of Łódź, more frequently by inhabitants of Puławy and Poddębice. Inhabitants of Łódź use supply sources outside the store more often than inhabitants of the remaining two towns. The conviction that various fields of life are corrupted is stronger in Łódź than in the other two towns.

In the course of programming this fragment of our studies, which was devoted to the economic foundations, we have mainly attempted to include the currently important and socially significant occurrences associated with the reformation of the Polish economy and the perception of various types of proposed and implemented reformatory designs. Let us therefore examine the perception of the management system and the preferences in this revealed by the inhabitants of the three towns. The influence of various institutions on the management of an enterprise was subjected to observation. These institutions were: the management, the self-government, the executive of the Polish United Workers' Party, trade unions and the founding body. Observation of the perception of the current influence of these institutions leads to the conclusion that in all three towns, the respondents accent with similar intensity the dominating influence of the management and the founding body on the management of enterprises. Postulates concerning the management system emphasize the necessity of increasing autonomy of the enterprise, except that the influence of the founding body should be somewhat smaller, but not eliminated entirely. In general, among our respondents, the manager-type of model of running

an enterprise is relatively the most popular. Such a tendency is the most accentuated by the respondents of Puławy and Poddębice. The self-government model is somewhat less popular, but nevertheless very clearly outlined, mostly by the respondents of Puławy. Opinions concerning the currently existing influence of selected institutions on the management of enterprises are similar in all three towns.

Another problem is the valuation of the effectiveness of private and state economic undertakings. The conviction that a state enterprise would function better if it were privately owned is strongest among the inhabitants of Łódź and Puławy, while among the inhabitants of Poddębice such an opinion is less popular. In the course of analyzing market and egalitarian orientations towards wage differences it turned out that the views of the inhabitants of the three towns are similar in essence.

Table 1 illustrates that for the eight described variables, in two cases the structural hypothesis appears to be relatively more strongly confirmed, in one case both hypotheses are equally credible, in one case neither one is, and in four cases the interaction hypothesis obtained the relatively strongest confirmation. The presented differences between the towns are of a quantitative nature, which means that all the occurrences discussed here take place in all the three towns. This universality, however, cannot conceal the existence of a distinct urban character, which causes differentiated participation in economic processes and different views on various economic phenomena. Most of these differences (4 out of 7) can be attributed to the specific subculture and interaction models typical for local communities, the rest are the effect of differences in the social-economic structure of the examined towns.

4. PERCEPTION OF THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE

Within the framework of this subject, we have placed under observation opinions on the causes of social inequalities and the attitudes toward phenomena influencing the existence of conflicting interests (the results are presented in tab. 2). Observation of the causes of social inequalities proves that the inhabitants of Poddębice are relatively more inclined to recognize that social inequalities are the effect of personal work contribution, i.e. education and work intensity. This means that the

inhabitants of Poddębice are more ready to legitimize social inequalities than the inhabitants of the remaining two towns. The refusal to legitimize inequalities connected with their criminal origin characterizes Łódź inhabitants in the largest degree. The subsequent variables were to check to what degree the inhabitants of the three towns are inclined to connect the social differences existing in the country with political and class phenomena. Thus, the inhabitants of Łódź are most inclined to accept the theory that the cause of inequalities lies in the differences in power and the possibilities of drawing additional benefits from this. The association of social inequalities with the favourizing by the state of certain social groups can be seen mainly among the inhabitants of Łódź, while the Poddębice inhabitants express this weakest and Puławy inhabitants are in the middle position. In turn, the conviction that private ownership differentiates the standard of living is most strongly expressed by the inhabitants of Łódź and weakest by the inhabitants of the remaining two towns. In the case of such phenomena as: party membership, additional possibilities of earning money and membership of a strong pressure group, it has turned out that the opinions of the inhabitants of the three towns are similar to each other. Observation of attitudes toward phenomena that influence the emergence of differences in interests produces similar conclusions. Thus,factors that most strongly influence differentiation of interests are money, private ownership and political power. In all three instances, it has turned out that these factors are considered to have the greatest significance by the inhabitants of Łódź. In the case of such phenomena as: influencing the management of enterprises, party membership and the education level and type of work – the inhabitants' views on the conflict-causing role of these have turned out to be similar.

Observation of the perception of chosen attitudes toward the social structure was based on 13 variables. As a result of conducted analyses, it has turned out that in five cases the attitudes of the inhabitants of the three towns are similar to each other. Most of the variables subjected to observation (8 out of 13) had a different course in the three examined populations. In the great majority of the cases (6 out of 8), the interaction hypothesis obtained a relatively stronger confirmation than the structural hypothesis, which more strongly explains 2 out of the 8 variables. From the obtained information it can be generally concluded that in the big-city environment there is a stronger influence of social inequalities on the inhabitants' imagination. The inhabitants of Łódź are inclined to attribute

greater significance to various factors differentiating the standard of living than in the case of inhabitants of small towns. The situation is similar in the case of perceiving conflicts of interests. Living in a big city is conducive to the formation of a contesting attitude toward social structure. This is accompanied by a conviction of a collective, i.e. class-political origin of social differences and a strong conviction of the existence of conflicts of interests.

Inhabitants of local communities have a less contesting attitude and are somewhat more inclined to perceive conflicts of interests as less intense. In addition, the conviction of a collective origin of inequalities is not as much accentuated by them.

5. THE PREFERRED STRATEGIES OF FULFILMENT OF INTERESTS

The next group of problems subjected to analysis was the variables illustrating the attitude of the respondents toward the strategy of fulfilment of interests. Our intention was, among other things, to find out whether our respondents are rather inclined to strive for the fulfilment of their own interests individually, or to do this within small groups, or within the framework of mobilization of relatively large collective bodies. The obtained information proves that support for individual strategies of action is smaller and in all three towns is similar (23-27%). Clique strategies, designed to mobilize the closest colleagues, friends or acquaintances, are the least popular in Puławy, while in Łódź and Poddębice they are preferred in a more or less similar degree. Readiness to participate in general campaigns that mobilize all those joined by common interests is most strongly expressed in Puławy, while in Łódź and Poddębice it is weaker and has similar intensity.

A relatively high popularity of collective operations in the examined towns has led us to poll for opinions on the preferred methods of their implementation. The obtained results can be arranged in two groups. The first is made up of rather moderate operations, intended to take advantage of the institutional political, trade or administrative structures, the second group is made up of radical extra-institutional operations. The moderate methods of operations, such as: letters and petitions to authorities, interventions through the party, formulating goals through the mediation

of the OPZZ trade union organization and self-governments were the least popular among the people of Łódź, and more popular in Puławy and Poddębice. Another of the moderate methods of conduct, i.e. group negotiations with superiors, was relatively the most strongly preferred method by Puławy inhabitants. Radical methods of conduct, i.e. the threat of lowering the work rate or of striking, of lowering productivity, strikes, are definitely the most strongly supported methods in the big-city environment, less supported in both small towns. Street protesting had very little support, similarly in all the three environments.

Another problem lies in the evaluation of group strategies in the categories of: conservatism versus innovativeness. In this case, the attitudes are quite similar, except that the inhabitants of Poddębice are somewhat more conservative than the inhabitants of the two other towns, while the differences are very small.

Of the variables presented in table 3, three had a similar course in the examined populations, in the remaining 11 differences appeared in the attitudes of the inhabitants of the three towns. From amongst these eleven variables, three are more markedly explained by the structural hypothesis. The great majority, 8 out of 11 variables, seems to be more markedly explained by the interaction hypothesis. Generally speaking, the domination of the great work enterprise in the employment structure of Puławy seems to be the causative factor of the appearance of attitudes that relatively strongly accentuate the necessity of conducting collective operations and rejecting clique strategies. At first glance, this information seemed to suggest that also in the Puławy environment, there will be relatively strong support for the radical collective strategies. Such an expectation was all the more justified since the employees of great work enterprises are more radical than the employees of smaller plants. The results of the studies lead to different conclusions. Clearly, the inhabitants of Łódź are more radical. The inhabitants of Puławy and Poddębice prefer rather the moderate group strategies and express less support for radical strategies. On the example of Puławy, it can be clearly seen that the course of social contacts and the political subculture typical for local communities have a stronger influence in making the methods of conduct more moderate than the large-enterprise structure has on their radicalization. To sum up, the visible alienation of big-city inhabitants toward economic and social institutions produces a relatively high radicalism and tendency to undertake extra-institutional methods of conduct in conflict situations.

6. PERCEPTION OF CONFLICTS IN THE WORK ENVIRONMENT

We have subjected to observation 13 factors that in the view of the respondents may act discouragingly on motivation for work. These were factors characterizing the attitude toward directors and co-workers, their level of competence, the interrelations etc. It turned out that only in one case – the conviction that bad relations with co-workers act in a discouraging way, there was differentiation of views, i.e. the relatively more marked significance of this factor is stressed by the inhabitants of Puławy.

In the case of attitudes toward conflicts in the work establishment, it turned out that the relative centralization of the economy and the universal laws governing human behaviour in the work environment act in a unifying manner on the perception of social relations in the work establishment.

7. POLITICAL ATTITUDES

In describing political attitudes, we shall present the results of studies that characterize the attitude of respondents to municipal authorities, the scope of identification with social-political organizations and the attitude toward the political system. The attitude toward the political system was measured while taking several possibilities into consideration. Support for the currently implemented line of policy, without reservations or with minor reservations, is most markedly expressed by the inhabitants of Puławy and Poddębice, least markedly by the inhabitants of Łódź. As far as the need for new radical changes of the government's line of policy is concerned, we have not noted any differences between the inhabitants of the three towns. However, the postulate of introducing a new model of socialism is least popular in Puławy and Poddębice and most strongly supported in Łódź. Support for the change of orientation of the political system into a non-socialist one is most weakly expressed in Poddębice, most strongly in Łódź, while the opinions of Puławy inhabitants are in the middle. The next two indices concerned the significance of political bonds for the inhabitants of the examined towns. In the case of the two smaller towns, it turned out that political views are a much stronger factor of

integration than in Łódź. The problem of identification with social-political organizations looks somewhat different; in this case, in Puławy and in Łódź these clearly have less significance for the inhabitants than in Poddębice.

Subsequent indices concern the attitude toward municipal authorities and the inhabitants' feeling of autonomy toward the authorities. In general, in Poddębice there is the greatest need for paternalism of the municipal authorities, expressed in the conviction that municipal problems should be resolved mainly by the municipal authorities. In Puławy and Łódź,, on the other hand, there is clearly greater support for the theory that mainly citizens should become involved in the resolution of municipal problems. Involvement in collective activity can be defined in terms of cooperation or conflict with the municipal authorities. It appears that the conflict attitude is most strongly felt in Łódź. We deduce this from the fact that support for the theory that the municipal authorities counteract self-organization of inhabitants is expressed in Łódź twice as often as in Puławy and three times as often as in Poddębice. Similarly, the inhabitants of Łódź accentuate the theory of disintegration of the urban community more frequently than the inhabitants of Poddębice (in Puławy this problem was not investigated).

In order to illustrate the attitude toward the policy of the municipal authorities, we asked our respondents what the municipal authorities were doing and what they should be doing. A comparison of the perceived conduct with the postulated conduct has served to construct an "alienation index"[3]. In all three towns, the existing hierarchy of interest of the authorities is not shared by the inhabitants. This divergence was most marked in Łódź and Puławy, and least marked in Poddębice.

The last problem presented here concerns the readiness to participate in various types of collective operations that aim at resolving the more important urban problems. Readiness to participate in such a way is relatively most strongly expressed by the inhabitants of Puławy.

Table 5 contains a numerical documentation for the theories described above. It appears from it that from amongst the 13 variables subjected to observation, only in one case no differences were noted between the attitudes of the inhabitants of the three towns. Of the remaining 12 differences in attitude, five can be explained by means of the structural hypothesis, six by means of the interaction hypothesis, and in one case both

hypotheses are equally plausible. Thus, in the great majority of the cases (12), a clear difference between the small-town environment (Poddębice) and the big-city environment (Łódź) has been marked.

The presented data lead to the confirmation of the theories put forward in other fragments of this study and concerning the clearly stronger feeling of alienation and contesting attitude of the inhabitants of big cities. It appears from table 5 that the feeling of alienation is accompanied by a hostile attitude toward municipal authorities and a somewhat stronger conviction of the necessity of self-organization of the inhabitants, even against the resistance of the municipal authorities. In Poddębice, in turn, there is greater trust of the municipal authorities and a greater readiness to accept their initiatives. The inhabitants of Puławy have intermediate views.

Summing up, it should be stated that observation of the political attitudes proves there are great differences in the views of the inhabitants of the three towns. These differences are better explained by means of the cultural and social distinct features of inhabitants of small towns and big cities rather than through differentiation of the social-economic structure of the three towns.

8. DIFFERENCES IN PERSONALITY FEATURES

The following is an attempt to see to what degree residence in a given town is associated with the total of various types of permanent experiences. These are permanent enough to cause the formation of personality features that are different or similar in the three urban environments. Personality features are the effect of a synthesis of such influences as: specific cultural patterns the influence of the family environment, opportunities to fulfil aspirations, education, work features, the standard of living etc. We have analyzed authoritarism and distress. Authoritarism is, to put it briefly, a personality feature expressed in insecurity, distrust of oneself and a need for black-and-white visions of social reality, with a simultaneous glorification of authority and readiness to submit to an individual or to a group considered as "strong". Psychiatrists believe that this type of attitude is pathology of the personality. Distress is associated with a feeling of fear and neurosis. The term psychological discomfort is often used.

Observation of a disintegration of personality traits suggests that in

Poddębice there is a greater psychological discomfort, but also greater authoritarism. It appears that the last is largely the result of a lower than average education level of the inhabitants of Poddębice. It should be noted that in this case, there is a distinct difference between Poddębice and the remaining two towns. This means that all the social-cultural differences that influence personality traits are most compatible with the opposition: small town versus big city.

9. BEHAVIOURAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE DIFFERENTIATOIN IN ATTITUDES OF INHABITANTS OF THE THREE TOWNS. SUMMING UP AND CONCLUSIONS

In the course of observation of the differences in the attitudes of inhabitants of the three examined towns we have exposed attitudes toward political and economic problems and toward personality traits. We feel that this type of treatment will allow us to make a relatively full (and quite carefully confirmed on the grounds of the existing sociological knowledge) detection of readiness for behavioural change of the inhabitants of the examined towns. For this end, we have subordinated our considerations to the following sequence of problems: the declared economic behaviour, attitudes toward social inequalities, causes of differences of interests, preferences for strategies of fulfilment of interests, radicalism and moderation of collective undertakings, causes of conflicts in the work establishment, political attitudes, personality traits and the manner of perceiving various problems connected with the functioning of urban environments. These problems, with the exception of the last one, are the traditional subject of sociological studies, aimed to reveal such features of the consciousness as: approbation, contestation, collectivism, individualism, expectation of continuation or social changes etc. For the description of the social-political attitudes in our studies we have used 63 variables. Of these, in 22 cases it turned out that there are no differences in the attitudes of inhabitants of the examined towns. The noted universality of attitudes applies to (in the great majority) 12 cases of perceiving the causes of conflict at the work place. This signifies there is a mutual impermeability of the work environ-

ment and the urban environment. At any rate, it should be assumed that the centralization of management and the domination of universal, industrial methods of work organization causes a uniformity of the manner of perceiving the work environment by the inhabitants of the examined towns. As far as the remaining 2/3 of the cases are concerned, i.e. the 41 variables, it turned out that the differences between the inhabitants of the three towns are quite distinct. In order to explain these differences, two hypotheses have been formulated – the interaction and the structural hypothesis. The first referred to the differences between the local community and the big city, the second aimed at finding out the relation between the economic-social and the demographic structures of the inhabitants and their attitudes. It turned out that in the great majority of the cases (24 out 41), the interaction hypothesis obtained stronger confirmation. In fourteen cases, there were more arguments in support of the structural hypothesis, in three cases both hypotheses were equally plausible (see tab. 7).

The presented numbers do not fully render the picture of the gathered study results. It turned out that with the exception of several individual cases, the attitudes of the inhabitants of Poddębice and Łódź were distinctly different. This means there is a stronger confirmation, than it would appear from table 7, of the different characters of the small town and the big city. The case of Puławy provides clear disturbances in this picture. A relatively large number of people residing in Puławy (50,000) makes the town undergo a process of transformation, which runs in a continuous manner from the local community to the big-city community.

On the basis of our studies it can be said that this process is in a beginning stage and in the great majority, the mechanisms of attitude formation typical for local communities have retained their social significance. The general conclusion that could serve to sum up our research attempts, confirms the generally known theories of the influence of urbanization on the feeling of alienation, a lowering of the psychological comfort level and social radicalism. However, there was no confirmation of the circulating opinions on the influence of the great-industrial elements on social radicalism. In the case of the examined towns, there was a much stronger influence of the modernizing effect of the local community on the great-industrial environment. Inasmuch as the revealed differences of attitude have a rather quantitative than qualitative character, a quite plausible theory could be put forward of certain differences in the manner of experiencing social reality by the inhabitants of big cities and small town.

It appears that next to the traditionally used gauges of attitudes connected with class or stratum position, the place of residence plays a significant differentiating role. Thus, we have within the Polish society a clear division into big-city and local communities. These differences are accompanied by quite a distinctly marked readiness for different behaviour patterns.

The data presented here, illustrating a relatively greater criticism and sense of autonomy of the inhabitants of big cities, appear to suggest the existence of greater readiness of these inhabitants to participate in social changes in these types of environment, while the opposite can be expected of small-town environments. The results of our studies do not confirm this. From table 5 it can be seen that inhabitants of big cities, when wanting to organize themselves, have to overcome their own fear of "disintegration" of possible initiatives in a disintegrated community. There is also the fear resulting from the conviction that the authorities shall counteract the spontaneously appearing initiatives. It is therefore quite probable that such phenomena, associated with a greater radicalism of the big-city environments, shall bear fruit in the general conviction of the necessity of changes, while specific initiatives will probably not be put forward. In effect, the accumulated frustrations will bring about inclinations towards rebellions, violent outbursts and acts of aggression, within which an excessive amount of unresolved matters shall hinder the logical arrangement of these and the implementation of plans. In the small-town environment, in turn, the readiness to look to the authorities can easily transform into a feeling of a lack of personal or collective influence and lead to passiveness of individuals and social groups. It appears from this that social changes or their lack are in both discussed environments a function of the existence of different mechanisms regulating social behaviour. In the big-city environment, there is a stronger need for contesting and radical social movements, while in local communities there is a stronger need for the leadership of local authorities and readiness to cooperate with these.

---

[1] Based on J. Turowski, "*Społeczność lokalna*", Studia Socjologiczne no 3, 1977.

[2] See B. Jałowiecki, "*Lokalność jako czynnik rozwoju społecznego*", "Wieś i Rolnictwo" no 4/57, 1987.

[3] Calculated by Andrzej Boczkowski.

Table 1

Similarities and Differences in the Attitudes and Behaviour of the Inhabitants of Three Towns in the Sphere of Economic Matters

Attitudes and behaviour	Towns		Which of the hypotheses is better confirmed
	similarities %	differences %	
1. Jobs outside the work place	Łódź – 46.9 Poddębice – 45.2	Poddębice – 34.2	structural
2. Jobs in free time (leaves, weekends)	Poddębice – 25.4 Puławy – 25.4	Łódź – 13.5	interaction
3. Source of supplies outside the store	Puławy – 49.4 Poddębice – 54.5	Łódź – 67.8	interaction
4. Bribes	Puławy – 33.1 Poddębice– 30.4	Łódź – 56.9	interaction
5. Preferences for the manager-type of management	Puławy – 60.5 Poddębice – 59.0	Łódź – 46.0	
6. Opinions on the current influence on management	indices consisting of several variables Łódź, Puławy, Poddębice		none
7. Orientation of self-government	Łódź – 19.1 Poddębice – 20.0	Puławy – 29.6	structural
8. Conviction of greater effectiveness of private enterprises	Łódź – 48.4 Puławy – 43.3	Poddębice – 34.3	both

Table 2

Similarities and Differences in Attitudes of the Inhabitants of Three Towns towards the Social Structure

Object of attitude	Towns		Which of the hypotheses is better confirmed
	similarities %	differences %	
1	2	3	4
9. Legitimization of inequalities	Łódź Puławy	Poddębice	both
10. Refusal to legitimize inequalities	Puławy – 30.2 Poddębice – 30.4	Łódź – 43.3	interaction
11. Inequalities are effect of position in authorities and drawing benefits from this	Puławy – 36.6 Poddębice – 34.7	Łódź – 48.0	interaction
12. Inequalities are effect of favouritism of some by government	Poddębice – 25.7 Puławy – in middle position – 31.6	Łódź – 36.7	interaction
13. Differentiating role of private ownership	Poddębice – 47.8 Puławy – 51.4	Łódź – 67.8	interaction
14. Party membership differentiates standard of living	Łódź – 16.0 Puławy – 12.6 Poddębice – 12.2	no differences	none
15. Group pressure influences standard of living	Łódź – 20.9 Puławy – 16.6 Poddębice – 15.6	no differences	none

Table 2, cont.

1	2	3	4
16. Money and income influence conflicts of interests	Puławy – 70.9 Poddębice – 67.3	Łódź – 80.7	interaction
17. Private ownership causes conflicts of interests	Puławy – 51.9 Poddębice – 55.1	Łódź – 71.3	interaction
18. Conflicts of interests are effect of political power	Puławy – 49.3 Poddębice – 45.6	Łódź – 60.2	interaction
Conflicts of interests are effect of:			
19. influence on management			
20. party membership		no differences	none
21. type of work			

Table 3

Similarities and Differences in Attitudes of the Inhabitant of Three Towns toward Group Strategies

Attitudes	Towns		Which of the hypotheses is better confirmed
	similarities %	differences %	
1	2	3	4
22. Preferences for individual measures		no differences	none
23. Preferences for conduct limited to small groups	Łódź – 22.9 Poddębice – 24.9	Puławy – 13.9	structural
24. Preferences for mass collective conduct	Łódź – 41.6 Poddębice – 39.1	Puławy – 53.9	structural
25. Letters and petitions to authorities	Puławy – 30.0 Poddębice – 34.6	Łódź – 17.1	interaction
26. Threat of lowering productivity or strike	Puławy – 22.1 Poddębice – 17.7	Łódź – 34.5	interaction
27. Actual collective lowering of work speed or productivity	Puławy – 13.4 Poddębice – 15.8	Łódź – 26.6	interaction
28. Group negotiations with superiors	Łódź – 46.8 Poddębice – 46.4	Puławy – 61.6	structural
29. Group interventions in party	Puławy – 48.2 Poddębice – 46.4	Łódź – 29.3	interaction

Table 3, cont.

1	2	3	4
30. Formulating of tasks by the OPZZ trade union organization	Puławy – 39.3 Poddębice – 42.3	Łódź – 26.0	interaction
31. Formulating of tasks by workers' self-government	Puławy – 42.4 Poddębice – 40.2	Łódź – 26.0	interaction
32. Strikes	Puławy – 18.5 Poddębice – 20.7	Łódź – 44.9	interaction
33. Street protesting		no differences	none
34. Group strategies aiming to defend hitherto existing state of ownership		no differences	none
35. Group strategies change	Łódź – 47.9 Puławy – 47.2	Poddębice – 39.8	structural aimed at

Table 4

Similarities and Differences in Attitudes of the Inhabitant of Three Towns toward Group Strategies

Attitudes	Towns		Which of the hypotheses is better confirmed
	similarities %	differences %	
36-47. Conflict-producing factors in the work establishment		no differences	none
48. Relations with co-workers act in a discouraging way		Puławy – 52.3 Poddębice – 46.7 Łódź – 40.9	structural

Table 5

Similarities and Differences in Attitudes of the Inhabitant of Three Towns toward the Political System

Attitudes	Towns		Which of the hypotheses is most strongly confirmed
	similarities %	differences %	
1	2	3	4
49. Support for political line of authorities without or with minor reservations	Puławy – 40.4 Poddębice – 47.4	Łódź – 25.6	interaction
50. Postulates for radical change of political line of authorities		no differences	none
51. Other model of socialism	Puławy – 22.5 Poddębice – 17.6	Łódź – 31.3	interaction
52. Neo-socialist political orientation		Poddębice – 4.2 Puławy – 9.1 Łódź – 13.8	both
53. Control group – people with similar political views	Poddębice – 52.9 Puławy – 60.0	Łódź – 37.1	interaction
54. Control group – social-political organizations	Puławy – 10.8 Łódź – 6.5	Poddębice – 18.8	structural
55. Municipal problems should be resolved mainly by the authorities with citizen cooperation	Łódź – 63.4 Puławy – 61.8	Poddębice – 72.2	structural

Table 5, cont.

1	2	3	4
56. Municipal problems should be carried out mainly by citizens with or without participation of authorities	Puławy – 35.5 Łódź – 35.5	Poddębice – 26.0	structural
57. Index of alienation toward municipal authorities	Łódź – 37.5 Puławy – 35.2	Poddębice – 29.9	structural
58. Municipal authorities assist inhabitants in organizing themselves	Poddębice – 53.3 Łódź – 30.2	Puławy – 39.7	interaction
59. Municipal authorities counteract organization of inhabitants	Puławy – 7.1 Poddębice – 10.9	Łódź – 23.6	interaction
60. Town inhabitants are a dispersed community		Poddębice – 52.4 Łódź – 67.3	interaction
61. Unconditional readiness to participate in collective undertakings under condition of avoiding conflict		Poddębice – 63.7 Puławy – 76.6 Łódź – 69.9	structural

Table 6

Differences in Personality Traits of the Inhabitants of Three Towns

Personality traits	Towns		Which of the hypotheses is better confirmed
	similarities %	differences %	
62. Great distress	Łódź – 71.7 Puławy – 74.0	Poddębice – 57.3	structural
63. High authoritarism	Łódź – 10.9 Puławy – 11.9	Poddębice – 20.8	structural

Table 7

Comprehensive Grouping of Variables Explained by the Structural and Interaction Hypothesis in Relation to Social-Political Attitudes

Hypotheses	Number of variables
Structural	14
Interaction	24
Both hypotheses equally plausible	3
No differences	22
Total	63

Anna Turska
University of Warsaw

CREATIVE AND DESTRUCTIVE FACTORS IN THE ACTIVITY OF LOCAL COMMUNITIES

I.

The eighties have enriched our perception of Polish society with a number of new insights. Yet even the new additions provided little to provide sufficient evidence that our society is taking a creative and active approach towards matters of its social, public and civic concern. Whether or not we agree with the picture of an active society depends, in my opinion on the choice of perspective. Therefore seen from the top, or in other words in a macrosystemic perspective, the Polish society would appear as an active one. Let us recall that for a number of years we have witnessed the nascency of an alternative society here in Poland complete with a well-developed network of relations specific for a society of citizens. However, if we look from the grass-roots level or from a local perspective we would quite likely draw altogether reverse conclusions. A disintegration and shallowness of our local existence could be seen with a naked eye not to mention empirical studies. Studies conducted by my research group support fully both the everyday experience and sociological investigations.

This state of things not only makes it harder to pass judgement on the public and civic life of the Poles but also suggests that the two important dimensions of social activity never get near enough to bring about a cumulative effect. The distance between social activeness in solving global or systemic problems and social engagement in solving local problems could not be adequately described in terms of a mere disproportion. We could rather speak of an abyss. But if things really look this way a question arises: whether and how it is possible to link up small local communities and pool their efforts toward a society of true subjects i.e. ones that are actively engaged in their social and public life in their immediate neigh-

bourhood. This is a very important question especially at the threshold of the reform program because crucial preconditions of successful political, social and economic reforms are linked directly with every move designed to reduce that huge distance.

The answer to the above question must not be dismissed with a diagnostic analysis alone. Instead, we need to concentrate on factors responsible for the erosion or alternatively growth of initiatives among local communities. Therefore going beyond a diagnosis, which for that matter usually reveals a certain degree of difference between societies under investigation, will help us steer clear off the dangers of wishful thinking. Once an investigation confirms the existence of an enclave of local social activity we are being lured to believe that perhaps things are not that bad after all. Such manner of thinking, very characteristic as it is for propaganda and ideological ends, distorts the sense of the principle that exceptions only confirm the rule. Further, a logical consequence of such thinking is the promotion of shining examples, which could only be compared to the treatment of effects without seeking the causes of an already serious structural socio-political illness of local communities. Therefore the point is not to focus and examine the exceptions from the rule but rather to investigate thoroughly the origins of that emptiness in the social life of local groups. This is by no means an easy task because the root causes occur on various planes and are additionally built into the political, social and even inner human fabric and also into the structure of civilisational change and cultural patterns.

That huge disparity of factors determining social activeness in local milieus, which finds articulation through accepted patterns of collective action is under our system nothing short of a cumulated effect of over four decades of stubborn and consistent policy of making the society a property of the State. The system of authority under real socialism abounds in paradoxes. Some of them however bear a symbolic meaning necessary to justify the very essence of that authority, which ostensibly preached the ideology of socializing the power while at the same time actually annexed every sphere of social life.

The special position of the State in the social system, and to a lesser extent in the political system where the political party played the leading role, has been visible since the beginnings of the Polish People's Republic. The State a the executor and guarantor of the accomplished revolution "penetrated just like sacrum does the reality of creating the world", while

"the revolution, whose true meaning had b een obscured, was presented in the guise of a historical miracle, as a praiseworthy metamorphosis, an ultimate triumph of truth and justice"[1]. The State in that spectacle of authority took upon itself the responsibility for every manifestation of social life and every social process. By doing so the State created facts and employed to that end a massive body of myths preaching supreme social, public and national interests and welfare, attempts to pierce through that tight mesh of fact and myth with a local, group or other low level interest has been routinely seen as an attack of the profane, or the empirical order of things – unbriddled and spontaneous as it was and therefore dangerous. It was perceived as an attack on the sacrum of the authority. The territory of sacrum was well-fortified with rules of prohibition and prescriptions. Permissions were sometimes issued to provide contrast i.e., without guaranteeing any means of settling disputes based on the rule of justice where there had been a violation of group, local or individual interest, they affirmed the indispensability and omnipresence of the authority.

The role of those mechanisms in the social and political creation of space is examined in detail by B. Jałowiecki. He also studied its origins and development up till the present times[2].

The rule of real socialism denied the existence of pluralist group, local or individual interests and likewise rejected such category as "people", which was recognized only as an object of paternalist yet also repressive rule and not as a real subject of socio-political processes. Let it be stressed that it was an option corresponding to Hegel's aversion to the category of "people" as politically dangerous since it could threaten with vindications against the State. That option involves yet another paradox of the system of power of real socialism. The State posing as protector of people did not slam the door shut to vindications. On the contrary it encouraged such behaviour. The history of the Polish People's Republic sliced by successive socio-political crises provides firm evidence that social masses are in fact an "active non-entity". This truth was recorded already by Montesquieu who wrote: "People are always either too swift or the opposite. Sometimes they destroy everything with their hundred thousand arms, and at times they creep like insects with their hundred thousand feet".

In our discussion of the problems outlined above we cannot avoid asking the following question: how did it happen that during successive socio-political crises local milieus invariably played the role of a proscenium for the actual spectacles and why the changes accompanying successive

turning-points brought so little to the reality of local Poland? This question is related to the problem of the abysmal distance between active social attitude toward global issues and the activity of local groups in resolving their problems.

The immediate answer to these questions would be quite simple: obviously local communities have proved to be exceptionally susceptible to the destructive policies of nationalizing the society at large. This sensibility is related on the one hand with the innermost properties of that type of the human collective, which could be summarized as a certain degree of autonomy, and on the other, with the fact that local communities had been exposed to a much greater extent than the society at large to a whole range of destructive factors accompanying our crippling civilisational processes. Eventually, while we might claim that the global society had lived through periods of activity paving the way for the emergence of a society of citizens the same could not be said about local communities. Here we could only note an all-embracing and cumulating degradation which in effect eliminated those local groups from the socio-political scene.

It is important to remember that local communities have been subjected to a three-tier training course in how to get dispossessed by the State, which was part of the State's destructive policy toward the society. The first to get trained was the macrosystem of politics. The second came the political lower level system, and third the local system of government. This pyramid of power rested on the fundamental principle of real socialism saying that local administration is only a mouthpiece of decision-making centers high above the local level. In practice this meant that local government performed a quasi-local function, while its officers grew into conservative bureaucrats. These properties of the local power apparatus are reflected like in a distorting mirror in attempts to reform the system. Interesting in this respect is a survey by P. Gieorgica and P. Dutkiewicz where they analyze opinions given by higher ranking officials at the Administration on how consultations were conducted on the voivodship level. Their views prove clearly the conservative attitudes of officers in low-level administration[3]. This is another paradox of real socialism: the habit of disregarding local communities proves stronger than the habit of acting as an emissary of the decision-making center. Attitudes of that kind articulate without doubt a collision of rituals where fear of destruction that could be brought by any change is getting the upper hand.

II.

It appears that the methods of "nationalizing" local communities through replacing the roles and local values with supra-local values, which were often presented in a camouflaged manner, were driving local communities into what S. Ossowski aptly described as a double Cinderella complex. First, it was the complex toward supra-local decision centers, and second it was a complex toward local authorities. Our research has confirmed not only the "double Cinderella complex" but also its various ramifications specifically in the patterns of local collective activity and patterns of recommended behaviour accompanying those activities.

It could be contended against these conclusions that the Cinderella complex of local groups toward the State has always been there due to the simple that they occupied the lowest position in the organization of the State. It is not difficult to refute that charge because even not so distant past shows that local societies if organized into integrated organisms endowed with clearly defined self-government powers could defend themselves against the abuses of State authority. Another thing is how successful that defence had been. Yet the very fact of having the right to defense created those societies as subjects on the political scene. Meanwhile small local communities today, being as they are socially disintegrated and degraded on the political scene which is organized by the decision-making center together with its long arm of local bureaucracy are denied such opportunities.

Our empirical material allows us to claim that a sense of dependence from supra-local State authority and local administration is related to the overall level of development of various local communities as is manifested in the following regularity: the deeper a local community is plunged in a civilisational regress and overpowering impotence the greater is the sense of dependence from their local authorities and even more so from higher levels of the Administration. We have investigated a number of towns in Poland and sorted them in a decreasing order with respect to the value of these criteria. Eventually we have found out that less than every fifth (18.0 per cent) inhabitant of Tadzin thinks that supra-local authorities ought to solve their local problems. The same opinion is expressed in Leszkow by every fourth citizen (25.3 per cent) and every third in Romanow (31.3 per cent). At the same time opinions of the inhabitants of these three towns on the responsibilities of local community for their own problems place them

in a reverse order. Most frequently this opinion was heard in Tadzin (nearly 30.0 per cent), followed by Leszkow (less than 25.0 per cent) and Romanow (less than 20.0 per cent).

It should be added that the inhabitants of Romanow displayed a strong sense of dependence on supra-local authorities and also lacked confidence in their own resourcefulness. These attitudes re accompanied by a clearly articulated inferiority complex toward the Administration. Asked why people obey the authorities the answers were: "because it is better not to stock out your head" (44.7 per cent), while the third-ranking answer was: "because a well-disposed authority could prove more generous" (24.7 per cent). Thus in the eyes of the respondents the authorities are primarily the source of punishment and less frequently the benefactor. Interestingly, the second-ranking answer is that "both the people and the authorities cater for our common good" (30.0 per cent). Other views include: "the authorities know full-well what ought to be done" (16.0 per cent) and further down the list: "among those in the driving seat of power are some deserving special trust of the people". Such opinions, in my view, seem to confirm the existence of an inferiority complex towards the authorities which, let me remind, punish, reward and act for our common good, though at the same time appear to command a not-too-high a standard of competence and enjoy a rather moderate confidence with the people.

These findings reveal, on the one hand, the destructive impact of the policies of the State under real socialism, and on the other, show the distance between the present stage of affairs and the stage in which such small communities become true actors on the socio-political scene. In the light of our findings the fundamental slogans of socio-political reform such as the society of independent subjects or socialization of authority cannot but appear as nothing more than a point of departure before a long and arduous journey into history.

Another quite important aspect of the destructive influence of paternalist-repressive policies of the State are the culturally assimilated ties between ideal and practical patterns of collective activity for local milieus. These policies of the paternalist-repressive State which acts as the ultimate decision-maker responsible for the allocation of everything from basic goods to political freedoms and human rights must have torn to pieces the delicate cultural tissue linking actual patterns of social and public activity and the ideal patterns which came to be regarded as duties. The system which is busy reproducing mechanisms to prove that everything could be

given or taken away away at any time and which leaves no space for a collective success, endangers specific psycho-social repercussions. For the local communities this means that they do not identify a sense of duty when discussing action for their own environment. Further the roles of actors on the local scene are being emptied of any meaning. One of the crucial issues under investigation by my group on local patterns of collective activity has been to find out how far they reflect the actual social activity and how much of it has been forced by so-called objective circumstance i.e., poor social or technological infrastructure or mock initiatives.

We have distinguished four types of patterns in which duties or obligations have been perceived and which may prove important for actual local behaviour. These are as follows:

a/ patterns of re-creation – when certain demands and directives devised at the central level are transmitted passively down to the local level;

b/ patterns of adaptation – when centrally generated requirements are passed down to the local level but in a form modified to fit in individual local environment;

c/ conservative patterns: they articulate the accumulated past activity and collective effort and experience of a local community;

d/ patterns of creation – self-created pattern of behaviour embodying the expectations normally associated with the role of a member of a local community and grown out of a sense of duty of the local people.

These four patterns of behaviour were then used as analytical categories in the interpretation of the behaviour of all subjects of collective activity i.e., not only those playing the role of inhabitants but also subjects of a broadly perceived local system of power.

We assumed that the duty patterns adopted in local activity would, on the one hand, stimulate or discourage the rules of behaviour and would play a part in selection and petrification of selected rules which had proved to be the most effective ones, most rational or the best suited to the local circumstances.

We were looking for a confirmation of our hypothesis about social patterns of behaviour by finding the dominating trends in behaviour. We agreed initially that a domination of formal manifestations of the work of an organization (which has statutory or legal duty to work for local environment) or participation in voluntary community work only

accompanied by a feeling that that behaviour is obligatory would testify to the entropy of the ideal and practical patterns of collective social activity and would also be proof of the disintegration or disorganisation of local milieus. We also agreed that token activity i.e., actions which the people do not feel obliged to take up but which are still felt as being forced upon them by the authorities would provide a strong indication in four of our hypothesis.

The empirical material (though not yet complete) examined so far allows us to formulate a preliminary conclusion that our hypothesis has been verified to a weak degree while in a stronger degree regarding token activity it has been verified only in the part concerning broadly understood local authority.

We have found out that in every local community under our investigation the dominating patterns of social activity has been one of people's participation in activities organized by institutions of the local system of authority yet at the same time promoted by central authorities (e.g., competition such as Bank of Towns, Champions of Economy, actions such as Springtime Cleaning-up, or voluntary work of various kind). In contrast to these quite regular events the collective activity organized by the people themselves are only sporadic and if anything they manifest themselves in social protest against local decisions.

It is not easy to interpret the findings especially where it concerns the relationship between duty patterns of behaviour and the rules of activity because of the psychological component of every behaviour. This remark is rather important because we have not analyzed that problem in any greater detail. Therefore some aspects of the issue could only be discussed to a limit set up by our intuition.

However, at least one aspect of that relationship seems quite obvious. The actual monopoly of the local system of authority in matters related to the organizing the collective activity of the local population has become a destructive factor where it confronted genuine social activity. That monopoly had effectively blocked already on the level of practiced rules of activity any grass-roots initiatives. The implications of that phenomenon are numerous. They are articulated in a disappearance – on a local level – of roles and identity of leadership. Another damage done to local communities concerns the occupations which used to enjoy a certain measure of respect such as doctors and teachers. They have not only their former prestige but also ceased to recognized in their former character. The above

conclusions have a broad underpinning in empirical material collected by us including characteristics of local activists, group interviews among theachers, secondary school pupils, war veterans, and direct first-hand observations.

In the light of our findings the destructive impact of the monopoly of collective activity inspired by the local authorities looks obvious. No less certain is the damage inflicted by that monopoly upon the process of shaping creative patterns of self-motivated behaviour. It is relatively more difficult to assess the impact on the society of self-motivated behaviour assimilated by local authorities.

Before we move on the discuss in detail that question a short comment should be made on the question of token activity. We can talk about this type of behaviour only with a high dose of probability with relation to local authorities especially where their activity was motivated by reproductive behaviour set to execute norms and directives that had originated to the top. If local authorities in their daily work are not motivated by a dedication to adopt central directives to the actual needs and interests of their local environment then they could quite safely be said to undertake only token action. Such behaviour is at the same time smoothly incorporated into the ritual of being an emissary of supra-local decision-making centers. Let me recall here a conversation with a representative of local authorities in one of the towns under investigation. I asked him about the agenda of the nearest session of the People's Council. He answered that it would focus on social pathology. My next question was whether that was an important issue in the life of his town. The answer was shocking: "No," he said, "but it is in the instruction from the Council of State".

Remarks on token activity was by no means meant to be a digression. The point is that in the towns where that type of behaviour predominates, which can be established upon examining int. al., official documents, participation of the population in actions organized by the local authorities is not significantly low (this concerns patterns of behaviour) but people hold positively ambivalent attitudes toward such activity. It is manifested both in the absence of a developed traditionalist self-responsibility and in the absence of ambition to initiate such activity by the local population themselves. The best illustration is found in Romanow. Conversely, where local authorities are guided in their activity by adaptive patterns, or even go beyond that and try to anticipate supra-local decisions, participation of the local population in authority-inspired collective activity is not only

much greater but also enhances the emergence of traditionalized self-responsibility patterns of behaviour and also stimulates grass-roots initiatives. This could well be seen on the example of the town of Tadzin.

The above findings concerning the interrelationship between ideal and actual patterns of behaviour both in the local population and the authorities are complementary to what has been earlier said about the influence on social behaviour and responsibilities of factors related to the civilisational progress in the towns under investigation.

III.

I have so far focused on the identification of the destructive and creative factors related to the manner of exercising authority under real socialism and also concentrated on the verification of those factors against empirical material. Therefore the main stress has been laid on political aspects while the effect of civilisational impulses has been pushed to the background. The context adopted here of the interpretation of the phenomena of interest to us concerning social activity of local population in collective undertakings was purposefully selected. In my view, under the system of power of real socialism any dychotomic divisions of the factors of social activity in collective endeavours by local communities largely lose their cognitive value even as ideal constructs. This is so because of the omnipresent and omnipotent role of the State, which not only desired to control every manifestation of social life but also sought to annex it with stubborn consequence.

What then is the cognitive value of such dychotomies as: endogenous and exogenous factors, factors of systemic-political and civilisational nature, institutionalized and non-institutionalized factors, disfunctional and eufunctional factors. The mechanisms of power of real socialism have disfigured either of the parts in the dichotomy. They have lost their identity and as a consequence got to be rather hardly distinguishable in the basis dimension of disfunctionality or eufunctionality.

This question stands out in full when we try to analyze the so-called perverted effects, the delayed in time effects of State policies. Policies, let us add, which had never been, under that system of rule, subjected to assessment. An interesting attempt to describe perverted affects has been presented recently by B. Jałowiecki[4]. Let me however focus now on civilisational factors.

In our research we have identified the following creative factors related to the civilisational progress of our society, which may pre-determine local society activity:

1/ departure from isolationism of those milieus and an opening to relations and processes going on in other groups, specifically in groups belonging to social macrostructure, which offers them a chance to participate in the life of the global community;

2/ growing institutionalization of social life, which incorporates people into bureaucratic structures, may elicit defensive postures in local groups;

3/ higher level of education and knowledge of fact of social and political life may help local communities overcome gradually the Cinderella complex;

4/ general civilisational progress accompanied by a large number of niches of civilisational underdevelopment in local Poland may stimulate initiatives and entrepreneurship of local communities.

The above factors however do not operate automatically. Still they could be activated because even in a most rigidly centralized system of monosystemic order there is always a certain margin of freedom. In social life not everything could be totally controlled. How far these chances could have been taken advantage of by local communities depended by and large at the beginning of anew political and social system. The towns investigated by us suggest three possible scenarios.

Tadzin – a district (powiat) town representing the highest of the three investigated towns level of civilisational advance and with a stable population structure survived through the process of industrialization and town planning because it could tap its existing resources. This enabled it to keep a certain degree of local identity which still today results in greater social activeness.

Leszkow had originally been a commune (gmina) and fought hard to win a status of a district town. At the same time it sought to attract business investments and tried to expand the town itself. It time did become a district town and could boast a handful of industrial plants. In the process Leszkow attracted a huge number of people from the surrounding villages. This in turn was responsible for the lack of social integration between the newcomers and the townsfolk. Eventually this bore negatively on social activeness of Leszkow during its fight for the status of a district town. Romanow received a coat of arms six hundred years ago. But it is the smallest of the three. It was starting from a position of an

already degraded town and therefore had the least chance to pick find its way to improvement. The ongoing processes of urbanization and industrialization had pushed it into the sidelines further. The town is a classic example of a provincial emptiness where local actions illustrate quite vividly the shallowness of the town's social life.

These three scenarios, the fates of three towns in People's Poland together with their consequences for the social activity of their citizens seem to indicate that the determinism of political factors has its limits. It may manifest itself in devastation, and that is what we attempted to document but it can not totally degrade nor nobilitate the local communities. What co-decided about the condition of small local groups as subjects of public life under real socialism have quite often been factors that had emerged long back in the past and gradually formed a cultural-civilisational tradition. However, the fact that Tadzin, while distancing itself from the global changes affecting our systemic-civilisational processes in post-war era has managed to preserve at least some symptoms of being a subject of public life, seems to support quite strongly our basic thesis about the devastations that real socialism inflicted upon small local communities.

IV.

In my concluding remarks I would like to return to two important problems. The first concerns the theoretical and empirical content of the notion "social emptiness in the life of local communities". During our research we have also attempted to define which phenomena legitimize the above notion. These are:

a/ absence in the life of communities of patterns of behaviour that have been generated by the local people themselves;

b/ absence of patterns of responsible behaviour create by local communities which would stimulate those communities to collective activity for their own benefit;

c/ absence of socially evolved senses attributed to the role of a participant in the local community;

d/ absence of genuine leaders.

Identifying the phenomena which substantiate the notion "social emptiness in the life of local communities" is in our view a necessary precondition of a restitution of local communities as important links in

the overall structure of both the State and society. They all articulate in a concise manner the social activity that has until now been licensed and they must chart new paths for reforms because the "emptiness" had been created and oranized by a certain system of power.

Second, considering the actual damage inflicted upon local groups, no reformist program for making these groups feel subjects of their social life and for socializing local power system can not count on an overnight success. At the same time the experience so far seems to suggest that the need for deep reforms in this field is an undisputed fact. The outlines for these reforms[5] must stay in harmony with pluralistic reforms in other walks of life including economy, politics, self-guarantees of the citizens and the working world. The situation must not be repeated, as it happened a few times in the post-war history of People's Poland, that with the help of small steps and manipulations of a legal character done to the Act on people's councils, whose title obligatorily contains the phrase "and the territorial self-government", another giant step toward democratization and de-centralization of power will be proclaimed.

A lasting and important place of small local communities in the socio-political system of our country could only be guaranteed through such reforms which would create a democratic system of elections to the territorial self-government as the organ of group authority and not state authority. Next, it should be reforms that would grant the self-government certain competence including economic and property decisions freeing it from a situation of "being financed from state coffers", and finally will throw the door wide open for a pluralistic manner of setting up various organizations by members of local communities.

---

[1] Cf. S. Filipowicz: *Mit i spektakl władzy*, (The Myth and Spectacle of Power), PWN, Warsaw 1988, pp. 12, 97.

[2] Cf. B. Jałowiecki: *Społeczne wytwarzania przestrzeni*, (Social Creation of Space), KiW, Warsaw 1988, and by the same author: "Lokalne ruchy społeczne w perspektywie procesów globalnych", (Local Social Movements in the Perspective of Global Processes), in: Problemy rozwoju lokalnego, (Problems of Local Development), Faculty of Geography and Regional Studies, University of Warsaw, vol. 11, Warsaw 1988, pp. 9-32.

[3] Cf. J.P. Gieorgica, P. Dutkiewicz: *"Stosunek aparatu administracji państwowej do reform politycznych (na przykładzie analizy wypowiedzi wyższych urzędników administracji na temat praktyki konsultacyjnej w województwach)"* (The Attitudes of State Administration to political Reforms (on the Example of Opinions of Higher Officials of

the Administration on Consultations in Voivodships), in: Problemy rozwoju lokalnego, (Problems of Local Development), Faculty of Geography and Regional Studies, University of Warsaw 1988, pp. 85-118.

[4] Cf. B. Jałowiecki: *"Procesy spontaniczne i żywiołowe w gospodarce przestrzennej"* (Spontaneous Processes in Space Economy), in: Gospodarka przestrzenna Polski, (Space Economy in Poland), Warsaw 1988, pp. 106-144.

[5] A wealth of comments on the outlines of future reforms could be found in papers published in a collective volume: Rola i funkcjonowanie instytucji samorządowych w systemie politycznym, (The Role and Functioning of Self-Government Institutions in the Political System). Centralny Ośrodek Metodyczny Studium Nauk Politycznych UW, vol. 1, no. 2, Warsaw 1988.

Krzysztof Herbst
Foundation for Support Local Democracy, Poland

POLISH WAY TOWARDS EUROPE AND WESTERN AID

1. INTRODUCTION - ABOUT POLAND

In Polish discussions, and also in political programmes, and even in international analyses dedicated to problems of reforms in the countries of Eastern Europe, the current transformations are being considered a bit like a technical operation. "Economy is to be market oriented", "a problem is constituted by the burden of foreign debts". It may seem that it is not the type of transformations but the scale of the phenomenon that causes its presence on the first page of newspapers. It seems that Lech Wałęsa's metaphor that a fish tank has been changed into fish soup, and now we need to transform it back into fish tank, remains forgotten.

Poland is not 'like other countries – only slightly in debt'. While considering the model of foreign aid for Poland it may prove to be worthwhile to first characterise the condition of the society and the economy, and only later, against that background – the indispensable features of the reform.

At the start constitutive features of the situation ought to be mentioned which influenced the society of 1944:

1. Taking over of authority on the basis of military power. Also utilised was the particular confusion of the society simultaneously liberated and conquered, with no support from international treaties, to a large extent accepting the (verbally) declared direction of changes of the social, political and economic order.
2. Creating an artificial system, in which functioned classic economic categories: capital and capital market, ownership, land rent and price

creating the basis of independent activity; they were substituted by administrative authorizations and steering by command methods.

3. Strong priority for the establishment of economic, social and military power of the country through an intensive industrialisation. Hence the excessive growth of the sphere called the production of production means. The remaining economic spheres were limited. They were treated as a sphere "not constituting national income" or as a consumption sphere, the costs of which burden the productive sphere.
4. The basing of authority legitimisation not on election (Staniszkis 1989), and thus on its detachment from structure, interests and options represented by social entities.
5. The abusing of the category of superior aims and central role of entity category (Strzelecki 1989, Kamiński 1976, 1984). The basic system assumption was the concept of opposing interests: central one (defined as general social) and local (particular) ones. It has been assumed that the realisation of one of those interests may only take place by the cost of leaving the other interest unrealised. Historical conditions of Marxism resulted in the certainty of the need of counteracting the spontaneous activities and unequivocally positive evaluation of entity in action.

As an effect established was a society the cultural specifics of which may be noted on the following spheres:

1. Historical features of the society were fixed:
   – traditions and institutions characteristic for social normative integration (concentrated on value), and not the functional integration (concentrated on institutions organising public life) – capability for surviving acquired as a result of historical experience which embraces the following:
   – ability to survive under the conditions of various types occupations, sieges etc.,
   – division between the sphere of private life (social and family one) and the public (state) sphere based on significantly expanded informal ("grey") sphere of economic, religious, social and public life,
   – great importance of the catholic church as an institutional alternative to the state monopoly.
   – lack of respect for standards and state institutions, unfavourable ethos of work and lack of respect for legal and social standards.
2. Monopolistical tendencies of the state in all spheres of public life crea-

ted a centralised structure of authority and administration. It has been supported by a hierarchical planning system, serving in fact the detailed control and management. Their consequence was constituted by the liquidation of urban self-government and submitting of local affairs to state administration and embracing with state control of institutional infrastructure of social life: associations, democratic liberties, independent information.

In the post-war history of the country a formalised pattern has been developing. It encompassed the building of state and economy structure, it created state controlled forms of satisfying the needs of the population. Limited was the dynamics of the second pattern – individual activity of the citizens, associations, self-governments. Established was an "impermeable" system for initiatives. It was disturbed by games played with each other by various segments of large organisation (main branches).

Concentration on the functioning of the state sector resulted in segmentation of the economy, the state and the society. Thus an extensive "grey", informal sphere was established in culture, social life and economy (Tyszka 1971, Sowa 1988).

3. A specific system was created which governed the behaviour of managers, employees, economic units. This system constitutes the so-called economy of shortage (Kornai 1985). Its logic is the battle for the maximalisation of resources. The economic aim of an enterprise is now constituted by the maximalisation of the wages fund. The accumulated capital is taken over by the Centre and divided according to political criteria, and not economic ones. Thus neither profits nor effectivity are an aim of the economic game conducted by various economic subjects.

   An effect is the devastation of the productive means and its decapitalisation, primitivism of technology, organisation and culture level both of production and of the produced goods, as well as the general loss of contact of the society with decent technical and civilisational standards.

4. The overindustrialisation was expressed by disturbances in proportions of the employment structure between the industrial and service sectors. The urbanisation rate was lower from the industrialisation rate due to limiting of consumption in favour of production development – or the policy of limited reproduction of manpower. A considerable percentage of the population employed in towns lives in the country. This

is not due to the choice of the style of life, but to a lack of dwellings in towns. As a consequence we are faced with long commuting routes to work posts and with a spontaneous settlement of the mixed farmer/labourer type of extremely low civilisational standards, in suburban zones and in the country. The applied term of "defective urbanisation" defines built-up areas lacking any social, civilisational and cultural features of the town (Diagnosis...).

The aims of industrialisation were not only of an economic but also of an ideological character. Commenced was a complex of processes of social promotion, personal achievement, changing from the traditional into the organisation of time, reduction of physical work, and simultaneously demolishment of the hitherto bases of existence, breaking down of social ties and control (Szczepański 1973). To a certain extent this is similar to migrations from the countries of the Third World.

5. The function of the market broke down (in the economic sense and in a wider one – according to Weber). In towns which were established and functioned as centres of service and exchange for agriculture, the domination of a state (bureaucratic) buying up of agricultural goods resulted in the vanishing of the local turnover (banks, commerce chambers etc.). A process of 'deregionalisation' of towns took place, vanishing of ranges of their influence.

Several events and processes constituting the history of Poland were of significant structure creating effects. Also a conscious policy of society transforming was in existence. The above described factors, as well as others, influenced it in an uncontrolled fashion. Sociologists dispute about the correct theory. While not suggesting here any concept of my own, I consider it necessary to present the main processes describing the specific structure of the Polish society.

1. Population migrations of many millions (and losses connected with them, or the opening possibilities were of selective character – they concerned various society levels to different extents); war losses, migrations connected with changes of state borders and industrialisation, industrialisation, elimination of the non-state sector of economy.
2. Selection: elimination of members, social class or order; physical extermination or deprivation of significant determinants of social influence and position: ownership, possibility of holding offices etc.; reservation of certain positions for acquaintances.

3. Breaking down of structure creating tissue: self-governments, regional autonomy, association structure, authority (ownership and ruling) by social entities. Its taking over took place in favour of a totalitarian state.
4. Large scale structure creating social processes: agricultural reform, general education, creation of channels for social promotion in the new economy, administration, political organisations, science, art etc. The openeness of promotion channels is determined by the following term used by sociologists: "society of open recruitment".

* * *

Sociologists undertaking efforts at describing the social structure encounter numerous theoretical problems and the lack of empirical materials (state statistics). It is worthwhile to mention the basic axes of structuralisation of the Polish society suggested by researchers. They embrace among others:

1. traditional – class vision of structure (Wesołowski, Słomczyński 1978). The supporters of this viewpoint encounter difficulties in defining main classes, their number and operational determination.
2. para-class viewpoint determining quasi-classes in accordance to the criterion of sub-ownership (Drążkiewicz 1982), share in special caste of "rulers" (Staniszkis 1989), positions in economy and politics (Narojek 1982);
3. structure of the society, in which partnership has been replaced by segmentation' division into isolated sectors (Staniszkis 1989);
4. meritocratic: transforming the society from the stage of class organisation based on ownership and ascriptional mechanisms into the stage of organisation in which social position is achieved through the functioning of mechanisms of promotion on the basis of knowledge, qualifications, efficiency. Thus this is a socio-professional structure (Domański 1985);
5. concepts of breaking down or recomposition of structure: decomposition of indices of class position; wealth, education, professional position are not convergent, and do not create a uniform hierarchy (Wesołowski 1966). "society disappearance" (Ireneusz Krzemiński); weakening of identification with certain levels of social organisations. The diagnosis of Stefan Nowak indicates a strong feeling of identification with family group and group of acquaintances with the highest level (nation). In the centre is the so-called sociological gap.

Also indicated is the vanishing of capability for cooperating and self-organising.

In order to be able to conduct the above characteristics we have applied several diagnoses and characteristics of the state of the society and the economy. They clearly indicate that in the case of Poland it is difficult to talk about an economic crisis. The complex of irrationalisms, pathology of organisational ineffective informative channels, artificially maintained aims and values, suggests the evaluation of the Polish crisis as a more complex one. This is more of a cultural crisis embracing all spheres of social life: production, norms and expectations or the so-called social "standards". Therefore all concepts of coming out of the crisis must be based not on the economic programme but also embrace the sphere of those values and institutions which we connect rather with the sphere of civilisation rather than solely of economy.

2. ECONOMIC AID IS A CULTURAL PROBLEM

I think that the above presented characteristic description of the situation may constitute a basis for deliberations about the directions and methods of cooperation and aid from the West. Undoubtedly it is not the case of a simple financial support. I would like to suggest that the opened channels of aid and cooperation be treated as intercultural ties. By this I understand the needs of a synchronic transfer of goods and information to all the above mentioned reform directions.

Often an analogy comes into mind to problems of aid to countries of the Third World. Researchers and publicists which have noticed this before simultaneously were aware of the fact that despite all similarities the situation in the case of Poland or other socialist countries is similar. This point of view enables the asking of a question once jestingly voiced: are socialist countries the Third of the Fourth World?

The analogy may not seem too favourable. However, it was just in the case of this question that we had to realise that neither money nor tools themselves were sufficient for helping the society free itself of barriers due to the complex civilisational structure. Experiences concerned with the Third World, if they are not to be considered literally, have numerous references to the Polish situation. Despite the fact that the distance to the

West is not so significant and the differences not so dramatic, the "Fourth World" is sufficiently different for the cultural context to determine the success of programmes of cooperation and aid.

The question of an efficient aid seen in this manner embraces a wide sphere of problems. They embrace the following:

- Adequacy of essence of aid to needs. It is easy to notice that the "aided" is not always the best judge in this matter. Simultaneously help should not deprive the fulfilled role or relieve in the functioning of local institutions;
- The instrument is checked out in the appropriate context of abilities and infrastructure required for its applying; in other cases the telescope of Columbus is used for nut cracking and the computer is used for typing. Certain things might be learned, others will be learned by the younger generation – more flexible one, not so routinised.
- Instruments applied in one civilisational circle not always have to be used in others; they may prove to be too refined, and may require adaptation. Frequently the total costs which are generated by its use (drawn cost) cancels the apparent rationality of its applying. The instrument ought to adhere to rules of social work organisation (production plant, family). Sometimes progress is based on the improving of furnace for burning down wastes and not selling an atomic radiator.
- Introduction of innovations sometimes encounters a resistance of the social structure – it may really or symbolically endanger its position or role. It is necessary to be able to identify the interested and opposing groups, to support the first ones and help solve problems of the latter.

Attention ought to be drawn to the fact that one of the best analyses of the cultural transfer was provided in the interwar period by Stefan Czarnowski, Polish sociologist of culture, by describing the migrations of Antique culture and of his contemporary Europe (Czarnowski 1956). A fascinating lecture presenting carricatural and dramatic aspects of cultural transfer, imposing an alien imported organisation, technology and culture on the society, even the compulsion of games in the French style is constituted by "Peter the I" by Aleksy Tolstoy.

3. CONTENTS OF THE POLISH REFORM

Poland belongs to Europe. The Poles like to stress historical and con temporary ties. The domination of the socialist order was felt by nume rous people as the reign of a different cultural circle. The internal changes and the weaking of ties with the Socialist countries brought the slogan of returning to Europe. It is connected with the hope for the opening of boundaries and livening up of political, cultural and economic ties.

The Poles hope that Western Europe and the United States would help her come out of the crisis and in refoming of the system. This expectation is all the more correct as it is easy to notice that those countries consider providing aid as their required role. It is additionally easy to observe the determination to provide such a type of aid that would exclude errors of the Gierek era: wasting of significant sums on inappropriate projects and consumption purchases. Also it is easy to notice influences of interests of various countries on the character of the offered help. All this as a conse quence leads to a situation where the intent of authors of programmes of help for Poland is rather the support of structural transformations – of the system – than subventions for the failing commerce or industry.

The society and the state must carry out large transformations. Their range only begins to reach the consciousness of politicians and common inhabitants of the country. This concerns the renewing of certain traditio nal values, making new ones more common, transfer capital and goods and also to create a social structure of activity. They embrace among others the following:

a) Establishing by the State and the Nation a complex picture (aim of transformations) of the new axiology: values and ideas concerning the state and the "market oriented" and "democratic" society, "drive" and "selfgovernment", in certain places changing the axiology of the socie ty in realistic socialism.
b) Elaboration of a new concept of the State: its aims and institutions, associations and organisations, with its characteristic features, such as stability, openness of rules and justice in social and economic relations. The establishment of institutions of controlling social and economic life: political system, legislative mechanisms, strategic planning, social and economic policy etc.
c) Learning practical abilities in acting and implementing of tasks in the reformed society. This contains the transforming of general conditions

(see a and b) into "savoir faire" (archetypical 'carbon copies' of typical actions in typical situations), new social roles and new professions (e.g. "manager"). Through an analogy to the term of 'good maritime practice' describing a complex of previously tried out behaviours recommended in maritime economy, this would be 'good practice of new orders'.

d) The adaptation of techniques and technology and the acquiring of equipment necessary for their introduction. If we do not wish Poland to turn back to the 19th century, we must see the necessary connection between axiology and technology. It is impossible (really and not declaringly) to accept the ecological idea without realising that there are technologies in existence that enable its implementation. A typical example is the computerisation and computer networks, telephones, organisation of services and administration based on the utilisation of those inventions. Other examples are constituted by strategies and technologies in spheres which are symbols of a new era in the West. We may mention here programmes of energy conservation, ecodevelopment, complex utilisation of biomass etc.

e) Transformation of the economic system:
   – making specific values and attitudes more general, tendency for saving, ethos of good work; right for a good pay, profit and social security;
   – generating of capital: making use of funds at the disposal of the State, credits from the West, accounts due to privatisation of economy, overdue payments etc. for the creation of a capital market; utilisation of personal property, real estate, mortgage etc.; policy of capital accumulation (investing, savings etc.);
   – enforcing the legal and social institution of ownership; property as source of income; bankruptcy: wide use of economic stimuli for generating the required attitudes (also in the case of assistance, subventions, reductions etc.);

f) establishment of infrastructure: banks, telephones etc.

g) stabilisation of the society after the 'transformations': structure, institutions, social standards. Stabilisation of axiology – new system of values and ideas - see a)-f).

4. OFFER FOR ASSISTANCE

The need for assistance for Poland and other countries of Eastern Europe, in carrying out of reforms, has been expressed in clearly formulated programmes. Thus it seems worthwhile to have a closer look at this offer and to compare promises with real chances created by it. The above presented scope of problems connected with the reform enables, I suppose, the definition of several aspects of the assistance. Let us compare those aspects with the offer for assistance presented to the Polish managers, local selfgovernments, businessmen. If the aid is to be effective as a system of intercultural transfer, it cannot be related to the narrowed essence scope. And thus it cannot, for example, relate to solely axiology with the exclusion of practice, present elements and not systems or microsystems.

1. Axiology: transfer of a complex of values connected with the requirement for transformations and their basic directions; operational knowledge about the principles of organisation, efficient activity, professional abilities.

   The only possible realisation is constituted by visits in other countries, more or less organised contacts and training: direct education of active persons in various scopes and the training of future trainers, which are to make the obtained knowledge more general in the whole country.

   This is a decidedly dominating position in the offer, supported by authorities of governments and international organisations. Never up to now was it possible for so many Poles to go abroad in order to acquire knowledge in good conditions, as well as experience and impressions. Also unprecedented is the offer of arrival of various teams organising courses and training help. It seems that this type of assistance constitutes at the same time a good business for schools and consulting companies from the West. Dominating are short trainings. They may be efficient from the viewpoint of axiology transfer and general knowledge concerning technology and organisation. However, they do not guarantee its acceptance and usefulness in the Polish conditions. They do not create work possibilities on given problems, nor do they verify the value of the Western mechanisms in the Polish conditions. They rather arouse desires than enable their satisfaction.
2. Tools and technologies: process of making them accessible and accepted (idea of utilisation – observation).

"Opening to the East" practically does not embrace the transfer of technologies. It seems (we shall return to this problem below) that the stipulation of introducing market oriented economy without modern technologies may lead in certain fields to the social, ecological and economic capitalism characterised by a 19th century quality of products. It seems that in the applied technologies it would be easy to determine the group – using the computer terminology – of "freeware" or "shareware", "copyrighted" and reserved. Information concerning the existence and accessibility of those technologies, regulations or prices, is fatal. It is not accessible to specially established agencies nor to embassies. During trainings and visits participants from Poland pose a lot of questions about this problem. Nobody is able to provide actual information about it.

3. Adaptation of tools and technologies and accomodation to them.
   It may seem that this constitutes a Polish problem. However, if it is to serve cooperation – openness, and also if it is to be efficient, than it cannot be a onesided action and ought to be based on adapting of the user to the tool or technology. In this adaptation also its author ought to participate. As we have already mentioned before, this frequently concerns a special product, not needed on the western market but adapted to Polish conditions.
   In order to achieve this it is necessary to make the system of cooperation in mixed Polish-western teams more universal. The main problem is not only the efficiency of action. Mixed work groups constitute the best intercultural solution we could recommend to our societies (and culture) which after all are not so distant.
   Aid projects really lack funds for this work. They did not foresee the elaboration of pilot projects. The undertaking of cooperation between the western enterprise "A" and the Polish one "B" requires a much more work consuming and capital consuming planning of future activities than on a uniform market. I cannot imagine the execution of such a work, based on the overcoming of culture barriers, without engaging mixed Polish-foreign companies. A capital of a small western company (potential partner of a Polish enterprise) is insufficient for financing such a work (even if concerns a three-person team).
   Methods of activity once elaborated may later become typical repeatable ones. Such works ought therefore to be conducted in the interest

of contacts development, and their financing should take place either through organisations of enterprises or by institutions having at their disposal state funds.

4. Flows and cooperation: information – marketing of offers and possibilities; infrastructure of contacts and cooperation; creation of markets (commercial, intelectual, cooperation).

   Both in Poland and in the Western countries there is a lack of information and effective channels of combining of initiatives. It is not known who is to be approached with an offer, what can be observed free of charge and what has been included in a 'copyright'. The shortage of information is so profound that it blocks all primary activities. Therefore, we do not observe symptoms of dynamics as up to now it did not prove possible to create a place in which it could be presented. Of course, there are big foreign trade organisations but the rate of their activities and prices of their services exclude their utilisation by small enterprises.

   The lack of guides and information channels is particularly difficult to understand in the case of those spheres which in the axiology they offer us are symbols of achievements distinguishing modern industrial civilisation from the 19th century industrialisation constituting an ideal economic development of countries of realistic socialism. Ecodevelopment, energy conservation and modern energetic economy are a foundation for axiological and technological offer of the West. It is shocking that this offer has no practical aspect whatsoever, that would give chance for utilisation in a single enterprise and not in an intergovernment agreement. Easily accessible funds for elaborating cooperation projects or credits or subventions for such projects that could be repeatable do not exist.

   In certain countries of the West there are some privileges for enterprises undertaking efforts of entering the Polish market. Encouragement for the establishment of joint ventures is expressed above all in the existence of credit and guarantee funds. Those means could be effective for efforts of tying up similar or comparable markets from the viewpoint of economic levels and general conditions for enterprises (bureaucracy, accessibility of offices, telephones and telefaxes, as well as of bank services). On those markets also similar enterprises should be active: enterprises of similar size and ties (including subordination). Meanwhile the hypothetical Polish "partner" is different from the po-

tential western partner. There are also numerous barriers between markets.

Economic cooperation between western markets and the Polish quasi-market requires searching for specific solutions, in some cases individual ones for that case. They should utilise (rather than consider as a barrier) differences in price levels and should be able to find cooperation methods with attractive effects for partners coming from such differing markets.

Successes of joint ventures and the conducted transactions of sale of western products for the Polish market constitute a proof that such solutions are possible. However, our markets, even if they do become similar in their principles, will still have to operate for a long time with incomparable price levels. This seriously limits the chances of a simple turnover. The closed European market does not accept easily the cheap import from the East. On the other hand, the difference in the price level renders a simple purchase of western services and goods impossible. Those factors combined together limit the applying of a normal economic partnership.

A way out seems to be constituted by own 'inventions' – use of individual organisational, technological and commercial solutions, making use of differences, connecting of demand value (of the new market) and cheap prices in the East and the organisation, technology, capital and functioning market in the West. Such channels enabling the commencement of cooperation on an open market are either not in existence or they are too ineffective.

5. Accessibility of assistance: of transferred substance, goods and possibilities.

Those ties cannot be realised through transmissional structures of a character of a formal – selective – hierarchical organisation. The essence of culture contacts is their spontaneity and impulsiveness. Indispensable are simplifications in travels and real methods of access of normal people to Europe. The present policy of the West result as a consequence in a situation where it is relatively most easy to get there for ministers and traders. Meanwhile it would be essential to open Europe for more intermediate circles of the society.

Assistance programmes place as an effect the State as the main factor of changes. Presently only the State is able to break down barriers in contacts between the East and the West. Markets are tightly closed

against a spontaneous development of contacts. Therefore, the State plays the role of a direct reformer as the unique distributor of profits due to European contacts.

Meanwhile, the breaking down of barriers, inability of rationalising post-communist organisation of economy, inefficiency in action and also the impermeability of certain elements of that Western civilisation for Poland requires the opening of a sphere of spontaneous contacts between people, societies, enterprises of the East and of the West. It cannot be replaced by contacts of state corporations.

5. ANNEXE; INSTITUTIONAL AID STRUCTURE



UPPER TRIANGLE

a) Western government (or governments) destine a certain fund for aid for Poland. For an efficient managing of its utilisation they rely on, or establish an institution which we will call "source". This institution has funds at its disposal and implements tasks defined by those governments. Simultaneously it represents a knowledge of Poland (whatever it may be) in relation to western governments.

b) Flow of information and decisions takes place in the upper triangle, and the horizontal relations concern the periodical evaluation of effects and discussions of general topics. Operational functions only realise connections running through the upper part of the triangle.

c) The operation of governments and their agencies is determined by features of the present situation, level of information and experience from the past, with which they are well acquainted. The attitudes in the West are dominated by the following:

- fear of repeating mistakes of the past – wasting of funds, and hence the wish to control everything;
- lack of knowledge about the situation, realities of law, economy, as well as in personal data, and as a consequence there is a striving at the formal acceptance of each project;
- lack of trust in Polish information sources and Polish experts. As an effect we are faced with touching efforts at getting acquainted with the present situation on their own account, undertaken by various teams;
- wish of various teams to protect national interests, including that of spending the possibly largest part of "aid" money on their own market.

In such a situation only a small part of that money can help Poland. The majority goes into the pocket of own citizens employed in business, services and training or expertises for Poles. Naturally in such a case they offer what they have rather than that which is indispensable for Poland. Who knows if this offer is similar in value to the proverbial materials and beads brought by their ancestors to Africa. Malicious people remark that Poland is to get out of this only the equivalent of hotel bills.

The attitudes of the Polish government and its agencies are dominated by the following:

- striving at a rational choice of western partners for various activities, while having similarly poor knowledge of their market as they have of ours;
- striving at controlling at least a part of funds destined for assistance;
- striving at a rational use of that assistance (from the Polish point of view).

As an effect both parties, and above all the institution called by us the "source", become motors of centralisation on a scale unusual even in socialism. The centralisation of control naturally causes the creation of bureaucratic obstructions. This deepens the already significant inertia of administration and economy, excluding them as partner from any

enterprise. Poland and the state administration, as well as the economic administration, which constitute a "context" or millieu of operation of western enterprises, prove in such a situation to be a swamp not to be crossed.

LOWER TRIANGLE

Let us imagine an effort at commencing a cooperation by two accidental institutions: a "western" one and an "eastern" one. Both parties undertake energetic efforts in this matter, but motives driving them are not identical.

The western enterprise desires accessibility to western funds destined for help to Poland. To achieve this it must find a Polish receiver, which would authenticate it in relation to the "source" institution. This explains a sudden influx of representatives of companies, which would like to train Polish people on various "three-day courses of westernisation".

Motives directing the operation of the Polish institution include mainly the hope that it would receive free of charge some information about the West. Their direct usefulness may be big or small. If it proves to be insignificant then at least one may hope that it would at least make it possible for a certain number of people to have a trip to the West. This still constitutes a personal and a professional privilege and we speak about it with no irony. It may also be expected that an attractive payment may be obtained in such a situation. A typical offer here is computer equipment.

The introduced forms of controlling the advisability of spending aid funds lead as a consequence to both parties applying to the Polish government or quasi-government agency with a request for approval of project, thus creating the two remaining sides of the triangle. It is easy to observe that the first effect of a large number of this type of operations is constituted by a total blockade. Desks of clerks are littered by applications and it proves to be extremely difficult to discern which is better or more urgent.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Czarnowski Stefan, 1956, *Culture*. Works, v. 1, State Scientific Publishers, Warszawa

Diagnosis of Condition of the Spatial Economy in Poland (ed. A. Kukliński), Brochure KPZK, vol. 123

Domański H., 1985, *Role of Classification of Professions in the Analysis of Social Structure*, Ossolineum, Wrocław

Drążkiewicz J., 1982, *Interests and Social Structure*, Polish Scient tific Publishers (PWN), Warszawa

Kamiński A.Z., 1976, *Organisation and Class-Order Structure*, in: Organizacje, Socjologia struktur, procesów i ról, Witold Morawski (ed.), Warszawa, pp. 63-82

Kamiński A.Z., 1984, *Monopoly and Competition. Sociological Analysis of Political and Economic Institutions*, State Scientific Publ lishers, Warszawa

Kornai J., 1985, *Economics of Shortage*, Polish State Publishers, Warszawa

Narojek W., 1982, *Social Structure in Experiences of Individual, Study in Sociology of Contemporary Polish Society*, PIW, Warszawa

Sowa K., 1988, *Informal Economy. Problems and Conditions of Research*, in: Problemy Rozwoju regionalnego i lokalnego, ed. Bohdan Jałowiecki, publ. by Warsaw University, Warszawa

Staniszkis J., 1989, *Ontology of Socialism*, Krytyka, Warszawa

Strzelecki J., 1989, *Lyrical Model of Socialism*, Czytelnik, Wars szawa

Szczepański J., 1983, *Transformations of the Polish Society in the Process of Industrialisation*, Warszawa, CRZZ Publishing House

Tyszka A., 1971, *Participation in Culture. About Variety in Styles of Living*, State Scientific Publishers, Warszawa

Wesołowski W., Słomczyński K., 1978, *Theoretical Concepts of Class and Order Structure in Poland in the Years 1945-1975*, in: Kształt struktury społecznej (ed. Wesołowski W.), Ossolineum, Wrocław

Garbor Szabo
Managing Institute for Public Administration, Hungary

THE HUNGARIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM IN TRANSITION

This lecture is dealing with the characteristic features and the main issues, problems of the Hungarian local government system, the system what is – as almost every other Eastern and Central European countries' local system – in a transition period now. As for both the former local system and the recent transition period, Hungary has got many common features with the other so-called, using an outdated term, "socialist" countries, but besides them has got specialities, too.

Before the Second World War Hungary had got a semi-democratic and semi-developed multi-party state with an appropriate local self-government system. This system (established in 1871) was described by a relatively significant independence from the central state authorities in the areas of self-management (e.g. local elections, local structure) and local autonomy (e.g. local taxes, relative freedom of expenditures), which was more or less the same what the other Central European countries (mainly Austria) had at that period. After the Second World War Hungary – as many other countries in this region of Europe – was forces to build up a stalinist-bolshevik-type central and local system, both of them were very unfamiliar to our people and to our historical traditions, development. On the local level the self- governments (municipalities and communes) were abolished in 1950, and instead of them a Soviet-type, three-tier council system was established. During the first decade of the new system (until about 1962) the county, the district, the town and the village councils – which, as the first Council Act had said, were the "organs of the people's power" – played an extremely oppressive and servile role acting on behalf of the communist (party) elite. This shameful role (for instance the compulsory produce delivery to the state, naturally at very low prices, which afflicted the peasants very considerably) characterized the

Hungarian local system especially before the 1956 Revolution and Independence War. Thereafter – except for a short period between 1958 and 1960 while a revenge for 1956 swept over the country – the hard bolshevik council system began to loose gradually. From the mid-sixties a new economy reform was starting which tried to smuggle some free market elements into the so-called socialist plan economy. This reform era exerted an influence on other social areas, among others on the council system, too. Recognizing that the second Council Act (what is in force from 1954) was an old-fashioned, outdated one, chief officers and experts started to prepare a new act what would be passed by Parliament in 1971.

This third Council Act (which is in force now, but was modified, amended in a large measure) comprises of ambigious values. It declares that the territorial and local councils are organs 1. for people's representation, 2. for self-government and 3. for local public administration. Among these three character-elements especially the second one, the self-government character of councils, is a deserving case. In the first two decades of the communist rule the term "self-government" was a disqualified one, saying it was unfit for a socialist system, because of its so-called "bourgeois" contents. In the course of the act preparation there were a lot of debates about this term, many experts preferred the term of self-management from the Yugoslaw system, saying it was fit for a socialist society. Finally in the drift of the reform era of sixties the term self-government triumphed over self-management. But the victory was a Pyrrhic one, for the self-government character remained a dead letter, remained formal which could not be effective in everyday's practice.

The question is the following: What were the obstacles which impeded the accomplishment of self-government character? These obstacles were very complex. Firstly at the end of sixties and the beginning of seventies the international situation did not encourage the self-governmental development. Owing to the defeat of Prague Spring and Warsaw Pact invasion in Chechoslovakia in 1968, the 1970 workers' revolt in Poland, the hardening of the Brezhnew-regime in the Soviet Union, the Hungarian reform era had to recoil too. It resulted among others the dismissal of some reform leaders, the strenghtening of central state guidance over state enterprises and also over local council.

As far as the external obstacles are concerned, there were essentially two important reasons a political and an economic one, which impeded the enforcement of the councils' self-government character. On the politi-

cal side the nature and facts of our one-party political system (for example the leading role of the marxist-leninist party, the society's leading force, which was a constitutional provision) made it automatically impossible that the councils (the alleged people's representative organs) would be the prevailing organs in towns or villages. Instead of them the different organs of Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP), party committees, party executive committees and party secretaries were on the top. All the important affairs concerning the locality (e.g. local investments, general plans of the settlement, cadre issues) were decided by the party organs, and the competence what the council could really was merely a sanctifying one.

In addition to this fact, the system was overinsured protecting the communist party power at the local level. Firstly the council executive committees were under dual subordination (double guidance), among the guidance lines there were a vertical one (from the county council executive committee) and a horizontal one (from the local council body). These two legal guidance lines were not really true in everyday's practice, for on one hand the vertical line came in an informal way from the county party organs through (and this was the legal form) the country council executive committee, but on the other hand the horizontal guidance line really never existed. At the town and village level the local party committee was the organ who guided directly the local council executive committee. Albeit the Council Act declared the council representative body's priority over its executive committee, in fact it was just the opposite, the executive committee guided, in an informal way, the council representative body.

Secondly the composition of local council organs also contributed to the functioning of communist party power. There are some typical statistical data on the composition of councils after the last local elections in 1985. From the total membership of territorial councils more than twothird (72%) was the proportion of HSWP members, as for the county council executive committees this proportion number was 86%, and all the council presidents in turn were communist party members. At local level it is practicable telling a distinguish between towns and villages. Among the town councils the proportion of party members were 60% by the council bodies, 75% by the council executive committees, and 100% by the council presidents (mayors). On the village level these proportion numbers were 44%, 61% and 93%, respectively. It is worth noticing that the higher was the administrative level and greater was the settlement, the

greater as the proportion of party membership in the different local organs. To be more exact and closer to the truth: the more important was a level or a settlement-type for the ruler party because of obvious reasons, the greater was their participation in it.

On the economic side the roots of problems were traceable to awkward nature of the former mechanism concerning the distribution and spending of the council budget. On one hand the county council organs had got (and partly has got nowadays) a very wide scope in distributing the central sources and this competence resulted the subordination of town and village councils in many formal and informal ways. On the other hand there were plenty of legal measures, ordinances which prevented the councils from economizin independently. On the whole our local councils never had the chance to manage their budgets, their revenues and expenditures on their own, but only as a part of the state budget.

The recent situation in the Hungarian local government system is in the middle of the transition period, in the middle of the transition period, in the middle of a rapid change. As a result of the parlamentary general elections, held this year in two rounds on the 25th of March and on the 8th of April and as a result of setting up the new Cabinet in May the change of regime, the taking over of power finished on the central level. Hereby Hungary expectably got from the party state to the constitutional state. On the local levels with the decline of the former one-party system the soviet-type councils is also gradually losing their scope, their Lebensraum. The way from the councils to the self-governments is equivalent on a small scale with the tendency from the party state to the constitutional state as I have mentioned before. The setting up of local self-government will mean that the change of regime will happen unreversible. This historical date can be expected this year's late September when the local authority elections will be held.

Laying the foundation of a brand-new local system in the first place we need a new act about local self-governments. The preparation of Local Self-government Act is in progress for a year, and the new act will e passed, I hope, in this summer. In the preparation course we had to keep in view the self-governmental standards of developed world (the OECD countries), especially the Western European countries. Hungary wants to be a member of the Common European House, and this aim needs the taking over of many generally accepted European standards, laid in the Council of Europe's document titled "European Charter of Local Self-

governments" (Strasbourg, 1985). I told standards and not concrete solutions, and I told it deliberately. It is because we do not want to copy one or the other existing solution from Western Europe. We have to move freely inside the framework of the European standards and to adjust them to our country's specialities, on one hand to our historical traditions (as I have mentioned we have got some self-governmental inheritance), and on the other hand to our endeavours to the European integration.

As for the future one can say: what is the guaranty that our local self-governments will be established properly and will be functioning as real self-governments? Let me cite here what Blaise Pascal wrote in his famous book called "Pensées": "The second miracle can postulate the first one, however the first one can not postulate the second one". (Pensées 810). In Hungary we already achieved the constitutional state, it as the first miracle. It is probably very true that it can not postulate the second mirac cle, the existence of local self-governments. However our case is a special one, the second miracle is a necessity: the future of the constitutional state will depend on the existence of local self-governments. In our case the first miracle has to postulate the second one. The question ahead of us – and I guess it can be said in the name of all Eastern European countries – is the following: Do we succeed in catching up the European democracies or do we fall behind ultimately? I am sure our only interest is the catching up and the way to the democracy leads through the real local self-government system.

Budapest, May 1990.

Francis Seydoux
Mayor of Bulle,
Suisse

BULLE. DEVELOPPEMENT ECONOMIQUE ET IDENTITE CULTURELLE

BREF HISTORIQUE

Bulle, petite cité suisse de 9'000 habitants, est le centre d'une région montagneuse de 500 km², qui s'appelle LA GRUYERE et compte 30'000 personnes.

Bourgade fondée bien avant l'an mille, très longtemps minuscule ville épiscopale, Bulle s'affirma dès le XIIème siècle en devenant le pôle économique de la région qui vivait essentiellement de l'élevage et de la fabrication du fromage.

Dès 1850, la ville devint l'un des plus importants centres du commerce de bétail de Suisse. Aujourd'hui encore, les expositions de bovins attirent une foule considérable, provenant de l'Europe entière, pays de l'Est compris, du Canada, des Etats-Unis. Toutefois, ces activités ne sauraient assurer l'essor économique d'une région. Elles relèvent plutôt de la tradition et du folklore.

Lors de la planification des lignes nationales de chemin de fer, vers 1860, les autorités communales bulloises, qui pressentaient l'importance d'une liaison ferroviaire, se battirent pour obtenir que le tracé Est – Ouest passe en Gruyère. Malheureusement, la décision ne fut pas favorable aux gruériens, si bien que la région resta éloignée des grandes voies de communication. Son développement en souffrit. Aussi, lorsqu'il fut question de réaliser une liaison autoroutière, toutes les forces politiques et économiques locales se mobilisèrent et rappelèrent la mise à l'écart lors de la mise en place du réseau ferroviaire. Ils obtinrent satisfaction. Ainsi, depuis 1981, la Gruyère est directement reliée au réseau autoroutier européen.

MISE EN PLACE DU PROCESSUS DE DEVELOPPEMENT

Curieusement, si les bullois et les gruériens ont toujours été d'excellents commerçants, ils ne furent que peu attirés par les activités industrielles. Mis à part l'industrie du bois qui connut des périodes fastes durant la première moitié du siècle, les usines qui s'implantèrent dans la région avant 1950 furent l'oeuvre de personnes venues de l'extérieur.

Des activités économiques naissent, se créent, mais hélas, d'autres périclitent ou disparaissent. Ainsi, l'industrie du bois déjà citée, qui fut l'un des fleurons de l'économie bulloise, connut des années difficiles après la seconde guerre mondiale, tout particulièrement au début des années soixante. D'autres entreprises, autrefois florissantes, ont considérablement réduit leur production.

En 1975, à l'occasion de l'élaboration d'un concept de développement découlant de la loi fédérale sur les investissements en zone de montagne (LIM), les autorités politiques gruériennes ont constaté avec surprise que la région avait perdu plus de mille postes de travail en l'espace de dix ans. Cette contre-performance peut être qualifiée de dangereuse, lorsqu'on sait que Bulle compte environ 5'600 personnes occupées dans les activités économiques.

Toutes ls forces concernées ont alors pris conscience de l'importance de dynamiser le processus de développement économique. Il s'agissait tout d'abord de mettre en place des équipements permettant d'accueillir de nouvelles activités. Fort heureusement, depuis 1981, la construction de l'autoroute allait relier Bulle et la Gruyère au réseau européen.

Depuis 1960, le Conseil communal s'était mis à acquérir des terrains en vue de les affecter à l'artisanat et à l'industrie. Ce fut une sage décision car dans la situation politico-économique que nous connaissons, une communauté publique peut difficilement susciter un développement si elle n'est pas propriétaire des terrains nécessaires.

L'autorité communale s'est ensuite penchée sur l'aménagement local du territoire. Dans le domaine économique, elle retint deux zones bien distinctes: l'une pour l'artisanat, l'autre pour l'industrie.

Ce choix ne correspond peut-être plus aux tendances actuelles quant à la complémentarité des activités. Les faits ont d'ailleurs confirmé cette thèse, car les dernières implantations dans la zone industrielle relèvent

plutôt du secteur artisanal. Néammoins, lesdites zones sont harmonieuses et donnent pleine satisfaction.

Dès le début de l'aménagement de la zone industrielle, le Conseil communal s'était attaché à diversifier les ctivités, tout en donnant la préférence aux industries qui offraient le plus grand nombre de postes de travail à du personnel qualifié en regard de la surface utilisée. C'est ainsi que les dépôts, grands consommateurs de terrain et occupant peu de main-d'oeuvre et en général non qualifiée, ont été écartés. Par ailleurs, une attention toute particulière a été portée aux risques de pollution, si bien que toutes les activités susceptibles d'être dangereuses dans ce domaine ont été exclues.

A propos des implantations, il y a lieu de souligner que comme tout produit, une zone industrielle ne se vend pas sans une intense prospection. Dans un premier temps, le Conseil communal avait passé un contrat avec une entreprise étrangère pour la promotion. Ce fut un échec complet, si bien que la commune rompit le contrat et décida de se mettre elle-même à la recherche d'industriels intéressés. L'aide de l'Office cantonal de développement économique se révéla très importante.

Un fait intéressant est à souligner. Dans les premières années, toutes les industries qui se sont installées étaient étrangères: deux allemandes, deux suédoises, une hollandaise. Or, actuellement, on assiste à l'implantation de sociétés locales très diversifiées: ateliers ferroviaires, construction métallique, caves à fromage, horlogerie, éditions musicales, conditionnement de volailles.

Parallèlement au démarrage de l'activité industrielle, Bulle a enregistré une forte croissance du secteur tertiaire. Aujourd'hui 57% des travailleurs y sont occupés, contre 41% dans le secondaire. Quant au secteur primaire, il ne compte plus que 1,6% des personnes actives.

INCIDENCES DU DEVELOPPEMENT

Lorsqu'on parle de développement, on pense immédiatement à l'augmentation des places de travail, à l'accroissement des activités économiques. Or, le développement local touche d'autres secteurs et ses effets ne doivent pas être minimisés. Les infrastructures de tous genres doivent être pensées et dimensionnées en fonction des nouvelles données. Les domaines suivants méritent une attention toute particulière:

– la protection de l'environnement,

- les voies de communication,
- les services édilitaires (approvisionnement en eau et en énergie, l'évacuation et le traitement des eaux usées, des déchets, etc.),
- la construction de logements,
- l'hébergement (hôtellerie),
- les possibilités de formation,
- les infrastructures liées aux loisirs, qu'ils soient sportifs ou culturels.

LA CULTURE

Une région qui se développe doit rester attachée à ses racines et conserver son identité. Elle doit assurer une vie communautaire basée sur des traditions, des us et coutumes. Dans le cas contaire, elle court le risque de grossir le lot des cités dortoirs sans âme, qui, abritent souvent une population repliée sur elle-même. Une animation culturelle soutenue permet de résister a l'anonymat et apporte une certaine qualité de vie.

Pour les pouvoirs publics, l'activité culturelle doit être comprise comme un équipement indispensable à la vie locale. Certes, il en résulte des coûts pour la collectivité, mais les conséquences positives que celle-ci en retire compensent très largement les sacrifices consentis.

Dans notre cité, 26 sociétés à but culturel sont officiellement recensées. Elles offrent une large palette d'activités. On y trouve:

- 6 choeurs d'adultes et d'enfants,
- 5 corps de musique ou groupements musicaux,
- 2 groupes liés aux costumes et coutumes,
- 2 guggenmusiks,
- 2 clubs d'accordéonistes,
- 2 troupes théâtrales,
- 2 groupes de modélistes,
- 1 groupe de danse folklorique,
- 1 groupe de danse moderne,
- 1 club d'échec,
- 1 club philatélique,
- 1 groupe lié à l'organisation du Carnaval

Tous ces groupements doivent pouvoir compter sur l'appui des autorités.

Pour assurer la pérennité de l'activité culturelle locale, le Conseil communal a pris diverses mesures, tant administratives que financières.

Nous en citerons six qui nous paraissent dignes d'intérêt:

- mise sur pied d'une commission culturelle composée de 14 membres issus des différents milieux intéressés. Elle est chargée de coordonner les différentes activités des sociétés et organise, chaque saison, un nombre important de spectacles et de concerts. Cette commission dispose d'un secrétaire à temps partiel, lui-même organisateur professionnel;
- versement de subventions annuelles en espèces. L'importance de l'aide est déterminée en fonction de l'importance de la société, de ses charges et de l'encadrement qu'elle accorde aux jeunes;
- il y a cinq ans, la commune a acheté et aménagé spécialement un bâtiment comprenant 16 salles qui sont mises gratuitement à la disposition des groupements locaux;
- la commune entretient une salle de spectacles de 500 places;
- face à la concurrence de la télévision, les salles de cinéma sont en déficit dans les petites villes. Le Conseil communal a décidé d'aider financièrement le cinéma local pour lui permettre de poursuivre son exploitation;
- la commune assume seule les charges d'exploitation du musée gruérien et de la bibliothèque publique qui lui est rattachée.

Nous relèverons enfin que la Ville de Bulle consacre 5% de ses recettes fiscales à la culture.

LE MUSEE GRUERIEN

Nous l'avons souligné tout à l'heure, une région en développement doit conserver son identité et ses racines. Ces dernières ne sauraient être qu'abstractions. La Ville de Bulle s'est fixé un but en construisant le musée gruérien: offrir une image de la Gruyère telle qu'elle se veut être: fidèle au terroir et engagée dans son temps.

Comment une bourgade telle que Bulle est-elle arrivée à réaliser un édifice de 17'000 m³ pouvant abriter un musée et un bibliothèque? Il a fallu de la chance, beaucoup de volonté et un magnifique soutien populaire.

Tout à commencé en 1917 par la générosité de l'écrivain Victor TISSOT qui légua sa fortune pour créer et développer un musée et une bibliothèque "dignes de ce nom". Une étape décisive fut ensuite l'engagement, en 1923, d'un conservateur à plein temps. Ce personnage, M. Henri

NAEF, docteur ès lettres, donna un essor remarquable à l'institution. Il rassembla l'essentiel des collections du musée et organisa la bibliothèque. Il comprit aussi qu'un musée régional devait être plus qu'un conservatoire d'antiquités. Les traditions le passionnèrent. En quelques années, il mit sur pied la défense du costume, la protection du patois, du patrimoine naturel et architectural. Il tissa ainsi des liens étroits entre l'institution et la population gruérienne. Son successeur, M. Henri GREMAUD, a oeuvré dans le même esprit. Il fut, en particulier, l'organisateur de grands rassemblements populaires. Depuis 1973, M. Denis BUCHS a repris le flambeau et poursuit le travail de ses prédécesseurs, tout en consacrant une part importante de son activité à la mise sur pied d'expositions temporaires. Nous y reviendrons. Trois conservateurs en septante ans. Cette fidélité témoigne de la confiance que nos autorités ont accordé et accordent encore aux responsables du musée.

Pourtant, au début des années 1970, la situation interne de la Fondation Tissot était loin d'être satisfaisante. Depuis des décennies, on déplorait la saturation des locaux. Surtout, on pritconscience du risque encouru par ces prestigieuses collections (12000 objets et plus de 40000 livres) dans un bâtiment vétuste et inadapté. Le Conseil commmunai bullois prit la décision de construire un édifice répondant aux critères modernes de conservation et de présentation. L'inauguration eut lieu en juin 1978. Le nouveau Musée gruérien est respectueux de son environnement historique. En effet, seul un quart du volume est apparent, la plus grande part étant située au sous-sol.

La pièce maîtresse de l'institution est l'exposition permanente. Sur 1500 m², elle illustre les arts et traditions populaires de la Gruyère. Le programme de cette exposition permanente repose sur un scénario simple. Une première partie met en place quelques éléments constitutifs de l'entité gruérienne: la géologie, la végétation et la faune dans leurs rapports avec les hommes; les moments de l'histoire qui ont laissé des traces durables. La plus grande part est réservée à l'art populaire et aux traditions dans leurs différents aspects: archiecture, mobilier, âges de la vie, cycle pastoral. Puis la dynamique de l'histoire est évoquée avec l'émigration, les bouleversements politiques, techniques et sociaux. Enfin, la conclusion met en évidence la pérennité de l'âme gruérienne dans la vie contemporaine. Deux spectacles audio-visuels intègrent à l'exposition les paysages et les saisons, les activités paysannes et artisanales, les coutumes d'aujourd'hui. Ainsi, le passé et le présent se trouvent réunis.

Cet aménagement moderne était une sorte de défi à la population gruérienne. Celle-ci répondit avec enthousiasme et les dons d'objets ont augmenté de façon spectaculaire. Une Société des Amis du Musée gruérien s'est constituée. En moins de vingt ans, elle a réussi à rassembler plus de mille membres.

Depuis l'inauguration du nouveau bâtiment, une part prépondérante de l'activité du Musée est consacrée aux expositions temporaires. Celles-ci se succèdent au rythme de quatre ou cinq par année. Certaines s'inscrivent dans la tradition de la maison et permettent d'approfondir un secteur de l'exposition permanente en puisant dans les réserves. Le Musée gruérien n'entend pas se limiter aux traditions. Des formes d'expressions contemporanes y ont trouvé audience. De jeunes artistes ont déjà pu y réaliser une première grande exposition individuelle à des conditions favorables.

Dotés d'un instrument à la mesure de leur vocation, le Musée gruérien et la Bibliothèque sont devenus un centre culturel animé.

La charge financière est cependant lourde et la Ville de Bulle l'assume seule. Elle le fait très volontiers, ayant conscience que cette institution est un trésor inestimable qui devra être remis intact aux générations futures. C'est la mémoire de la région, la garantie du maintien des traditions populaires.

* * *

Voilà résumée, en quelques lignes, la politique adoptée par le Conseil communal dans le domaine de l'animation culturelle. Comme dans bien d'autres secteurs, l'autorité doit susciter l'engagement de la population, coordonner ses activités et lui apporter, dans la mesure où elle s'avère nécessaire, une aide matérielle.

Pour conclure, nous souhaitons faire la remarque suivante: L'Europe se trouve à la veille de mutations importantes dans tous les domaines. On peut penser qu'une redistribution des activités économiques en découlera. Dans ce contexte, les régions, avec leurs caractéristiques individuelles, auront leur rôle à jouer, même si la partie sera difficile face aux grands centres économiques et industriels. Chaque entité doit croire en son avenir et prendre son destin en charge. La succès sera d'autant plus grand si les autorités et la population autochtones sont étroitement liées au processus de développement.

Antoni Kukliński

"Das Irrlicht "Sozialismus" erlischt aber der Sumpf des Kapitalismus bleibt". Hamburg, 1 Dezember 1989 – Gegen der Strom Nr 29/30 1989.

WHAT HAS HAPPENED IN EUROPE IN 1989 AND 1990

I. THE TURNING POINT

There is no doubt that the historians of the XXI century will define 1989[1] and 1990 as one of the most important turning points in the European history. The transformations in Central and Eastern Europe have created a chance to open a set of processes leading to Unified Europe of the XXI century. I would like to stress, however, that this is only a chance which may be, or may not be translated into the reality of Unified Europe.

II. THE DIFFUSION OF FOUR INNOVATIONS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

The experiences of Central and Eastern Europe can be analysed now in the framework of the theory and methodology of the processes of the diffusion of innovations.

There are four innovations emerging in different scale and velocity in different countries.

There are four innovations emerging in different scale and velocity in different countries:

1/ arliamentary democracy
2/ market economy with different interpretations of this phenomenon[2]
3/ clean environment[3]

4/ modern technical infrastructure especially in the field of communication and information

The whole European continent must achieve a certain minimum level of uniformity in these four fields – as a precondition for the creation of United Europe. I am not suggesting to eliminate the most important resources of diversity of European societies, economies and culture. I suggest only that the limited differences will integrate our continent and if the differences are too deep – they create equally deep divisions of Europe, especially among rich and poor countries, regions and localities. So the dilemma – diversity versus uniformity – will remain an important issue. Let me only stress that limited differences in any field – economic, social or political are an encouragement for more efficient activity while very deep qualitative differences can very often be a source of despair and hopelessness. We should avoid the historical trap that East Central Europe will look at Western Europe in the same way as did Latin America at North America.[4]

III. COMMENTS ON EAST CENTRAL EUROPE

In 1989 and 1990, the system of real socialism has collapsed totally in East Central Europe. Nobody with some sense of reality and humour has assumed it was a strong system. But very few have seen that the weaknesses of that system were so deep and great and that it would collapse so quickly and easily. I think six sources of this weakness can be outlined in this context.

1/ he exogenous character of the system (Oskar Lange – each country a small copy of the Soviet Union)
2/ he totalitarian or semitotalitarian character of the political process
3/ he grosso modo low quality of the ruling élites[4a] – the partially external legitimization of the élite
4/ he low productivity of labour and capital
5/ he high burden of armaments
6/ the high burden of indebtedness

One could develop very interesting comparative studies on the profiles and styles of bankruptcy of real socialism in different countries of East Central Europe. Similarities and differences among Poland, Hungary, East

Germany, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia could be a fascinating subject for research.

The process of bankruptcy may be analysed along comparative lines, concentrating attention on the scope and intensity of bankruptcy, its velocity, cost and elegance. One could compare, for example, the Polish and Bohemian experiences from the point of view of a sui generis historical cost benefit analysis answering the questions what inputs were necessary to achieve the same final results. How big is the economic sacrifice on the altar of political change? From this point of view I think that the Bohemians are much smarter than the Poles.

The profiles of the bankruptcy are important not only from the point of view of rerum cognoscere causas. The profiles are a valid starting point for any prognoses of the future of parliamentary democracy and market economy in those countries.

It is an open question which of the following choices will be selected by the different countries of East Central Europe –

- to try to join in the European Economic Community
- to try to join the EFTA[5]
- to create one or several trade and economic associations
- to continue COMECON

IV. SOME COMMENTS ON SOVIET UNION

There is no doubt that without Pieriestrojka there will be no turning point of 1989/90. I am not underestimating the internal political and social movements which promoted the bankruptcy of real socialism in Poland and other countries of this region. But Pieriestrojka was one of the necessary conditions of the ultimate success of these movements. There is, however, an important difference in the perception of the fate of Soviet Union in autumn 1989 and in spring 1990.

In autumn 1989, one could get the impression that the whole Soviet Empire was already in the shadow of history. Now, in spring 1990, we see that the semi-satellite countries of East Central Europe are already firmly on the irreversible way to Freedom. However the process of the disintegration of the Soviet Union proper is the process that may be reserved, at least for some years. It is not excluded that Michail Gorbaczow

will be a President of the Rejuvenated Soviet Confederation. Great empires grow and die slowly. It seems to be the rule of history.[6]

V. A COMMENT ON GERMANY[7]

The turning point of 1989 and 1990 opens a new stage in the history of Germany and a new role of this important country in Europe. The negative experience of the past should not be taken as a guideline for the discussions on the future of Germany in the XXI century. Nevertheless the past should not be forgotten. In the immediate future, most interesting is the style of the absorption of Eastern by Western Germany. In this case, we will have the optimal conditions for the quick liquidation of the legacy of real socialism, inter alia in the field of polluted environment[8] and underdeveloped technical infrastructure. We have, however, to remember that the process of bankruptcy of G.D.R.is not as yet concluded and some surprises in this process are not totally excluded.

VI. TOWARDS UNIFIED EUROPE - A SPONTANEOUS OR GUIDED PROCESS?

One could represent the point of view that the changes in Europe have predominantly been shaped by spontaneous political, economic and social forces.

Individual human beings, local and regional communities and spontaneous market forces, inspired by the noble goal of Unified Europe, are changing the reality of our continent, and are creating and expressing a certain political and moral climate at the turn of the XX and XXI century.

In this interpretation, the main vehicle of change in favour of a Unified Europe is the transformation of the public opinion in all European countries. There is no doubt that in the creation of a Unified Europe the role of spontaneous processes is and will be very important. But these processes alone will not create a Unified Europe. Let us look at the creation of the Single Market. This is not only a spontaneous process, it is also and may first of all be a guided process. The machinery of guidance, coordinated by the Commission of European Communities in Brussels, is

just immense. Let us look at the processes of German – German integration – the role of guided processes in this historical change is also very great.

To my great disappointment, the processes of positive guidance in the macrotransformation of East Central Europe are very weak. Up till now, the West has not used the historical opportunity to develop a new Marshall Plan for East Central Europe. That plan could be a new crusade in Europe accelerating the creation of a Unified Europe. Unfortunately, there are no leaders in the west who would have sufficient amount of charisma, power and imagination to create and implement this idea. The tragedy of the misguided dialogue between East Central Europe and the West is always the same. When the West was offering the Marshall Plan we were prevented by Mr. Stalin to accept it. Now – when there is neither Stalin nor his successor acting in the same way – there is no willingness of the West to design a new Marshall Plan. One of the very eminent Polish intellectualists, T. Boy-Żeleński, wrote a half century ago: "Bo w tym cały jest ambaras aby dwoje chciało naraz".

VII. TOWARDS A UNIFIED EUROPE - MICRO VERSUS MACRO APPROACHES

It was a great mistake when microeconomics was raped by politically misguided macroeconomics. This was the experience of real socialism which killed the microeconomic efficiency of the enterprise. But it is also wrong when grand ideas as well as macropolitical and macroeconomic approaches are paralysed by the simplistic ideology[9] of the XIX century laissez faire – by the assumption that the efficiency of the individual enterprise is the only problem we have to solve. There will be no Unified Europe without grand designs and approaches developed in the spirit of macroeconomic and macropolitical efficiency. Let us look, from this point of view, at the transformation of East Central Europe, as proposed by P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan[10] in London, in 1943. Naturally the realities are different now but the model of thinking, presented in this paper, should just now be considered very seriously.

VIII. TOWARDS UNIFIED EUROPE - OVERCOMING THE EXISTING DIVISIONS IS NOT ENOUGH

The title of the Seminar is reflecting the classical historical approaches expressed in the idea that if we overcome the existing divisions we will build a Unified Europe[1]. I am convinced that Unified Europe is much more than a continent without the existing divisions. So we have to compare two visions of Unified Europe: one based on the transformation of the past and the other, a positive vision, based on the anticipation of the Future.

---

[1] W. Weidenfeld, J. Janning – *Der Umbruch Europas – die Zukunft des Kontinents.* Arbeitspapiere 4. Bertelsmann Stiftung – Chronologie 1989, p. 45-58.

[2] J.K. Galbraith – *Revolt of our Time: The Triumph of Simplistic Ideology.* Paper, Spring 1990. Let us read a few sentences from that paper.

"...The events of these last months in Eastern Europe, building on earlier change in Poland and the Soviet Union, have, not surprisingly, nurtured a major economic discussion. Some of this has been eminently sensible; some, rather more, has been aberrant to the point of mild insanity. The aberration extends to both sides of what was once the Iron Curtain or, in more recent symbolism, the Berlin Wall. We need a name for it; it can, I believe, best be denoted Simplistic Ideology.

... The Simplistic Ideology that extensively interprets these events pictures a starkly bipolar world. On the one side Communism, on the other side capitalism. Each exists in its unadulterated form. Now, reversing all Marxian prediction, capitalism is triumphant. Communism having failed both economically and politically in Eastern Europe, the countries once so afflicted will now make their way to the capitalist nirvana. As will, if more gradually, the U.S.R.R. The prospect is a blessed improvement in economic life; this will combine with the freedoms that we in the West enjoy. Interim pain and shock are possible and perhaps to be welcomed; "Shock Therapy for Poland", a recent New York Times headline proclaimed. There is no question, however, as to the ultimate reward.

The prime essential is that the transition to capitalism be complete. And this view is being advanced in both East and West. Lecturing on these matters in Budapest last autumn, I was questioned severely by a Hungarian journalist who was distressed that I had not mentioned Friedrich Hayek as a guide to needed reform. Did he not offer the most workable economic and political model? My interrogator was visibly depressed when I replied that it was a design we in the West would not ourselves care to risk.

...So, to summarize: Capitalism in its original or pristine form could not have survived. But under pressure it did adapt. Socialism in its original form and for its first tasks did succeed. But it failed to adapt, and it nurtured an oppressive and

repressive political structure. Having shed this last, how does it now adapt?

Two things will be clear. First, those who speak, as so many do so glibly, even mindlessly, of a return to the Smithian free market are wrong to the point of a mental vacuity of clinical proportions. It is something we in the West do not have, would not tolerate, could not survive. Ours is a mellow, government-protected life; for Eastern Europeans pure and rigorous capitalism would be no more welcome than it would be for us.

Equally to be avoided are those who see, out of short-run shock and hardship, the promise of prompt economic betterment. In this view the hardship itself is therapeutic. Out of any suffering must come good. Elements of theology intrude here: self-mortification, as in notable religious rites, is the path to righteousness.

The citizens so afflicted will not be as easily convinced as are those who, from a distance or from positions of some persona. comfort, see virtue in hardship. And the political consequences are far from attractive. This is a moment of great and welcome liberty in Eastern Europe. It would be tragic indeed were liberty to be there identified with unacceptable economic deprivation. I would especially urge against any prescription of hardship from western capitals, including Washington. There is little to be said for therapy that, again, we would not wish to suffer at home.

... Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are now experiencing one of the greatest moments in their history. That moment is also ours.

... I return to simplistic ideology. Nothing would be more disastrous in the West than a return to the economic order envisaged in early capitalist doctrine and still celebrated by its more devout theologians. The system has survived only because of its capacity, in a liberal political context, to adapt.

Socialism encountered revolt because it failed to adapt. Adaptation and not a dramatic descent to primitive capitalism is now the need. It is an untrod road; it cannot be negotiated by adherence to rigid rules. It requires, alas, the painful processes of thought. That has in all economic ages been resisted, as it is being resisted now. There is, sadly, no alternative."

[3] *Darkness at Noon.* Time, April 9, 1990.

[4] compare: J.D. Sachs – *Charting Poland's Economic Rebirth – Challenge*, January – February 1990.

[4a] D. Passent – *Najlepsza dekada.* Polityka, April 14, 1990.

[5] compare: *One Big European Economy Seems less Like a Dream* International Business Week, November 13, 1989.

[6] compare: P. Kennedy – *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers.* Vintage Books 1989.

[7] *One Germany.* International Business Week, April 2, 1990.

[8] compare: *Darkness at Noon*, op. cit.

[9] compare: J.K. Galbraith, op. cit.

[10] P.N. Rosenstein-Rodan – *Problems of industrialization of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.* The Economic Journal 1943, London.

[11] compare: O. Halecki – *The Limits and Divisions of European History.* Sheed and Ward, London N.Y. 1950.

Antoni Kukliński

NEW EUROPE - GEOGRAPHY OF NEW EUROPE - RESEARCH PRIORITIES

(A note for discussion)

I. CHANGES IN THE EUROPFAN REALITY

The dream about United Europe is as old as the history of our continent. At the end of the XX century, we have new chances to implement the vision of United, Liberal and Pluralistic Europe, integrating the idea of unity and diversity of the European civilization.

The Holy Father and most eminent charismatic political leaders of our times have created a new moral and political spirit of international cooperation opening the way to United Europe.

In this spiritual framework, one should analyse the four most important transformations that are changing the ideological and material face of our Continent.

1/ The establishment and development of the European Economic Community as the most powerful political and economic magnet creating a field of attraction and demonstrating the pragmatic advantages of the European integration.

2/ The bankruptcy of real socialism in East-Central Europe, the elimination of different ideological, political and economic iron curtains separating nations and countries belonging to the some European civilization. One can look at East-Central Europe as a field of relatively quick diffusion of two innovations – defined as parliamentary democracy and market economy. These innovations will not be adopted in "crudo radice" since East-Central Europe has its own traditions in the field or parliamentary democracy and market economy.

Expressing this noble goal in more pragmatic terms we can discuss the

difficult road of transformation from real socialism to real capitalism in East-Central Europe.

It is important to demonstrate that the old division of Europe – the division between democratic and totalitarian Europe – will not be replaced by the new division between the rich and poor Europe.

3/ The creation of United Germany is a step on the way to United Europe. We sincerely hope the New United Germany will e one of the most important cornerstones of United Liberal and Pluralistic Europe. The location, the economic and political power of Germany create for that country a particularly important field of the historical responsibility for not repeating in the XXI century the mistakes of the XX century.

4/ The transformation of the Soviet Union into a Confederation of Really Free Countries which will – sooner or later – join the European Economic Community.

It is an open question if Russia will keep the status of a global power or will it be reduced to the dimension of a big, basically European country.

The transformation of the Soviet Union is one of the most difficult and dangerous dilemmas of our times. The results of this transformation process are very important for the Future of United Europe.

* * *

The euphoria of political successes should not create illusions that the road to the construction of really United Liberal and Pluralistic Europe is short and easy.

We have to develop very strong feelings of the European Solidarity to create a moral, political and economic climate that will stimulate the processes leading to the construction of United Europe.

II. NEW GEOGRAPHY

It is time now to prepare a historical evaluation of the geography of Europe as developed between 1939 and 1989. It was grosso modo the geography of Divided Europe – accepting that division not only in the description of the reality but also as the field of professional specialization. There were very few geographers who kept alive the idea of the fundamental unity of Europe.

We need now a new geography of United Liberal and Pluralistic Europe. This new geography should be seen as an open geography in four dimensions.

1/ In the interdisciplinary dimension of broad cooperation with the whole coalition of natural, social and technical sciences.

2/ In the historical dimension as the ability to interpret the historical experiences in a way that is both objective and imaginative.

3/ In the prognostic dimension as the courage "to analyse" the Future – the facts, the phenomena and the processes.

4/ In the dimension of value judgements. The new geography should reject the principle of Wertfreiheit and it should express value judgements concerning both the past and the future.

The new geography of new Europe should also answer the question how to change regional geography into a valid field for the XXI century. This field should incorporate not only all important modern research techniques but also reestablish the old French alliance between geography and fine arts.

III. RESEARCH PRIORITIES

It is extremely difficult to outline a comprehensive and valid list of research priorities on he Geography of New Europe. I am convinced that several approaches in this field should be developed and tested in international discussion. Maybe after the critical examination of several lists a sui generis consensus will emerge.

So please look at my list of 15 topics which perhaps could also be the titles for consecutive volumes of a Series – The New Geography of New Europe.

1. **Europe** – historical and prognostic interpretations. A well prepared and well organised panel discussion of an eminent group of scholars expressing their views on the past and the future of Europe.
2. **Political systems and political activities in Europe.** Another formulation of this topic could be – Democracy in Europe. The diversity of theoretical and practical interpretations.
3. **The capitalistic economy in Europe** – The processes of transformation and diffusion. The intensive and extensive growth of capitalism in France. The experience of the XX century. The prognoses for the XXI century.

4. **The geography of New Europe and the creation of an integrated European technical infrastructure.** The experiences of the XX century. The tasks for the XXI century.
5. **The changing hierarchy of metropolitan cities in Europe.** This is the most evident yard-stock of the change in the geography of Europe.
6. **The European landscape and its transformation at the turn of the XX and XXI century.** The dilemma – uniformity versus diversity – is most dramatically expressed in the fate of the European landscape.
7. **The ecological catastrophe of Divided Europe and the chances and barriers for the promotion of the ecological renaissance of United Europe.**
8. **The fate of the Mediterranean Sea as an element of European civilization and European ecology.**
9. **The Baltic Sea in ecologic, economic and political perspective.**
10. **Geography of New Europe and the transformation of Germany.** The process of German-German integration. The role of United Germany in Europe.
11. **Geography of New Europe and the transformation of the Soviet Union.** The historical geography of the Russian and Soviet Empire. The scenarios of the future.
12. **New Europe as Europe of Nations and Nationalities.** The historical roots of the national problems in Europe. The validity of the national problem in the XXI century – a ghost or reality?
13. **The patterns of Regional Development in Europe - Uniformity versus Diversity.** An attempt to identify different types of regional development in Europe.
14. **The Patterns of Local Development in Europe.** The dilemma Locality versus Globality in Europe.
15. **United Europe as a competitive continent in the global economy of the XXI century.**

CONCLUSIONS

This is only a note for discussion. There is, however, no doubt concerning the following four conclusions.

(1) A New Europe is emerging as a fact of the political and economic reality.

(2) The academic community must meet the challenge of our times and create a New Geography of this New Europe. The Old Geography belongs to the history, jointly with the Old Divided Europe.

(3) This new geography will not be created in a spontaneous way only. A new research programme and a new publication series are urgently needed to accelerate and promote this process.

(4) The demand for this new geography is generated not only by the internal forces of academic and educational communities. This demand is also generated by the public opinion at large and by the international business and banking communities very much interested in he geographical interpretation of the Past and the Future of Europe.

Roger Bivand
Institute of Geography
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration

BERGEN VIEWS ON A GEOGRAPHY OF THE NEW EUROPE

1. A NEW GEOGRAPHY OF THE NEW EUROPE

1.1. Dicussion at the Institute of Geography, Bergen

Taking advantage of the visit paid to Norway by Prof. Antoni Kukliński of the Faculty of Geography and Regional Studies, University of Warsaw, the Institute of Geography, University of Bergen/Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, invited him to participate in a staff seminar on new geography and the new Europe. Despite being arranged at short notice, as many as ten geographers and other interested scholars were present to meet Prof. Kukliński, who was accompanied by Prof. Czekanowska. Prof. Kukliński presented the current status of his proposal, together with Prof. Wolf Tietze, entitled variously "The European House – dynamic approaches to the geographical structures of our continent" and "New Europe – Geography of New Europe – Research Priorities".

1.2. Research an publication programme

The proposal bases the need for looking at Europe anew on four factors: the increasing integration of the EC, the bankruptcy of Real socialism in East-Central Europe, the creation of a United Germany, and the transformation of the Soviet Union. The renaissance of geography is seen as stemming from an interdisciplinary dimension, a historical

dimension, a forecasting dimension, and the expression of value judgements. Research priorities are to be focussed on elected topics which in turn are to form the kernels for books and/or edited collections of papers to be published in series form within the next 3-5 years. The programme is the outcome both of pressure coming from within geography, and of demand from without, by public opinion and the international community.

2. URBAN AND REGIONAL RESTRUCTURING

2.1. The European Science Foundation Programme

Most of the seminar was devoted to a discussion of Prof. Kukliński's proposal. Prof. Jens Chr. Hansen described his participation in the European Science Foundation Programme on urban and regional restructuring which is now being initiated. He stressed the clear tendency of the proposal being discussed to emphasise the political system, in contrast to the ESF programme. Here the national state is squeezed between the production and consumption systems, between multinational and national corporations on the one hand and consumers on the other. Were the scenarios we developed during the 1980's satisfactory, and how can we use this experience with regard to the coming decade?

2.2. Target group and media

Prof. Hansen continued to say that the ESF programme intended to increase activity among scientists in Europe, and as such should mobilise them within the bounds of academic institutions. It seemed to him that the Kukliński/Tietze proposal was much broader, a point confirmed in reply, with specific reference to the political and business communities, to secondary schools, and as works of reference. This raised the question of the proposal as a media production project, in particular whether book publications are alone the best choice of medium for reaching a wider

public than the academic, or even for these. There exist now many examples of successful multimedia publication projects, involving newer technologies, in particular video and interactive video. For instance, Kukliński's first topic "a... panel discussion of an eminent group of scholars expressing their views on the past and the future of Europe" could very well be published as a video, or short series of video essays.

3. A NEW GEOGRAPHY?

3.1. New methods

The discussion next moved to the demands to be placed on a new geography; Tor Halvdan Aase wondered what the specifically geographical approach to these issues ought to be. Would one not in practice see an application of the traditional methods of regional geography to the New Europe? Kukliński replied that geography ought to be understood symbolically, and that the topics should not be monopolised by geographers; geography should be a platform of cooperation. In this context, reference was made to David Stoddart's view that geography is not necessarily bound to being a 20th century discipline, but that it can "claim the high ground", looking out beyond the artificiality introduced to science by the sociology of discipline-maintaining behaviour. Stoddart. D. (1987) *"To claim the high ground: geography for the end of the century"* , Transactions, Institute of British Geographers, NS12, 327-336.

3.2. Change of resolution

Both Jens Chr. Hansen and Roger Bivand took up the issue of resolution change in the distribution of power and influence. Global forces are being projected onto regional and national systems, leading to a plurality of options for the new Europe. In particular the future role of stronger regions or city states, such as Europe has in act known for most of its history, was stressed. Even if one accepts that the proposals only concern the past and present decades, it is by no means clear that simple choices with regard to resolution serve the geography of the new Europe best.

4. ANALOGY WITH THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

In an interesting intervention, historian Prof. Trygve Solhaug refered us to the experience of the US in creating a nation from a continent. He pointed to the difficulty of using the US analogy because of the lack of a "frontier spirit" in Europe, and because Europe continues to respond to pressures from without.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The themes which emerged from the discussion may be summarised as follows. Interest in the subject areas covered by the Kukliński/Tietze proposal and the ESF programme was clearly expressed. It was felt that it would be dereliction of duty for geographers to turn their backs on current developments in Europe. That said, there was room for differing approaches, both with regard to methods, to target groups, to media employed, to resolution, and to the ranking of processes under analysis.

Zdenka Vajdová
Institut of Sociology, CS Academy of Sciences, Prague

LOCAL COMMUNITIES EFORE THE FIRST DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Global pattern of Czechoslovak society is similar to that of Poland and Hungary. This pattern is a result of 40 years of totalitarian era and an effect of political and economic ruling structures on global and local level which were essentialy the same in the Soviet block countries. Characteristic features of this pattern are the lack of elites, mainly on the local level, and lack of middle class people knowing what private ownership means, and the mass of fearful people without iniciative, waiting changes. The only small difference is perhaps – quite common trust to the government and to the president. I think this characteristics can be said inspite of that practically no sociological research on local communities and local politics has been done in Czechoslovakia during the last 20 years.

In our renewed Institut of Sociology we are working hard to detect and collect maximum of events and facts about the present time, at first place thouse related to parliamentary and communal elections. All our work aims at describing and explaining the exceptional present situation. The research project "Transformation of Local Communities in the Post-totalitarian era" was formulated with this aim. This project is headed by Michal Illner and it covers monitoring and analysing the transformation of local communities in the number of aspects of social and political life during this and the next year when foundation of democratic society is expected to be laid down in our country. The research has commenced in April this year. The attention is focused on rural communities and small towns (up to 10 000 inhabitants) in the Czech Republic. Monitoring consists of three components. One and perhaps most important of them is longitudinal observation of a panel approximately 20 communities based on diaries kept by local "informers". The first information about the panel sample we ob tained by a questionary reviewing the starting situation of community in the number of social, political, economic and demographic aspects. I would like to present here some conclusions resulting from the data

obtained supporting the opinion expressed at the begining of my contribution.

In a wide variety of changes of political structure of local communities in our country one always finds two characteristic features:

– the new reality of local Civic Fora, and

– the reconstruction of Local Nation Committee (local government).

However symbolical in some cases, the reconstruction was based on a temporary law expiring 31 March 1990, allowing to eliminate the leading role of CPCS in the parliament and local governments. Practical application of this law led to limitation of CPCS members by replacing them by Civic Forum-supported citizens. The individual replacements were agreed at round-table meetings of representatives of local political scene.

These two minimum features sufficiently describe the situation in small communities below 100 inhabitants, where the former political and social structure was relatively simple. In larger communities with more complicated political, social and socio-spatial structure one observes additional typical events such as decomposition of organisations based on the totalitarian ideology, reactivation of organisations suppressed after 1948 or 1968, and emergence of new organisations. Here one observes the lack of new competent leaders. The communities created through the process of unification of traditional smaller communities during the past 20 years are decomposing in the original units. Here again one observes the lack of local competent leaders.

The data indicate evident satisfaction from changes following after 17 November, relaxation of interpersonal relation and communication as a consequence of newly gained freedom of speech, and reappearance of trust to the central government and to the president.

Another fact indicated by the data is the uncertainty and fears from the expected economic reform (unemployment, properly claims by expatriated persons etc.).

At the local level socio-political reality is perceived typically as "in principle all will be the similar as before" and with the feeling of certain provisionality the people remain busy with every-day-life and business.

I would like to finish with a question, the answer to which is in my opinion open. Are the historical and national roots of our previous democratic traditions strong enough to change our damaged mind and moral, to pass from non-economy to the market economy, to create democratic society better for all citizens?

Jadwisin, 20-24 May 1990

Antoni Kukliński

THE DIAMOND

I. THE BOOK

Michael E. Porter of the Harvard Business School has written an important and challenging book "The Competitive Advantage of Nations".[1]

In the author's words[2] –

"This book is about why nations succeed in particular industries, and the implications for firms and for national economies. Its concepts and ideas, however, can be readily applied to political or geographic units smaller than a nation. Successful firms are frequently concentrated in particular cities or states within a nation. In the United States, for example, many of the nations' leading real estate developers are based in Dallas, Texas; oil and gas equipment suppliers in Houston; hospital management chains in the south central region encompassing Nashville, Tennessee; carpet producers in Dalton, Georgia; running shoe manufacturers in Oregon; mobile home producers in Elkhart, Indiana; and minicomputer companies in Boston. Something about these locations provides a fertile environment for firms in these particular industries. While my discussion is framed in terms of nations, the geographic concentration of industries within nations will be important to explain. Government policy at the state and local level has an important role to play in shaping national advantage."

II. FIRMS, GOVERNMENTS AND NATIONS

The globalization of competition should change our thinking about the role of firms, governments and nations.

The aim of the book in this field is defined by M.E. Porter in the following way.[3]

"My aim is to help firms and governments, who must act,

choose better strategies and make more informed allocations of national resources. What I have found is that firms will not ultimately succeed unless they base their strategies on improvement and innovation, a willingness to compete, and a realistic understanding of their national environment and how to improve it. The view that globalization eliminates the importance of the home base rests on false premises, as does the alluring strategy of avoiding competition.

National governments, for their part, must set the appropriate goal, productivity, which underpins economic prosperity. They must strive for its true determinants, such as incentive, effort and competition, not the tempting but usually counterproductive choices such as subsidy, extensive collaboration, and "temporary protection that are often proposed. Government's proper role is to push and challenge its industry to advance, not provide "help" so industry can avoid it. At this time when much of the world is reexamining its economic structures, the need for proper choices has never been greater. National economic prosperity need not come at the expense of other nations, and many nations can enjoy it in a world of innovation and open competition.

As globalization of competition has intensified, some have begun to argue a diminished role for nations. Instead, internationalization and the removal of protection and other distortions to competition arguably make nations, if anything, more important. National differences in character and culture, far from being threatened by global competition, prove integral to success in it. Understanding the new and different role of nations in competition will be a t ask which occupies much of what follows".

III. THE DIAMOND

In chapter 3 M.E. Porter creates the concept of "Determinant of National Competitive Advantage". This concept may be interpreted in both analytical and strategic dimensions.

Let us again quote the original formulations of the author.[4]

"Why does a nation achieve international success in a particular industry? The answer lies in four broad attributes of a nation that

shape the environment in which local firms compete that promote or impede the creation of competitive advantage:

1. *Factor conditions. The nation's position in factor of production, such as skilled labor or infrastructure, necessary to compete in a given industry.*
2. *Demand conditions. The nature of home demand for the industry's product or service.*
3. *Related and supporting industries. The presence or absence in the nation of supplier industries and related industries that are internationally competitive.*
4. *Firm strategy, structure and rivalry. The conditions in the nation governing how companies are created, organized, and managed, and the nature of domestic rivalry.*

The determinants, individually and as a system, create the context in which a nation's firms are born and compete: the availability of resources and skills necessary for competitive advantage in an industry; the information that shapes what opportunities are perceived and the directions in which resources and skills are deployed; the goals of the owners, managers, and employees that are involved in or carry out competition; and most importantly, the pressures on firms to invest and innovate.

Firms gain competitive advantage where their home base allows and supports the most rapid accumulation of specialized assets and skills, sometimes due solely to greater commitment. Firms gain competitive advantage in industries when their home base affords better ongoing information and insight into product and process needs. Firms gain competitive advantage when the goals of owners, managers, and employees support intense commitment and sustained investment. Ultimately, nations succeed in particular industries because their home environment is the most dynamic and the most challenging, and stimulates and prods firms to upgrade and widen their advantages over time.

Nations are most likely to succeed in industries or industry segments where the national "diamond", a term I will use to refer to the determinants as a system, is the most favorable. This is not to say that all a nation's firms will achieve competitive advantage in an industry. In fact, the most dynamic the national environment, the more likely it is that some firms will fail, because not all have

equal skills and resources nor do they exploit the national environment equally well. Yet those companies that emerge from such an environment will prosper in international competition.

The "diamond" is a mutually reinforcing system. The effect of one determinant is contingent on the state of other. Favorable demand conditions, for example, will not lead to competitive advantage unless the state of rivalry is sufficient to cause firms to respond to them. Advantages in one determinant can also create or upgrade advantages in others.

... The basic unit of analysis for understanding national advantage is the industry. Nations succeed not in isolated industries, however, but in clusters of industries connected through vertical and horizontal relationships. A nation's economy contains a mix of clusters, whose makeup and sources of competitive advantage (or disadvantage) reflect the state of the economy's development. How entire national economies develop in international competitive terms will be a subject I will return to later".

IV. THE DIAMONDS OF 10 NATIONS

The book has a very rich empirical content based on the experiences of 10 nations: Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States.

According to M.E. Porter, "Together, the ten nations studied accounted for fully 50 percent of total world exports, in 1985".[5]

V. THE SWISS AND SWEDISH DIAMOND

For a very long time I have been looking for a study presenting an imaginative comparative analysis of Switzerland and Sweden.[6]

Therefore, with a special intellectual pleasure I am reading the part of the book (pages 307-355) analysing the experiences of those two countries.

Let us present in this context two quotations on the two diamonds.

The Swiss diamond[7]

"Swiss firms have been able to achieve and sustain competitive advantage in a remarkably broad range of industries. Drawing on unique home demand conditions and driven by the relentless pressure of high wages and appreciating currency, Swiss firms have

sought out the high-quality, differentiated segments of industries. A pool of highly trained and highly skilled people have provided the capabilities to upgrade advantage over time. Swiss firms have had a unique capacity to internationalize in order to upgrade advantage even further.

Switzerland illustrates the success of an economy that has upgraded its competitive advantages over time. Swiss firms simply have no choice. While they have gone through painful periods, pragmatic though deliberate adjustment took place. At the same time, the unusually broad demand advantages for a nation of Switzerland's size have supported success in sophisticated segments in a wide range of industries. These absorb any employees freed up by productivity growth. The result is a high and rising standard of living for nearly all Swiss, without the pockets of disadvantaged citizens that plague so many other nations."

The Swedish diamond[8]

"The Swedish economy has developed out of resource positions in forest products and mining. Today it is an economy with deep clusters in these upstream sectors as well as in a range of industrial and supporting sectors. The Swedish "diamond" has been a powerful machine for upgrading the established clusters of industry. Sophisticated demand, fluid buyer-supplier relationships, good technical and human resources, and well-managed large companies have partially offset a mixed record in domestic rivalry. Sweden has been able to sustain national competitive advantage where it has historically competed."

VI. THE POLISH DIAMOND

The deep analysis of M.E. Porter should be seen as a challenge to the Polish mind, will and capacity to transform the Polish economy and society. We have to find the Polish diamond to enter the XXI century as an European nation.

VII. THE DIAMOND AND THE PROGRAMME - GLOBALITY VERSUS LOCALITY

The publication of M.E. Porter's book is a new important inducement for the development of ideas, concepts and approaches presented in the volu ume "Globality versus Locality".[1] National diamonds are very much dep pendent on the formation of local diamonds.

The study of patterns of local competitive advantage could be a valid chapter of the Programme on Globality versus Locality.

A joint critical evaluation of both books could be a subject of a very interesting and stimulating international conference.

Kristiansand, August 14, 1990

---

[1] M.E. Porter, *The Competitive Advantage of Nations*, The Macmillan Press Ltd., London 1990, p. 855.

[2] op. cit., p. 29.

[3] op. cit., p. 30.

[4] op. cit., p. 71-72.

[5] op. cit., p. 21..

[6] A. Kukliński, *Regional Development in Unitary and Federal States* (in:) G. Gor rzelak, Regional Dynamics of Socio-Economic Change. Warsaw 1988.

[7] op. cit., p. 329.

[8] op. cit., p. 352.

[9] A. Kukliński, *Globality versus Locality*. Warsaw 1990. University of Warsaw.